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Imminent risk from Brexit Last year saw first budget surplus since - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Imminent risk from Brexit Last year saw first budget surplus since 2007 August 2019 Index Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 23: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 40: Brexit Page 46: Long-term fundamentals Page 57: Property Page 64: Other


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SLIDE 1

Imminent risk from Brexit

Last year saw first budget surplus since 2007 August 2019

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SLIDE 2

2

Index

Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 23: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 40: Brexit Page 46: Long-term fundamentals Page 57: Property Page 64: Other Data Page 76: Annex (GDP distortions explainer)

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SLIDE 3

Full employment as debt sustainability improves

Summary

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SLIDE 4

4

  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 2008 2011 2014 2017 Non-Construction Employment Construction Employment Total Employment vs 2008 peak

Domestic economy growing: averaging around 4.5 per cent from 2013-18

Dramatic drop in unemployment rate Employment (000s) well above 2008 peak True growth healthy

* Underlying series is modified final domestic demand (excludes inventories)

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% GDP Underlying* 16.0 4.6 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

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SLIDE 5

5

Primary surplus, improving debt dynamics and cash balances provide protection

Ireland is improving its debt dynamics by the month

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 € Billions Debt Prefunded Expected Remaining 2019 issuance Debt Profile

Debt-to-GNI* (104% 2018, from 166% peak) Debt-to-GG Revenue (251% 2018, from 353%) Average interest rate (2.6% 2018, from 5.1%) Debt-to-GDP^ (64% 2018, from 120%) Cash-balance provides near-term protection (€bn) Five years of primary surplus (€bn)

^ due to GDP distortions, Debt to GDP is not representative for Ireland, we suggest using other measures listed.

Gap year helpful

  • 25
  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019f GG Balance Primary Balance

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SLIDE 6

6

Main risks are external and outside of Ireland’s control

Brexit

“Hard” Br Brexit – end end Oct.

  • ct. 2019

is is ne next xt cli cliff ed edge - cou

  • uld redu

educe Irish rish gr growth th to

  • 0%

% in in 2020. Em Empl ployment migh ight t be be up up to

  • 4%

% le less ss tha than in in a a be benign sce cenario acc according to

  • Do

DoF/E /ESRI.

US

Ireland is still a “high beta” bet

  • n
  • n the

the US S ec economy, in n par parti ticular r its its ICT sec ector. US S is is in in the the la late stag age of

  • f its

its ec economic cy cycl cle, , al although this this may be be extended by y Fed pol policy

Tax

Cor Corporati tion tax x reform rm may im impact Irela eland's s ec economic ic mod

  • del in

in the the med edium term erm. The he OECD BEP BEPS II pr process ss is is sla lated to

  • rep

eport rt by y en end 2020

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SLIDE 7

7

€12bn (of €14-18bn) issued in 2019 so far; well positioned given prefunding and maturity lengthening

Pre-funded

Curr Current t cash ash bal balances s cover r al all l 2019 red edempti tions s an and mor

  • re

The remainder of this year’s fun unding (at le least €3bn bn) wil ill mee eet t 2020 bon bond rede edempti tions

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties s in in Eur Europe NTM NTMA used ECB’s QE to extend deb debt maturit ity, red educe in interest cos

  • st an

and rep epay the the IMF loa loans

A+/A2/A+

Rati tings s from mai ain ag agencies Ireland’s debt sustainability is im improving, g, alth although Br Brexit is is hol holding bac back rati ting up upgrades

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SLIDE 8

Best measures - labour market and MFDD

  • show Ireland’s economy is in rude health

Section 1: Macro

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SLIDE 9

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

9

  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Thousands Non-Construction Employment Construction Employment Total Employment vs 2008 peak

Labour market best illustrates Ireland’s growth story – Ireland is at or very close to full employment

Unemployment rate: down to 4.6% in July 2019 from peak of 16% Total employment back above previous peak as 160K non-construction jobs added on net

Unemployment back to pre-crisis levels

Source: CSO

2.3m people employed

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SLIDE 10

10

High-skill employment has grown sharply

Labour participation has not yet fully recovered as young stay in school

High-skill employment an important driver; though labour participation rate has been slow to recover

Source: Eurostat; CSO High Skill jobs include the ISCO08 defined groupings Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals

58% 59% 60% 61% 62% 63% 64% 65% 66% 67% 68% 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019

Rate inflated pre-crisis by migrant construction workers

  • 10.0%
  • 8.0%
  • 6.0%
  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 High Skill Other Employment Growth

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SLIDE 11
  • 10%
  • 8%
  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018 2019 Hours worked Hourly wage Employment Other Compensation COE growth (y-o-y)

11

Wage growth a driver for increase in compensation of employees… … but disparities remain across sectors

Wages growth evident in 2018 but uneven across sectors

Source: CSO

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% Transport/Storage IT Arts & Rec Construction Admin & Support Wholesale/Retail Fin, Insurance & RE Total Education Industry Prof, science & tech Accom & Food Health Public admin 4Q average hourly earnings y-o-y Q1 2019 2018 average annual earnings (€000, RHS)

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12

y = -0.7385x + 0.0956 R² = 0.8006

  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 2.0% 5.0% 8.0% 11.0% 14.0% 17.0% Nominal wage growth per head Unemployment Rate

Inflation (%) in Ireland similar to rest of euro area currently – Brexit ref. impact has gone

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 3 4 HICP Ireland HICP Euro Area "Core" Ireland "Core" EA

At full employment, wage growth could be an issue in 2019

Despite being late cycle, inflation is low; Ireland’s Phillips Curve might be starting to bite

Source: CSO, NTMA analysis; Non-Agriculture employment /wage data on yearly basis (1999-2018) Source: CSO, Eurostat

Unemployment breached 5% barrier in early 2019

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SLIDE 13

13

GNI* was €197bn in 2018; 7.3% higher than in 2017 (current prices) GNI* growth rate averaged 7.7% 2013-2018 (current prices)

GDP distortions mean we need to look to other metrics; Irish recovery evident when looking at GNI*

Source: CSO Note: See annex for discussion on the GDP distortions from 2015 onwards

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 GDP GNI* GNI* is 61% of GDP

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% GDP Growth GNI* Growth

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14

In real terms underlying growth in Ireland averaged 4.4% since 2014 Unusually large changes in multinational stock levels distort the MDD measure

When looking for price-adjusted timely data, modified final domestic demand is the best measure

  • 15.0%
  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Investment Consumption Govt Stocks MDD MFDD

Source: CSO Note MFDD measure used here includes private consumption, government consumption, building investment, elements of machinery & equipment investment, elements of intangible asset investment. See annex for more detail.

