integrity in lobbying JANOS BERTOK, OECD Transparency and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

JANOS BERTOK,

OECD

Transparency and integrity in lobbying

Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying: a Comparative Perspective

Workshop for Committee on Constitutional Affaires European Parliament 22 September 2015 Janos Bertok Head of Public Sector Integrity Division OECD

Trust in government is low and has been decreasing

Source: Gallup World Poll

Transparency in policymaking is a lever for trust in government

Source: World Economic Forum – Global Competitiveness Report (2013-2014)

AUS AUT BEL CAN CHL CZK DNK EST FIN FRA DEU GRCHUN ISL IRL ISR ITA JAP KOR LUX MEX NLD NZL NOR POL PRT SVK SVN ESP SWE CHE TUR GBR USA OECD R² = 0.75 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Transparency of government policymaking, 1-7 (best), WEF Public trust in politicians, 1-7 (best), WEF

Correlation between public trust in politicians and transparency in government policymaking (2013)

Transparency drives lobby reforms

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

42% 26% 26% 5% 0% 38% 36% 16% 8% 2% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Legislators Lobbyists

Does transparency in lobbying increase citizens’ trust in the public decision-making process?

Does transparency in lobbying increase citizens’ trust in the public decision-making process?

Regulation of lobbying is accelerating

16 countries have regulated lobbying 8 in the past 5 years, including Ireland in 2015

Implementation: How to make it effective?

Raising awareness with tailored measures

Most effective ways to learn about lobbying rules/guidelines according to legislators; and integrity standards and transparency tools according to lobbyists

50% 17% 33% 67% 33% 67% 33% 33% 17% 55% 22% 67% 24% 37% 35% 36% 26% 36% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Briefing Lecture Workshop Online training Conference or learning event Direct communication Scenario-based training Provision of training material Information on the website of the office responsible for lobbying Legislators Lobbyists

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Implementation

What measures are considered effective? Incentives for compliance

There are generally no effective rewards for agreeing to comply with lobbyist codes of conduct

13% 32% 51% 4% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes, there are effective rewards for agreeing to comply with the code Not really, there are some benefits for complying but they are not compelling No, there are no effective rewards for agreeing to comply with the code Don’t know

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Implementation

What measures are considered effective? Sanctions

Are there compelling sanctions for breaching the lobbyist code of conduct?

38% 39% 12% 40% 34% 18% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes, there are effective penalties for breaching the code Not really, there are some penalties but they are not compelling No, there are no penalties for breaching the code Lobbyists (2009) Lobbyists (2013)

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Areas of Concern 1: Revolving doors

Are there restrictions on public officials engaging in lobbying activities after they leave the government?

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Generally no restrictions are in place (e.g. a "cooling-off" period) to restrict legislators from engaging in lobbying activities after they leave Parliament

5% 5% 16% 74% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes, there are restrictions but they are too restrictive Yes, there are restrictions and they are sufficiently restrictive Yes, there are restrictions but they are not sufficiently restrictive No, there are no restrictions

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Pre-public employment: OECD countries’ restrictions on lobbyists to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

No 29% Yes 71%

Pre-public employment: lobbyists’ view on restrictions to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government

3% 12% 12% 46% 28% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes, there are restrictions but they are too restrictive Yes, there are restrictions and they are sufficiently restrictive Yes, there are restrictions but they are not sufficiently restrictive No, there are no restrictions Don't know

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Areas of Concern 2: Advisory-expert groups A balanced composition of interests?

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Lobbyists are sitting on advisory groups in a personal capacity

18% 60% 22% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes, lobbyists are and I am currently sitting on a government advisory/expert groups or Parliamentary advisory/expert groups in a personal capacity Yes, lobbyists are and but I am personally not sitting on a government advisory/expert groups or Parliamentary advisory/expert groups in a personal capacity No

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

Availability of information on advisory-expert groups

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

The way forward

• Compliance by incentives and enforcement remain a

challenge

Intensify efforts in addressing lobbying concerns and risks in order to foster confidence in policy making

• Limited measurement of costs and benefits

Identify relevant data, benchmarks, and indicators in relation to transparency in lobbying

• The broader integrity framework remains vital

Establish a whole-of-government 21st-century integrity framework

Types of information that stakeholders believed should be made publicly available

84%

Actors & types of communication that stakeholders believe should be covered by lobbying rules

What incentives?

Easy registration

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume

• 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and

Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

www.oecd.org/gov/ethics

Thank you

DAVID COEN

University College London

Institutional and Constitutional Aspects

• f Interest

Representation

(Policy Department study for AFCO)

INSTITUTIONAL & CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST REPRESENTATION

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

Presentation September 2015.

