Labor Income Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy Christopher Carroll 1 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

labor income uncertainty and the macroeconomy
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Labor Income Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy Christopher Carroll 1 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Labor Income Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy Christopher Carroll 1 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Christopher.Carroll@cfpb.gov Presentation at Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy May 2014 US Personal Saving Rate ( s ), 19662011 14


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SLIDE 1

Labor Income Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy

Christopher Carroll

1Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Christopher.Carroll@cfpb.gov

Presentation at “Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy” May 2014

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SLIDE 2

US Personal Saving Rate (s), 1966–2011

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Percent of Disposable Income

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SLIDE 3

Theory

v(mt) = max

{ct,xt} u(ct) + βEt [v(mt+1)]

s.t. Rt+1 = ζRt+1 + (1 − ζ)R mt+1 = (mt − xt − ct)Rt+1 + θt+1 ◮ Labor Income Uncertainty

◮ Unemployment Is Biggest Shock ◮ Lots of Micro Evidence that Precautionary Saving Is Big ◮ Basically, people facing greater σ:

◮ Don’t buy a house/car (x = 0) ◮ Hold larger net worth

◮ Rate-Of-Return Uncertainty

◮ Theoretical effects on C ambiguous

◮ For plausible parameter values, σ ↑⇒ C ↑

◮ Portfolio share in risky asset is reduced

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SLIDE 4

Literature on C

◮ “Wealth Effects”

◮ Modigliani, Klein, MPS model, ...

◮ st = −0.05mt + other stuff

◮ “Precautionary”

◮ Carroll (1992)

◮ Saving rate rises in recessions ◮ ∆ log Ct+1 strongly related to Et(ut+1 − ut)

◮ “Credit Availability”

◮ Secular Trend:

◮ Parker (2000), Dynan and Kohn (2007), Muellbauer (many papers)

◮ Cyclical Dynamics:

◮ Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Hall (2011)

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SLIDE 5

Great Recession 2007–2009

◮ s rises by ∼4 pp ◮ Bigger & more persistent increase than any postwar recession ◮ But all three indicators also move a lot:

◮ Credit conditions tighten ◮ Unemployment Expectations rise ◮ Wealth falls

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SLIDE 6

Personal Saving Rate 2007– ↑

  • 4.00
  • 2.00

0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 Deviation from Start-of-Recession Value in % 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Quarters after Start of Recession

Historical Range Historical Mean 2007+

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SLIDE 7

Saving Rate After a Permanent Rise in ℧

⟵ Overshooting t Time  ˇ

t

 ˇ

t

 t

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SLIDE 8

Credit Easing/Financial Innovation & Deregulation

↖ Orig Target ⟵ Δ t+1

e

= 0 ⟵ Orig () New () ⟶

 

ˇ m is close to linear in credit conditions

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SLIDE 9

Net Worth (Ratio to Quarterly Disp Income)

4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

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SLIDE 10

Credit Easing Accumulated (CEA) (` a la Muellbauer)

Accumulated responses, weighted with debt–income ratio, to:

“Please indicate your bank’s willingness to make consumer installment loans now as opposed to three months ago.”

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

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SLIDE 11

℧t Implied by Michigan U Expectations

UExp: “How about people out of work during the coming 12 months—do you think that there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?”

2 4 6 8 10 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

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SLIDE 12

Reduced-Form Regressions

st = γ0 +γmmt +γCEACEAt +γEuEtut+4 +γt t +γuC(Etut+4 ×CEAt)+εt

Model Time Wealth CEA Un Risk All 3 Baseline Interact γ0 11.95∗∗∗ 25.20∗∗∗ 9.32∗∗∗ 8.24∗∗∗ 14.90∗∗∗ 15.23∗∗∗ 15.55∗∗∗ (0.61) (1.73) (0.57) (0.42) (2.56) (2.16) (2.56) γm −2.61∗∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗ −1.18∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗ (0.32) (0.42) (0.35) (0.46) γCEA −14.14∗∗∗ −5.47∗∗∗ −6.12∗∗∗ −4.60∗∗∗ (1.74) (1.94) (0.57) (1.72) γEu 0.67∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) γt −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) γuC −0.32∗∗ (0.16) ¯ R2 0.70 0.85 0.82 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 F stat p val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 DW stat 0.30 0.69 0.50 0.86 0.94 0.93 0.98

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SLIDE 13

PSR Forecasts—Out of Sample

2012–2015

2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Baseline Scenario Upside Risk Scenario Downside Risk Scenario Fitted values of model (percent of disposable personal income)

Scenarios based on SPF and our judgement

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SLIDE 14

Conclusions

◮ All three effects present ◮ Easier borrowing largely explains secular decline s ◮ Order of importance in Great Recession:

  • 1. Wealth shock
  • 2. Labor income risk
  • 3. Credit tightening

◮ ⇒ if credit has big cyclical effect, comes thru w and ℧

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SLIDE 15

References

Carroll, Christopher D. (1992): “The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some Macroeconomic Evidence,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1992(2), 61–156, http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/BufferStockBPEA.pdf. Dynan, Karen E., and Donald L. Kohn (2007): “The Rise in U.S. Household Indebtedness: Causes and Consequences,” International Finance Discussion Paper 37, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Eggertsson, Gauti B., and Paul Krugman (2012): “Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher–Minsky–Koo Approach,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3), 1469–1513. Guerrieri, Veronica, and Guido Lorenzoni (2017): “Credit crises, precautionary savings, and the liquidity trap,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(3), 1427–1467. Hall, Robert E. (2011): “The Long Slump,” AEA Presidential Address, ASSA Meetings, Denver. Parker, Jonathan A. (2000): “Spendthrift in America? On Two Decades of Decline in the U.S. Saving Rate,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14, NBER Chapters, pp. 317–387. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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SLIDE 16

Background Slides

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SLIDE 17

Alternative Measures of Credit Availability

.6 .7 .8 .9 1 Abiad et al. Index of Financial Liberalization .5 1 1.5 CEA/Debt−Income Ratio 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

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SLIDE 18

Assumptions/Scenarios for Out-of-Sample Forecasts

400 450 500 550 600 650 700 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Baseline scenario Upside risk scenario Downside risk scenario (percent of disposable personal income) 4 6 8 10 12 4 6 8 10 12 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Baseline scenario Upside risk scenario Downside risk scenario Unemployment expectations (percent of labor force)

Household net wealth Unemployment rate Credit conditions Household saving rate

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SLIDE 19

Assumptions/Scenarios for Out-of-Sample Forecasts

Sources: Haver Analytics and authors' estimates. 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Baseline scenario Upside risk scenario Downside risk scenario 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Baseline Scenario Upside Risk Scenario Downside Risk Scenario Fitted values of model (percent of disposable personal income)

Credit conditions Household saving rate

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SLIDE 20

Actual and Target Wealth

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 16 18 20 22 24 26 Actual Wealth Target Wealth

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SLIDE 21

Household Wealth 2007– ↓ by 150% of Income

−150 −100 −50 50 100 Deviation from Start−of−Recession Value 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Quarters after Start of Recession

Historical Range Historical Mean 2007−2009 Recession

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SLIDE 22

Sustained Expectations of Rising Unemp Risk

Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Et(ut+4 − ut)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130

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SLIDE 23

Tighter HH Credit Supply (Based on Muellbauer)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

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SLIDE 24

Consumption Function

Δ+1

e =0 ⟶

Δ+1

e = 0 ↘

e()=Stable Arm ⟶ SS ↘ 

e



e

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SLIDE 25

Overshooting and Fiscal Policy

DSGE models: ◮ Frictions, frictions everywhere; but missing here ◮ If ∆c imposes ‘external’ costs

◮ Sticky prices/wages ◮ Capital (or Investment) adjustment costs ◮ Other reasons for ‘pecuniary externalities’

◮ ⇒ ‘stimulus’ payments, fiscal policy may reduce cost of cycle ◮ Justification for ‘automatic stabilizers’?

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SLIDE 26

Reduced-Form Regressions on Model Data

stheor

t

= γ0+γmmt+γCEACEAt+γEuEtut+4+γt t+γuC(Etut+4×CEAt)+εt

Model Time Wealth CEA Un Risk All 3 Baseline Interact γ0 11.96∗∗∗ 21.44∗∗∗ 9.35∗∗∗ 8.42∗∗∗ 12.24∗∗∗ 12.51∗∗∗ 12.49∗∗∗ (0.50) (1.11) (0.41) (0.16) (0.60) (0.53) (0.55) γm −2.33∗∗∗ −0.79∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ (0.25) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) γCEA −13.82∗∗∗ −5.85∗∗∗ −6.49∗∗∗ −5.33∗∗∗ (1.12) (0.59) (0.14) (0.47) γEu 0.63∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) γt −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) γuC −0.19∗∗∗ (0.04) ¯ R2 0.80 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 F stat p val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 DW stat 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.39 0.72 0.71 0.99

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SLIDE 27

Reduced-Form Regressions on Actual Data

smeas

t

= γ0+γmmt+γCEACEAt+γEuEtut+4+γt t+γuC(Etut+4×CEAt)+εt

Model Time Wealth CEA Un Risk All 3 Baseline Interact γ0 11.95∗∗∗ 25.20∗∗∗ 9.32∗∗∗ 8.24∗∗∗ 14.90∗∗∗ 15.23∗∗∗ 15.55∗∗∗ (0.61) (1.73) (0.57) (0.42) (2.56) (2.16) (2.56) γm −2.61∗∗∗ −1.12∗∗∗ −1.18∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗ (0.32) (0.42) (0.35) (0.46) γCEA −14.14∗∗∗ −5.47∗∗∗ −6.12∗∗∗ −4.60∗∗∗ (1.74) (1.94) (0.57) (1.72) γEu 0.67∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ (0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) γt −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) γuC −0.32∗∗ (0.16) ¯ R2 0.70 0.85 0.82 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 F stat p val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 DW stat 0.30 0.69 0.50 0.86 0.94 0.93 0.98