Homogeneity in donkey sentences Lucas Champollion New York - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Homogeneity in donkey sentences Lucas Champollion New York - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Homogeneity in donkey sentences Lucas Champollion New York University champollion@nyu.edu 1 Most semanticists who see a donkey sentence write about it. For insights and examples, I am indebted to Barker 96, Buerle and Egli 86, Brasoveanu


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Lucas Champollion New York University champollion@nyu.edu

1

Homogeneity in donkey sentences

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Most semanticists who see a donkey sentence write about it.

  • For insights and examples, I am indebted to Barker

96, Bäuerle and Egli 86, Brasoveanu 08, Brogaard 07, Chierchia 95, Dekker 93, Francez 09, Gawron, Nerbonne, and Peters 92, Geurts 02, Heim 82, Heim 90, Kadmon 90, Kamp 91, Kanazawa 94, Krifka 96, Lappin and Francez 94, Rooth 87, van Rooy 03, Schubert and Pelletier 89, von Fintel 94, Yoon 94, Yoon 96 and others

2

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An old idea: plural definites ≈ donkey pronouns

  • Löbner 00: homogeneity in plural definites


The books are/aren’t in Dutch ≈ All/None of them are

  • Yoon 96, Krifka 96: similarity to donkey sentences



 The windows are shut/open ≈ All/Some are
 Everyone with a window keeps it shut/open ≈ all/one
 
 Core idea: Sum-based analysis: [[it]] = [[the windows]]
 


3

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The parallel isn’t in the semantics

  • Kanazawa 01 deploys a battery of tests to show

that the donkey pronoun “it” cannot refer to sums
 
 Every donkey-owner gathers the donkeys at night
 *Every farmer who owns a donkey gathers it at night
 
 So if [[the windows]] is a sum, [[it]]≠ [[the windows]]!

4

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This talk: putting the parallel into the pragmatics

  • Malamud 12, Križ 15: pragmatics of plural definites



 Core idea: semantics produces truth-value gaps in mixed cases; pragmatics fills gaps with truth or falsity

  • This talk: donkey sentences are pragmatically similar

to plural definites
 
 Pragmatics: a straightforward application of Križ 15
 Semantics: plural compositional DRT (Brasoveanu 08)
 “Look Ma, no sums!”


5

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SLIDE 6

Goals of this talk

  • Predict how context disambiguates donkey

sentences

  • by building on a pragmatic account of how

context disambiguates plural definites (e.g.Križ 15)

  • Compositionally derive the semantic ambiguity
  • by using a trivalent dynamic plural logic to serve

up truth-value gaps to the pragmatics
 (following a suggestion in Kanazawa 94)

6

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I will use this convention in my pictures

7

Entities in the 
 denotation of the VP
 will be shown in black Entities not in the 
 denotation of the VP ,
 in grey

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

Giles beats all of his donkeys

8

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

clearly true! Giles beats all of his donkeys

9

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

Giles beats none of his donkeys

10

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

clearly false! Giles beats none of his donkeys

11

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

Giles beats only one of his donkeys

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Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey not so clear! Giles beats only one of his donkeys

13

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey not so clear! Giles beats only one of his donkeys

“Mixed scenario” ≈

someone doesn’t treat all his donkeys the same way

  • Intuitions “vacillate” (Heim 82)
  • “I am simply not sure” (Rooth 87)
  • Barker 96 suggests certain donkey sentences

presuppose that the scenario isn’t mixed But in many mixed scenarios, intuitions are clear…

14

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The farmers of Ithaca, N.Y., are stressed out. They fight constantly with each other. Eventually, they decide to go to the local psychotherapist. Her recommendation is that every farmer who has a donkey should beat it, and channel his aggressiveness in this way.

credited by Chierchia 95 to Paolo Casalegno

15

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey Giles beats only one of his donkeys

16

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

Jake beats his donkey George beats his donkey clearly true this time! Giles beats only one of his donkeys

17

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

Jake reports his donkey George reports his donkey Giles reports only one of his donkeys

18

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

Jake reports his donkey George reports his donkey Giles reports only one of his donkeys clearly false in this mixed scenario

19

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Goals influence pragmatic interpretation

20

van Rooij 03, Malamud 12 a.o.

