Home Invasion v2.0 WHO ARE WE? The Presenters Daniel - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

home invasion v2 0 who are we the presenters
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Home Invasion v2.0 WHO ARE WE? The Presenters Daniel - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Home Invasion v2.0 WHO ARE WE? The Presenters Daniel unicornFurnace Crowley - Managing Consultant, Trustwave SpiderLabs Jennifer savagejen Savage - Software Engineer, Tabbedout David videoman Bryan - Security


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Home Invasion v2.0

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WHO ARE WE?

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Daniel “unicornFurnace” Crowley

  • Managing Consultant, Trustwave SpiderLabs

Jennifer “savagejen” Savage

  • Software Engineer, Tabbedout

David “videoman” Bryan

  • Security Consultant, Trustwave SpiderLabs

The Presenters

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WHAT ARE WE DOING HERE?

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Science fiction becomes science fact Race to release novel products means poor security Attempt to hack a sampling of “smart” devices Many products we didn’t cover Android powered oven Smart TVs (another talk is covering one!) IP security cameras

The “Smart” Home

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WHAT’S OUT THERE?

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Belkin WeMo Switch

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  • 1. Vulnerable libupnp version
  • 2. Unauthenticated UPnP actions
  • 1. SetBinaryState
  • 2. SetFriendlyName
  • 3. UpdateFirmware

Belkin WeMo Switch

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MiCasaVerde VeraLite

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  • 1. Lack of authentication on web console by default
  • 2. Lack of authentication on UPnP daemon
  • 3. Path Traversal
  • 4. Insufficient Authorization Checks
  • 1. Firmware Update
  • 2. Settings backup
  • 3. Test Lua code
  • 5. Server Side Request Forgery
  • 6. Cross-Site Request Forgery
  • 7. Unconfirmed Authentication Bypass
  • 8. Vulnerable libupnp Version

MiCasaVerde VeraLite

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INSTEON Hub

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  • 1. Lack of authentication on web console
  • 1. Web console exposed to the Internet

INSTEON Hub

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Karotz Smart Rabbit

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  • 1. Exposure of wifi network credentials unencrypted
  • 2. Python module hijack in wifi setup
  • 3. Unencrypted remote API calls
  • 4. Unencrypted setup package download

Karotz Smart Rabbit

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  • 1. Unauthenticated UPnP actions

Linksys Media Adapter

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LIXIL Satis Smart Toilet

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  • 1. Default Bluetooth PIN

LIXIL Satis Smart Toilet

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  • 1. Unauthenticated API
  • 2. Disclosure of WiFi passphrase

Radio Thermostat

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SONOS Bridge

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  • 1. Support console information disclosure

SONOS Bridge

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DEMONSTRATION

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CONCLUSION

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Daniel “unicornFurnace” Crowley dcrowley@trustwave.com @dan_crowley Jennifer “savagejen” Savage savagejen@gmail.com (PGP key ID 6326A948) @savagejen David “videoman” Bryan dbryan@trustwave.com @_videoman_

Questions?