Jean Acquatella Ph.D Economic Affairs Officer, Natural Resources - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Mining-Oil Sector Rents in Latin America 2000-2014: outcomes and implications for improved global Resources Governance Jean Acquatella Ph.D Economic Affairs Officer, Natural Resources Division U.N ECLAC, Santiago, Chile SDC presentation and
Jean Acquatella Ph.D Economic Affairs Officer, Natural Resources Division U.N ECLAC, Santiago, Chile SDC presentation and discussion July 6th 2016
2. Resource Governance implications ? -> key discussion
both: a) Government’s and b) Extractive Industries’ performance and responsibilities.
Extractive Development outcomes, incentives and political economy constraints.
competition through regional integration). Improve progressiveness during up-cycles.
and stabilization funds, with specific uses?).
3. Multi-level Governance interventions in 2030 SDG agenda.
role plus Global level regulation, TAIs, market access & reputational incentives.
conduct and strengthened transparency mechanisms , monitoring/verification/certification to ensure positive development outcomes.
Increasing socio-environmental conflicts to extractive project development
Extractive Rents revenue flows within Government (Host country):
Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTIVE Operations Private TNCs, State Corp. CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry Treasury
Extractive REGION
Local community
Socio-economic development
Extractive REGION Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
Public investment Sub-National GOVT.
Fiscal Federalism
Revenue sharing? Public investment fund allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc. Improved HDI
Extractive Revenue Taxation –Fiscal Channel Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Responsibility Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$ Rent allocation
Current expenditure
Investments?
Extractive Rents revenue flows within Government ( Host country): Quality public investment of rents is key to socio-economic development - HDI
Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTIVE Operations Private TNCs, State Corp. CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry Treasury
Extractive REGION
Local community
Socio-economic development
Extractive REGION Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
Public investment Sub-National GOVT.
Fiscal Federalism
Revenue sharing? Public investment fund allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc. Improved HDI
Extractive Revenue Taxation –Fiscal Channel Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Responsibility Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$ Rent allocation
Current expenditure
Investments?
“National Capital” in its broadest sense. Y = f(K, H, Nnr )
National Income (welfare)
time
resources efficiency
International revenue, financial, trade, IFF flows: (Host & Home countries) Government & Private sector actors –nat’l. & Int’l.
Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTION operations Private TNCs, State Corp. CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry Treasury
Extractive REGION
Local community
Socio-economic development
Extractive REGION Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
Public investment Sub-National GOVT.
Fiscal Federalism
Revenue sharing? Public investment fund allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc. Improved HDI
Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Responsibility Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$ Rent allocation
Current expenditure
Investments?
Revenue Taxation–Fiscal Channel $$$ Int’l. Private flows profits, etc.
Global and Home country challenges
EITI Govt. – Corp.
Revenue payment disclosure
FATF Tax cooperation Trade due diligence ICMM codes of conduct
Information disclosure, transparency & accountability mechanisms Post COP-21 MRV
$$$ Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTION operations Private TNCs, State Corp. CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry Treasury
Extractive REGION
Local community
Socio-economic development
Extractive REGION Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
Public investment Sub-National GOVT.
Fiscal Federalism
Revenue sharing? Public investment fund allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc. Improved HDI
Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Responsibility Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$ Rent allocation
Current expenditure
Investments?
EITI Govt. – Corp.
Revenue Payment Transparency & other Accountability mechanisms
Revenue Taxation–Fiscal Channel
Repatriated profits Tax evasion, Transfer pricing etc.
Mis-invoicing, bribery Due diligence supply chain
FATF implementation Illicit flows, laundering etc. Private flows profits, etc.
Extractive Rents flows: Global, Home & Host country challenges MULTI-LEVEL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE interventions or pressure points
$$$ Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTION operations Private TNCs, State Corp. CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry Treasury
Extractive REGION
Local community
Socio-economic development
Extractive REGION Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
Public investment Sub-National GOVT.
Fiscal Federalism
Revenue sharing? Public investment fund allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc. Improved HDI
Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Responsibility Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$ Rent allocation
Current expenditure
Investments?
Revenue Taxation–Fiscal Channel
Repatriated profits Tax evasion, Transfer pricing etc.
Mis-invoicing, bribery Due diligence supply chain Illicit trade
FATF implementation Illicit flows, laundering etc.
sustainability of the global economy.
Private flows profits, etc.
Extractive Rents flows: Host, Home countries and Global challenges call for MULTI-LEVEL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE interventions or pressure points beyond current status-quo
during latest price-cycle 2003 – 2012.
fiscal ministry and central bank statistics)
– Evidence of extraordinary profits ( windfall) – Progressive taxation during up-cycle only in Oil/Gas, not in Mining ( Corp. Income
tax + royalties, no windfall taxes, sharing contracts, need to move towards Res.Rent Taxation)
– Case studies: local level « dutch disease »; anecdotal evidence for transfer pricing type practices.
