GLOBAL JUSTICE, DOMESTIC Tsilly Dagan DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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GLOBAL JUSTICE, DOMESTIC Tsilly Dagan DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

GLOBAL JUSTICE, DOMESTIC Tsilly Dagan DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY ROADMAP The Cosmopolitans Statists debate The central role of the state ensuring justice Globalizations challenge for domestic justice & (thus) on


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GLOBAL JUSTICE, DOMESTIC DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY

Tsilly Dagan

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ROADMAP

  • The Cosmopolitans – Statists debate
  • The central role of the state ensuring justice
  • Globalization’s challenge for domestic justice &

(thus) on state’s legitimacy

  • Is coordination/cooperation the answer?
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Cosmopolitans Statists

THE SCOPE OF JUSTICE

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COSMOPOLITANS*

  • Focus on Individuals
  • Nationality should not matter

*Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, and Thomas Pogge

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STATISTS (INSTITUTIONALISTS)

  • Justice is a political good
  • No Pre-state duty of justice beyond humanitarian

“[j]ustice is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation.” (Nagel)

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STATISTS

“On the political conception, sovereign states are not merely instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice.”

Thomas Nagel, The problem of global justice, 33.2 Philosophy & public affairs 113, 120 (2005).

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STRONG STATISTS* (NAGEL)

  • Within the state – a duty of justice
  • Beyond the state – simple humanitarianism

* Other institutionalists reject this sharp distinction

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WHY (ONLY) THE STATE?

(WHAT BRINGS US PAST HUMANITARIANISM?)

Nagel: Coercive Co-authorship

“when individuals are both subjects in law’s empire and citizens in law’s republic.” (coehn & Sable)

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THE STATE: COERCIVE CO-AUTHORSHIP

Coercion

Ensures cooperation Requires legitimation

“An institution that one has no choice about joining must offer terms of membership that meet a higher standard.”

Co-authorship

Speaks in the name of others

Requires legitimation “it is impermissible to speak in someone’s name…unless that person…is…given equal consideration in making the regulations."

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THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA (IN CONTRAST)

  • No such combination of co-authorship &

coercive implication of will.

  • The state completely mediates the relationship
  • f individuals to the supranational bodies.
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THE CHALLENGE FOR TAX LEGITIMAC ACY: INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION

Tax competition

  • Lack of ability to ensure justice

Tax competition

  • Diminishing capacity to equally

pronounce its constituents’ collective will

The result

  • Ability to provide justice wanes (and thus)

legitimacy of coercive power wanes

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THE CHALLENGE FOR TAX LEGITIMAC ACY: INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION DECENTRALIZATION & MOBILILTY FRAGMENTATION— SOVEREIGNTY À LA CARTE

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MOBILITY

  • Taxpayers can relocate (residence, investments and business activities).
  • States often foster such mobility—incentives to desirable taxpayers
  • Tax competition turns the decision making process on its head:

From compulsory regimes to elective regimes

  • Mobility is the new class –favorable treatment of mobile taxpayers
  • Equal respect and concern?

What’s the effect

  • f convergence?
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FRAGMENTATION

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FRAGMENTAION– À LA CARTE

  • Differing residency rules; a wide assortment of source rules;

conflicting rules for allowing deductions; differing tax and withholding rates; and a vast number of tax treaties between various jurisdictions.

  • Paper shifting: tax planners opt-out of a tax jurisdiction.
  • Tax technologies-products used by states to compete (patent boxes)

Coercive power=> menu of f options (f (for some)

What’s the effect

  • f convergence?
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THE LOST STATE?

  • The state's coercive taxing power is reliant on
  • ther states’ cooperation (cartel)
  • Supply and demand replace co-authorship
  • Exit replaces voice
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THE MARKET OF STATES UNDERMINES STATES’ LEGITIMACY

 If the state can no longer use its coercive power to assure its constituents’ mutual responsibility, can it still legitimately impose duties of justice?  If it no longer equally implicates the will of its constituents in a political dialogue among themselves, but rather caters to their relative market value, can it genuinely speak in the name of them all? And  if the state allows (some of) them to pick and choose among its various functions, does it still constitute the political institution envisioned by statists when they designate it the exclusive political institution for socio-economic justice?

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IS COORDINATION THE ANSWER?

  • Coordination v. Transplants

both may create convergence but a difference in process

(Cooperative v. What? (spontaneous? Independent? Competitive? Coerced by the market?))

  • Does coordination require independent legitimacy?
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THANK YOU