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Modified Domestic Demand MFDD (MDD ex stocks)

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SLIDE 15

15

Breakdown of the Irish economy by sector – Industry (pharma) and ICT are 40% of GVA Information and communication sector has seen exceptional growth in recent years

Economy has been driven by multinational growth – in particular ICT; sector grew 25% in 2018 alone

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 ICT % of Economy (GVA adjusted for 2015 distortions) ICT Sector (GVA 4Q y-o-y) Industry, 27.4%

Construction + Real Estate, 9.6%

Dist, trans, hotels, rest., 14.0% ICT, 14.5% Financial, 8.0% Prof, Admin and Support , 12.0% P Admin, Educ & Health, 11.9% Other, 2.7%

Source: CSO (2018) Note GVA figures adjusted for distortions in 2015. A depreciation charge was subtracted from industry GVA in 2015 and onwards to take account od multinational effects.

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SLIDE 16

16

MFDD growth is heavily correlated with employment growth Ireland’s PMIs diverging in recent months, as manufacturing slows around the world

Short-term indicators point to further growth, although a little less hot than in the last five years

Source: CSO; Markit, Bloomberg, Investec Note MFDD measure used here includes private consumption, government consumption, building investment, elements of machinery & equipment investment, elements of intangible asset investment. See annex for more detail. MFDD = 1.362*employ + 0.004 R² = 0.86

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15%

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% MFDD y-o-y growth Employment y-o-y growth 40 45 50 55 60 65 Services Manufacturing Composite

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SLIDE 17

17

Consumer spending growth consistent around 3% mark

Private consumption expanded by 3.4% in 2018 – Q1 continued trend Services driving latest growth in spending

Source: CSO; Eurostat

45 55 65 75 85 95 105 115

  • 6%
  • 3%

0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Consumption Growth (4Q Y-o-Y) Consumption (€bns, RHS)

  • 6%
  • 3%

0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Services Durables Non-Durables Consumption

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SLIDE 18

18

  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Credit advanced to Business (y-o-y) Lending for house purchase (y-o-y)

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 M+E B+C Intangibles Investment

Lending for house purchase only edging into positive territory recently

Crucially the recovery has not been driven by credit so far

Economic growth 2013-18

Source: CBI; CSO Note: Credit to business series excludes financial intermediation and property related credit Note: Modified investment excludes impact of imports of intangible and aircraft leasing assets

Modified investment led solely by building + construction; Mach. + Equipment sluggish

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SLIDE 19

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 Debt (€Bns) Disposable Income (€Bns) Debt-to-Income Ratio (%) 2008 2013 2018

19

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450% Public and Private debt (% of MFDD) Private debt (% of MFDD) Public debt (% of MFDD) 2003 2008 2013 2018

Household debt ratio has decreased due to deleveraging and increasing incomes Legacy of crisis is on Govt. balance sheet not the private sector’s

Private debt levels remain elevated but Ireland has used recovery period to repair balance sheets

Source: CBI data Source: CBI Note: Private debt includes Household and Irish-resident enterprises (ex. financial intermediation) CBI quarterly financial accounts data used for household and government liabilities. MFDD = modified final domestic demand. Used instead of GDP.

Economic growth has allowed private sector deleveraging

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SLIDE 20

20

Gross household saving rate lower than peak but healthy 8-11% Interest burden down to below 4% of disposable income from peak of 11%

Saving rate lower in recent years, facilitating consumption and slower pace of deleveraging

Source: Eurostat, ONS, CSO ; CBI, Eurostat NTMA calculations Note: Gross Savings as calculated by the CSO has tended to be a volatile series in the past, some caution is warranted when interpreting this data

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 % of f di disp sposable le Inc ncome Ireland EA-19 Germany Spain Italy Netherlands 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 % of Disposable Income (4Q MA) Ireland EU-28 EA-19 UK

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21

External environment a bit more helpful for Ireland in 2019

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019f EA Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative Less accommodative Accommodative ? US Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative but tightening Further tightening Curve inversion, but easing possible US growth Stimulative Less stimulative Stimulative Stimulative due to fiscal package Neutral 2nd derivative Oil price Falling Falling Rising Falling No change y-o-y UK growth Stimulative Less favourable; Brexit impact Growth slowing Growth slowing Brexit crunch Euro Growth Stimulative Stimulative Stimulative Slowing growth Possibly improving Euro currency Very Helpful Helpful Headwind Neutral No change y-o-y

  • v. £; weaker v $
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SLIDE 22

22

Goods exports outside MNC-dominated sectors were weak in 2018 (y-o-y change) Current account is distorted heavily by MNEs: modified CA is consistent with GNI*

Outside Pharma and ICT, export growth has slowed in recent quarters; Ireland is living within its means

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Exports Chemical Products and Computer Services Exports ex. Chem & Comp Rebound in Q1 19

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Current Account (% of GNI*) Modified Current Account (% of GNI*)

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations Nominal values, exports excludes contract manufacturing. Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland’s current account data. MNC’s action distort metrics heavily.

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SLIDE 23

Ireland is fully funded for 2019 having recorded a small budget surplus in 2018

Section 2: Fiscal & NTMA funding

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SLIDE 24

24

€11.25bn issued in 2019 so far; well positioned given prefunding and maturity lengthening

Pre-funded

Curr Current t cash ash bal balances s cover r 2019 2019 red edempti tions The he rem emainder r of

  • f €14

14-18bn in in exp xpected fun unding in in 2019 to

  • fun

und 2020 rede edempti tions

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties s in in Eur Europe NTM NTMA has has us used QE QE per period to

  • le

lengthen maturi riti ties, lo lower r in interest t cos

  • sts

ts an and rep epay its its IMF loa loans s ea earl rly

A+/A2/A+

Rati tings s from mai ain ag agencies s Ireland’s debt sustainability is im improving, g, whi hich sug uggests ts tha that t rati tings may ris rise to

  • dou

double-A A terri erritory furt urther r barr barring sho hocks

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SLIDE 25

25

Maturity profile: IMF repayment and FRN buy-backs have reduced refinancing risk; Green diversifies investor base