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Anyone who catches a Zika fly should bring it to me

What if you catch several flies?

  • Scientist looking for a sample: bring one!
  • Health official trying to eradicate the species: bring

all!

21

adapted from Gawron et al. 92

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Definite plurals
 work similarly

Löbner 2000, Malamud 2012, Križ 2015

22

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The doors are open

  • Two doors are open, the third one is closed
  • Doors are arranged in sequence

Löbner 2000, Malamud 2012, Križ 2015

23

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The doors are open

  • Two doors are open, the third one is closed
  • Doors are arranged in sequence

clearly false! Löbner 2000, Malamud 2012, Križ 2015

24

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The doors are open

Now the doors are arranged in parallel Löbner 2000, Malamud 2012, Križ 2015

25

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The doors are open

Now the doors are arranged in parallel clearly true this time! Löbner 2000, Malamud 2012, Križ 2015

26

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Malamud 12, Križ 15 a.o.

  • n plural definites

The semantics produces truth-value gaps:

  • [[The doors are open]]
  • TRUE iff all the doors are open
  • FALSE iff no door is open
  • NEITHER iff some but not all of the doors are open

27

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Križ 15 on the pragmatics of truth-value gaps

The Current Issue (≈QUD): a salient question that gives rise to an equivalence relation “≈” on worlds. w ≈ w’ means that w and w’ agree on the current issue. Sentence S is judged true at w0 iff it is “true enough”:

  • that is, if S is True (at w0), or
  • if S is Neither at w0, True at some w ≈ w0, and not

False at any w’ ≈ w0 Otherwise, S is judged false.

Precursors: Lewis 79; Lasersohn 99; Malamud 12

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Križ 15, 
 applied to definites

29

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A true-enough definite plural

A: “Can we reach the safe?”
 B: “The doors are open.”

30

wactual

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judged true

A true-enough definite plural

31

wactual A: “Can we reach the safe?”
 B: “The doors are open.”

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A true-enough definite plural

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wactual safe reachable

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wleft wactual wright

A true-enough definite plural

33

safe reachable safe reachable safe blocked

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A true-enough definite plural

34

wleft wactual wright safe reachable safe reachable safe blocked

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Neither False True

At wactual “The doors are open” is neither true nor false. 


A true-enough definite plural

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≈ wleft wactual wright safe reachable safe reachable safe blocked

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At wactual “The doors are open” is neither true nor false. 
 But it is true at wleft. So it is true enough at wactual .

true enough False True

A true-enough definite plural

36

≈ wleft wactual wright safe reachable safe reachable safe blocked

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Not true enough feels false

A: “Can we reach the safe?”
 B: “The doors are open.”

37

blocked
 safe wactual

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Not true enough feels false

judged false

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A: “Can we reach the safe?”
 B: “The doors are open.” blocked
 safe wactual

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Not true enough feels false

39

blocked
 safe wactual

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Not true enough feels false

40

reachable
 safe blocked
 safe blocked
 safe wtop wactual wbottom

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Not true enough feels false

41

≈ wtop wactual wbottom reachable
 safe blocked
 safe blocked
 safe

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Not true enough feels false

At wactual “The doors are open” is neither true nor false. 


42

≈ True Neither False wtop wactual wbottom reachable
 safe blocked
 safe blocked
 safe

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Not true enough feels false

At wactual “The doors are open” is neither true nor false. 
 It is false at wbottom. So it is not true enough at wactual .

