JESPER RANGVID C H A I R M A N , D A N I S H F I N A N C I A L C R - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

jesper rangvid c h a i r m a n d a n i s h f i n a n c i
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

JESPER RANGVID C H A I R M A N , D A N I S H F I N A N C I A L C R - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Danish experience : Why did more than a third of banks disappear and how was it handled? FINANCIAL SATEFY NET CONFERENCE 2015 JESPER RANGVID C H A I R M A N , D A N I S H F I N A N C I A L C R I S I S C O M M I T T E E P R O F E S S O R


slide-1
SLIDE 1

FINANCIAL SATEFY NET CONFERENCE 2015 JESPER RANGVID

C H A I R M A N , D A N I S H F I N A N C I A L C R I S I S C O M M I T T E E P R O F E S S O R , C O P E N H A G E N B U S I N E S S S C H O O L

The Danish experience: Why did more than a third of banks disappear and how was it handled?

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

50 75 100 125 150 175 2008 2013

Number of banks in Denmark

Banks transferred to Finansiel Stabilitet. Banks receiving capital requirement from FSA, but private solutions found. Other banks ceasing existence

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

3

Why a financial crisis in Denmark?

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Risk in Danish financial sector before the crisis

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

4

Lending Deposits Deposit deficit

DKK bn DKK bn

slide-5
SLIDE 5

Example of a bank ceasing existence

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

5

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Lending (bn DKK) 7.1 8.3 13.3 18.3 24.7 25.7 23.9 Large commitments, % of Tier 2 194.7 219.9 470.5 294.5 349.1 416.3 180.4 Commercial property exposure 16.5 22 24.8 27.6 34.7 40.7 38.5 Deposit deficit 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 Return on equity 22.7 27.8 39.4 36.0 22.7

  • 39.5
  • 35.5
slide-6
SLIDE 6

Lending to 17 specific customers in failed banks

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

6

Total lending 2007 Selected loans Impairments 08-11 / Mio. Mio. Lending 07 Roskilde Bank 44972 12003 49.6 Amagerbanken 27246 6029 58.2 Fionia Bank 25980 1010 56.5 Fjordbank Mors 13390 346 108.7 EBH Bank 9525 323 263.7 Max Bank 8163 295 54.2 Eik Bank 8001 514 53.3 Sparekassen Østjylland 7593

  • Gudme Raaschou Bank

4861 552 3.4 Totalt 149730 21072 73.9

slide-7
SLIDE 7

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

7

How was the crisis handled?

slide-8
SLIDE 8

Bank packages in Denmark

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

8

Bank package I

  • (The Stability Package)
  • October 5, 2008

General state guarantee lasting until September 30, 2010. Bank package II

  • (The Credit Package)
  • January 18, 2009

Capital injection (Tier 1) from the State and Individual state guarantee. Bank package III

  • (The Exit Package)
  • June 25, 2010

Haircut on unsecured senior loans and deposits above EUR 100,000

slide-9
SLIDE 9

Timeline of transfer

Assets and liabilities of failing bank

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

9

Bank package III

Source: Danmarks Nationalbank

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Amagerbanken …. or Armageddonbanken

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

10

aaaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaa

slide-11
SLIDE 11

Rating agencies and markets reacted…..

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

11

slide-12
SLIDE 12

…. and then Danish authorities reacted

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

12

Fjordbank Mors. June 24, 2011

Absolutely tiny bank.

Here’s FT quoting CreditSights: This is a tiny bank by international standards – at end- 2010 Fjordbank Mors had total assets of DKK 13.2 bln (€1.8 bln) and equity of DKK 0.8 bln (€0.1 bln) – but there are wider implications for the banking system in Denmark and Europe. Following the failure of Amagerbanken, Moody’s downgraded the senior ratings

  • f all Danish banks, including Danske Bank, and this

latest move underlines the determination of the Danish authorities to impose losses on senior creditors of failing

  • banks. This is in contrast to the ongoing debate in

Ireland, where the ECB has blocked haircuts for senior bondholderrs in Irish banks, but, of course, such action is much easier in respect of such a tiny, domestic

  • institution. Nonetheless, it will keep the bail in debate in

the headlines and at the forefront of the rating agencies’ thinking.

Bank package IV

  • (the Consolidation Package)

 Opportunity for the Danish

Deposit Guarantee Fund to supply funds or provide guarantee against losses to a buyer bank.

 Since then, solutions founds

and no bail-in required.

slide-13
SLIDE 13

Learnings

Financial crisis in Denmark. J. Rangvid (CBS)

13

 Danish crisis due to a combination of being a small open economy,

procyclical fiscal policy, optimistic lending practices, liberalization of mortgage lending rules, house price bubble, etc.

 Extensive bank packages introduced during the crisis.  Bank package III – that was the first to implement and use bail-in in

Europe – grabbed international attention.

 It is possible to wind down a (small) bank during a weekend,

including imposing losses on senior debt holders, and continue

  • perating the following Monday with no effect for ordinary customers.

 Denmark first to use bail-in.

 Costly for Danish banks. Initiatives were taken to soften impact.