Generics and Stereotypes Andrei Cimpian, NYU andrei.cimpian@nyu.edu - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Generics and Stereotypes Andrei Cimpian, NYU andrei.cimpian@nyu.edu http://CimpianLab.com Twitter: @AndreiCimpian

What are stereotypes 1,2 ? • Despite variability across researchers, 2 common elements: (1) Stereotypes are beliefs or generalizations about groups (2) that guide our interactions with the social world (e.g., Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Judd & Park, 1993; Jussim, 2012) 1 explicit (vs. implicit) stereotypes; 2 cognitive (vs. cultural) products

Also… • A shared assumption that stereotyping is continuous with general processes involved in reasoning about categories • Differences in content, not structure or process (e.g., Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Judd & Park, 1993; Jussim, 2012)

The problem • “Stereotypes = beliefs/generalizations about groups” is underspecified • Beliefs about groups – and about categories more generally – can be generic or statistical (quantified) politicians are liars some/all/64% of politicians are liars (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Gelman, 2003; Gelman et al., 1998, 2004; Leslie, 2007, 2008; Nickel, 2016; Sterken, 2015)

This matters because… • Generic and statistical beliefs about categories differ considerably • in how they map onto the world • in their cognitive ease • in their developmental trajectory (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Cimpian, 2016; Leslie & Gelman, 2012; Gelman, 2004; Leslie, 2007, 2008; Nickel, 2016; Sterken, 2015)

The question arises… • Well, what are stereotypes? Are they generic beliefs about groups, or are they statistical beliefs? • Not necessarily either/or • And how could we find out?

Our criterion • Despite variability across researchers, 2 common elements: (1) Stereotypes are beliefs or generalizations about groups (2) that guide our interactions with the social world Functional criterion: Which type of belief is more closely related to social judgments?

Prediction • Social judgments will rely more on generic than statistical beliefs • because generic beliefs are cognitively easy and developmentally primitive

Overview • Four studies comparing generic and statistical beliefs as predictors of social judgments • Broader implications • Can stereotypes said to be accurate?

Study 1 Matt Hammond Lecturer (Assistant Professor) Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington (NZ) Data and syntax on OSF: https://osf.io/s6zab/

Study 1: Materials • Finding stereotypes: • searched Google Scholar with relevant key words (e.g., “stereotypes”) and downloaded papers on first 3 pages of results • 45 unique stereotypes • Participants on MTurk ( n = 65) were asked if people believed each stereotype • 27 stereotypes were retained (with average scores above the midpoint)

Study 1: Materials • Examples (in generic form): • African Americans are athletic • African Americans are musical • Asians are intelligent • Doctors are intelligent • Lawyers are greedy • Men are logical • Women are compassionate

Study 1: Participants • 97 participants from MTurk • 55% women • ages: 20–83 ( M = 36.54, SD = 13.18)

Study 1: Measures • For each of the 27 stereotypes: • Generic belief: Ps rated agreement with generic statements: e.g., “African Americans are athletic” −3 = strongly disagree to 3 = strongly agree AS SEPARATE • Statistical belief: BLOCKS Ps estimated the prevalence of the trait: e.g., “What percentage of African Americans are athletic?” 0–100 sliding scale

Study 1: Measures • The social judgment DV: • Does an unfamiliar member of a group possess a stereotypical trait? “Suppose that Person Y is African American. Is Person Y athletic?” −3 = very unlikely to 3 = very likely

Study 1: Results Generic β = .514*** [.476, .552] Beliefs Social b = −.199 [−.269, −.129] Judgments *** (expectations) Statistical β = .315*** [.277, .354] Beliefs multilevel model with cross‐classified random effects for subjects and items *** p < .001

Study 1: Additional results • Same results for the subsets of stereotypes about race/ethnicity, gender, and profession, b s < −.208, p s < .001 • No moderation by social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; e.g., “I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble”)

Study 1: Conclusion • Initial evidence that generic beliefs provide a stronger guide for social judgments than statistical beliefs do • Generic beliefs might be more central to the structure of stereotypes

Study 2 • Why do social judgments rely more on generic (vs. statistical) beliefs? • Possible answer: because reasoning with generic beliefs in easier (e.g., Cimpian, 2016; Hampton, 2012)

Study 2 • If so, we might expect stronger reliance on generic beliefs (and weaker reliance on statistical beliefs) for certain participants: (1) those with intuitive (vs. analytic) cognitive styles: The Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005): e.g., “Soup and salad cost $5.50 in total. The soup costs a dollar more than the salad. How much does the salad cost?”

