How the high technicality of EU affairs impacts lobbying in - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Sylvain Laurens School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences

How the high technicality of EU affairs impacts lobbying in Brussels and its consequences

Data excerpted from this book

Sylvain Laurens, Les courtiers du capitalisme : Milieux d’affaires et bureaucrates à Bruxelles (sept. 2015)

PRESSURE Introduction

• A fieldwork that started in 2009
• Archives from EU institutions
• Interviews with lobbyists or high ranking civil servants

from the EU institutions from the EU institutions

• Ethnography
• f

internal meetings

• f

business associations from different economical sectors

PRESSURE Introduction

Summary, in five points

• 1/ The high technicity of lobbying as a byproduct of the

rooting of EU institutions

• 2/ What has changed since the 90’s ?
• 2/ What has changed since the 90’s ?
• 3/ New lobbying strategies: “Scientific“ forms of influence
• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms and labelling
• 5/ Consequences for democracy

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions

Berlaymont building (1968). Source et DR : www.badeaux.be

• How the EU bureaucracy built its legitimacy against the administration of member

states Extract of an interview with Jean Durieux , DG internal market 1958-1970 , ( Oral History program of the EC):

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions

" So I was in charge of industry. So the problem was : what does an Industry division do at the beginning

• f

the European Economic Community ? What can be its task ? (...) We consulted the national administrations of six Member States. [...] And the answer was : "Do not interfere in industrial policy; it is a matter for Member States." (...) Then we saw the business associations . Their position was much more nuanced . The employers began to be sensitive to the idea that industrial structures were not going to remain intact after the test of the unification of markets, increased competition , etc. (...) "

• Faced with the Member States: the choice of Commission officials was to prodce

European data, asking the business community to collect it.

• - But the emergence of a European economic expertise was not so easy.

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions

EC Archives (AC 144 1992 644) An official of the DG Internal Market on the issue of economic statistics study groups ( March 1961 ) :

• Experts in national employers federations have “low skills, " are caught in "

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions

• Experts in national employers federations have “low skills, " are caught in "

national ways of thinking

• We must " intensify contacts with business associations to improve the

homogeneity of the available documentation and fill some gaps ."

• " The ground should be prepared by a mental conditioning process to prove the

usefulness of good knowledge in each sector"

EU civil servants strategy :

• Collect contacts of trade associations that

agree to help the decision process

• Build directories (first register in the 60’)

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions

• Build directories (first register in the 60’)
• Subsidize UNICE and several business

associations.

In the 60s’, 70s’ and 80s’, European Business associations are a roundtable

• f national associations that guarantees civil servants:

1. A synthesis of business positions based on the expertise of different national associations

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions 2. And the absence of counter-lobbying at national level (useful for bureaucrats in a system of decision based on unanimity : “my directive will pass through the council“)

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions

Internal functioning of a European business association in the 70’s or the 80’s President elected by the board Board of presidents of national trade associations Board of presidents of national trade associations General Assembly (membership composed by national trade associations) French business association German business association Italian business association Nederlands business association Belgian business association Business association from Luxembourg

European Commission Commissioner Board of presidents Business Association

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions Externalisation of expertise and production of consensus

• n European business associations

DG Internal Market Permanent staff Thematic committee fueled by expertise of national associations Commissioner Head of the unit Desk officer Board of presidents

• f national

associations

Year Unde r 4 4 or 5 6 7 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 Over 20 Over 25 NR Total Number of countries represented within European business associations

• 3. Des organisations patronales « en miroir » des institutions

This system was adapted to the evolution of EU institutions and new member States…

PRESSURE

• 1. The high technicity of lobbying : a byproduct of the rooting of EU

institutions

r 4 15 20 20 25 1960 2,2% 34,6% 23,5% 28,67% 3,67% 2,1% / 1,4% 3,7% n=136 1973 2,5% 22,6% 19,7% 29,4% 8,45% 2,46% 1,9% 0,8% 0,7% n=284 1980 4,1% 10,1% 12,7% 41,9% 15,08 3,01% 1% 0,4% 10,8% n=464 1986 2,6% 7,4% 3,3% 20,51% 20,7% 10,16% 1,5% 8% 23,4% n=541

This old model of relationships between EU commission and Business associations has been impacted by at least three changes

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

These three changes have made lobbying increasingly science-based because business interest groups are trying to maintain their privileged access to bureaucracy… access to bureaucracy…

First Change : The new density of the European quarter “Business is no longer ‘alone’"

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

“Business is no longer ‘alone’"

1973

Source : Laurens et al. 2013, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales

1991

Source : Laurens et al. 2013, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales

2009

Source : Laurens et al. 2013, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales

• Half of the NGOs seated in Brussels today arrived in the second half of the

1990’

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?
• And we should also talk about the rise of consultancies, think tanks…

(Lahusen 2003) (Lahusen 2003)

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

Second change : Rise of bureaucracy : before and after the legislative process Some MEPs used to say that the European Parliament has got more and more power but we have to consider 1/ The complexity of the logics of the informal trilogu 1/ The complexity of the logics of the informal trilogu 2/ The rise of comitology 3/ The new agencies… Exemple : REACH -> ECHA

Third change European Business associations are no longer simple coalitions of national trade associations but are directly driven by European champions or multinational firms

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

This is one of the side effects of the construction of a Common Market. National champions became European champions or multinational firms.