True not true enough False

43

wtop wactual wbottom reachable
 safe blocked
 safe blocked
 safe

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Extending Križ 15 to donkey sentences

44

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The farmers of Ithaca, N.Y., are stressed out. They fight constantly with each other. Eventually, they decide to go to the local psychotherapist. Her recommendation is that every farmer who has a donkey should beat it, and channel his aggressiveness in this way.

credited by Chierchia 95 to Paolo Casalegno

45

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

46

wactual

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

judged true (Chierchia 95)

47

wactual

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

“Is everyone channeling his aggressiveness?”

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wactual

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

yes

49

wactual “Is everyone channeling his aggressiveness?”

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

yes yes no

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wactual wleft wright “Is everyone channeling his aggressiveness?”

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

yes yes no ≈

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wactual wleft wright “Is everyone channeling his aggressiveness?”

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

yes yes no ≈ At wactual the donkey sentence is neither true nor false. 
 Neither False True

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wactual wleft wright

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

yes yes no ≈ At wactual the donkey sentence is neither true nor false. But it is true at wleft. So it is true enough at wright. True (enough) False True

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wactual wleft wright

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

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wactual

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

judged false

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wactual

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

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wactual “Is anyone breaking the law?”

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

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wactual “Is anyone breaking the law?” yes

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

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wactual wleft wright “Is anyone breaking the law?” yes no yes

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

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wactual wleft wright “Is anyone breaking the law?” yes no yes

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

Neither False True

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≈ wactual wleft wright yes no yes

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Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

not true enough False True

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≈ wactual wleft wright yes no yes

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No man who has an umbrella leaves it home

  • n a rainy day

Umbrellas left home 
 are black
 (and with a house) Umbrellas taken along
 are grey
 (and without a house)

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No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

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wactual

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No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

judged true

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wactual

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No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

“Does everyone have an umbrella with him?”

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wactual

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No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

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wactual “Does everyone have an umbrella with him?” yes

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No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

wactual wleft wright yes yes no

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“Does everyone have an umbrella with him?”

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No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

wactual wleft wright ≈ True (enough) False True

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yes yes no

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No man who has a 10- year-old son gives him the car keys

Sons that get the keys
 will be shown in black
 (and with keys) Sons that don’t get 
 them, in grey
 (and without keys)

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No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

70

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No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

judged false

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No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

“Does every father behave responsibly?”

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No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

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wactual no “Does every father behave responsibly?”

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No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

no yes no

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wactual wleft wright “Does every father behave responsibly?”

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No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

≈ not true enough False True

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wactual wleft wright no yes no

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The theory so far

  • Context sensitivity of donkey sentences is central

(like Yoon 96, Krifka 96)

  • Links definite plurals to donkey sentences (like

Yoon 96, Krifka 96; building on Križ 15)

  • No commitment to sums (unlike Yoon 96, Krifka 96)
  • No commitment as to whether truth-value gaps are

presuppositions (Barker 96: YES; Križ 15: NO)

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Compositional implementation

77

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The bird’s-eye view

Semantics delivers

  • True
  • Neither
  • False

input into Pragmatics delivers

  • True (incl. true enough)
  • False

78

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Zooming in on 
 the semantics

Semantics

delivers

  • True
  • Neither
  • False

input into

Pragmatics

delivers

  • True (incl. true enough)
  • False

79

… … …

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The semantic pipeline

80

Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

  • True
  • Neither
  • False
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Tasks for the semantics

  • Generating and managing anaphora without sums
  • I will build on PCDRT (Brasoveanu 08).
  • Generating truth value gaps
  • I will enrich PCDRT with error states (van Eijck 93)

and assume that donkey pronouns produce gaps

  • Projecting gaps and keeping them under control
  • Supervaluation quantifiers (van Eijck 96)

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Our semantic backbone: PCDRT (Brasoveanu 08)

  • Constituents relate input (I) to output (O) states
  • A state is a set of assignments i1, i2 etc. that relate

discourse referents u1, u2 etc. to entities x, y etc.

  • A state can be seen as a table:

u1 u2 i1 i2

82

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83

Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

  • True
  • Neither
  • False

Restrictor 
 (not today's focus)

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Restrictor 
 (not today's focus)

  • [[everyu1 farmer who owns au2 donkey]]
  • I assume that all indefinites are strong: they

introduce as many individuals as they can.