50 100 150 200 250 300
ene-00 sep-00 may-01 ene-02 sep-02 may-03 ene-04 sep-04 may-05 ene-06 sep-06 may-07 ene-08 sep-08 may-09 ene-10 sep-10 may-11 ene-12 sep-12 may-13
Metales Energía (Petróleo, Gas Natural y Carbón)
Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), sobre la base de información del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI).
International commodity Price Index, January 2000 to May 2013 (price index January 2005=100)
2004 - 2009 2010 - 2013 before- 2003
Performance differs between Oil/Gas and Mining sectors in terms of % State appropriation of rents, investment and production dynamics in response to the price cycle.
AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE: RENTABILIDAD SOBRE ACTIVOS DE LAS 500 MAYORES EMPRESAS DE LA REGIÓN, 2010 (En porcentajes)
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), sobre la base de información estadística de América Economía, diciembre 2011 (http://www.americaeconomia.com/).
Mining Profit / Assets ratio far exceeds profitability indicators of all other economic sectors in the region ( 2010 data)
Fuente: CEPAL 2013, “Recursos naturales: situación y tendencias para una agenda de desarrollo regional en ALC” .Presentado en Reunión CELAC, 27 enero 2014.
Global exploration investment cuadrupled from 2.2 to 10.7 Billion USD 2003-2010; and doubled from 10.7 to 21.5 Billion USD between 2010-2012 LAC region has consistently captured the largest share (approx. 25%) of this investment.
(2007 peak year for mineral/oil prices before global financial crisis)
Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), sobre la base de información del Banco Mundial, World Development Indicators. Estadística: Mineral Rent ( % GDP) definida como precio internacional – costo unitario de producción para canasta de 10 minerales. Nota: *El dato del año 2009 de Asia del Este y el Pacífico corresponde al año 2006.
Estimated Mining Sector rent: 0.54% PIB regional avg. 1990-2003, Almost cuadrupled to 2.08 % PIB regional avg. 2004-2009
10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 1990-1992 1999-2001 2003-2005 2007-2009 Norteamérica Asia del Este y el Pacífico* America Latina y el Caribe RENTA DEL SECTOR MINERO EN LAS PRINCIPALES REGIONES MINERAS, 1990-2009 (En millones de US$ de 2005)
LAC LAC
Source : based on data from COCHILCO* Average production costs refers to direct and indirect mining costs, interest payments and depreciation , minus proceeds from sale of indirect products, (C3, according to Brook Hunt terminology), ** Costs for period 1992-1996 reflect only Chile.. ** World Bank ( WDI) World Development Indicators Database Mineral Rent ( % GDP)
Refined cooper prices London Metals Exchange and average production costs LAC * ( USD cents per lb.)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Precio Cu (BML) Costo de producción (promedio América Latina)**
International Price
Extraction Cost At mine head.
Tax payments (appropriated by Govts;)
Factor payments beyond extraction phase
(labor, sale costs, debt service.)
Net profits (appropriated by mining industry)
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000
Mining sector Economic Rent for selected countries (Millions US$, year 2009)**
País MINING SECTOR RENTS (% GDP) OIL& GAS RENTS (% GDP) MINING FISCAL REVENUE (% total Fiscal revenue) OIL& GAS FISCAL REVENUE (% total Fiscal revenue) 1990- 2003 2004- 2009 1990- 2003 2004- 2009 1990- 2003 2004- 2009 1990-2003 2004-2009 Argentina 0.05 0.48 3.30 9.85 Bolivia 0.30 2.28 6.32 28.87 n.d. 2.2 11.5 27.4 Brasil 0.64 2.24 1.03 3.06 8.2 9.0 Chile (GMP-10+CODELCO) 6.47 17.29 0.31 0.28 8.1 35.1 Chile (sólo minería
privada GMP-10)
1.4 13.1 Colombia 0.17 0.91 4.97 7.11 0.9 2.1 9.4 14.2 Ecuador 0.01 0.03 13.00 24.22 30.7 29.4 Guatemala1/ n.d. n.d. 0.54 1.08 n.d. 0.3 Guyana 5.62 5.34 Honduras 0.25 0.69 0.05 0.5 Jamaica 3.43 1.67 México 0.14 0.34 4.83 7.71 30.0 35.8 Nicaragua 0.07 0.63 Perú 0.79 7.16 1.61 1.99 2.9 13.4 4.4 3.8 República Dominicana 0.69 1.96 Suriname 7.26 5.07 4.08 Venezuela, RB 0.32 0.83 26.89 31.00 56.3 44.9 América Latina 0.54 2.08 3.61 7.11 Australia 1.17 4.12 Canadá 0.2 0.69 Estados Unidos 0.0 0.08 Sudáfrica 0.9 2.47
Fuente: Elaborado sobre la base de datos de COMTRADE, UNCTAD, Banco mundial y CEPAL.