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

60 70 80

Nationality of the first 100 companies in the World (1912-2002)

10 20 30 40 50 1912 1958 1972 1985 2002 2012 Firmes américaines Firmes britanniques Firmes de la Communauté Européenne (non britanniques)

US UK EU (except UK) Defraigne (Fortune 500)

• Today 314 of 754 biggest firms in the world are represented directly or

indirectly in Brussels

• Today

two third

• f

European business associations accept direct membership from major firms.

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?
• They also accept direct or indirect membership of non European firms if they

have plants or businesses inside the EU. It is now the expertise given by the major firms of the sector that directly fuels the expertise of European business associations (and no longer expertise given by national trade associations) These firms have enough resources to fund scientific forms of expertise

Internal functioning of European business associations since the 1990s’ Président of the association Board of CEOs

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

Advisory committee composed of national associations Board of CEOs National associations Membership directly composed of Major firms of the sector

European Commission Commissioner Board of CEOs of the major firms of the sector Business Association New forms of the relationship between the EU commission and interest groups

• 2. What has changed since the 90’s ?

DG Internal Market Permanent staff Thematic committee with expertise provided by major firms Commissioner Head of the unit Desk officer the sector

• Strategy 1: Commission, Commission and Commission…
• MEPs change but bureaucrats last a long time:
• One of the main managers of the European business association Orgalime :
• “There are people who come and leave, that's for sure. But there are others… I

have known them when they were head of unit,with whom we worked and they

• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

have known them when they were head of unit,with whom we worked and they are now director-general. The good ones, they climb up the scale and when you have a personal relationship that is established, the trust … we keep it . Me there are several directors-general I've got like this. "

“Know your desk officer“

• 3. Montée de l’importance du capital scientifique & technicité croissante du

lobbying européen

• 5. Le lobbying comme manipulation d’un savoir sur l’administration, d’un

« capital administratif »

• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

• Strategy 1: Commission, Commission and Commission…
• Predominance of quiet politics (Pepper Culpepper 2010)
• And in Brussels quiet politics requires science
• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

• Strategy 1: Commission, Commission and Commission…
• A senior advisor from EUROGAS :

“In my case, I really am in permanent contact with the European Commission. So frankly, we really work more at the Comm 'even if we are lobbyists and everyone expects that we stand at the Parliament. We found much more that can influence decision making at the Commission level

• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

We found much more that can influence decision making at the Commission level before it became public and before we begin to discuss at the European Parliament, so we are going to focus on it (...). We make internal meetings as soon as possible because as any good association we had the documents even if it is confidential and out. So we are developing some points before the document is published to say: "That there are certain things that are unacceptable in the document you are proposing is that you can not change it because anyway we will not take it, (…) or we will argue and say we can not see where come from these numbers they quote. "

• Strategy 2 : “Institutes“ instead of lobbies
• Quiet politics requires Science
• Science is a means of very detailed influence on decision-making
• And it offers a means of access to an arena where NGOs are very few and weak.
• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

• Some Business associations change their statutes from AISBL to « Organisme

Scientifique Industriel de droit belge »

• A lot of business associations now hire today people with PhDs.

This has become standard practice in the chemical sectors where toxicologists are very numerous inside business associations.

Barrie Gilliatt, director of Eurochlor

• “In Europe the European Community was beginning to flex its environemental muscles
• n regulating the production, use and disposal of certain chemicals and many of those –

due to environementalists’ clamour – were chlorine-based. Many claims by environnementalists in the 1980s and early 1990s were willdly exagerated. (…) We needed to improve our science so that we could confirm or deny such claims often presented as

• facts. And we needed to improve our ability to communicate our viewpoints on issues of
• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

• facts. And we needed to improve our ability to communicate our viewpoints on issues of
• concer. (…) What kind of advocacy messages would be effective ? (…) The first priority was

to re-engineer our organisation and signal that with an ew identity. BITC metamorphosed into Euro Chlor. From just product stewardship, we now had to embrace science, communications and advocacy in a coordinated manner. It was necessary to strengthen both our staff and our professionalism. From two part-time staff in 1990, Euro Chlor has grown to 14 full-time employees in 2002, with 10 professionnels and four support staff. (…) Five hold PhDs and almost all are graduate. »