84

u1 u2 i1 i2

  • For each farmer x,

this will generate a state in which every assignment maps u1 to x and u2 to a different donkey that x owns

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Verb phrase

85

Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

  • True
  • Neither
  • False
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SLIDE 86

Error-state semantics produce VP truth-value gaps

[[λx. x beats itu]] ≈

u u x u u x u u x

success

{

error failure van Eijck 93

86

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DPL with error states (van Eijck 93)

  • In DPL and related systems, information about the

values of variables is encapsulated in a state, passed on from one subterm to the next.

  • In DPL, states are assignment functions
  • van Eijck adds error states: special assignments

that prevent a formula from having a truth value

  • Error states can be thrown, passed on, and caught

87

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PCDRT with error states

  • Conventions:
  • We’ll use the empty table ε as an error state
  • Most conditions return true on the error state
  • Most DRSs pass incoming error states onwards
  • This requires various tweaks for bookkeeping

88

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A PCDRT predicate denotes a test on each row

  • farmer ↝ λv. λIλO. I=O & forall i in I. farmer(i(v))


(true if v=u1)

  • beats ↝ λvλv’. λIλO. I=O & forall i in I. beats(i(v),i(v’))


(false if v=u1, v’=u2)

  • No trivalence yet

u1 u2 i1 i2

89

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Introducing PCDRT shorthands

  • farmer ↝ λv. λIλO. I=O ∧∀i∈I. farmer(i(v))


Shorthand: λv. [ farmer{v} ]

  • beats ↝ λvλv’. λIλO. I=O ∧∀i∈I. beats(i(v),i(v’))


Shorthand: λvλv’. [ beats{v,v’} ]

  • No trivalence yet

u1 u2 i1 i2

90

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Conditions only have inputs, DRSs also have outputs

  • A condition is a test on an input state: λI …
  • Atomic predicates:


R{u} =def λI. ∀ i∈I. R(i(u))

  • A DRS relates input to output states: λI λO …
  • Lifting a condition C into a DRS:


[C] =def λI λO. C(I) ∧ I=O

  • Random and targeted assignments of discourse referents:


[u] =def λI λO. ∀i∈I ∃o∈O. i[u]o ∧ ∀o∈O ∃i∈I. i[u]o
 u:=x =def λI λO. [u](I)(O) ∧ ∀o∈O. o(u)=x

91

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Success, failure, error

  • succeeds(D,I) =def ∃O≠ε. D(I)(O)


D transitions to some non-error state

  • fails(D,I) =def ¬∃O. D(I)(O)


D does not transition to any output state

  • error(D,I) =def ∃O. D(I)(O) ∧ ∀O. (D(I)(O) → O=ε)


D only transitions to error states Mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive.

92

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Static connectives turn DRSs into conditions

  • DRS negation checks that the DRS fails on any

nonempty substate of the input state:

  • ~D =def λI. ∀H≠ε. H⊆I → fails(D,H)
  • DRS disjunction checks that at least one of the

disjuncts succeeds:

  • D | D’ =def λI. succeeds(D,I) ∨ succeeds(D’,I)

93

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Dynamic connectives turn DRSs into other DRSs

  • DRS conjunction: apply the two DRSs in sequence
  • D ; D’ =def λIλO. ∃H. D(I)(H) ∧ D’(H)(O)
  • Maximalization: store as many different entities under

column u as possible as long as D returns an output

  • maxu(D) =def λIλO. (I=O=ε) ∨ 


([u] ; D)(I)(O) ∧ ∀K. ([u] ; D)(I)(K) → uK ⊆ uJ where uK =def { x : there is an i in K such that x=i(u)}

94

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Testing if a DRS treats all rows the same