x4 x2 Estimated Mining Sector rent: 0.54% GDP regional avg. 1990-2003, X 4 2.08 % GDP regional avg. 2004-2009 Estimated Oil/Gas Sector rent: 3.61% GDP regional avg. 1990-2003, X 2 7.11 % GDP regional avg. 2004-2009
País MINING SECTOR RENTS (% GDP) OIL& GAS RENTS (% GDP) MINING FISCAL REVENUE (% total Fiscal revenue) OIL& GAS FISCAL REVENUE (% total Fiscal revenue) 1990- 2003 2004- 2009 1990- 2003 2004- 2009 1990- 2003 2004- 2009 1990-2003 2004-2009 Argentina 0.05 0.48 3.30 9.85 Bolivia 0.30 2.28 6.32 28.87 n.d. 2.2 11.5 27.4 Brasil 0.64 2.24 1.03 3.06 8.2 9.0 Chile (GMP-10+CODELCO) 6.47 17.29 0.31 0.28 8.1 35.1 Chile (sólo minería
privada GMP-10)
1.4 13.1 Colombia 0.17 0.91 4.97 7.11 0.9 2.1 9.4 14.2 Ecuador 0.01 0.03 13.00 24.22 30.7 29.4 Guatemala1/ n.d. n.d. 0.54 1.08 n.d. 0.3 Guyana 5.62 5.34 Honduras 0.25 0.69 0.05 0.5 Jamaica 3.43 1.67 México 0.14 0.34 4.83 7.71 30.0 35.8 Nicaragua 0.07 0.63 Perú 0.79 7.16 1.61 1.99 2.9 13.4 4.4 3.8 República Dominicana 0.69 1.96 Suriname 7.26 5.07 4.08 Venezuela, RB 0.32 0.83 26.89 31.00 56.3 44.9 América Latina 0.54 2.08 3.61 7.11 Australia 1.17 4.12 Canadá 0.2 0.69 Estados Unidos 0.0 0.08 Sudáfrica 0.9 2.47
Fuente: Elaborado sobre la base de datos de COMTRADE, UNCTAD, Banco mundial y CEPAL.
x4 x2
x4 x9 X2 x10 x4 x2.5
==
x1.5 = = =
Fiscal revenue increased everywhere, but critical question is: How did the State’s share in total Resource Rent generated evolved during up-cycle after 2004??
Source : based on data from COCHILCO* Average production costs refers to direct and indirect mining costs, interest payments and depreciation , minus proceeds from sale of indirect products, (C3, according to Brook Hunt terminology), ** Costs for period 1992-1996 reflect only Chile.. ** World Bank ( WDI) World Development Indicators Database Mineral Rent ( % GDP)
Refined cooper prices London Metals Exchange and average production costs LAC * ( USD cents per lb.)
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Precio Cu (BML) Costo de producción (promedio América Latina)**
International Price
Extraction Cost At mine head.
Tax payments (appropriated by Govts;)
Factor payments beyond extraction phase
(labor, sale costs, debt service.)
Net profits (appropriated by mining industry)
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000
Mining sector Economic Rent for selected countries (Millions US$, year 2009)**
Taxes and fiscal payments by Mining Companies compared with Total national Tax revenue*, and estimated total Mining Sector Rent each year (in millions of USD)
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Ingresos tributarios totales (Gobierno central) Rentas mineras totales Tributación y aportes totales de la minería (sin impuesto específico) Impuesto específico declarado por GMP-10
Fuente: Elaboración propia sobre la base de datos de COCHILCO, CEPAL, Banco Mundial, FMI y Banco Central de Chile. Notas: * Los ingresos tributarios son del Gobierno Central. Los datos fueron tomados de CEPAL y del Banco de Chile. ** La tributación y aportes totales de la minera incluye los dividendos de CODELCO y los excedentes de ENAMI.
Total national Tax revenue Mining Fiscal receipts Estimated Mining Sector Rent
< 8%
35% of
mining rent
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Aportes de las empresas privadas CODELCO ENAMI Tributación minera total (incluye royalty)
Taxes and fiscal payments by Mining Companies as percentage
1/3 of total cooper production.
CODELCO (State Corp) GMP-10 TOTAL
35.7% 22.1% 13.6%
<5%
Taxes, royalties and fiscal payments by Mining Companies
( % of total Fiscal Revenues)
Fuente: Elaboración propia sobre la base de datos de COCHILCO. Nota: Los ingresos tributarios corresponden al Gobierno Central, que en promedio, corresponden al 93% de los ingresos tributarios del Gobierno General.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 CODELCO Tributación empresas privadas GMP-10 (sin impuesto específico) ENAMI Tributación minera total (incluye impuesto específico) Impuesto específico declarado por GMP-10
TOTAL revenue CODELCO (State Corp) 10 largest PRIVATE Royalty payments
Fuente: Elaboración propia sobre la base de datos de Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria (SUNAT), Banco Mundial y FMI. Notas: * Los ingresos tributarios son los del Gobierno Central. Incluyen: Impuestos a la renta, a la producción y consumo, a la importación y otros ingresos como impuesto a las transacciones financieras, temporal a los activos netos, a las acciones del Estado, etc. ** Los impuestos pagados por las empresas mineras incluyen el 100% del impuesto a la renta minera.