Source: NTMA Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extension that will bring their weighted-average maturity from 12.5 years to 19.5 years. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any of its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the 2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Billions € Bond (Fixed & ILB) Bilateral EFSM EFSF Bond (Floating Rate) Green

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SLIDE 26

26

The NTMA took advantage of QE to extend debt profile

…Ireland (in years) now compares favourably to other EU countries Various operations have extended the maturity of Government debt …

Source: NTMA; ECB *excludes programme loans. Ireland’s maturity including these loans is still similar

10.1 10.0 10.0 8.3 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.5 6.9 6.4 6.5 6.1 2 4 6 8 10 12 Govt Debt Securities - Weighted Maturity EA Govt Debt Securities - Avg. Weighted Maturity 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-53 € Billions Debt Prefunded Long-term Extensions since 2014 Debt Profile

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27

NTMA issued €66bn MLT debt since 2015; 14.3 yr. weighted maturity; avg. rate of 1.1% Interest costs forecasted pre-QE to be c.€10bn; likely to be below €5bn in ‘19

Funding strategy has lowered the State’s interest burden

Source: NTMA, CSO, Department of Finance Other issuance includes inflation linked bonds, private placement and amortising bonds

2 4 6 8 10 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 GG interest (€bns) SPU 2014 Estimates 2019-2021 Latest Estimates 5Y 8Y 5Y 10Y 10Y 16Y 7Y 30Y 10Y 5Y 20Y 10Y 12Y 15Y 10Y 30Y 5.5 3.9 2.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 3 6 9 12 15 18 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 YTD € Billions Other Auction Syndication Weighted Average Yield % (RHS)

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SLIDE 28

28

The State is funded three to four quarters in advance

  • The next redemption is in October. Cash

balances easily cover it.

  • In January 2019, the NTMA issued a 10

year benchmark bond. It raised €4bn at 1.123% yield.

  • In May 2019, the NTMA issued a 30 year

benchmark bond. It raised €4bn at 1.53%.

  • In February, June and July, the NTMA

auctioned a further €3.25bn across the 2029, 2033 and 2037 bonds.

  • Other borrowing (such as non-comp)

brings the total to c. €12bn

Source: NTMA

  • EBR is the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (DOF estimate)
  • Outflows, long term paper and end-year cash position are estimates for illustrative purposes.
  • Cash balances excludes non-liquid asset classes such as Housing Finance Agency (HFA) Guaranteed Notes.
  • Other outflows includes bond buybacks, switches, and contingencies.
  • Other funding includes Retail (State Savings).
  • Rounding may occur.

€15.3 Cash €13.1 Cash

EBR €2.1

Other €3.6 Bond €13.1 Long term Paper €16 Bonds €17.1 UK €1.6 UK €1.9 Other, €5.0 €- €4 €8 €12 €16 €20 €24 Y/E 2018 Outflow Funding (€14-18bn) Y/E 2019 2020 Outflow

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SLIDE 29

29

Ireland roughly split 80/20 on non-resident versus resident holdings (End ‘18) “Sticky” sources - official loans, Eurosystem, retail - make up over 50% of Irish debt

Diverse holders of Irish debt – sticky sources account for

  • ver 50%

Source: CSO, Eurostat, CBI, ECB, NTMA Analysis IGBs excludes those held by Eurosystem. Eurosystem holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of

  • FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA. Other debt Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC-

related liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

33% 7%, Resident 2% 23% 10%, Resident 24% IGBs - Private Non Resident IGBs - Private Resident Short term Eurosystem Retail Other Debt (incl. Official) 50 100 150 200 250

IGBs - Private Non Resident IGBs - Private Resident Short term Eurosystem Retail Other Debt (incl. Official) Total Debt (€bns)

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SLIDE 30

30

Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

Investor breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications

Source: NTMA

36.0% 38.4% 15.6% 10.0% Fund/Asset Manager Banks/Central Banks Pensions/Insurance Other Ireland, 8.2% UK, 30.2% 6.7% Cont. Europe, 41.8% 10.6% 2.5% Ireland UK US and Canada Continental Europe Nordics Asia & Other

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31

US yield curve has inverted (albeit only slightly so far): will history repeat? In Euro Area, PSPP re-investment continuing as ECB eases with TLTROs

Late cycle risks mixed for Ireland: yield curve sets recession clock ticking but central banks are now easing

Source: DataStream, ECB *S *Shaded area reas indicate re recessionary periods in the US US

  • 3%
  • 2%
  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 US 10 year bond yield minus 3m Treasury bill yield 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 € Billions PSPP IGB purchases (RHS) Cumulative Purchases (LHS)

Re- investment spread out

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SLIDE 32
  • 9.1%
  • 8.3%
  • 6.4%
  • 3.7%
  • 1.2% -0.7% -0.3%

0.0%

  • 12.3%
  • 11.5%
  • 8.4%
  • 4.8%
  • 2.0%
  • 1.0% -0.5%

0.0%

  • 14%
  • 12%
  • 10%
  • 8%
  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 GGB (% of GDP) GGB (% of GNI*)

32

  • Gen. Govt. Balance from -12% to

surplus (ex-banking recap) in 7 yrs Revenue surge has helped Ireland balance the books since 2015 (€bn)

Ireland provisionally recorded a full budget surplus for first time in 11 years in 2018

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

Surplus is back due to CT windfall

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f 2021f € Billions GG Expenditure (ex-banking recap) GG Revenue GG Revenue 10yr rolling average

slide-33
SLIDE 33
  • 4
  • 2

2 Cyprus Romania France Spain Italy UK Latvia Slovakia Belgium Finland EU28 Estonia EA Portugal Poland Ireland(GNI*) Austria Croatia Denmark Lithuania Slovenia Czech Rep Sweden Greece Netherlands Germany Bulgaria Malta Luxembourg

33

In recent years Ireland has run primary surpluses that reduced debt ratios 2018 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP); Ireland middle of the pack in Europe

Ireland has improved its debt dynamics: next step is to follow others and run consistent GGB surplus

Source: CSO; Department of Finance, EU Commission forecasts, NTMA calculation Note: Debt Stabilising primary balance is the primary balance it is necessary to run in a year to keep the debt-to-GNI* ratio from rising given the average interest rate and growth in that year.