  • uniformTest(D) =def λI. ( D | [~D] )

uniformTest([beats{u1,u2}]) holds of this state: and of this state: but not of this state:

u1 u2 i1 i2 u1 u2 i1 i2 u1 u2 i1 i2

95

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Goal: mixed worlds should trigger error states

beats itu ↝ λv. λIλO.

u u x u u x u u x

{

O=I and v beats all the referents of u in I O = ε and v beats some but not all of the referents

  • f u in I
  • r

(in the third case, no

  • utput matches the input)
  • r

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The DRS uniform converts failed uniformTests into error states

uniform(D) =def λI λO. 
 (uniformTest(D)(I) ∧ I=O) ∨ (¬uniformTest(D)(I) ∧ O=ε) uniform([beats{u1,u2}]) succeeds on this state and on but maps to the error state

u1 u2 i1 i2 u1 u2 i1 i2 u1 u2 i1 i2

97

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In pronouns, I depart from Brasoveanu 08

  • In original PCDRT, itu tests if all assignments in the

input agree on some atom as the referent of u. itu ↝ λP . [atom{u}] ; P(u)
 
 where atom{u} =def λI.∃x.atom(x) ∧ ∀i∈I. i(u)=x

  • This test precludes trivalence, so I’ll drop it.
  • I don’t use sums, so I’ll drop the atomicity check.

98

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I propose that pronouns introduce trivalence via uniform

itu2 ↝ λP . uniform(P(u2)) ; P(u2)
 brays ↝ λv. brays{v} itu2(brays) succeeds on this state and fails on and maps to the error state

99

u2 i1 i2 u2 i1 i2 u2 i1 i2

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Pronouns in object position are type-lifted in the usual way

Lift(itu2) ↝ λRλv. uniform(R(u2)(v)) ; R(u2)(v)
 beats ↝ λv’λv. beats{v,v’} Lift(itu2)(beats)(u1) succeeds on this state fails on and maps to the error state

100

u1 u2 i1 i2 u1 u2 i1 i2 u1 u2 i1 i2

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101

Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

  • True
  • Neither
  • False

Embedding quantifier 
 (not today's focus)

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Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

This farmer introduces
 a spurious error

  • We can’t just let errors bubble up to the top level.
  • As soon as we find a farmer who doesn’t beat any

donkey of his, we know the sentence is false. This farmer makes the 
 sentence false

102

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Ordinary quantifiers

Every A is a B TRUE

103

A B

103

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Ordinary quantifiers

A

Every A is a B FALSE

B

104

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Supervaluation quantifiers

B

Every A is a B (SUPER)TRUE

105

(Everything inside A is definitely inside B)

A

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Supervaluation quantifiers

B

Every A is a B (SUPER)FALSE

106

(Some things inside A are definitely outside B)

A

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Supervaluation quantifiers

B

Every A is a B NEITHER

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(Some things inside A may or may not be inside B)

A

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Supervaluation quantifiers and trivalent VP meanings

B = [[λx. x beats itu]]

u u x u u x u u x

clearly in clearly out neither

108

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The supervaluation quantifier everyu

  • If the sentence is supertrue (that is, every farmer

beats all of his donkeys), return the input state.

  • Otherwise return an error… unless it is superfalse

(that is, some farmer beats none of his donkeys).

  • (In that case, do nothing.)

109

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The supervaluation quantifier everyu

everyu =def λDλD’λIλO. ( O=I ∧
 ∀x. (succeeds(u:=x ; D)(I) → succeeds(u:=x ; D ; D’)(I)) ) ∨ ( O=ε ∧
 ¬∀x. (succeeds(u:=x ; D)(I) → succeeds(u:=x ; D ; D’) (I)) ∧
 ∧ ∃x. (succeeds(u:=x; D)(I) ∧ fails(u:=x ; D ; D’)(I)) )

110

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111

Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

  • True
  • False
  • Neither

Overview of the semantics

For every 
 farmer x… …create a state with all of the donkeys that x owns… … and launch an error if the state is mixed; … … finally, let the supervaluation quantifier return T, F , or N.

