Transparency and integrity in lobbying JANOS BERTOK, OECD
Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying: a Comparative Perspective Workshop for Committee on Constitutional Affaires European Parliament Janos Bertok 22 September 2015 Head of Public Sector Integrity Division OECD
Trust in government is low and has been decreasing Source : Gallup World Poll
Transparency in policymaking is a lever for trust in government Correlation between public trust in politicians and transparency in government policymaking (2013) 7 Transparency of government policymaking, 1-7 (best), WEF FIN 6 R² = 0.75 NZL CHE LUX SWE JAP GBR AUT CHL NLD NOR EST 5 CAN IRL ISL DEU OECD TUR SVN DNK MEX USA AUS BEL FRA ISR SVK 4 ESP PRT CZK POL GRCHUN KOR 3 ITA 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Public trust in politicians, 1-7 (best), WEF Source : World Economic Forum – Global Competitiveness Report (2013-2014)
Transparency drives lobby reforms 100% Does transparency in lobbying increase citizens’ trust in 90% the public decision-making process? 80% 70% 60% Does transparency in lobbying increase citizens’ trust in the public decision -making 50% Legislators 42% process? 38% 36% 40% Lobbyists 26% 26% 30% 16% 20% 8% 10% 5% 2% 0% 0% Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Regulation of lobbying is accelerating 16 countries have regulated lobbying 8 in the past 5 years, including Ireland in 2015
Implementation: How to make it effective? Raising awareness with tailored measures Most effective ways to learn about lobbying rules/guidelines according to legislators; and integrity standards and transparency tools according to lobbyists 50% Briefing 55% 17% Lecture 22% 33% Workshop 67% 67% Online training 24% 33% Legislators Conference or learning event 37% Lobbyists 67% Direct communication 35% 33% Scenario-based training 36% 33% Provision of training material 26% Information on the website of the office 17% 36% responsible for lobbying 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Implementation What measures are considered effective? Incentives for compliance There are generally no effective rewards for agreeing to comply with lobbyist codes of conduct 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 51% 50% 40% 32% 30% 20% 13% 10% 4% 0% Yes, there are effective Not really, there are No, there are no Don’t know rewards for agreeing to some benefits for effective rewards for comply with the code complying but they are agreeing to comply with not compelling the code Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Implementation What measures are considered effective? Sanctions Are there compelling sanctions for breaching the lobbyist code of conduct? 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 39% 38% 40% 34% Lobbyists (2009) 30% Lobbyists (2013) 18% 20% 12% 10% 0% Yes, there are Not really, there are No, there are no effective penalties for some penalties but penalties for breaching the code they are not breaching the code compelling Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Areas of Concern 1: Revolving doors Are there restrictions on public officials engaging in lobbying activities after they leave the government ? Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Generally no restrictions are in place (e.g. a "cooling-off" period) to restrict legislators from engaging in lobbying activities after they leave Parliament 100% 90% 80% 74% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 16% 20% 5% 5% 10% 0% Yes, there are Yes, there are Yes, there are No, there are no restrictions but they restrictions and they restrictions but they restrictions are too restrictive are sufficiently are not sufficiently restrictive restrictive Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Pre-public employment: OECD countries’ restrictions on lobbyists to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government No 29% Yes 71% Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Pre-public employment: lobbyists’ view on restrictions to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 46% 50% 40% 28% 30% 20% 12% 12% 10% 3% 0% Yes, there are Yes, there are Yes, there are No, there are no Don't know restrictions but restrictions and restrictions but restrictions they are too they are they are not restrictive sufficiently sufficiently restrictive restrictive Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Areas of Concern 2: Advisory-expert groups A balanced composition of interests? Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Lobbyists are sitting on advisory groups in a personal capacity 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 60% 50% 40% 30% 22% 18% 20% 10% 0% Yes, lobbyists are and I am Yes, lobbyists are and but I am No currently sitting on a government personally not sitting on a advisory/expert groups or government advisory/expert Parliamentary advisory/expert groups or Parliamentary groups in a personal capacity advisory/expert groups in a personal capacity Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Availability of information on advisory-expert groups Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
The way forward • Compliance by incentives and enforcement remain a challenge Intensify efforts in addressing lobbying concerns and risks in order to foster confidence in policy making • Limited measurement of costs and benefits Identify relevant data, benchmarks, and indicators in relation to transparency in lobbying • The broader integrity framework remains vital Establish a whole-of-government 21st-century integrity framework
Types of information that stakeholders believed should be made publicly available 84%
Actors & types of communication that stakeholders believe should be covered by lobbying rules
What incentives? Easy registration Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014
Thank you www.oecd.org/gov/ethics
Institutional and Constitutional Aspects of Interest Representation (Policy Department study for AFCO) DAVID COEN University College London
INSTITUTIONAL & CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST REPRESENTATION DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS Presentation September 2015. Professor David Coen & Alexander Katsaitis. University College London. School of Public Policy.
Accredited Individuals across committees; 2012-2014 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 AFCO AFET AGRI BUDG CONT CULT DEVE ECON EMPL ENVI FEMM IMCO INTA JURI LIBE ITRE PECH PETT REGI TRAN Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations Non-governmental organisations
Interest groups contact during different phases of the policymaking cycle (Q6). 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Public Affairs 9 21 55 4 4 6 Consultancy Legal Affairs Office/ 8 26 61 0 0 5 Firm Association 2 16 55 2 8 16 Trade Union 2 25 50 4 8 10 Company 6 17 58 0 8 12 NGO/ SMO 4 8 55 2 9 23 Think Tank 13 24 47 4 2 9 Religious Groups 5 18 37 0 16 24 Regional/ Municipal 4 24 44 2 4 20 Groups Member State 2 11 36 23 2 26 Representatives Commission Proposal Preparation Commission Proposal European Parliament Committee Amendments Trialogue Negotiations Plenary Amendments Plenary Vote
Interest groups’ influence (Q4) 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Public Affairs Consultancy 5 18 49 21 7 Legal Affairs Office/ Firm 9 26 47 12 5 Association 2 16 49 28 5 Trade Union 2 18 50 27 4 Company 4 18 32 35 12 NGO/ SMO 2 12 43 34 9 Think Tank 7 19 42 32 0 Religious Groups 12 40 39 9 0 Regional/ Municipal Groups 5 23 48 21 2 Member State 0 9 36 39 16 Representatives Not at all influential Slightly influential Moderately influential Very influential Extremely influential
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