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L ECTURE 4 The Effects of Fiscal Changes: Aggregate Evidence - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Economics 210c/236a Christina Romer Fall 2016 David


  1. Economics 210c/236a Christina Romer Fall 2016 David Romer L ECTURE 4 The Effects of Fiscal Changes: Aggregate Evidence September 14, 2016

  2. I. I NTRODUCTION

  3. Theoretical Considerations (I) A traditional Keynesian model (sticky prices and demand-determined output in the short run; consumption determined largely by current income; small supply-side effects; etc.) - Increases in G (or decreases in T) cause Y, C, and r to rise; I falls. - The response of monetary policy is very important.

  4. Theoretical Considerations (II) A neoclassical model with lump-sum taxation (flexible prices; permanent-income consumers; …) - Changes in T have no effects (Ricardian equivalence). - The effects of changes in G work through wealth and substitution effects. For example, an increase in G means lifetime private resources are lower, leading to a fall in leisure (and so an increase in labor supply) and a fall in consumption.

  5. Theoretical Considerations (III) News of a future rise in G in a neoclassical model with lump-sum taxation - Wealth effects cause immediate falls in consumption in leisure. - Since output is higher and C is lower (and G hasn’t yet changed), I is higher. - When the change in G occurs, C and L don’t change discontinuously. So I falls sharply. - …

  6. Theoretical Considerations (IV) Examples of possible additional complications: - Adding “GHH preferences.” When these are added to a neoclassical model with lump-sum taxation, a rise in G has opposing effects on C: the fall in wealth acts to push it down, but the rise in L acts to push it up. - Adding distortionary taxes. Now taxes matter in a neoclassical model. - Adding more complicated “Keynesian” features, such as gradual price adjustment. …

  7. II. H ALL , “B Y H OW M UCH D OES GDP R ISE I F THE G OVERNMENT B UYS M ORE O UTPUT ?”

  8. Hall’s Regression where Y is real GDP and G is real government military purchases (and the data are annual).

  9. What Question Are We Trying to Answer?

  10. Are There Possible Sources of Omitted Variable Bias in Hall’s Regression? How Does Hall Interpret His Regression?

  11. From: Hall, “By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government Buys More Output?”

  12. From: Hall, “By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government Buys More Output?”

  13. III. R AMEY , “I DENTIFYING G OVERNMENT S PENDING S HOCKS : I T ’ S A LL IN THE T IMING ”

  14. From: Ramey, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”

  15. From: Ramey, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”

  16. From: Ramey, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”

  17. From: Ramey, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”

  18. From: Ramey, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”

  19. From: Ramey, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing”

  20. IV. R OMER AND R OMER , “T HE M ACROECONOMIC E FFECTS OF T AX C HANGES : E STIMATES B ASED ON A N EW M EASURE OF F ISCAL S HOCKS ”

  21. Background: Blanchard and Perotti • A VAR with Y, G, cyclically-adjusted T. • G and cyclically-adjusted T assumed not to respond to Y within the quarter. • More precisely: Shocks to G and cyclically-adjusted T assumed uncorrelated with present and future shocks to Y.

  22. Discussion of Romer and Romer’s Approach

  23. Classifying Motivation • Endogenous – Countercyclical – Spending-driven • Exogenous – Deficit-driven – For long-run growth

  24. Figure 1 New Measure of Fiscal Shocks b. Long-Run and Deficit-Driven Tax Changes 3 2 Deficit-Driven Tax Changes 1 Percent of GDP 0 -1 Long-Run Tax Changes -2 -3 -4 1945-I 1947-I 1949-I 1951-I 1953-I 1955-I 1957-I 1959-I 1961-I 1963-I 1965-I 1967-I 1969-I 1971-I 1973-I 1975-I 1977-I 1979-I 1981-I 1983-I 1985-I 1987-I 1989-I 1991-I 1993-I 1995-I 1997-I 1999-I 2001-I 2003-I 2005-I 2007-I From: Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes”

  25. Figure 3 Comparing New Measure of Tax Changes and Cyclically Adjusted Revenues a. Exogenous Tax Changes and the Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 3 2 Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 1 Percent of GDP 0 -1 Exogenous Tax Changes -2 -3 -4 1947-II 1949-II 1951-II 1953-II 1955-II 1957-II 1959-II 1961-II 1963-II 1965-II 1967-II 1969-II 1971-II 1973-II 1975-II 1977-II 1979-II 1981-II 1983-II 1985-II 1987-II 1989-II 1991-II 1993-II 1995-II 1997-II 1999-II 2001-II 2003-II 2005-II 2007-II From: Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes”

  26. Specifications 1. 2. 3. A two-variable VAR with tax changes and GDP, 12 lags, tax variable ordered first.

  27. Figure 4 Estimated Impact of an Exogenous Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP (Single Equation, No Controls) 1.0 0.0 -1.0 Percent -2.0 -3.0 -4.0 -5.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes”

  28. Figure 6 Results of a Two-Variable VAR for Exogenous Tax Changes and Real GDP c. Response of GDP to Tax 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 Percent -1.5 -2.0 -2.5 -3.0 -3.5 -4.0 -4.5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes”

  29. Figure 7 Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP (Single Equation, No Controls) a. Using the Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 1.0 Using the Change in Cyclically Adjusted Revenues 0.0 -1.0 Percent -2.0 Using Exogenous Tax Changes -3.0 -4.0 -5.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes”

  30. Figure 12 Estimated Impact of a Tax Increase of 1% of GDP on GDP Including Tax Changes Dated Both at Time of Implementation and at Time of Passage (Single Equation, Controlling for Lagged GDP Growth) 3.0 Time of Passage 2.0 1.0 0.0 Percent -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 -4.0 Time of Implementation -5.0 -6.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Quarter From: Romer and Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes”

  31. Discussion

  32. V. A UERBACH AND G ORODNICHENKO , “M EASURING THE O UTPUT R ESPONSES TO F ISCAL P OLICY ”

  33. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko’s Question • Does the size of the fiscal multiplier vary with the state of the economy?

  34. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko’s Method The variables in X are log real government purchases, log real government receipts net of transfers, and real GDP. The baseline sample period is 1947:Q1–2008:Q4.

  35. Local Projections Variant From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion”

  36. From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Output Responses to Fiscal Policy”

  37. From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Corrigendum”

  38. From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Corrigendum”

  39. From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Corrigendum”

  40. From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Output Responses to Fiscal Policy”

  41. Accounting for Expectations • Auerbach and Gorodnichenko try several approaches. • One is to add either the forecast or the forecast error to the VAR.

  42. From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Corrigendum”

  43. From: Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, “Corrigendum”

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