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Overview of the pragmatics

Semantics delivers

  • True
  • Neither
  • False

input into Pragmatics delivers

  • True (incl. true enough)
  • False

112

as in Križ 15 Trivalent 
 truth-value Bivalent
 truth-value

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SLIDE 113

Conclusion

  • Definite plurals and donkey sentences can be given

a uniform pragmatic treatment (Yoon 96, Krifka 96)

  • No need for sum individuals, so we avoid the

problems in Kanazawa 01

  • By combining van Eijck 93, van Eijck 96, and

Brasoveanu 08, we can deliver trivalent semantics in a fully compositional way

113

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Thank you!

114

Thanks to Justin Bledin, Adrian Brasoveanu, 
 Jan van Eijck, Manuel Križ, 
 and NYU colleagues and students
 for feedback and encouragement

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SLIDE 115

Bonus slides

for question/answer session

115

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SLIDE 116

Barker 96 on homogeneity

  • The use of an adverbial quantifiers with an

asymmetric readings presupposes homogeneity

  • In mixed scenarios, if the quantifier is adverbial and

the reading is asymmetric, this is violated

  • Domain narrowing can come to the rescue by

eliminating individuals

116

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SLIDE 117

Usually, if a man has a hat, he wears it to the concert.

  • Can quantify over man-hat pairs (symmetric

reading)

  • Can quantify over men; in that case, presupposes

scenario is not mixed

  • If the scenario is mixed, domain narrowing can

eliminate hats to help accommodating the presupposition

117

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SLIDE 118

When a professor has a computer problem, he usually solves it.

  • 1 professor solved 70 out of 90 problems last year,

thus violating homogeneity

  • 10 professors each solved 0 of 1 problems
  • Barker 96: homogeneity presupposition should lead

to presupposition failure, or else domain narrowing should lead to truth by removing 20 hard problems

  • But the sentence is judged false

118

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SLIDE 119

Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it

“What is the world like?” Neither False True

119

wactual wleft wright

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SLIDE 120

Predictions of maximally fine-grained current issues

  • Every farmer … —> universal reading
  • No farmer … -> existential reading
  • Most farmers … -> universal reading
  • A farmer … -> universal (!) reading

120

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SLIDE 121

Predictions for uniqueness requirements of pronouns

  • A: “This sick boy only speaks Welsh. Can anyone

help him?”/“Is there a Welsh doctor in London?”
 B: “There is a doctor in London and he is Welsh.”

  • true enough despite the presence of non-Welsh

doctors in London

  • A: “How many Welsh doctors are in the city?” /

“Are there any non-Welsh ones?” 
 B: “There is a doctor in London and he is Welsh.”
 not true enough due to non-Welsh doctors

121

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SLIDE 122

B

A DRS D resolves a DRS D’ iff it makes it totally precise

  • resolves(Dprecise,Dfuzzy) =def 



 ∀I. (succeeds(Dfuzzy,I) → succeeds(Dprecise,I)) ∧
 ∀I. (fails(Dfuzzy,I) → fails(Dprecise,I)) ∧
 ¬∃I. error(Dprecise,I)


122

A

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SLIDE 123

Existential and universal readings

123

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SLIDE 124

Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

Jake reports his donkey George reports his donkey Giles reports only one of his donkeys

124

clearly false in this mixed scenario

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SLIDE 125

Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the IRS

Jake reports his donkey George reports his donkey Giles reports only one of his donkeys

125

clearly false in this mixed scenario

… donkey will report all of his donkeys to the IRS This is the universal reading

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SLIDE 126

Every man who has a hat will wear it to the concert

126

Hats that get worn
 will be shown in black Hats that don’t get 
 worn, in grey

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SLIDE 127

Every man who has a hat will wear it to the concert

Dekker 93; Chierchia 95 Al will wear one of his two hats Bill will wear his hat Carl will wear his hat

127

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SLIDE 128

Every man who has a hat will wear it to the concert

Al will wear one of his two hats Bill will wear his hat Carl will wear his hat clearly true in this mixed scenario Dekker 93; Chierchia 95