  • 30%
  • 25%
  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% Primary Balance (% of GNI*) Debt Stabilising PB (% of GNI*)

~

  • 40%
slide-34
SLIDE 34

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019f Ireland (GNI*) Ireland (GDP)

34

Gross Government debt 64% of GDP at end-2018; 104% of GNI*; reality somewhere in between

Debt-to-GNI* ratio is high but has declined quickly

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

37% 67% 80% 87% 90% 86% 66% 65% 59% 55% 25% 19% 32% 33% 30% 18% 11% 9% 9% 9% 62% 86% 111% 120% 120% 104% 77% 74% 68% 64% 61% 56% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% Net Debt/GDP Cash Balances/EDP assets GG Debt/GDP

slide-35
SLIDE 35

35

Alternative debt service metrics must also be used for Ireland e.g. General Government debt to GG Revenue

Source: Eurostat, CSO; Department of Finance

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020F Ireland Spain Italy Belgium EA-19

slide-36
SLIDE 36

36

It’s best to analyse Irish debt with broad range of metrics

2018 GG debt to GG revenue % GG interest to GG rev % GG debt to GDP % Greece 378.8% 6.7% 181.1% Italy 284.5% 7.9% 132.2% Portugal 279.2% 7.9% 121.5% Cyprus 256.8% 6.7% 102.5% Ireland 251.4% 6.4% 63.4% Spain 249.8% 6.2% 97.1% UK 218.3% 6.2% 86.8% Belgium 197.4% 4.6% 102.0% EA19 184.0% 4.0% 85.1% France 183.9% 3.5% 98.4% EU28 177.8% 4.1% 80.0% Slovenia 162.8% 4.6% 70.1% Austria 151.8% 3.3% 73.8% Germany 133.7% 2.0% 60.9% Slovakia 122.6% 3.2% 48.9%

Source: Eurostat, Department of Finance * 2018 Interest % of GG Revenue would be closer to 6% excluding the interest paid to CBI (of which 80% is returned to the State) , much of which accrues because of the holdings of the CBI’s legacy holding of Irish FRNs ** 107% Debt to GNI* ratio in 2018

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SLIDE 37

37

Snowball Effect (i-g) in Ireland’s favour given lower average interest rate

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% GG Revenue Growth (g) Average Interest Rate (i)

slide-38
SLIDE 38

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 0% 4% 8% 12% 16% 20% 24% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f Corporation Tax (€bns, RHS) Corporation Tax (% of tax revenue) Corporation Tax (% of GG Revenue) 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f Income Tax Capital Gains + Stamp Duty Corporation Tax

38

Corporation tax receipts have more than doubled in four years Income tax base intact (% tax revenue) - not comparable to narrowing of base pre-crisis

Corporation tax revenue keeps surprising positively, but each year the concentration risk increases

Since 2014 c.40% of CT paid by 10 companies

Source: Department of Finance

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SLIDE 39

39

€ Bill illion 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018

Currency y and d de depos

  • sit

its (main inly ly retail il de debt) t) 21.3 21.6 21.6 Securit itie ies oth ther than an sh shar ares,

  • exc. financia

ial l de derivativ ives 124.2 130.7 134.2

  • Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc)

2.4 2.9 3.1

  • Long-term (MLT bonds)

121.8 127.8 131.1 Loa Loans 55.2 49.0 50.3

  • Short-term

0.7 0.5 0.6

  • Long-term

(official funding) 54.6 48.5 49.7 General Gov

  • vernment

t Debt 200.7 201.3 206.2 ED EDP de debt t ins nstrument assets ts 24.9 27.3 28.6 Net Net Gov

  • vernment

t de debt t 175.8 174.0 177.6

Ireland: “A” grade from all major credit rating agencies; Net debt level is a positive for Ireland relative to peers

Source: NTMA, CSO

Ra Rating g Ag Agency Lon Long- term Sho Short- term Outl utlook/ Trend Da Date of

  • f

las last cha change Standard & Poor's A+ A-1 Stable June 2015 Fitch Ratings A+ F1+ Stable Dec 2017 Moody's A2 P-1 Stable Sept 2017 DBRS A(high) R-1 (middle) Stable March 2016 R&I A a-1 Stable Jan. 2017

slide-40
SLIDE 40

“Hard Brexit” risk has increased as UK politics is polarised; end-October deadline

Section 3: Brexit

slide-41
SLIDE 41

41

Brexit path is unclear – probability of a “Hard” Brexit has risen with significant implications for Ireland

  • Less trade given lower demand from UK/ tariffs
  • Higher import prices possible in long-term: tariffs

may outweigh FX benefit. Non-tariffs costs could also be significant.

  • Regions suffer (agriculture, tourism), while Dublin

may benefit (via FDI that leaves Britain)

  • Banking sector likely to suffer because
  • f its UK operations (especially Bank of Ireland)
  • Political economy (border, ally on direction of EU

economic policy)

  • Increased FDI, as multinationals avoid turmoil
  • Financial services (passporting lost by UK)
  • Other multinationals - especially

IT and business services

  • Commercial property occupancy could rise; there

may also be an influx of well paid workers

  • Fiscal help from Europe is possible
  • Some trade offsets
  • Irish companies may steal EU market share

from British ones

Cons Pros

slide-42
SLIDE 42

42

Whichever type of Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted

Irish rish/U /UK tr trad ade li link nkages s will ill suf uffer r fol

  • llowing Br

Brexit

  • The UK is the second largest single-country

export destination for Ireland’s goods and the largest for its services

  • At the same time, Ireland imports 20-25%
  • f its goods from the UK. Consumer goods,

capital equipment and inputs into the export process will become cheaper thanks to FX. The here is is sign ignificant em employment t rela elated to Ireland’s trade with the UK

  • The UK might only account for 15% of

Ireland’s total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that, considering the employment related to those exports SM SMEs Es ac account for

  • r over

r 55% % of

  • f IE

E exp xports rts to

  • UK.

