In the IP of the Beholder: Strategies for Active IPv6 Topology - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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In the IP of the Beholder: Strategies for Active IPv6 Topology - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

In the IP of the Beholder: Strategies for Active IPv6 Topology Discovery Robert Beverly * , Ram Durairajan , David Plonka , Justin Rohrer * Naval Postgraduate School University of Oregon Akamai Technologies October 31, 2018


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SLIDE 1

In the IP of the Beholder: Strategies for Active IPv6 Topology Discovery

Robert Beverly*, Ram Durairajan†, David Plonka‡, Justin Rohrer*

∗Naval Postgraduate School †University of Oregon ‡Akamai Technologies

October 31, 2018

ACM Internet Measurement Conference 2018

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 1 / 27

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SLIDE 2

Background

Outline

1

Background

2

What to Probe

3

How to Probe

4

Results

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 2 / 27

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SLIDE 3

Background

What We Did

Performed large-scale topological survey of the Internet using IPv6 Evaluated ability of IPv6 hitlists to produce targets Utilized a new traceroute technique Analyzed results (1.4M discovered router addresses):

IPv6 subnetting Privacy implications

How to map the router-level IPv6 Internet?

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 3 / 27

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SLIDE 4

Background

What We Did

Performed large-scale topological survey of the Internet using IPv6 Evaluated ability of IPv6 hitlists to produce targets Utilized a new traceroute technique Analyzed results (1.4M discovered router addresses):

IPv6 subnetting Privacy implications

How to map the router-level IPv6 Internet?

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 3 / 27

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SLIDE 5

Background

What We Did

Performed large-scale topological survey of the Internet using IPv6 Evaluated ability of IPv6 hitlists to produce targets Utilized a new traceroute technique Analyzed results (1.4M discovered router addresses):

IPv6 subnetting Privacy implications

How to map the router-level IPv6 Internet?

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 3 / 27

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SLIDE 6

Background What’s New

But wait, decades of experience with active topology mapping! IPv6-Specific Challenges:

1

Massive address space that is sparsely populated ! What to probe?

2

Mandated ICMPv6 rate limiting ! How to send probes? This work seeks to make progress against both challenges, and increase coverage/fidelity of IPv6 Internet router topologies.

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 4 / 27

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SLIDE 7

Background What’s New

But wait, decades of experience with active topology mapping! IPv6-Specific Challenges:

1

Massive address space that is sparsely populated ! What to probe?

2

Mandated ICMPv6 rate limiting ! How to send probes? This work seeks to make progress against both challenges, and increase coverage/fidelity of IPv6 Internet router topologies.

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 4 / 27

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SLIDE 8

Background What’s New

But wait, decades of experience with active topology mapping! IPv6-Specific Challenges:

1

Massive address space that is sparsely populated ! What to probe?

2

Mandated ICMPv6 rate limiting ! How to send probes? This work seeks to make progress against both challenges, and increase coverage/fidelity of IPv6 Internet router topologies.

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 4 / 27

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SLIDE 9

What to Probe

Outline

1

Background

2

What to Probe

3

How to Probe

4

Results

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 5 / 27

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SLIDE 10

What to Probe Background

State-of-the-art: CAIDA (Ark) and RIPE (Atlas) continually collect IPv6 topologies via active probing Technique and tools of these production systems mirror IPv4

For each IPv6 prefix in global BGP table, sequentially traceroute to:

::1 in prefix random address in prefix

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 6 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Question: Current production IPv6 active topology mapping systems probe an address in each globally advertised prefix. While this strategy provides breadth, does it miss subnetting and other topological structure? Hitlists: We compare this approach to using existing collections of known IPv6 hosts, or hitlists as targets

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 7 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Question: Current production IPv6 active topology mapping systems probe an address in each globally advertised prefix. While this strategy provides breadth, does it miss subnetting and other topological structure? Hitlists: We compare this approach to using existing collections of known IPv6 hosts, or hitlists as targets

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 7 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Using Hitlists

Name Method Date Addrs CAIDA BGP-derived 2018/05/09 105.2k DNSDB Passive DNS 2018/02/15 – 04/28 5.4M Fiebig Reverse DNS 2018/03/27 11.7M FDNS

  • Fwd. DNS

2018/04/27 24.8M CDN Clients kIP anonymization 2018/02/18 – 03/03 N/A 6gen Generative 2018/03/13 4.9M TUM* Collection varies 5.6M Random Random Routed 2018/05/23 26.5M Combined Join Sets varies 50.8M Lots of recent work on developing / gathering IPv6 hitlists