128

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SLIDE 129

Every man who has a hat will wear it to the concert

Al will wear one of his two hats Bill will wear his hat Carl will wear his hat clearly true in this mixed scenario Dekker 93; Chierchia 95

… will wear one of his hats to the concert This is the existential reading

129

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SLIDE 130

No man who has a 10- year-old son gives him the car keys

Sons that get the keys
 will be shown in black
 (and with keys) Sons that don’t get 
 them, in grey
 (and without keys)

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SLIDE 131

No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

Al gives none of his sons the keys Bill doesn’t give his son the keys Carl doesn’t give his son the keys Rooth 87

131

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SLIDE 132

No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

Al gives none of his sons the keys Bill doesn’t give his son the keys Carl doesn’t give his son the keys Rooth 87 clearly true

132

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SLIDE 133

No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

Al gives both of his sons the keys Bill doesn’t give his son the keys Carl doesn’t give his son the keys Rooth 87

133

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SLIDE 134

No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

Al gives both of his sons the keys Bill doesn’t give his son the keys Carl doesn’t give his son the keys Rooth 87

134

clearly false

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SLIDE 135

No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

Al gives only one of his sons the keys Bill doesn’t give his son the keys Carl doesn’t give his son the keys Rooth 87

135

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SLIDE 136

No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

Al gives only one of his sons the keys Bill doesn’t give his son the keys Carl doesn’t give his son the keys Rooth 87

136

still false in this mixed scenario

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SLIDE 137

No man who has a 10-year-

  • ld son gives him the car keys

Al gives only one of his sons the keys Bill doesn’t give his son the keys Carl doesn’t give his son the keys Rooth 87

137

still false in this mixed scenario

… son gives any of his sons the car keys This is the existential reading

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SLIDE 138

No man who has an umbrella leaves it home

  • n a rainy day

Umbrellas left home 
 are black
 (and with a house) Umbrellas taken along
 are grey
 (and without a house)

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SLIDE 139

No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

Al leaves one of his umbrellas home (but takes another one with him) Bill doesn’t leave his umbrella home Carl doesn’t leave his umbrella home Rooth 87 clearly true in this mixed scenario

139

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SLIDE 140

No man who has an umbrella leaves it home on a rainy day

Al leaves one of his umbrellas home (but takes another one with him) Bill doesn’t leave his umbrella home Carl doesn’t leave his umbrella home Rooth 87 clearly true in this mixed scenario

… leaves all his umbrellas home on a rainy day This is the universal reading

140

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SLIDE 141

I will call a donkey sentence homogeneous if it is not judged true in mixed scenarios.

141

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SLIDE 142

Homogeneous sentences so far

  • Every farmer who owns a donkey reports it to the

IRS

  • Every man who has a hat will leave it home tonight
  • No man who has a 10-year-old son gives him the

car keys

142

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SLIDE 143

Both universal and existential readings can be homogeneous

  • Every farmer who owns a donkey reports all of his

donkeys to the IRS —> universal

  • Every man who has a hat will leave all his hats

home tonight—> universal

  • No man who has a 10-year-old son gives any of his

sons the car keys—> existential

143

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SLIDE 144

Every man who has a hat will leave it home tonight

Al will leave one of his hats home (and take the other one with him) Bill will leave his hat home Carl will leave his hat home Dekker 93; Chierchia 95

144

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SLIDE 145

Every man who has a hat will leave it home tonight

Al will leave one of his hats home (and take the other one with him) Bill will leave his hat home Carl will leave his hat home Dekker 93; Chierchia 95 clearly false in this mixed scenario

145

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SLIDE 146

Every man who has a hat will leave it home tonight

Al will leave one of his hats home (and take the other one with him) Bill will leave his hat home Carl will leave his hat home Dekker 93; Chierchia 95 clearly false in this mixed scenario

… will leave all of his hats at home tonight This is the universal reading

146