K. The hey ar are e li likely y to

  • be

be mor

  • re ad

adverse sely ly affected tha than la larger r com

  • mpanies

s by y the the in intr troducti tion of

  • f tari

ariffs s and and barr barriers s to

  • tr

trad ade

Source: CSO 2017 * UK data includes Northern Ireland NTMA calculations; Data does not include contract manufacturing

Good

  • ods

(20 2018) Servic ices (20 2017) Tot

  • tal

(20 2017) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.7 16.9 11.6 27.0 18.3 25.0 UK* 11.4 21.9 16.4 9.3 15.1 13.7 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 39.0 37.9 29.9 25.7 32.8 27.4 China 3.9 5.9 2.5 1.5 3.2 2.8 Other 18.0 17.4 39.5 36.6 30.5 31.1

slide-43
SLIDE 43

43

UK is 13-14% of goods exports but very important partner in many small sectors UK is 16% of services exports but not the majority trading partner in any segment

Breakdown of exports to the UK: important trade partner especially so in smaller sectors (agri-food products)

Meat Dairy

Medicinal and pharmaceutical products

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% UK trade % of segment exports UK trade as % of total goods exports Red Box includes many small export sectors that UK is significant % of Computer Services

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% UK trade % of segment exports UK trade as % of total services exports

Source: CSO goods 2017 data, services 2016 data The size of bubble relates to the sector’s importance to Ireland’s exports

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SLIDE 44

44

Forecast vs. no Brexit baseline Short term (2 years) Medium term (5 years) Long term (10-15 years) Department of Finance (ESRI)

  • 2.4%
  • 3.3%
  • 5.0%

Copenhagen Economics

  • 2.0 to 2.5%
  • 4.5%
  • 7.0%

(of which -4.9% is due to regulatory divergence) Central Bank of Ireland

  • 4.0%
  • 6.0%

Bank of England “disruptive” (implied)

  • 5.0%
  • 6.2%
  • 6.2%

Bank of England “disorderly” (implied)

  • 6.3%
  • 8.2%
  • 8.2%

UK Treasury range (implied)

  • 5.0 to 7.2%

Hard Brexit impact estimates all show similar story – return to WTO rules would be big negative for Ireland

Source: ESRI, Copenhagen, Bank of England, UK treasury Implied uses the impact on UK GDP and an elasticity measure of 0.8 to calculate the impact on Irish Growth

slide-45
SLIDE 45

45

  • Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.

The chief areas of interest are  Financial services  Business services  IT/ new media.

  • Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt,

Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services.

  • Ireland’s FDI opportunity will depend on the
  • utcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK

(City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more

  • pportunities in time.

FDI: Ireland may benefit Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland

Many financial institutions have already announced that they will expand or set up in Dublin after Brexit

slide-46
SLIDE 46

Ireland’s long run future looks bright thanks to its favourable demographics

Section 4: Long term fundamentals

slide-47
SLIDE 47

47

Ireland’s GNI* per capita hit 2007 levels and compares favourably to EA

Much rebalancing has taken place – Ireland’s structural growth drivers have reasserted

Source: CSO, Eurostat

Gross National Income* at current prices (1995=100)

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 "Celtic Tiger" 1994-2001 Credit/Prop erty Bubble Bubble Burst

Recovery

  • 5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 Ireland (GNI*) EA 19 (GDP) Germany (GDP)

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SLIDE 48

48

20 40 60 80 World USA Sweden China Ireland UK Denmark Canada Finland Belgium France Germany Greece Portugal Italy Spain Japan 2015 Old Age Dependency Ratio 2045

Ireland’s population profile healthier than the EU average

Ireland’s population was 4.86m in 2018 –

  • ver 200,000 more than 2011 Census

Ireland’s population will remain younger than most of its EA counterparts

Source: Eurostat (2018) CSO; UN population projections

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% <1 yr 5 101520253035404550556065707580859095

Ireland Germany EU28

25% of Ireland’s population aged 17 or below versus 19% for EU % of population in age cohort

slide-49
SLIDE 49

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 10% 15% 20% 25% % of population >64 years of age % of population < 15 years of age Other Germany Ireland Spain France Italy Best position is top right

49

Regional data show Ireland’s mix of young and old among the best in EU Ireland’s Working-Age Population expected to grow in coming years (2019-2028)

Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look great

Source: Oxford Economics forecasts Source: Eurostat; Regional NUTS2 basis Note: Each dot is a NUTS2 region in the EU. Y-axis is inverted

  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% Japan Germany China Italy Euro area EU Austria Netherlands France Spain Belgium UK Denmark Ireland US India

slide-50
SLIDE 50

50

  • 120
  • 100
  • 80
  • 60
  • 40
  • 20

20 40 60 80 Third level Other Education Net Migration 2009-2013 2014-2018

Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland “Reverse Brain Drain”

Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland

Source: CSO

  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%

  • 100
  • 50

50 100 150 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Emigration (000s) Immigration (000s) Net Migration (000s) Net Migration (% of Pop, RHS)

slide-51
SLIDE 51

51

Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Brexit may hinder export-led growth

Ireland benefits from export diversification by destination Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices)

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations , * Contract manufacturing proxy

Good

  • ods

(20 2018) Servic ices (20 2017) Tot

  • tal

(20 2017) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.7 16.9 11.6 27.0 18.3 25.0 UK* 11.4 21.9 16.4 9.3 15.1 13.7 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 39.0 37.9 29.9 25.7 32.8 27.4 China 3.9 5.9 2.5 1.5 3.2 2.8 Other 18.0 17.4 39.5 36.6 30.5 31.1

  • 10.00
10.00 30.00 50.00 70.00 90.00 110.00 130.00 150.00 170.00

90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Contract Manufacturing* Services Goods ex. CM Exports

slide-52
SLIDE 52

52

All this leads to mixture of highly productive and labour intensive sectors in Ireland

Source: CSO , NTMA calculations, 2018 data

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Industry ex. Distortions Info & comm Fin, insurance & RE Distribution, transport, hotels and restaurants Prof, admin and support Public admin, education and health Construction Other Agri, forestry, fish GVA (€bns) Employment (% of Total, RHS) LI Highly productive Labour Intensive HP

slide-53
SLIDE 53

90 95 100 105 110 115 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% Unemployment

  • Comp. of Emp. per

employee growth Annual Averages (1999-2007) 2019f

53

Nominal Labour Cost Ratio – IE vs Euro Area Unemployment back towards 1999-2007 level, but wage growth less than half

Ireland is pretty competitive now; we need to avoid repeat

  • f the mid-2000s

Ireland competitive versus euro area

Source: CSO, Eurostat, NTMA calculations Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis *Ratio = IE Nom. Labour Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs

2019 forecast

slide-54
SLIDE 54

54

Selected Countries Global Rank Index Score (0-100)