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 8 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Using Hitlists

Name Method Date Addrs CAIDA BGP-derived 2018/05/09 105.2k DNSDB Passive DNS 2018/02/15 – 04/28 5.4M Fiebig Reverse DNS 2018/03/27 11.7M FDNS

  • Fwd. DNS

2018/04/27 24.8M CDN Clients kIP anonymization 2018/02/18 – 03/03 N/A 6gen Generative 2018/03/13 4.9M TUM* Collection varies 5.6M Random Random Routed 2018/05/23 26.5M Combined Join Sets varies 50.8M Many IPv6 Hitlists “CAIDA” (BGP) is baseline for today’s systems “Random” is baseline for unguided probing Wide variety of methods

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 8 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Using Hitlists

Name Method Date Addrs CAIDA BGP-derived 2018/05/09 105.2k DNSDB Passive DNS 2018/02/15 – 04/28 5.4M Fiebig Reverse DNS 2018/03/27 11.7M FDNS

  • Fwd. DNS

2018/04/27 24.8M CDN Clients kIP anonymization 2018/02/18 – 03/03 N/A 6gen Generative 2018/03/13 4.9M TUM* Collection varies 5.6M Random Random Routed 2018/05/23 26.5M Combined Join Sets varies 50.8M Many IPv6 Hitlists Composition varies widely Primarily focused on end hosts ! Targets in some hitlists concentrated in small number of prefixes / ASes

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 8 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Using Hitlists

Name Method Date Addrs CAIDA BGP-derived 2018/05/09 105.2k DNSDB Passive DNS 2018/02/15 – 04/28 5.4M Fiebig Reverse DNS 2018/03/27 11.7M FDNS

  • Fwd. DNS

2018/04/27 24.8M CDN Clients kIP anonymization 2018/02/18 – 03/03 N/A 6gen Generative 2018/03/13 4.9M TUM* Collection varies 5.6M Random Random Routed 2018/05/23 26.5M Combined Join Sets varies 50.8M Many IPv6 Hitlists Composition varies widely Primarily focused on end hosts ! Targets in some hitlists concentrated in small number of prefixes / ASes How can hitlists inform active IPv6 topology mapping? We develop a generalized method for generating targets from “seeds”

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 8 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Target Generation

seed addresses

2607:5300::1029 2607:5300::109f 2607:5300::102a 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:e3ae::200e 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:87e8::400a 1

Begin with seeds: hitlist addresses

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 9 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Target Generation

seed addresses intermediate prefixes

prefix transformation

2607:5300::1029 2607:5300::/64 2607:5300::109f 2607:5300::102a 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:e3ae::200e

z64

− − → 2a07:18e8:4005:80b::/64 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:87e8::400a 1

Begin with seeds: hitlist addresses

2

zn aggregation: Group addresses into prefixes of length n

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 9 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Q: What aggregation granularity?

zn Packets Other ICMPv6 Router Addrs /40 1.4M 17.5k 27.0k /48 3.6M 105.8k 45.5k /56 6.1M 194.8k 60.5k /64 11.8M 486.8k 85.5k Evaluate parameter impact: Packets (cost) Router addresses discovered (benefit) Collateral impact as non-TTL exceeded responses (cost)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 10 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Q: What aggregation granularity?

zn Packets Other ICMPv6 Router Addrs /40 1.4M 17.5k 27.0k /48 3.6M 105.8k 45.5k /56 6.1M 194.8k 60.5k /64 11.8M 486.8k 85.5k Evaluate parameter impact: /64 has highest cost, but most benefit /48 strikes a balance We perform full probing with both z64 and z48

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 10 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Target Generation

seed addresses intermediate prefixes

prefix transformation

2607:5300::1029 2607:5300::/64 2607:5300::109f 2607:5300::102a 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:e3ae::200e

z64

− − → 2a07:18e8:4005:80b::/64 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:87e8::400a 1

Begin with seeds: hitlist addresses

2

zn aggregation: Group addresses into prefixes of length n

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 11 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Target Generation

seed addresses intermediate prefixes targets

prefix transformation target synthesis

2607:5300::1029 2607:5300::/64 2607:5300:::1234:5678 2607:5300::109f 2607:5300::102a 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:e3ae::200e 2a07:18e8:4005:80b::/64 → 2a07:18e8:4005:80b::1234:5678 2a07:18e8:4005:80b:87e8::400a 1

Begin with seeds: hitlist addresses

2

zn aggregation: Group addresses into prefixes of length n

3

Targets are synthesized with interface identifier In this example, 5 seed addresses are used to generate 2 targets

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 12 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Q: How do Target Sets Compare?

Portion in Each Target Set Color: unique, Gray: shared “Rtd Targ”: Not all targets routed While many targets are unique, significant prefix/AS

  • verlap

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 13 / 27

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What to Probe Target Generation

Q: How do Target Sets Compare?

Coverage Inset: Non-trivial numbers of prefixes / ASes that exist in

  • nly one target set

Intuition: increasing coverage in targets increases coverage in topology results

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 13 / 27

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How to Probe

Outline

1

Background

2

What to Probe

3

How to Probe

4

Results

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 14 / 27

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How to Probe Background

Strategies for increasing coverage

Select better destinations (hitlists) Probe more destinations ! probe faster Probing faster: RFC4443, §2.1.1: “an IPv6 node MUST limit the rate of ICMPv6 error messages it originates” Implemented with a token bucket

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 15 / 27

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How to Probe Background

State-of-the-art Production: e.g., CAIDA and RIPE

“Sequential” (i.e. TTL=1,2,. . .) Limited parallelism (i.e. waiting for responses, window of destinations) Probing faster can be self-defeating: triggers more rate-limiting

Question: How to probe in IPv6 to minimize effect of rate-limiting, while maintaining complete probing?

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 16 / 27

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How to Probe Background

State-of-the-art Production: e.g., CAIDA and RIPE

“Sequential” (i.e. TTL=1,2,. . .) Limited parallelism (i.e. waiting for responses, window of destinations) Probing faster can be self-defeating: triggers more rate-limiting

Question: How to probe in IPv6 to minimize effect of rate-limiting, while maintaining complete probing?

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 16 / 27

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SLIDE 29

How to Probe Yarrp6

Yarrp: “Yelling at Random Routers Progressively” (IMC2016) Uses a block cipher to randomly permute the hIP, TTLi domain Is stateless, recovering necessary information from replies By randomly spreading probes in time/space, permits fast Internet-scale active topology probing Yarrp6 We extend Yarrp to support IPv6 And add IPv6-specific enhancements Hypothesis: Yarrp-mapping of the IPv6 Internet will suffer less rate-limiting, even at higher probing rates

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 17 / 27

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How to Probe Yarrp6

Yarrp: “Yelling at Random Routers Progressively” (IMC2016) Uses a block cipher to randomly permute the hIP, TTLi domain Is stateless, recovering necessary information from replies By randomly spreading probes in time/space, permits fast Internet-scale active topology probing Yarrp6 We extend Yarrp to support IPv6 And add IPv6-specific enhancements Hypothesis: Yarrp-mapping of the IPv6 Internet will suffer less rate-limiting, even at higher probing rates

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 17 / 27

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How to Probe Avoiding Rate-Limiting

Comparison of Sequential vs. Yarrp Probing

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Fraction Responsive (Traces) IPv6 Hop Method and Rate sequential 20pps yarrp (rand) 20pps sequential 1kpps yarrp (rand) 1kpps sequential 2kpps yarrp (rand) 2kpps

US-EDU-3

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Fraction Responsive (Traces) IPv6 Hop

US-EDU-2 Same targets, same vantage point Varied probing rate (20-2kpps) Yarrp outperforms sequential, especially near source and as rate increases Some hops exhibit different rate-limiting behavior

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 18 / 27

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How to Probe Avoiding Rate-Limiting

What about techniques to avoid re-probing initial hops? e.g., DoubleTree, also designed for Internet-scale topology probing:

Probes backward until it receives a response from a known hop Does not probe complete path, infers missing hops (can be wrong)

We find that DoubleTree performs better than sequential But, rate-limiting (missed responses) causes DoubleTree to continue to probe backward (feedback loop)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 19 / 27

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How to Probe Avoiding Rate-Limiting

Fill Mode

Yarrp is stateless Must select TTL range (maxTTL) (potentially missing hops) Don’t know when to stop probing (potentially wasting probes) Fill mode: For response to probe with TTL=h, immediately probe w/ TTL=h + 1 if h maxTTL. Not random, but uncommon and at path tail Win/win efficiency gain: Allows us to lower the maxTTL (less wasted probing), without missing hops.

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 20 / 27

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How to Probe Avoiding Rate-Limiting

Fill Mode

Yarrp is stateless Must select TTL range (maxTTL) (potentially missing hops) Don’t know when to stop probing (potentially wasting probes) Fill mode: For response to probe with TTL=h, immediately probe w/ TTL=h + 1 if h maxTTL. Not random, but uncommon and at path tail Win/win efficiency gain: Allows us to lower the maxTTL (less wasted probing), without missing hops.

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 20 / 27

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Results

Outline

1

Background

2

What to Probe

3

How to Probe

4

Results

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 21 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

Probing

Single runs: May 14, 2018 3 vantage points: 2 US Universities; 1 EU Network 18 different target sets Yarrp6 w/ TTL=16 and fillmode ICMPv6 probes 2kpps Ethical Considerations Followed good “Internet citizenship” guidelines Received two-opt outs (someone’s actually monitoring IPv6!)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 22 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

Probing

Single runs: May 14, 2018 3 vantage points: 2 US Universities; 1 EU Network 18 different target sets Yarrp6 w/ TTL=16 and fillmode ICMPv6 probes 2kpps Ethical Considerations Followed good “Internet citizenship” guidelines Received two-opt outs (someone’s actually monitoring IPv6!)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 22 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

Macro Results

45.8M traces to 12.5M destinations (in less than a day) Discover 1.4M IPv6 router addresses Order of magnitude more than prior efforts Including ⇠0.6M EUI64 addresses (45%!)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 23 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

Features of discovered Interface Addresses (all VPs, z64) ⇠ 70% of interface addresses discovered

  • nly via single target

set 100’s of prefixes and ASes only discovered via single target set Thus, target sets are complementary

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 24 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64

Path-divergence-inferred subnet min. prefix length

1 100 10 k 20k 100k 150k

Count of inferrred subnets (log scale) fiebig-z64 fdns_any-z64 cdn-k256,z64 cdn-k32,z64 6gen-z64 dnsdb-z64 caida-z64 combined-z64 tum-z64

Subnet Discovery Anecdotal evidence: wide variety of production IPv6 subnetting practices Subnets important to how IPv6 is being used, geolocation, reputation, etc. Inspired by Lee et al. , developed a method using traces to find subnetting

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 25 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64

Path-divergence-inferred subnet min. prefix length

1 100 10 k 20k 100k 150k

Count of inferrred subnets (log scale) fiebig-z64 fdns_any-z64 cdn-k256,z64 cdn-k32,z64 6gen-z64 dnsdb-z64 caida-z64 combined-z64 tum-z64

Subnet Discovery Peaks at /40, /48 CAIDA has fewest subnet and largest subnets Many more subnets, and more granular subnets discovered using CDN, TUM targets

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 25 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64

Path-divergence-inferred subnet min. prefix length

1 100 10 k 20k 100k 150k

Count of inferrred subnets (log scale) fiebig-z64 fdns_any-z64 cdn-k256,z64 cdn-k32,z64 6gen-z64 dnsdb-z64 caida-z64 combined-z64 tum-z64

Subnet Discovery Seeds with high-clustering (e.g. Fiebig) discover primarily small subnets Ability to discover subnets constrained by target sets’ DPL (see paper for details)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 25 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

EUI64

Unanticipated Result EUI64 embeds a device’s H/W MAC into its IPv6 address For privacy reasons, most OSes use ephemeral random addresses instead Surprisingly, across 45.8M traces, discover 651.4k EUI64 addresses (45% of all addresses!)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 26 / 27

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Results Probing Campaign

EUI64

Unanticipated Result EUI64 embeds a device’s H/W MAC into its IPv6 address For privacy reasons, most OSes use ephemeral random addresses instead Surprisingly, across 45.8M traces, discover 651.4k EUI64 addresses (45% of all addresses!) Implications to Security and Privacy (RFC7721) Primarily at the end of the path (CPE!) Concentrated among providers and manufacturers Working with community to address (E.g., next week at IETF maprg WG)

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 26 / 27

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Summary

Summary

Studied where and how to send IPv6 topology probes

Using hitlists to generate targets Yarrp6 to probe

Inferred IPv6 subnetting and structure Step toward more complete IPv6-level router topologies Working within IETF to address privacy aspects of EUI64 infrastructure addresses Working toward production deployment within CAIDA Thanks! – Questions? https://www.cmand.org/yarrp

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 27 / 27

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Summary

Summary

Studied where and how to send IPv6 topology probes

Using hitlists to generate targets Yarrp6 to probe

Inferred IPv6 subnetting and structure Step toward more complete IPv6-level router topologies Working within IETF to address privacy aspects of EUI64 infrastructure addresses Working toward production deployment within CAIDA Thanks! – Questions? https://www.cmand.org/yarrp

(NPS/UOregon/Akamai) Active IPv6 Topology Discovery IMC 2018 27 / 27