• Excerpt from The challenge of change in EU business associations (Greenwood 2006)

How a Eurochlor position paper looks like today:

• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

• 3. New lobbying strategies:

« Scientific » forms of influence

Stakeholders committee: ECHA 71% of members are industry associations. But if we look at the “non-industry associations“ we also find ECETOC and firms…

• Investment in science is a means to have better norms PPP and subsidies
• 314 of 754 biggest firms in the world are represented directly or indirectly in

Brussels (2014)

• Among the 314, here are the 50 firms who spend the most in lobbying
• 4/ The enrolment of science in the battle of norms and

labelling

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs

• Among the 314, here are the 50 firms who spend the most in lobbying

Nom Secteurs (selon FT) Pays (selon FT et Fortune) Montants déclarés en euros (chiffre bas selon registre) Groupe BPCE Banks France 7 550 000 Exxon Mobil Oil & gas producers US 4 750 000 EADS Aerospace & defence Netherlands 4 500 000 Microsoft Software & computer services US 4 500 000 Siemens General industrials Germany 4 500 000 Royal Dutch Shell Oil & gas producers UK 4 250 000 ENI Oil & gas producers Italy 3 750 000 GDF Suez Gas, water & multiutilities France 3 750 000 General Electric General industrials US 3 250 000 Huawei Investment & Holding Financial services China 3 000 000 Bayer Chemicals Germany 2 760 000 Daimler Automobiles & parts Germany 2 618 000 Total Oil & gas producers France 2 500 000 BASF Chemicals Germany 2 400 000

Tableau – 50 multinational firms spending the more money in lobbying in Brussels (2013)

BASF Chemicals Germany 2 400 000 E.ON Gas, water & multiutilities Germany 2 200 000 Deutsche Post Industrial Transformation Germany 2 140 000 Telefonica Fixed line telecommunications Spain 2 069 000 Electricité de France (EDF) Electricity France 2 000 000 RWE Gas, water & multiutilities Germany 2 000 000 Deutsche Bank Banks Germany 1 900 000 Intel Technology hardware & equipment US 1 750 000 British American Tobacco Tobacco UK 1 500 000 Rolls-Royce Aerospace & defence UK 1 500 000 Anheuser-Busch InBev Beverages Belgium 1 250 000 Google Software & computer services US 1 250 000 Syngenta Chemicals Switzerland 1 250 000 Deutsche Telekom Mobile telecommunications Germany 1 200 000 Accenture Support services US 1 000 000 Energie Baden-Wérttemberg Electricity Germany 1 000 000 Gazprom Oil & gas producers Russia 1 000 000 International Business Machines Software & computer services US 1 000 000

And here is the list of 25 Multinational firms earning the most money from European Commission (contracts and subsidies)

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs subsidies)

Nom Secteur Pays Subvention ou marché touchés par la Commission en euros Dans le top 50 des firmes + dépenses lobbying Montants déclarés en euros pour le lobbying (chiffre bas selon registre) EADS Aerospace & defence Netherlands 243 670 000 Oui 4 500 000 Deutsche Bahn Industrial Transformation Germany 235 405 637 Oui 650 000 Alstom Industrial Engineering France 70 000 000 Non 300 000 Accenture Support services US 68 383 081 Oui 1 000 000 BT Group Fixed line telecommunications UK 51 200 000 Oui 900 000 GDF Suez Gas, water & multiutilities France 38 765 000 Oui 3 750 000 Enel Electricity Italy 32 129 000 Non 350 000 Hewlett-Packard Technology hardware US 24 867 719 Non 450 000 Total Oil & gas producers France 23 928 395 Oui 2 500 000 Microsoft Software & computer US 19 208 200 Oui 4 500 000 Microsoft Software & computer services US 19 208 200 Oui 4 500 000 SAP Software & computer services Germany 18 000 000 Oui 600 000 L.M. Ericsson Technology hardware Sweden 16 685 000 Oui 900 000 Siemens General industrials Germany 16 169 743 Oui 4 500 000 Deutsche Post Industrial Transformation Germany 13 677 681 Oui 2 140 000 Continental Automobiles & parts Germany 9 797 000 Non 300 000 Veolia Environnement Gas, water & multiutilities France 9 134 031 Oui 600 000 Telefonica Fixed line telecommunications Spain 6 975 000 Oui 2 069 000 Rolls-Royce Aerospace & defence UK 5 467 000 Oui 1 500 000 Tata Steel Industrial Metals & Mining India 5 000 000 Non 400 000 E.ON Gas, water & multiutilities Germany 4 500 000 Oui 2 200 000 BAE Systems Aerospace & defence UK 4 200 000 Non 50 000 ArcelorMittal Industrial metals & Netherlands 4 000 000 Non 350 000

