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Programming and Proving with Distributed Protocols Disel: Distributed Separation Logic { P } c { Q } ` http://distributedcomponents.net Ilya Sergey James R. Wilcox Zach Tatlock Distributed Systems Distributed Infrastructure Distributed


  1. Programming and Proving with Distributed Protocols Disel: Distributed Separation Logic { P } c { Q } ` http://distributedcomponents.net Ilya Sergey James R. Wilcox Zach Tatlock

  2. Distributed Systems

  3. Distributed Infrastructure

  4. Distributed Applications

  5. Verified Distributed Systems

  6. Verified Distributed Infrastructure Veri- Wow -Cert Iron

  7. Verified Distributed Applications Veri- Wow -Cert Iron

  8. Verified Distributed Applications Veri- Wow Challenging to verify apps in terms of infra. starting from scratch is unacceptable Indicates deeper problems with composition one node’s client is another’s server! -Cert Iron

  9. Verified Distributed Applications Challenges Solutions Client reasoning Protocols Veri- Wow Invariants rule WithInv Separation rule/Hooks Frame ` { P } c { Q } -Cert Disel: Iron

  10. Outline ` { P } c { Q } Protocols and running example Logical mechanisms programming with protocols invariants framing and hooks Implementation and future work

  11. Cloud Compute 21 C S

  12. Cloud Compute

  13. Cloud Compute : Server while true: (from, n) <- recv Req send Resp(n, factors(n)) to from Traditional specification: messages from server have correct factors Proved by finding an invariant of the system

  14. Cloud Compute: Server

  15. Cloud Compute: Client

  16. Cloud Compute: Client send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} Start over with clients in system? In Disel: use protocol to describe client interface

  17. Protocols

  18. Protocols A protocol is an interface among nodes Enables compositional verification

  19. Cloud Compute Protocol Messages: State: Transitions: Sends: precondition and effect Receives: effect

  20. Cloud Compute Protocol Messages: Req(n) | Resp(n,s) outstanding: Set<Msg> State: Transitions: Req Resp Sends: Receives: Req Resp

  21. Cloud Compute Req(21) C S Send Req(n) Precondition: none Effect: none

  22. Cloud Compute Req(21) ( C ,21) { } C S Receive Req(n) add (from, n) to out Effect:

  23. Cloud Compute { } C S Resp({3,7}) Send Resp(n,l) l == factors(n) Requires: (n,to) in out removes (n,to) from out Effect:

  24. Cloud Compute { } C S Resp({3,7}) Recv Resp(n,l) Effect: none

  25. Cloud Compute Protocol Messages: Req(n) | Resp(n,s) outstanding: Set<Msg> State: Transitions: Req Resp Sends: Receives: Req Resp

  26. Outline ` { P } c { Q } Protocols and running example Logical mechanisms programming with protocols invariants framing and hooks Implementation and future work

  27. Cloud Compute : Server while true: (from, n) <- recv Req send Resp(n, factors(n)) to from Precondition on send requires correct factors

  28. Cloud Compute: Server t ∈ { Pre } ` { } m h send m to h send m to h ( ) sent t t t , while true: (from, n) <- recv Req send Resp(n, factors(n)) to from Precondition on send requires correct factors

  29. Cloud Compute: Client send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} recv doesn’t ensure correct factors

  30. Cloud Compute: Client t ∈ ` { > } m { recvd ( ) } recv m t send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} recv doesn’t ensure correct factors

  31. Protocol Invariants ` { P } c { Q } I inductive 0 ` { P ∧ I } c { Q ∧ I } Protocol where every state satisfies I

  32. Cloud Compute: Client t ∈ 0 ` { > } m { recvd ( ) } recv m t send Req(21) to server (_, ans) <- recv Resp assert ans == {3, 7} Now recv ensures correct factors

  33. Cloud Compute: More Clients send Req(21) to server 1 send Req(35) to server 2 (_, ans 1 ) <- recv Resp (_, ans 2 ) <- recv Resp assert ans 1 ans 2 == {3, 5, 7} ∪ Same protocol enables verification

  34. Frame rule ` { P } c { Q } R stable independent protocols ` { P R } c { Q R } ∗ ∗ Reuse invariants from component protocols

  35. Frame rule: Hooks ` { P } c { Q } R stable ` { P R } c { Q R } ∗ ∗ Allows one protocol to restrict another

  36. Outline ` { P } c { Q } Protocols and running example Logical mechanisms programming with protocols invariants framing and hooks Implementation and future work

  37. Implementation Shallowly embedded in Coq with full power of functional programming Executable via extraction to OCaml via trusted shim to implement semantics Case study: two-phase commit exercises all features of the logic

  38. Related and Future Work Concurrent separation logics Iris, FCSL, CAP, … Adding other effects e.g. mutable heap, threads, failure…

  39. Composition: A way to make proofs harder “In 1997, the unfortunate reality is that engineers rarely specify and reason formally about the systems they build. It seems unlikely that reasoning about the composition of open-system specifications will be a practical concern within the next 15 years.”

  40. Verified Distributed Applications Challenges Solutions Client reasoning Protocols Veri- Wow Invariants rule WithInv Separation rule/Hooks Frame ` { P } c { Q } -Cert Disel: Iron

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