Professor David Coen & Alexander Katsaitis. University College London. School of Public Policy.

Accredited Individuals across committees; 2012-2014

500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500

AFCO AFET AGRI BUDG CONT CULT DEVE ECON EMPL ENVI FEMM IMCO INTA JURI LIBE ITRE PECH PETT REGI TRAN Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations Non-governmental organisations

Interest groups contact during different phases of the policymaking cycle (Q6).

9 8 2 2 6 4 13 5 4 2 21 26 16 25 17 8 24 18 24 11 55 61 55 50 58 55 47 37 44 36 4 2 4 2 4 2 23 4 8 8 8 9 2 16 4 2 6 5 16 10 12 23 9 24 20 26 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Public Affairs Consultancy Legal Affairs Office/ Firm Association Trade Union Company NGO/ SMO Think Tank Religious Groups Regional/ Municipal Groups Member State Representatives Commission Proposal Preparation Commission Proposal European Parliament Committee Amendments Trialogue Negotiations Plenary Amendments Plenary Vote

Interest groups’ influence (Q4)

5 9 2 2 4 2 7 12 5 18 26 16 18 18 12 19 40 23 9 49 47 49 50 32 43 42 39 48 36 21 12 28 27 35 34 32 9 21 39 7 5 5 4 12 9 2 16 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Public Affairs Consultancy Legal Affairs Office/ Firm Association Trade Union Company NGO/ SMO Think Tank Religious Groups Regional/ Municipal Groups Member State Representatives Not at all influential Slightly influential Moderately influential Very influential Extremely influential

MEPs Perceptions regarding the TR

Completely Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Completely Agree Improves the behaviour of interest groups

2 10 27 53 8

Reduces inappropriate influence caused by lobbying

3 19 27 41 10

Improves the transparency of the EU

5 17 46 32

Is helpful for public interest groups

5 5 24 49 17

Conclusions/ Recommendations

• The EP could consider further augmenting the activity of public interests that surround it,

especially in committees with less activity.

• Further enhance the European Parliament Research Service & expand resources provided

to committee secretariats to support rapporteurs and MEPs directly.

• The EP could further incentivize administrators across EU institutions and levels to

communicate primarily with special interests registered on the TR.

• The EP could make information regarding special interests entering the Institution and

meeting with specific MEPs and administrative staff publicly available.

• The EP could further increase its transparency & legitimacy by making information on

accreditations (and registrations) more easily available to the public.

• Special interests, both those registering as well as those with accreditations, could be

given options to indicate clearly which committees and DGs they are most interested in lobbying.

• The inclusion of the Council of the EU in the TR would considerably assist the mapping

and understanding of EU inter-institutional lobbying.

ROLAND BLOMEYER,

Blomeyer & Sanz

Scrutiny of declarations

• f financial interests

(Policy Department study for AFCO)

Scrutiny of declarations of financial interests in national legislatures

Roland Blomeyer, 22 September 2015

32

Contents

(1)Context (2)Conclusions (3)Recommendations

sanction guide rule monitor report

33

(1) Context

• Code of Conduct adopted in December 2011 / Implementing

Measures in April 2013

• Accordance with relevant moral values and norms
• Rules versus values

34

(1) Context

Asset disclosure No GRECO recommendation GRECO recommendation not applicable

35

(1) Context

Codes of Conduct Code > 10 years Code < 10 years not applicable

36

(2) Conclusions

• Why? More integrity / transparency?
• What? Review existing experience / practices.
• How? Exchange with Member State parliaments.
• When? Proactive / ongoing reform.

37

(3) Recommendations - rule

• Identification of debts (map)
• Actual income / detailed income brackets
• Revolving doors
• Family members (map)

rule

38

(3) Recommendations: debts

applicable not applicable

39

(3) Recommendations: family

applicable not applicable

40

(3) Recommendations - guide

• Leadership
• Strategy

guide

41

(3) Recommendations - monitor

monitor

self-scrutiny administration external scrutiny (only members) external scrutiny (public office holders)

42

(3) Recommendations

Publication of declarations Database Integrated document Individual documents

43

(3) Recommendations - monitor

Resources for monitoring (members per 1 monitor)

monitor

44

(3) Recommendations - sanction

• Integrity issues affecting the President or a member of the

Advisory Committee

• Judging by peers versus external independent assessment

sanction

45

(3) Recommendations - report

• Evaluation of performance

report

Thank you

Roland Blomeyer, rblomeyer@blomeyer.eu / www.blomeyer.eu

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