Nom Secteur Pays Subvention ou marché touchés par la Commission en euros Dans le top 50 des firmes + dépenses lobbying Montants déclarés en euros pour le lobbying (chiffre bas selon registre) EADS Aerospace & defence Netherlands 243 670 000 Oui 4 500 000 Deutsche Bahn Industrial Transformation Germany 235 405 637 Oui 650 000 Alstom Industrial Engineering France 70 000 000 Non 300 000 Accenture Support services US 68 383 081 Oui 1 000 000 BT Group Fixed line telecommunications UK 51 200 000 Oui 900 000 GDF Suez Gas, water & multiutilities France 38 765 000 Oui 3 750 000 Enel Electricity Italy 32 129 000 Non 350 000 Hewlett-Packard Technology hardware US 24 867 719 Non 450 000 Total Oil & gas producers France 23 928 395 Oui 2 500 000 Microsoft Software & computer US 19 208 200 Oui 4 500 000 Microsoft Software & computer services US 19 208 200 Oui 4 500 000 SAP Software & computer services Germany 18 000 000 Oui 600 000 L.M. Ericsson Technology hardware Sweden 16 685 000 Oui 900 000 Siemens General industrials Germany 16 169 743 Oui 4 500 000 Deutsche Post Industrial Transformation Germany 13 677 681 Oui 2 140 000 Continental Automobiles & parts Germany 9 797 000 Non 300 000 Veolia Environnement Gas, water & multiutilities France 9 134 031 Oui 600 000 Telefonica Fixed line telecommunications Spain 6 975 000 Oui 2 069 000 Rolls-Royce Aerospace & defence UK 5 467 000 Oui 1 500 000 Tata Steel Industrial Metals & Mining India 5 000 000 Non 400 000 E.ON Gas, water & multiutilities Germany 4 500 000 Oui 2 200 000 BAE Systems Aerospace & defence UK 4 200 000 Non 50 000 ArcelorMittal Industrial metals & Netherlands 4 000 000 Non 350 000

• Scientific forms of lobbying require that you suggest the norms and technology

that will be dominant in your sector

• CEPI (Confederation of European Paper Industry) employee

“For me there are really two types of lobbyists . They are those that come with a paper with a lowest common denominator and saying, "Look that's the thing we

• 4/ The enrolment of science in the battle of norms and

labelling

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs

paper with a lowest common denominator and saying, "Look that's the thing we have in common in our industry ." I always thought that the added value of this type of paper is close to zero. (...) If companies invest in a federation in Brussels , the result should be something other than what they could have achieved alone. They must therefore be interested , for example by submitting a better standard for the industry …”

• The example of biorefineries
• 4/ The enrolment of science in the battle of norms and

labelling

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs

• http://www.biocore-europe.org/

Innovation for your business is co-funded by EC

• A kind of environmental antidumping against paper from Asia…

• 4/ The enrolment of science in the battle of norms and

labelling

European business association suggests to EC that the 4-5 major firms in its economical sector would agree on a new norm or new technology But this new norm or technology of labelling/producing requires funds and expertise

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs

norm or new technology A PPP is built with the business association, EC and universities

• Another example: UNIFE and Shift2Rail
• 4/ The enrolment of science in the battle of norms and

labelling

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs

• Another example: European Green Vehicles Initiative
• 4/ The enrolment of science in the battle of norms and

labelling

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs

• 4/ The enrolment of science in the battle of norms and

labelling

• Another example : 6 billions of PPPs in Research

http://ec.europa.eu/research/industrial_technologies/ppp-in-research_en.html

• 4/ How science is enlisted in battles on norms, labelling

and PPPs

• CERAME-UNIE, EUROMETAUX, CEMBUREAU, CEFIC are in the board of these PPPs

• 3. Montée de l’importance du capital scientifique & technicité croissante du

lobbying européen

• 1. L’insertion progressive des lobbys économiques dans le quartier européen

de Bruxelles

PRESSURE

Consequences for democracy

If democracy = legitimacy from elections… What is actually the role of elected people in this system ?

• 3. Montée de l’importance du capital scientifique & technicité croissante du

lobbying européen

• 1. L’insertion progressive des lobbys économiques dans le quartier européen

de Bruxelles

PRESSURE

Consequences for democracy

If democracy = balance of power between different interests

• 3. Montée de l’importance du capital scientifique & technicité croissante du

lobbying européen

• 1. L’insertion progressive des lobbys économiques dans le quartier européen

de Bruxelles

PRESSURE

Consequences for democracy

If democracy = balance of power between different interests Budget : 40 000 000 euros per year Number of employees: 160 Expertise provided by engineers from 550 companies Budget : 3 800 000 euros per year Number of employees: 15 (and only one campaigner for chemical products) Expertise provided by 3 people from Greenpeace Science Unit 4 times a year