Sweden 1 85.6 Denmark 2 84.2 Finland 3 84.0 Norway 4 83.9 Czech Republic 5 81.9 Germany 6 81.7 France 10 80.3 Belgium 12 80.0 United Kingdom 16 78.3 Ireland 19 77.9 Spain 25 76.8 Portugal 28 75.6 Italy 30 75.5 Luxembourg 33 75.0 Greece 38 72.9 United States 42 72.4

Ireland’s strong fundamentals highlighted by performance

  • n United Nations sustainability index

Source: United Nations SDG project

Ireland Global rank Vs. Regional Average

Subjective Wellbeing (2016) 13/133 Environmental Performance Index (2016) 19/155 Human Development Index (2016) 8/157 Global Competitiveness Index (2016/17) 21/134 Global Peace Index (2016) 12/149

slide-55
SLIDE 55

55

UN Goal – Peace, Justice and Strong institutions Ireland Actual Figure Ireland Normalised (world leader = 100) OECD Average

Overall

  • 87.5

75.8 Corruption Perception Index (0-100) 73.0 79.4 73.5 Government Efficiency (1-7) 4.8 74.8 52.8 Homicides (per 100,000 people) 1.1 97.8 96.1 Prison population (per 100,000 people) 80.0 87.8 74.6 Property Rights (1-7) 6.1 94.8 73.1 Population who feel safe walking alone at night (%) 75.0 73.7 67.4

Ireland is close to OECD norms on social issues Ireland scores well on metrics such as property rights and government efficiency

Ireland is a good place to live and do business

Source: United Nations SDG project

50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Gender Equality Decent work and economic growth Reduced Inequalities Sustainable Cities and Communities Ireland (World leader = 100) OECD Average

slide-56
SLIDE 56

56

  • Ireland agreed two Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives

(ATADs) with our fellow EU Member States in 2016 and 2017. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives represent binding commitments to implement three significant BEPS recommendations into Irish law as well as two additional anti-avoidance measures.

  • Three out of five required components of the

ATADs are now in effect as of 1st Jan 2019: Controlled-Foreign Company (CFC) rules, Exit Tax and General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAAR).

  • We continue to engage positively at both EU and

OECD level on tax issues.

  • Ireland has been a strong supporter of the BEPS

process since inception.

  • Removal of known tax avoidance structures such

as the “Double Irish”, “the Single Malt” and “stateless companies”.

  • Ireland is best in class on tax transparency and

exchange of information. Ireland is one of only 23 jurisdictions to have been found to be fully compliant with new international best practice by the Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information.

  • Ireland introduced Country-by-Country Reporting

in 2015. Ireland also ratified the BEPS multilateral instrument in domestic legislation which will update the majority of Ireland’s tax treaties to be BEPS compliant. Ireland’s part in OECD (BEPS) corporate tax reform Ireland’s role in EU actions on corporate tax reform

Ireland reformed its corporate tax code to meet global standards; the 12.5% rate is fixed Government policy

slide-57
SLIDE 57

Residential property prices have started to cool as supply comes online

Section 5: Property

slide-58
SLIDE 58

58

House prices rising strongly but some way off peak Office leads commercial property (peak = 100)

Property prices have levelled off over the last year

Source: CSO; IPD

20 40 60 80 100 120 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 Retail Office Industrial 20 40 60 80 100 120 National

  • Excl. Dublin

Dublin

slide-59
SLIDE 59

59

Housing supply still below demand; price inflation has moderated as supply slowly catching up

New dwellings* make up 80% of housing completions: some debate about the rest Housing Completions above 22,000 in 2018 but still low historically (000s)

* Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections

  • f old houses or connections from “ghost estates” overstate the annual run rate of new building.

Source: DoHPCLG, CSO, NTMA Calculations

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010 2018 Nationally Dublin

  • ex. Dublin

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 New dwelling completion Unfinished Reconnection Non-Domestic All connections

slide-60
SLIDE 60

60

Demand has picked up since 2015; Credit slowly increasing as cash buyers become less important

Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep trough (000s) Non-mortgage transactions still important but closer to 40% of total

Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register Source: BPFI *4 quarter sum used

20 40 60 80 100 120 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Residential Investment Letting Mover purchaser First Time Buyers

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Q4 2010 Q2 2011 Q4 2011 Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q2 2013 Q4 2013 Q2 2014 Q4 2014 Q2 2015 Q4 2015 Q2 2016 Q4 2016 Q2 2017 Q4 2017 Q2 2018 Q4 2018 Thousands Non-mortgage transactions Mortgage drawdowns for house purchase Non-mortgage transactions % of total (RHS)

slide-61
SLIDE 61

61

Residential property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012 but steadied in 2018

Source: CSO;

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 National (Y-o-Y %) Ex Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Dublin (Y-o-Y %)

slide-62
SLIDE 62

62

  • First time buyers (FTBs) can borrow 90% of the

value of a home (10% minimum deposit). Five per cent of the total new lending to FTBs will be allowed above the 90% LTV limit.

  • For second and subsequent buyers (SSBs), banks

must restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 80 per cent LTV to no more than 20 per cent of new lending to SSBs.

  • Bank must restrict lending for primary dwelling

purchase above 3.5 times LTI to no more than 20 per cent of that aggregate value for FTBs and 10 per cent for SSBs.

  • Banks have to limit Buy-to-Let loans (BTL) above

70 per cent LTV to 10 per cent of all BTL loans. CBI’s amended macro-prudential rules Transaction growth has slowed since macro- prudential rules introduced

CBI’s macro-prudential rules increase resilience of banking and household sector

Introduced in 2015

Source: Residential Property Price Register

  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 Q1 2011 Q4 2011 Q3 2012 Q2 2013 Q1 2014 Q4 2014 Q3 2015 Q2 2016 Q1 2017 Q4 2017 Q3 2018 Q2 2019 4Q Sum of Transactions Y-o-Y Change (RHS)

slide-63
SLIDE 63
  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% SD BG NW OE NL ES FR DN LX IE EA PT UK FN BD IT GR

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% SD NW BG UK DN FR IE LX ES NL FN OE EA BD PT GR IT

63

Irish house price valuation metrics continue to rise but remain below 2008 levels

Source: OECD, NTMA Workings Note: Measured as % over or under valuation relative to long term averages since 1980.

Deviation from average price-to-income ratio (Q4 2018, red dot represent Q1 2008) Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q4 2018, red dot represent Q1 2008)

slide-64
SLIDE 64

Worries about contingent liabilities no longer; Ireland now has legacy assets

Section 6: Other data

slide-65
SLIDE 65

Ireland has legacy banking-related assets

  • Ba

Banki king

  • Banks continue to be profitable; income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved.
  • Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues and the

slow judicial process in accessing collateral.

