[PPT] - Game theory for wireless networks static games; dynamic games; PowerPoint Presentation

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Game theory for wireless networks

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

static games; dynamic games; repeated games; strict and weak dominance; Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimality; Subgame perfection; …

SLIDE 2

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Outline

1 Introduction 2 Static games 3 Dynamic games 4 Repeated games

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SLIDE 3

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Brief introduction to Game Theory

Proper operation of wireless networks requires appropriate

rule enforcement mechanisms to prevent or discourage malicious or selfish behavior

– Discouraging malicious or selfish behavior can benefit from game theoretic modeling

Classical applications: economics, but also politics and

biology

Example: should a company invest in a new plan, or enter a

new market, considering that the competition may make similar moves?

Most widespread kind of game: non-cooperative (meaning

that the players do not attempt to find an agreement about their possible moves)

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SLIDE 4

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Classification of games Non-cooperative Cooperative Static Dynamic (repeated) Strategic-form Extensive-form Perfect information Imperfect information Complete information Incomplete information

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Cooperative Imperfect information Incomplete information

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Classification of games

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non-cooperative games: individuals cannot make binding agreements and the unit of analysis is the individual. In cooperative game theory, binding agreements between players are allowed and the unit of analysis is the group or coalition. Static games: each player makes a single move and all moves are made simultaneously. Perfect info: each player has a perfect knowledge of the whole previous actions of

ther players at any moment it has to make a new move.

Complete info: each player knows who the other players are, what are their possible strategies and what payoff will result of each player for any combination of moves.

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Cooperation in self-organized wireless networks

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S1 S2 D1 D2 Usually, the devices are assumed to be cooperative. But what if they are not?

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Assumptions and terminology

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We will consider two players and non-cooperative games in four simple

game examples related to wireless network operations:

Forwarder’s dilemma
Joint packet forwarding game
Multiple access game
Jamming game
The players wish to transmit or receive data packets coping with limited

transmission resources which can make them to have selfish or malicious behavior.

Si: Strategy of player i (e.g. forward the packet, drop the packet, etc.)
S-i: Strategy of the opponents of player i (as we will have only two players i

and j, S-i will be Sj)

Having any strategy Si the players would get some benefit and have to pay

some cost

Ui: Utility or payoff of player i expresses the benefit of him given a strategy

minus the cost it has to incur: Ui = bi - ci

Users controlling the devices are rational, i.e. try to maximize their benefit.

SLIDE 8

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Outline

1 Introduction 2 Static games 3 Dynamic games 4 Repeated games

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SLIDE 9

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Example 1: The Forwarder’s Dilemma

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? ?

Blue Green

Forwarder’s Dilemma:
Two players: Blue and Green
Green has one data packet to send to its receiver (R1) via Blue and also

blue has one data packet to send to its receiver (R2) via Green.

If Blue forwards the packet for Green to R1, it must pay the transmission

cost of c and Green will get the benefit of 1.

The dilemma:
each player is tempted to drop the other player’s packet to save its

energy

but the other player may reason in the same way -- > they could do

better by forwarding for each other

R1 R2

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

From a problem to a game

game formulation: G = (P,S,U)

– P: set of players – S: set of strategy functions – U: set of payoff functions

strategic-form representation of the game

(each cell corresponds to one possible combination of strategies

f the players and is presented as (Ublue , Ugreen))

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Benefit for the source of a packet reaching the destination: 1
Cost of packet forwarding for the forwarder: c (0 < c << 1)

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 1) (1, -c) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward Drop Forward Drop

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Solving the Forwarder’s Dilemma (1/2)

' '

( , ) ( , ), ,

i i i i i i i i i i

u s s u s s s S s S

   

    

i

u U 

i i

s S

 



i

s

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Strict dominance: strictly best strategy, for any possible strategy of the other player(s) where: payoff function of player i strategies of all players except player i

In this game, Drop strictly dominates Forward from the point of view of both

players:

Because 1-c<1 and –c<0
Therefore the solution of the game is (D,D), i.e. both players choose the

strategy drop

Forward Drop Drop

Strategy strictly dominates strategy S’i if

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 1) (1, -c) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Solving the Forwarder’s Dilemma (2/2)

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Solving the game by iterative strict dominance: iteratively eliminate strictly dominated strategies

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 1) (1, -c) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward Drop Forward Drop

This is the lack of trust between the players that leads to this suboptimal solution (green is never sure that Blue will

forward for it, if it forwards for blue (as they play simultaneously) and vice versa.)