12,000 M 3,500 M
5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Ingresos tributarios Tributación minera total Rentas mineras Regalías
2.9% 27.2%
Taxes and other fiscal revenue paid by Mining companies* , relative to Mining Sector rent. absolute values (US$ millions each year)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Tributación + Regalías Tributación Regalías
19.5%
35%
29% Taxes and fiscal payments by Mining Companies as percentage
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Rentas mineras totales Impuestos sobre la Renta Regalías Gob/Mun
Fuente: Elaboración propia sobre la base de datos de http://goldcorpguatemala.com/, Instituto de Desarrollo Global y Medio Ambiente, FMI y World Bureau of Metal Statistics.
Taxes and other fiscal revenue paid by Marlin Gold Mine, relative to Mining Sector rent. absolute values (US$ millions each year)
Mining : State appropriation of sector rent 1990-2003 vs. 2004-2010
State participation in sector rents, and fiscal contribution of mining as % of total fiscal revenue
País
State participation (%) Mining sector rent (anual avg. for period) Fiscal contribution Mining Sector (%) total fiscal revenues (anual avg. for period) Before 2004 2004-2009 Total period Before 2004 2004-2009 Total Period Bolivia (datos CEPAL) (*) (*) (*) 0,9 3,0 2,6 Bolivia (datos PIEB) 57.7 2.2 Bolivia (sin COMIBOL, datos PIEB) 34.6 1.3 Chile (cobre, GMP-10+CODELCO) 21.8 35.7 32.1 8.2 37.5 23.0 Chile (CODELCO with dividends) 17.1 22.1 21.0 6.6 30.4 18.7 Chile (10 largest private mining GMP-10) 3.9 13.6 11.1 1.5 14.3 8.0 Colombia 48.9 37.1 1.9 Guatemala 12.2 0.4 Honduras 10.3 10.0 10.1 0.05 0.5 0.4 Perú
(*)
27.4
(*)
2.9 14.2 10.1 Australia (minería metálica) 17.9 26.1 20.2 Canadá 38,6 10 largest Mining multinationals Taxes paid globally (% gross rents.)
33.6
33.2
Fuente: Elaborado sobre la base de datos de COMTRADE, Banco mundial y CEPAL. Calculado como el promedio de los porcentajes de participación anuales (utilizando precios nominales). Los datos PIEB para Bolivia se tomaron del estudio de Rolando Jordán (PIEB, 2010). (*) No se pudo calcular el porcentaje de participación en estos períodos por errores estadísticos.
Mining fiscal receipts increase in absolute terms. However as % of total estimated Mining Rents their heterogenous behaviour does not reflect progressive State participation in mining sectorrents during the latest price cycle.
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Rentas mineras totales Impuestos sobre la Renta Regalías Gob/Mun
Fuente: Elaboración propia sobre la base de datos de http://goldcorpguatemala.com/, Instituto de Desarrollo Global y Medio Ambiente, FMI y World Bureau of Metal Statistics.
Taxes and other fiscal revenue paid by Marlin Gold Mine, relative to Mining Sector rent. absolute values (US$ millions each year)
INT’L. FISCAL issues
Repatriated profits Tax evasion, Transfer pricing, Mis-invoicing, etc.
INT’L FINANCIAL issues
Fiscal havens, IFFs
Host Government capacity for fair Rent appropriation and quality public investment is critical for positive OUTCOMES
NAT’L FISCAL issues
Tax evasion, transfer pricing, undeclared profits Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTIVE activity CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL Treasury EXTRACTIVE REGION OUTCOME
Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
???
Sub-Nat’l GOVT. Public investment? Revenue Transfer? Corp. Social Respons Socio-Env. Conflict Revenue Taxation–Fiscal Channel International Private flows Revenue Investment?
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Tributación + Regalías Tributación Regalías
19.5%
35%
29% Taxes and fiscal payments by Mining Companies as percentage
Contrast between Mining and Oil/Gas sector performance and Fiscal regimes.
Mining taxation regimes.
smaller countries with incipient but emerging mining ( Guatemala, Honduras etc.)
maintaining dynamic exploration & development investment and strengthened sectoral fiscal regimes.
avoid fiscal competition.
INT’L. FISCAL issues
Repatriated profits Tax evasion, Transfer pricing, Mis-invoicing, etc.
INT’L FINANCIAL issues
Fiscal havens, IFFs
Host Government capacity for fair Rent appropriation and quality public investment is critical for positive OUTCOMES
NAT’L FISCAL issues
Tax evasion, transfer pricing, undeclared profits
Resource flow avg. 15%
HDI impact ??? Export Market access as key driver incentive for both Govt. &
performance.
transparency and accountability mechanisms.
certification (MRV)
Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTIVE activity CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL Treasury EXTRACTIVE REGION OUTCOME
Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
???
Sub-Nat’l GOVT. Public investment? Revenue Transfer? Corp. Social Respons Socio-Env. Conflict Revenue Taxation–Fiscal Channel International Private flows Revenue Investment?
$$$
Extractive Rents: Key Government and Private actors ( Host & Home countries)
Mining/Oil RENTS EXTRACTION operations Private TNCs, State Corp. CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry Treasury
Extractive REGION
Local community
Socio-economic development
Extractive REGION Local GOVT.
Capacity for Quality PUBLIC INVESTMENT?
Public investment Sub-National GOVT.
Fiscal Federalism
Revenue sharing? Public investment fund allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc. Improved HDI
Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Responsibility Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$ Rent allocation
Current expenditure
Investments?
EITI Govt. – Corp.
Revenue Payment Transparency & other Accountability mechanisms
Revenue Taxation–Fiscal Channel
Tax evasion Transfer pricing REGIONAL/GLOBAL Perverse fiscal competition Tax cooperation Accountability beyond EITI
Mis-invoicing, bribery Due diligence supply chain REGIONAL/GLOBAL Conditional market access Commodity certification Monitoring, reporting, Verification.
FATF implementation Illicit flows, laundering… REGIONAL/GLOBAL Financial cooperation
Harmonized rules Private flows repatriated profits, etc.
more progressive taxation of resource rents, in particularly during upward “price cycles”. Need for concerted regional effort among countries to avoid fiscal competition.
efficient public investment of resource rent revenues into human capital ( education), infrastructure, technology development and innovation), isolating them from political pressure to use them as current expenditure. Resource rents are not substitutes for national tax regimes.
public information disclosure mechanisms on Resource Rent revenue payments by industry and their accumulation and specific use by governments.
change towards gradual decoupling of national dependence of resource sectors.
conflicts related to resource development through expedite compensation and consultation schemes that avoid their judiciarization .
Sector can be a useful warning indicator for fiscal authorities ( start with WB WDI database).
States (tax information sharing agreements), Industry ( ICMM type codes of conduct, stds. etc.).
capacities of fiscal authorities in resource exporting countries.
practices, commodity certification and market segmentation???
perverse fiscal competition among countries
achieve positive socio-economic outcomes. ( How to incentivize it?)
revenue transfer - local level “dutch disease”?
MRV accountability mechanisms, benchmarks, industry codes of conduct, media attention, due diligence on supply chains, commodity certification, etc. as function of
International experience shows instances of countries where exploitation of natural resources leads to a political economy in which a small group captures the rents and uses them to reinforce patterns of inequality and social segregation and to maintain control over the political apparatus. In such cases the rents are not used to drive further productive or social investments, they are dissipated on volatile current expenditure with negative consequences for sustainable economic development. There are also cases of “developmental” governments, giving rise to a political economy in which the State effectively captures resource rents and directs them towards high social return investments in education, health, infrastructure and sustainable poverty reduction.
type of political economy that blocks the exercise of effective governance to pursue policies needed to drive structural change towards greater equality.
institutions, and with low levels of growth in countries with weak institutions. “The resource curse is confined to countries with weak governance.” Paul Collier (2010)
U.N ECLAC considers the governance of resource sectors as the effective capacity of States, including the international community of resource-exporting and resource-using countries, to take political and institutional action to ensure that exploitation of natural resources and the appropriation, distribution and use of extractive resource rents contribute effectively to socially inclusive economic development and structural transformation in host countries, including: Enacting regulation, taxation and concession regimes that ensure both:
resources for structural transformation, particularly during periods of windfall or extraordinary prices through progressive fiscal instruments (as is routinely done in the oil industry).
avoids perverse fiscal competition among resource exporters, while establishing int’l benchmarks, performance standards, accountability and transparency mechanisms for both industry and govts.
investment of resource rents in human capital accumulation ( education, poverty reduction etc. ) and
the national economy ( such as development of appropriate infrastructure in energy, water/sanitation, road/port transport etc.) . This might include the judicious use of special purpose long term saving/investment funds, monitoring and evaluation of the impact/quality of resource rent investments.
economy, promote technological & structural change, and employment generation.
Jean Acquatella CEPAL Taller GIZ 13 Mayo 2016
majority of Latin American commodity exporting countries were not successful in turning these surpluses into effective investments for economic diversification, accumulation of technological innovation capacity, and improved infrastructure.
decade, without a strategic priorization of long term public investment of resource rents.
– Low diversification of productive structure, with production concentrated in commodity sectors with low economic complexity and innovation potential; – High consumption expansion and diversification with growing relative weight of imported goods.
could bring about serious trade balance and fiscal disequilibria for several countries in the region.
Increasing socio-environmental conflicts to extractive project development
90% 3% 3% 2% 2% AGRICULTURA PESCA GANADERIA COMERCIO TURISMO
Elaborado con la información del Observatorio de Conflictos Socio-Ambientales en América Latina (OLCA) www.olca.cl
Economic sector impacted
Lower tax burden relative to other regions. Within Lat. America resource exporters tend to lower tax burdens.
2005 - 2009
Net Fiscal position has historically been a deficit:
2005 - 2009
Back to business as usual after 2009?
𝑄𝑢 = 𝑄𝑢 2,8 + 𝑄𝑢 8,20 + 𝑄𝑢 20,70 + 𝑄𝑢(70, ∞) Donde: 𝑄𝑢 : Es la serie que se desea filtrar, en nuestro caso el precio real de cada producto básico. 𝑄𝑢 2,8 : Es el componente cíclico de corto plazo, asociado a ciclos de negocio. 𝑄𝑢 8,20 : Es el componente cíclico de mediano plazo. 𝑄𝑢 20,70 : Es el súper ciclo. 𝑄𝑢 70, ∞ : Es la tendencia cíclica de largo plazo Filtro pasa banda asimétrico Christiano y Fitzgerald (2003), Cuddington y Jerret (2008)
5 5.5 6 6.5
.5 1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 año No Tendencia SC Cobre Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Cobre: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
Methodology Price series decomposition in its cyclical components of various frequencies.
4.5 5 5.5 6
.5 1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 año No Tendencia SC Estaño Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Estaño: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
5 5.5 6 6.5
.5 1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 año No Tendencia SC Zinc Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Zinc: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
5.5 6.5 7.5
.5 1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 año No Tendencia SC Aluminio Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Aluminio: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
6.5 7 7.5 8
.5 1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 año No Tendencia SC Oro Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Oro: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
4.5 5.5 6.5
.5 1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 año No Tendencia SC Plata Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Plata: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
Methodology Price series decomposition in its cyclical components of various frequencies.
.5 1900 1950 2000 2050 t SC_lplata_1 SC_lzinc_1 SC_lestano_1 SC_lcobre_1 SC_laluminio_1
periodicidad entre 20 y 70 años en todas las series.
encontrándose duraciones máximas de 29 años.
15 años, magnitud superó la de los super ciclos previos.
precio real no vistos desde los 1970s, incluso superiores el hierro, oro y el petróleo crudo.
sucesivas hacia sus niveles tendenciales de largo plazo
Strength and Quality of Fiscal Institutions correlated with performance:
Trinidad & Tobago 2007 National Heritage and Stabilization Fund.
Gráfico 5 Precio real y Tendencia CJ: Metales industriales
Los precios reales de los metales industriales mostraron una tendencia de largo plazo decreciente o cercana a cero. El petróleo crudo es el único bien primario cuyo precio real muestra una tendencia de largo plazo creciente entre 1900 y 2015. Lo cual evidencia un comportamiento de largo plazo claramente diferenciado del exhibido por los metales.
Gráfico 6 Metales reserva de valor: Precio real y Tendencia CJ
[1] La tendencia de largo obtenida va variando muy gradualmente en el tiempo reflejando la dinámica del precio real en horizontes
mayores a cuatro décadas.
La descomposición de las series de precio aplicada para la estimación de ciclos permite obtener una tendencia de largo plazo, que en este caso se refiere a componentes cíclicos una periodicidad mayor a 70 años. Nos referimos a la misma como Tendencia CJ [1]
Results II: Linear trend between breaks 1960-2015
5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 1960q1 1973q3 1987q1 2000q3 2014q1 Trimestres Oro Tendencia Lineal
Oro
7 7.5 8 8.5 1960q1 1973q3 1987q1 2000q3 2014q1 Trimestres Aluminio Tendencia Lineal
Aluminio
7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 1960q1 1973q3 1987q1 2000q3 2014q1 Trimestres Cobre Tendencia Lineal
Cobre
8.5 9 9.5 10 1960q1 1973q3 1987q1 2000q3 2014q1 Trimestres Estaño Tendencia Lineal
Estaño
7 7.5 8 8.5 9 1960q1 1973q3 1987q1 2000q3 2014q1 Trimestres Zinc Tendencia Lineal
Zinc
2 3 4 5 1960q1 1973q3 1987q1 2000q3 2014q1 Trimestres Crudo Tendencia Lineal
Petróleo
Fin de tendencia creciente del precio real en 1T 2012 para el petróleo. Durante trimestres 2011 para el cobre, estaño, hierro, oro y la plata; y 2007 aluminio y zinc. Aplicación del filtro L1 también señala el fin del auge en todos los bienes analizados.
Mining Operation EXTRACTION CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry -Treasury Extractive REGION Local Community HDI Extractive REGION Local Government
QUALITY PUBLIC INVESTMENT capacity?
HDI Provincial GOVT. Fiscal Federalism
revenue sharing ? Investment resource allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc.
Extractive Rent Revenue Channel Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Res. Channel Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$
First Products
refining
Metal Manufacturing
Rent Invest- ment
Petróleo Crudo
Estadísticas Super ciclos 1900-2015
Cuadro 3
Nota: La última columna para cada producto básico fue estimada como el promedio hasta 2015 Fuente: Estimaciones de los autores
Cuadro 5 Ciclos: fechas de los máximos y mínimos -Bry-Boschan (1971)
Se verifica fin de último auge de precios reales entre el 1T2009 (petróleo) y el 2T2014, (estaño). El de la cotización real del aluminio terminó en el 2T2011, las del cobre y el mineral de hierro en el 1T2011, la del zinc en el 4T2009, las del oro y la plata en el 3T2011 y la del gas en 1T2009.
2 3 4 5 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Cima Valle
Ciclos del Crudo
Precios reales de los productos básicos: Correlaciones cruzadas 1T 1960-4T 2015 Precios reales de los productos básicos: Correlaciones cruzadas 1900-2015
.5 1900 1950 2000 2050 t SC_lplata_1 SC_lzinc_1 SC_lestano_1 SC_lcobre_1 SC_laluminio_1
Precios reales de los productos básicos: Correlaciones cruzadas 1T 1960-4T 2015
2 4 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Refugio Industriales
Factores Comunes Grupos de Commodities
.5 1900 1950 2000 2050 t SC_lplata_1 SC_lzinc_1 SC_lestano_1 SC_lcobre_1 SC_laluminio_1
Las series de precios reales mostraron también una alta persistencia en todos los bienes estudiados. Esto significa que tras una perturbación los precios tardan mucho tiempo en volver a los niveles que presentaban antes de la ocurrencia de ese evento. Este resultado es consistente con las dinámicas anteriores.
a) El último auge de precios se inició alrededor del 2000, tuvo una duración media de 15 años y alcanzando niveles de precio que no se veían desde la década de 1970. Sin embargo este último auge ya concluyó entre 2011-12 y nos encontramos dentro de la fase de caída de precios del super ciclo actual. Este resultado es robusto en tres metodologías y en todos los bienes estudiados. b) Se encuentra evidencia de al menos 4 super ciclos series anuales 1900-2015 con duración media de 31,6 años y de 16 años para las fases de auge y caídas de precio. c) Con magnitudes de variación de precios que superan el 40 y 100 por ciento, respectivamente en la mitad y un quinto de todos los auges/caídas en el registro histórico 1900-2015; d) Seguidas a su vez por sucesivas reversiones de precio hacia el nivel de tendencia, negando la posibilidad de auges o caídas permanentes ( pero sí muy persistentes, ya que pueden prolongarse por décadas.)
En un total de 45 fases de auges/caídas en los super ciclos identificados de 6 metales y petróleo entre 1900-2015, la magnitud del cambio en el nivel de precios superó el 100% en 9 de ellas (un quinto), el 40% en 22 de ellas ( la mitad)
1. Primeramente resalta la importancia, para los países especializados en metales e hidrocarburos, de evaluar su vulnerabilidad frente a variaciones cíclicas de precios en horizontes temporales considerablemente mayores que los que normalmente informan el diseño de los mecanismos de estabilización de uso más común, como las reglas macro-fiscales y los fondos soberanos de inversión, entre otros. 2. Sugiere también considerar las limitaciones que pueden tener los actuales mecanismos de estabilización como opciones viables para hacer frente a ciclos de largo plazo con rangos de duración y magnitud como los observados en las series de precio entre 1900 y 2015. 3. En relación a este último punto, el reconocimiento de una variabilidad cíclica importante en los precios a largo plazo, enfatiza nuevamente el riesgo que conlleva la sobre especialización en estos bienes, y apunta a reevaluar la prioridad política que el Estado y el sector privado nacional, otorgan al logro de mayor diversificación del aparato productivo a mediano plazo. 4. En general los resultados refuerzan el mensaje sobre la importancia que tiene lograr diversificación económica en los países dependientes de sectores extractivos, como la mejor garantía para asegurar su estabilidad macroeconómica a futuro.
Jean Acquatella Ph.D. Energy and Natural Resources Unit
United Nations ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Santiago, Chile. Jean.acquatella@cepal.org
𝑄
𝑢 = 𝑄 𝑢 2,8 + 𝑄 𝑢 8,20 + 𝑄 𝑢 20,70 + 𝑄 𝑢(70, ∞)
Donde: 𝑄
𝑢 : Es la serie que se desea filtrar, en nuestro caso el precio real de cada producto básico.
𝑄
𝑢 2,8 : Es el componente cíclico de corto plazo, asociado a ciclos de negocio.
𝑄
𝑢 8,20 : Es el componente cíclico de mediano plazo.
𝑄
𝑢 20,70 : Es el súper ciclo.
𝑄
𝑢 70, ∞ : Es la tendencia cíclica de largo plazo
Filtro pasa banda asimétrico Christiano y Fitzgerald (2003), Cuddington y Jerret (2008)
5 5.5 6 6.5
.5 1900 1923 1946 1969 1992 2015 año No Tendencia SC Cobre Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Cobre: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
Metodología: Descomposición de series de precio en componentes cíclicos de distinta frecuencia
3.5 4.5
.5 1 1960q1 1980q1 2000q1 2020q1 trimestre No Tendencia SC Crudo Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Crudo: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
4 4.5 5 5.5
.5 1 1960q1 1980q1 2000q1 2020q1 trimestre No Tendencia SC Gas Tendencia Precio Real
(Escala Logarítmica)
Gas: Superciclos y Tendencia de Largo Plazo.
Metodología: Estimación tendencias lineales por tramo
El filtro propuesto por Kim et al. (2009) es una variación del filtro HP, en el que se reemplaza el término cuadrático por un término en valor absoluto, de forma de entregar como resultado una tendencia lineal por
metodología es:
7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Cobre Filtro Lineal Cobre
Serie Original y Filtrada Cobre
Kim et al. (2009), Yamada y Yoon (2014) y (2015)
2 3 4 5 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Crudo Filtro Lineal Crudo
Serie Original y Filtrada Crudo
Bry-Boschan (1971)
7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Cima Valle
Ciclos del Cobre
Para fechar el auge del último super ciclo en trimestres se empleó la metodología de Bry y Boschan (1971) que se basa en primera instancia en la detección de mínimos y máximos locales potenciales. Una vez elegidos estos, se les somete al cumplimiento de dos reglas adicionales: una de duración mínima de fase y otra de secuencia, pues no se permiten mínimos (máximos) consecutivos. Para la mencionada detección hay que seleccionar un horizonte de comparación. En el caso de esta investigación se eligió una ventana móvil centrada de tres trimestres.
2 3 4 5 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Cima Valle
Ciclos del Crudo
Metodología:
Fechas – algoritmo Bry Boschan
2 4 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Refugio Industriales
Factores Comunes Grupos de Commodities
1 2 1960q1 1968q1 1976q1 1984q1 1992q1 2000q1 2008q1 2016q1 Trimestres Recíproco TCR Factor Común Industrial
Nota: Las series fueron normalizadas
Factor Común Industriales y TCR
En general los precios de los metales industriales responden a los factores de demanda/oferta y sus dinámicas en el corto y largo plazo; mientras que el oro y plata se comportan más bien como activos financieros, y son usados como reserva de valor en los períodos de mayor volatilidad global o riesgo en los mercados de capitales.
Mining Operation EXTRACTION CENTRAL Nat. GOVERNMENT FISCAL Ministry -Treasury Extractive REGION Local Community HDI Extractive REGION Local Government
QUALITY PUBLIC INVESTMENT capacity?
HDI Provincial GOVT. Fiscal Federalism
revenue sharing ? Investment resource allocation
Local public investment Infrastructure, education Health etc.
Extractive Rent Revenue Channel Extractive Revenue Investment Channel
Efficient channeling of Extractive Revenue into Public Investment with local HDI impact?
Corporate Social Res. Channel Socio-Env. Conflict $$$ $$$ $$$
First Products
refining
Metal Manufacturing
Rent Invest- ment
Very high profitability of Mining and Oil/Gas sector during the 2006-2011 period explain this concentration of FDI flows.
However profitability indexes slow down during 2012 – 2013.
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
2006-2011 2012-2013
Fuente: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), sobre la base de cifras preliminares y estimaciones oficiales al 23 de mayo de 2014
Latin America and Caribbean ( selected countries). FDI Profitability as % of profit over investment stock, annual averages 2006-2011 and 2012-2013
10'000 20'000 30'000 40'000 50'000 60'000 70'000 80'000 90'000 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011
Menas y concentrados de metales (28) Metales no ferrosos refinados (68)
Acero y productos derivados (67)
Manufactura de metales y no metales (66 y 69)
ALC: evolución de las exportaciones de minerales primarios y manufacturas de minerales a, 1990-2011 (En millones de dólares de 2005)
Fuente: CEPAL 2013, “Recursos naturales: situación y tendencias para una agenda de desarrollo regional en ALC” .Presentado en Reunión CELAC, 27 enero 2014.
majority of Latin American commodity exporting countries were not successful in turning these surpluses into effective investments for economic diversification, accumulation of technological innovation capacity, and improved infrastructure.
decade, without a strategic priorization of long term public investment of resource rents.
– Low diversification of productive structure, with production concentrated in commodity sectors with low economic complexity and innovation potential; – High consumption expansion and diversification with growing relative weight of imported goods.
could bring about serious trade balance and fiscal disequilibria for several countries in the region.