  • An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) was completed in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer

to be used for debt reduction.

  • NA

NAMA

  • NAMA has repaid 100% of its senior debt; it forecasts a profit of €4.0bn subject to market conditions.
  • This is expected to be returned to the Exchequer in the next few years – starting in 2020.

65

slide-66
SLIDE 66

66

All three pillar banks profitable given enhanced margins

Allied Irish Bank Bank of Ireland Permanent TSB

Source: Annual reports of banks - BOI, AIB, PTSB Profit measures are before exceptional items

State Ownership 71% owned 14% owned 75% owned

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 2012201320142015201620172018 Net Interest Margin % 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 2012201320142015201620172018 Net Interest Margin % 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% Net Interest Margin %

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Profit Before Tax (€bns)

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 Profit Before Tax (€bns)

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 2012201320142015201620172018 Profit Before Tax (€bns)

slide-67
SLIDE 67

67

Domestic bank cost base reduced over time

… and IE banks* below to EU average Cost income ratios improve dramatically…

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks, EBA * EBA data includes three domestic banks as well as Ulster Bank, DEPFA & Citibank.

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks

Staffing (000s) shrunk by c.50% post crisis

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% LV SK ES PL DK GR PT NL HU SI GB FI IS IE IT EU AT LU BE FR CY DE

26 16 5 10 11 2 10 20 30 AIB BOI PTSB 2008 2018 123% 88% 144% 53% 65% 64% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% AIB BOI PTSB 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

slide-68
SLIDE 68

68

CET 1 capital ratios (End 2018) Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books slimmed down

Capital ratios strengthened as banks were slimmed down and consolidated

Source: Published bank accounts

Note: “Transitional” refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios.

Source: Published bank accounts

21.1% 17.5% 15.0% 13.4% 14.7% 12.2% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) AIB BOI PTSB

  • 20

40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) AIB BOI Dec-10 Dec-18

slide-69
SLIDE 69

69

Non-performing loans sold during 2018 as asset quality continues to improve at three pillar banks

No Non-performin ing exp xposures % of f tot total l loan

  • ans1 (los

loss pr prov

  • visio

ion % of NP NPE) Dec-17 17 Dec-18 18 Book k (€bn) bn) BOI

Irish Residential Mortgages 11.0(24) 9.5(21) 23.7 UK Residential Mortgages 1.9(14) 2.3(15) 21.7 Irish SMEs 15.4(46) 11.2(49) 7.6 UK SMEs 8.6(42) 6.1(53) 1.6 Corporate 3.0(69) 2.6(60) 10.3 CRE - Investment 17.9(43) 10.7(44) 7.7 CRE - Land/Development 39.4(55) 14.0(54) 0.6 Consumer Loans 2.1(98) 2.1(140) 5.1 8.3( 3(36 36) 6.3( 3(35 35) 78.4

AIB

Residential Mortgages 14 10.1 (20) 32.3 SMEs/Corporate 11 5.2 (36) 19.6 CRE 33 18.0 (29) 7.9 Consumer Loans 18 11.1 (50) 3.1 16 16 9.6 62.9

PTSB

Residential Mortgages 21.7(44) 8.8(39) 12.4 Buy-to-let Mortgages 21.8(64) 12.9(113) 4.0 Commercial 30.3(104) 33.3(76) 0.2 Consumer Loans 15.4(92) 7.5(112) 0.3 21.7( 7(50) 0) 10.0( 0(64) 4) 16.9

Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Dec 18)

Consumer CRE Corporate/ SME Mortgage

All 3 Pillar banks (€bn) Dec-17 Dec-18 Total Loans 162.4 158.2 Non-performing Exposures 22.0 12.7 (NPE as % of Total) 13.5% 8.0% Provisions 7.3 4.4 (Provisions as % of book) 4.4% 2.8% (Provisions as % of Impaired) 33.2% 34.6%

Source: Published bank accounts 1 Non-performing exposures include impaired loans, loans past due greater than 90 days but not impaired, and Forborne Collateral Realisations

60% 10% 5% 25%

slide-70
SLIDE 70

70

Ireland’s interest rates on lending for house purchase the highest in euro area Rates on SME loans* over euro area average

Profitability aided by higher interest rates than EA peers

Source: ECB *SME loans proxy of loans <1year and <€1m to Non-Financial Corporates

% % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Max Min Ireland Euro Area 2% spread above euro area rates since 2015 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Max Min Ireland Euro Area Consistent 1% spread above euro area rates

slide-71
SLIDE 71

71

Irish residential mortgage arrears are still improving; but there are complications unrelated to the economy

  • Non-bank entities now hold 13 per cent of all PDH mortgage accounts outstanding; 9 per cent are held by regulated retail credit

firms, with the remaining 4 per cent held by unregulated loan owners. Unregulated loan owners hold 23 per cent of all PDH mortgages in arrears over 720 days

  • 8.0
  • 6.0
  • 4.0
  • 2.0

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1819 Over 90 days 90-180 days 181-360 days 361-720 days >720 days Total change

Mortgage arrears (90+ days) Repossessions**

Source: CBI

PDH Arrears (by thousands)

* Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years. ** Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%

341234123412341234123412341234123412341 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

PDH + BTL (by balance) PDH + BTL (by number) 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 PDH BTL % of MA90+ (RHS)

slide-72
SLIDE 72

72

NAMA: All original senior debt has been repaid; likely to deliver surplus of around €4bn from 2020 onwards

  • NAMA’s operating performance is strong
  • Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par
  • f loans of 780 debtors for €32bn
  • NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges.
  • It

t has has rep epaid 100% % of

  • f €30.2b

.2bn of

  • f orig
  • riginal sen

enior de debt

  • NAMA exceeded its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains on course,

subject to market conditions, to redeem its small amount of subordinated debt by 2020.

  • NA

NAMA cou

  • uld deli

deliver r a a surp urplus s for

  • r Irish

rish taxp xpayers s of

  • f ab

about €4.0b .0bn, , acc according to

  • its

its management t tea eam - if if cur current t mar arket t con

  • ndit

itions rem emain favourable.