Drop strictly dominates Forward Dilemma (F,F) would result in a better outcome for both players

BUT

}

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Example 2: The Joint Packet Forwarding Game

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?

Blue Green Source Dest

?

For this game there is no strictly dominated strategies !

A sender sends its packets to its receiver and two players (Blue and Green)

should forward the packets for it.

Reward for packet reaching the destination: 1 for both players
Cost of packet forwarding: c (0 < c << 1)

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward Drop Forward Drop

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Weak dominance

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?

Blue Green Source Dest

?

'

( , ) ( , ),

i i i i i i i i

u s s u s s s S

   

  

with strict inequality for at least one s-i

Solving the game by Iterative weak dominance: iteratively eliminate weakly dominated strategies

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward Drop Forward Drop

For Green, Drop is weakly dominated

by Forward (so the second column is eliminated); then in the remaining parts

f the table Blue would do better to

Forward.

The result of the iterative weak

dominance is not unique in general.

Weak dominance: Strategy s’i is weakly dominated by strategy si if

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Nash equilibrium (1/2)

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Nash Equilibrium: a game strategy such that no player can increase its payoff by deviating unilaterally

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 1) (1, -c) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward Drop Forward Drop

E1: The Forwarder’s Dilemma:

(Drop, Drop) is a Nash Equilibrium; if Green deviates to (D,F) its payoff decreases (from 0 to –c) and similarly if blue deviates to (F,D) its payoff decreases (from 0 to –c)

E2: The Joint Packet Forwarding game:

There are 2 Nash Equilibria for this game: (F,F) and (D,D)

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward Drop Forward Drop

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Nash equilibrium (2/2)

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* * *

( , ) ( , ),

i i i i i i i i

u s s u s s s S

 

  

i

u U 

i i

s S 

where: payoff function of player i strategy of player i

( ) argmax ( , )

i i

i i i i i s S

b s u s s

  



The best response of player i to the profile of strategies s-i is a strategy si such that: Nash Equilibrium = Mutual best responses

Caution! Many games have more than one Nash equilibrium

Strategy profile s* constitutes a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i,

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Example 3: The Multiple Access game

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Benefit for the source of a successful transmission: 1 Cost of transmission: c (0 < c << 1)

For this game:
There is no strictly dominating strategy
There are two Nash equilibria

(0, 0) (0, 1-c) (1-c, 0) (-c, -c)

Blue Green Quiet Transmit Quiet Transmit

Time-division channel

Two players have packets to send to their receivers but

through the same channel; if in a given time slot both transmit packets there will be a collision and no packet will be delivered to its destination

If one player transmits and the other stays quiet in that

time slot, the packet will be received by its receiver and its source will get some benefit

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

(1 )(1 ) (1 )

blue

u p q c pqc p c q       

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bjectives

– Blue: choose p to maximize ublue – Green: choose q to maximize ugreen

(1 )

green

u q c p   

1 , 1 p c q c     p: probability of transmit for Blue q: probability of transmit for Green

is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Green: If p<1-c --> 1-c-p is positive; Green chooses q=1 If p>1-c --> 1-c-p is negative; Green chooses q=0 If p=1-c 1-c-p=0; Green’s benefit not affected by its move Blue: If q<1-c --> 1-c-q is positive; Blue chooses p=1 If q>1-c --> 1-c-q is negative; Blue chooses p=0 If q=1-c 1-c-q=0; Blue’s benefit not affected by its move

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Example 4: The Jamming game

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Transmitter: has a data packet to send to its receiver at each time slot Jammer: is interested in preventing the transmitter from successful transmission by sending packets on the same channel

Transmitter:
benefit of 1 for successful transmission
loss of -1 for jammed transmission
Jammer:
benefit of 1 for successful jamming
loss of -1 for missed jamming

There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium

two channels: C1 and C2

(-1, 1) (1, -1) (1, -1) (-1, 1)

Blue Green C1 C2 C1 C2

transmitter jammer

1 1 , 2 2 p q  

is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium p: probability of transmit on C1 for Blue q: probability of transmit on C1 for Green

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Theorem by Nash, 1950

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Theorem: Every finite strategic-form game has a mixed- strategy Nash equilibrium.

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Efficiency of Nash equilibria

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E2: The Joint Packet Forwarding game

(1-c, 1-c) (-c, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)

Blue Green Forward Drop Forward Drop

How to choose between several Nash equilibria ?
One way is to compare strategy profiles using the concept of

Pareto-optimality. Pareto-optimality: A strategy profile is Pareto-optimal if it is not possible to increase the payoff of any player without decreasing the payoff of another player.

Strategy profile s is Pareto-superior to strategy profile s’ if for any player i:

With strict inequality for at least one player.

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Back to the examples

In Forwarder’s dilemma game:

– The Nash Equilibrium (D,D) is not Pareto-Optimal – Strategy profiles (F,F), (F,D) and (D,F) are Pareto-Optimal but not Nash Equilibria.

In Joint Packet forwarding game:

– (F,F) and (D,D) are Nash Equilibria; out of them only (F,F) is Pareto-Optimal.

In Multiple Access game:

– (T,Q) and (Q,T) are Nash Equilibria and Pareto-Optimal.

In Jamming game:

– There exists no pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (D,D) but all pure-strategy profiles are Pareto-Optimal.

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Back to the examples

In Multiple Access game with mixed-strategy:

– The mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium (p=1-c, q=1-c) results in the payoff (0,0); – Hence, both pure-strategy Nash Equilibria are Pareto-superior to it.

It can be shown in general that there does not exist a mixed strategy

profile that is Pareto-superior to all pure strategy profiles. Because each mixed strategy of a player I is a linear combination of her pure strategies with positive coefficients that sum up to one.

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SLIDE 24

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Outline

1 Introduction 2 Static games 3 Dynamic games 4 Repeated games

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Extensive-form games

usually to model sequential decisions
game represented by a tree
Example 3 modified: the Sequential Multiple Access game:

– Blue plays first, then Green plays. – Blue: leader; Green: follower

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Green Blue T Q T Q T Q (-c,-c) (1-c,0) (0,1-c) (0,0)

Reward for successful transmission: 1 Cost of transmission: c (0 < c << 1)

Green

Time-division channel

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Strategies in dynamic games

The strategy defines the moves for a player for every

node in the game, even for those nodes that are not reached if the strategy is played.

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Green Blue T Q T Q T Q (-c,-c) (1-c,0) (0,1-c) (0,0) Green

strategies for Blue: T, Q strategies for Green: TT, TQ, QT and QQ

TQ means that player p2 transmits if p1 transmits and remains quiet if p1 remains quiet.

There are three pure-strategy Nash Equilibria: (T,QT), (T,QQ) and (Q,TT)
Blue: T  Green’s best move Q; Blue: Q  Green’s best move T

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Backward induction

Solve the game by reducing from the final stage
Green’s best moves: Q if Blue moves T and T if Blue moves Q
Blue can calculate its best move knowing this argument:

– Blue’s best move is T (comparing (1-c,0) to (0,1-c))

So backward induction starts from the last stage and ends at the root

– The continuous line from a leaf of the tree to the root would be the solution

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Green Blue T Q T Q T Q (-c,-c) (1-c,0) (0,1-c) (0,0) Green Backward induction solution: h={T, Q}

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Subgame perfection

In fact extends the notion of Nash equilibrium

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Green Blue T Q T Q T Q (-c,-c) (1-c,0) (0,1-c) (0,0) Green Stackelberg equilibria using backward induction : (T, QT) and (T, QQ)

Stackelberg equilibrium (subgame perfect equilibrium ): A strategy profile s is a Stackelberg equilibrium for a game with p1 as the leader and p2 as the follower if p1 maximizes her payoff subject to the constraint that player p2 chooses according to her best response function.

SLIDE 29

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Outline

1 Introduction 2 Static games 3 Dynamic games 4 Repeated games

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SLIDE 30

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Repeated games

repeated interaction between the players (in stages)
move: decision in one interaction
strategy: defines how to choose the next move, given the

previous moves

history: the ordered set of moves in previous stages

– most prominent games are history-1 games (players consider only the previous stage)

initial move: the first move with no history
finite-horizon vs. infinite-horizon games
stages denoted by t

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SLIDE 31

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Utilities: Objectives in the repeated game

finite-horizon (finite no. of stages ) vs. infinite-horizon games
myopic vs. long-sighted repeated games

 

1

i i

u u t  

 

T i i t

u u t





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 

i i t

u u t

 



Myopic games : players maximize their next stage payoff long-sighted finite games: players maximize their payoff

for the whole finite duration T

long-sighted infinite: the period of maximizing the payoff is not finite payoff with discounting:

 

t i i t

u u t 

 

 



1   

is the discounting factor

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Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Strategies in the repeated game

usually, history-1 strategies (strategy depend only on the previous

stage), based on different inputs:

– others’ behavior: – others’ and own behavior: – payoff:

   

1

i i i

m t s m t



     

     

1 ,

i i i i

m t s m t m t



     

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   

1

i i i

m t s u t      

Example strategies in the Forwarder’s Dilemma:

Blue (t) initial move F D strategy name Green (t+1) F F F

AllC (always cooperate)

F F D

Tit-For-Tat (TFT) (repeat the opponent’s move)

D D D

AllD(always defect)

D D F

Anti-TFT(opposite to the

pponent’s move)

SLIDE 33

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Analysis of the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma (1/3)

Blue strategy Green strategy AllD AllD AllD TFT AllD AllC AllC AllC AllC TFT TFT TFT Blue payoff Green payoff 1

c

1/(1-ω)

c/(1-ω)

(1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω)

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infinite game with discounting: usually used to model finite games

in which the players are not aware of the duration of the game

By decreasing values of future payoffs:

 

t i i t

u u t 

 

 



0< ω <1

SLIDE 34

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Analysis of the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma (2/3)

AllC receives a high payoff with itself and TFT, but
AllD exploits AllC
AllD performs poor with itself
TFT performs well with AllC and itself, and
TFT retaliates the defection of AllD

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Blue strategy Green strategy AllD AllD AllD TFT AllD AllC AllC AllC AllC TFT TFT TFT Blue payoff Green payoff 1

c

1/(1-ω)

c/(1-ω)

(1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω)

TFT is the best strategy if ω is high (ω ≈ 1)!

SLIDE 35

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Analysis of the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma (3/3)

Blue strategy Green strategy Blue payoff Green payoff AllD AllD TFT TFT (1-c)/(1-ω) (1-c)/(1-ω)

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Theorem: In the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma, if both players play AllD, it is a Nash equilibrium. Theorem: In the Repeated Forwarder’s Dilemma, both players playing TFT is a Nash equilibrium as well. The Nash equilibrium sBlue = TFT and sGreen = TFT is Pareto-optimal (but sBlue = AllD and sGreen = AllD is not) !

SLIDE 36

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

(1, 1) (-1, 2) (2, -1) (0, 0)

Country 1 Country 2

Reduce military investment Increase military investment

Payoffs: 2: I have weaponry superior to the one of the opponent 1: We have equivalent weaponry and managed to reduce it on both sides 0: We have equivalent weaponry and did not managed to reduce it on both sides

1: My opponent has weaponry that is superior to mine

An Example beyond Engineering

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SLIDE 37

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Who is malicious? Who is selfish?

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 Both security and game theory backgrounds are useful in many cases !! Harm everyone: viruses,… Selective harm: DoS,… Spammer Cyber-gangster: phishing attacks, trojan horses,… Big brother Greedy operator Selfish mobile station

SLIDE 38

Georg-August University Göttingen

Game theory for wireless networks

Conclusion

Game theory can help modeling greedy behavior in wireless

networks

Four simple examples were used to explain how to capture

the wireless networking problem in a corresponding game

Game theory has been recently applied to wireless

communication, but discipline still is in its infancy

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