Study 2 • If so, we might expect stronger reliance on generic beliefs (and weaker reliance on statistical beliefs) for certain participants: (1) those with intuitive (vs. analytic) cognitive styles (2) those with more authoritarian tendencies: Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) e.g., “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government…” Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) e.g., “Inferior groups should stay in their place”

Study 2 • If so, we might expect stronger reliance on generic beliefs (and weaker reliance on statistical beliefs) for certain participants: (1) those with intuitive (vs. analytic) cognitive styles (2) those with more authoritarian tendencies (3) those who are older (?) e.g., working memory and fluid reasoning abilities typically decline with age (e.g., Salthouse, 2015).

Some evidence from Study 1 Older (+1 SD ) participants: b = .641*** [.583, .699] Younger (–1 SD ) participants: b = .474*** [.420, .527] Generic β = .514*** [.476, .552] Beliefs Social b = −.199 [−.269, −.129] Judgments *** (expectations) Statistical β = .315*** [.277, .354] Beliefs *** p < .001

Study 2 • New set of stereotypes: • Participants on MTurk ( n = 33) were asked to list common stereotypes, regardless of whether they believed them to be true • Only stereotypes mentioned by 3 or more participants were retained • Final set: 30 stereotypes

Study 2 • Examples (in generic form): • Asian people are bad drivers • Black people are lazy • Blondes are dumb • Muslims are terrorists • Native Americans are alcoholics • Southerners are ignorant • Teenagers are irresponsible • White people are racist

Study 2 • Changed how we measured generic beliefs: • same sliding‐scale format used for statistical beliefs (except still Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree )

Study 2: Main Results N = 185, MTurk 68% women ages 18–78, M = 37.13 Generic β = .458*** [.433, .484] Beliefs Social b = −.129 [−.175, −.084] Judgments *** (expectations) Statistical β = .329*** [.304, .354] Beliefs *** p < .001

Study 2: Cognitive Style Generic β = .458*** [.433, .484] Beliefs Social b = −.129 [−.175, −.084] Judgments *** (expectations) Statistical β = .329*** [.304, .354] Beliefs Analytic thinkers (+1 SD ): b = .366*** [.324, .408] Intuitive thinkers (–1 SD ): b = .296*** [.257, .335] *** p < .001

Study 2: Authoritarianism High‐authoritarian subjects (+1 SD ): b = .521*** [.478, .565] Low‐authoritarian subjects (–1 SD ): b = .428*** [.389, .467] Generic β = .458*** [.433, .484] Beliefs Social b = −.129 [−.175, −.084] Judgments *** (expectations) Statistical β = .329*** [.304, .354] Beliefs High‐authoritarian subjects (+1 SD ): b = .283*** [.242, .324] Low‐authoritarian subjects (–1 SD ): b = .379*** [.339, .419] *** p < .001

Study 2: Age Older (+1 SD ) participants: b = .500*** [.456, .544] Younger (–1 SD ) participants: b = .425*** [.383, .466] Generic β = .458*** [.433, .484] Beliefs Social b = −.129 [−.175, −.084] Judgments *** (expectations) Statistical β = .329*** [.304, .354] Beliefs *** p < .001

Study 2: Conclusion • Additional evidence that generic beliefs are more strongly related to social judgments than statistical beliefs are • Social judgments may rely on generic beliefs more in part because they are low‐effort

Study 3 • Would we find the same results with respect to non‐ social categories (animals, artifacts, etc.)? • We compared social and non‐social stimuli • 30 non‐social stimuli were borrowed from Khemlani, Leslie, and Glucksberg (2012; e.g., ducks lays eggs; barns are red; sharks attack swimmers) • Same 30 social stimuli as in Study 2 • Identical procedure for the two sets of stimuli

Study 3 • We simplified the statistical belief question: “Out of all of the [category members], how many [have feature]?” sliding scale: none to a ll

Study 3: Social stimuli N = 98, MTurk Generic β = .451*** [.420, .483] Beliefs Social b = −.121 [−.176, −.065] Judgments *** (expectations) Statistical β = .330*** [.299, .362] Beliefs *** p < .001