  • NA

NAMA in init itiati tive to

  • de

develop up up to

  • 20,00

,000 ho housi sing uni units s by y 2020 – sub ubject t to

  • com
  • mmercial via

viability ty.

 Progress has been strong so far: 9,700 units were completed in 2014 – 2018;  Another 3,000 are under construction or have had funding approved;  A further 6,400 have planning permission granted.

More NAMA information available on www.nama.ie

slide-73
SLIDE 73

73

The European Commission’s ruling on Apple’s tax affairs does not change the NTMA’s funding plans

  • The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This

figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland’s tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014.

  • Thi

his s case has nothing to do with Ireland’s corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: “This decision does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or its corporate tax rate”.

  • App

pple is is ap appealing the the rulin ruling, g, as as is is the the Iris rish Govern rnment.

  • t. This process could be lengthy. Pending the
  • utcome of the appeal, Apple has paid approximately €13bn plus EU interest into an escrow fund.
  • Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services

to hold and administer the fund.

  • Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management

International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund.

  • As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the

the NTM NTMA has has mad ade no no al allowance for

  • r these

these funds. s.

slide-74
SLIDE 74

74

Irish Sovereign Green Bond Framework aligned with the ICMA Green Bond Principles

Use of Proceeds Project Evaluation and Selection Process Management of Proceeds

Sustainable Water, Clean Transportation, Energy Efficiency, Climate Change Adaptation & Others Working Group established by Government: NTMA, DPER, DCCAE & DFIN Pending its allocation to Eligible Green Projects, Ireland will temporarily hold proceeds in its Central Fund.

Reporting

Annual Allocation Report & Biennial Eligible Green Project Impact Report

Source: NTMA Further details are available at ntma.ie

slide-75
SLIDE 75

75

Government’s NDP outlines green projects; aim to cut CO2 emissions by at least 80% by 2050

Sustainable Mobility €8.6 billion Sustainable Management

  • f Water and

Environmental Resources €6.8 billion Transition to a Low carbon and Climate Resilient Society €7.6 billion

Total:€23 billion (13%

  • f GNI*)

Source: National Development Plan 2018-2027

1 in 5 euros in the NDP to be spent on green projects

Further details are available at ntma.ie

slide-76
SLIDE 76

Explanatory charts about the distortions to Ireland’s National Accounts

Annex

slide-77
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77

Substantial activity from multinationals distorts the national accounts Reclassification of several companies and “onshoring” of IP led to step change in GDP

Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Change in Inventories External Channel Modified Domestic Demand GDP 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 19971999200120032005200720092011201320152017 Nominal GDP (€bns) Nominal GNP (€bns)

c.35% increase in nominal GDP in 2015

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The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports – mostly through contract manufacturing (CM)

Source: CSO

The capital stock expanded in 2015 by c. €300bn or c. 40%. This is due to:

  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several multinational

companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland by

multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets in Ireland.

Goods produced by the additional capital were mainly

  • exported. Complicating matters, the goods were

produced through “contract manufacturing”. CM occurs where a company in Ireland engages another abroad to manufacture products on its behalf.

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 National accounts exports Trade data exports Contract manufacturing proxy*

Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the

  • verseas contractor never takes ownership of the product. When the product is sold abroad, a change of

economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold. This export is recorded in Ireland’s statistics even though it was never produced in Ireland. Little or no employment in Ireland results from this contract manufacturing.

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Investment distorted by multinationals importing intellectual property (IP) into Ireland

  • Investment is above the pre-crisis level due to

MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland.

  • Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years

with this investment impacting the real economy.

  • However the recent sharp increase in intangibles

investment overstates Ireland’s position and should be discounted accordingly.

  • Building investment grew by 12.4% y-o-y in 2018

versus 2017 highlighting pent up demand for housing. Investment (4Q sum, €bns)

Source: CSO,

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Building Investment Other Investment Distortions Modified GFCF Total GFCF

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GNI* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP; best as a level rather than a growth metric

  • GDP headline numbers do not reflect the “true”

growth of Ireland’s income due to MNCs.

  • Reasons for 2015-18 MNC distortions:
  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • By modifying GNI to take account of these factors,

GNI* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.

National Account – Current Prices (€, y-o-y growth rates) 2015 2016 2017 2018 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 262.8bn (34.9%) 271.7bn (3.4%) 297.1bn (9.4%) 324.0bn (9.4%) minus Net Factor Income from rest of the world = Gross National Product (GNP) 200.8bn (22.9%) 220.6bn (9.9%) 234.9bn (6.5%) 253.1bn (7.7%) add EU subsidies minus EU taxes 1.2bn 1.0bn 1.1bn 1.1bn = Gross National Income (GNI) 202.0bn (22.9%) 221.6bn (9.7%) 236.0bn (6.5%) 254.2bn (7.7%) minus retained earnings

  • f re-domiciled firms
  • 4.7bn
  • 5.8bn
  • 4.5bn
  • 5.0bn

minus depreciation on foreign owned IP assets

  • 30.1bn -35.3bn -42.5bn -46.3bn

minus depreciation on aircraft leasing

  • 4.6bn
  • 4.9bn
  • 5.1bn
  • 5.4bn

= GNI* 162.7bn (9.4%) 175.6bn (8.0%) 184.0bn (4.7%) 197.5bn (7.3%)

Source: CSO

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Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) – which ignores exports - is best cyclical indicator

  • GNI* is useful but not timely. MDD and MFDD are

released on a quarterly and real basis.

  • MDD ignores the net exports channel. It also omits

aircraft leasing and IP imports from investment.

  • The measure includes:
  • Private and government consumption
  • Building investment
  • Some machinery & equipment investment
  • Some intangible asset investment
  • Value of physical changes in stock. This last piece

is impacted by MNCs and is quite volatile.

  • MDD has Ireland growing negatively in Q1 2019

mainly due to volatility in stocks.

  • When stocks are excluded, (i.e. using Modified Final

Domestic Demand) real underlying growth was 3.7% in Q1 2019. Since 2014, annual growth has averaged 4.4% when looking at MFDD.

Source: CSO, four quarter sum growth rate used to strip out substantial quarterly volatility. Note MDD includes inventories. Large inventories in Q4 2016 added a further degree of volatility into MDD data.

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Modified Domestic Demand MFDD (MDD ex stocks)

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Disclaimer

The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities. The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying

  • slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information
  • provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past
  • r future) of the Irish State or the NTMA.

The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice.