Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity Management Landscape Anna Vapen, Niklas Carlsson, Anirban Mahanti, Nahid Shahmehri Linkping University, Sweden NICTA, Australia 2 Information Sharing and User


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SLIDE 1

Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity Management Landscape

Anna Vapen¹, Niklas Carlsson¹, Anirban Mahanti², Nahid Shahmehri¹ ¹Linköping University, Sweden ²NICTA, Australia

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SLIDE 2

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Information Sharing and User Privacy

In Third-Party Identity Management

Log in with a third-party:

I am and I like

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SLIDE 3

Background: Third-party Web Authentication

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Web Authentication

  • Registration with each website
  • Many passwords to remember

Third-party authentication

  • Use an existing IDP (identity provider)

account to access an RP (relying party)

  • Log in less often; Stronger authentication
  • Share information between websites
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SLIDE 4

Third-party Authentication Scenario

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Redirect Logged in Relying party (RP) Identity provider (IDP) Relationship between RP and IDP

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SLIDE 5

Questions

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  • What type of data is being shared between RPs and IDPs?
  • How does information sharing in third-party identity

management affect privacy?

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SLIDE 6

Our Studies

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  • Categorization of data in app-right agreements

– Manual study on the top 200 most popular websites

  • Targeted login tests on websites using popular IDPs
  • Pre-study on multi-IDP usage

– Leveraging our large scale crawled dataset – 3,202 unique RP-IDP relationships

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SLIDE 7

Protocol and IDP Selection

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  • The OAuth authorization protocol is increasingly

used for authentication

– Data is transferred in both directions between IDP and RP – Rich user data is shared

  • The use of the more privacy preserving OpenID

protocol is decreasing!

OAuth OpenID Both

April 2012 vs. Sept 2014

  • 11%

+24%

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SLIDE 8

Protocol and IDP Selection

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  • IDPs occur in specific combinations
  • Many pairs and triples of popular IDPs
  • Of RPs with 2-3 IDPs, 75% of these RPs are selecting all

their IDPs from the top 5 most popular IDPs

Top IDPs:

+

37%

+

19%

+

12%

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SLIDE 9

App Rights and Information Flows

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  • App-rights: the permission

agreements between RP and IDP

– Data from IDP to RP – Actions from RP to IDP

  • Specified by

– Protocol (OAuth) – The API of the IDP – Selected by RP

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SLIDE 10

App Rights and Information Flows

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E-mail address used as identifier

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SLIDE 11

App Rights and Information Flows

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Full name, profile picture, Google+ ID, age range, language and friend list Full name, profile picture, profile URL, public information

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SLIDE 12

App Rights and Information Flows

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Post SoundCloud activity on Google+

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SLIDE 13

Classification of Information

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  • Basic information (B): Identifiers, public information
  • Personal information (P): E.g. interests, age, political views
  • Created contents (C): E.g. images, behavior data (likes)
  • Friend’s data (F): Data belonging to other users
  • Authorized actions (A): Update/ write/ delete data on IDP

IDP RP

Data (B, P, C and F) from IDP to RP User U Actions (A): The RP acts as U on the IDP

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SLIDE 14

Classification of Information

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  • Basic information (B): Identifiers, public information
  • Personal information (P): E.g. interests, age, political views
  • Created contents (C): E.g. images, behavior data (likes)
  • Friend’s data (F): Data belonging to other users
  • Authorized actions (A): Update/ write/ delete data on IDP

Actions (A) Non-actions (¬A)

P C F B P C F B 25 14 1 31 9 3 4

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SLIDE 15

Classification of Information

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  • Basic information (B): Identifiers, public information
  • Personal information (P): E.g. interests, age, political views
  • Created contents (C): E.g. images, behavior data (likes)
  • Friend’s data (F): Data belonging to other users
  • Authorized actions (A): Update/ write/ delete data on IDP

Actions (A) Non-actions (¬A)

P C F B P C F B 25 14 1 31 9 3 4

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SLIDE 16

Risk Types

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Data only Data + actions

Risk type Class combination R- A ∩ B R A ∩ P R+ A ∩ P ∩ C R++ A ∩ P ∩ C ∩ F

Actions (A)

P C F B 25 14 1

Non-actions (¬A)

P C F B 31 9 3 4 Risk type Class combination R- ¬A ∩ B R ¬A ∩ P R+ ¬A ∩ P ∩ C R++ ¬A ∩ P ∩ C ∩ F

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SLIDE 17

Risk Types

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Data only Data + actions

Risk type Class combination R- A ∩ B R A ∩ P R+ A ∩ P ∩ C R++ A ∩ P ∩ C ∩ F

Actions (A)

P C F B 25 14 1

Non-actions (¬A)

P C F B 31 9 3 4 Risk type Class combination R- ¬A ∩ B R ¬A ∩ P R+ ¬A ∩ P ∩ C R++ ¬A ∩ P ∩ C ∩ F

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SLIDE 18

Risk Types

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Data only Data + actions

Risk type Class combination R- A ∩ B R A ∩ P R+ A ∩ P ∩ C R++ A ∩ P ∩ C ∩ F

Actions (A)

P C F B 25 14 1

Non-actions (¬A)

P C F B 31 9 3 4 Risk type Class combination R- ¬A ∩ B R ¬A ∩ P R+ ¬A ∩ P ∩ C R++ ¬A ∩ P ∩ C ∩ F

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SLIDE 19

Risk Types: Results

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  • Only a few relationships in the most privacy

preserving category R-, OpenID only

  • 2+ IDPs: More than half are using actions

– Actions are dangerous when having several IDPs – Potential multi-IDP leakage! 67%

non-actions

1 IDP

51%

actions

2+ IDPs

News and file sharing RPs: most frequent users of actions

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SLIDE 20

Head-to-head IDP Comparison

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  • Facebook: Rich data, actions, default settings not

privacy preserving

  • Google: Fine grained personalization, several

information “bundles”

  • Twitter: Much more actions than the other IDPs
  • Sept. 2014

Relationship type IDP (total) R- R R+ R++ R R+ R++ Unknown Facebook (55) 24 5 3 13 3 1 6 Twitter (15) 4 11 Google (29) 4 7 12 6

Dangerous combination: rich data + actions Most popular pair!

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SLIDE 21

Multi-account Information Risks

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  • Targeted login tests: all pairs of Google, Twitter and Facebook
  • Changing the order of IDPs

– Connect IDP1 first, then IDP2, and the other way around

  • Local account at RP

– Added before IDP usage – Added during first IDP login

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SLIDE 22

Multi-account Information Risks: Results

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  • Unwanted combinations of conflicting information
  • RPs handle multi-IDP usage badly
  • Data import + actions  cross account leakage

IDP1 IDP2 RP

  • A. Smith

Age: 21+ Alice S. Age: 25

Conflicting information

IDP1 IDP2 RP

Relationship Fail

IDP1 IDP2 RP

Import private photos

This is me!

Information collision Account merging and collisions Cross-IDP information leakage

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SLIDE 23

Contributions and Findings

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  • Captured protocol usage and IDP combinations

– IDPs occur in specific combinations – A non-privacy preserving protocol used

  • Profiled information sharing between sites

– Categorization of transferred data – Defined risk types

  • Identified privacy issues when using multiple IDPs

– RPs do not handle multiple IDPs well – Imported information may leak to other third-parties

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SLIDE 24

Log in with a third-party:

Information Sharing and User Privacy in the Third-party Identity Management Landscape

Anna Vapen, Niklas Carlsson, Anirban Mahanti, Nahid Shahmehri anna.vapen@liu.se