GPU Technical Conference: Spring 2018 – San Jose, CA Speakers: Greg McCullough and Aaron Sant-Miller
MARCH 28, 2018
FIGHTING DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS (DGAS) WITH MACHINE LEARNING
Collaboration space, Alexandria, VA
FIGHTING DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS (DGAS) WITH MACHINE LEARNING - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
FIGHTING DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS (DGAS) WITH MACHINE LEARNING GPU Technical Conference: Spring 2018 San Jose, CA Speakers: Greg McCullough and Aaron Sant-Miller MARCH 28, 2018 Collaboration space, Alexandria, VA CYBER ATTACKS ARE
MARCH 28, 2018
Collaboration space, Alexandria, VA
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navigates to a dangerous domain and deviates from its established behavioral baseline
Our DGA use case:
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Greg McCullough is the Director of Cyber Machine Intelligence Capability Development at Booz Allen
market, while building, deploying, and scaling government custom products and solutions focused on securing networks and IT systems. Most recently, he has driven compliance automation and key cyber integrations across the entire Federal market. He holds a BS in Computer Science from Butler University, a BS in Electrical Engineering from Purdue University, and an MS in Computer Science from George Washington University. Aaron Sant-Miller is a Lead Data Scientist at Booz Allen Hamilton with a specialization in applied mathematics, machine learning, and statistical modeling. He has architected, developed, and deployed data science solutions and machine learning suites across a wide-range of domains, including tax fraud detection, climate science trend forecasting, cybersecurity risk scoring, and professional athlete performance prediction. Aaron’s current areas of research are focused on Bayesian modeling design, synthetic data generation, and neural network-based time series modeling. He holds a BS and an MS in Applied and Computational Mathematics and Statistics from the University of Notre Dame.
For more than 100 years, business, government, and military leaders have turned to Booz Allen Hamilton to solve their most complex
live, serve, and do business. With decades of mission intelligence combined with the most advanced tools available, we prote ct industry and government against the attacks of today, and prepare them for the threats of tomorrow. To learn more, visit BoozAllen.com.
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Attack surfaces are rapidly expanding – growing dependence on IT systems and rapidly evolving novel technologies expose our networks in new ways while increasing our dependence on vulnerable systems The work force is saturated – adding more bodies to defensive efforts no longer improves defense due to a lack
Organizations are inundated with cyber tools – well-funded organizations have the money to buy new cyber tools and do so, but they are unable to effectively manage or integrate the capabilities of these tools Attackers are talented and increasingly more sophisticated – adversaries are getting more creative, developing dynamic attacks that can circumvent existing rules-driven and structurally-defined cyber defenses Cyber compromises are having real financial and physical impacts at an organizational and individual level. Creative adversaries have the ability to compromise an endpoint, access a network, steal and ransom data or accounts, and dangerously expose personal information to the open market. Many recent high profile attacks demonstrate this impact. An evolving landscape demands innovation and creative, new defensive tactics to advance defensive posture in a challenging and impactful cyber warzone.
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Adversaries have developed creative tactics that easily circumvent rules-based defenses. To counter more adaptive attack methods, we must develop our own adaptive and innovative techniques to prevent attacks that transform every minute. Machine learning and AI enable our defenses to evolve and react to new tactics in real time, hardening our defenses.
Adversaries Adversaries Rules Compromise AI Defense Security
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are algorithms that can rapidly create a large number of domain names that act as a midpoint between a user and malware. ➢ Ever-changing and adaptive: Algorithms can rapidly generate new domains of new structures with regularity ➢ Inconspicuous at the surface-level: Algorithms can concatenate dictionary words or normative character patterns ➢ Large in number and historically tagged: Large pools of known DGAs are available and have been reverse engineered To defend against DGAs:
characteristics, but also evolve and adapt rapidly We have at our disposal:
and reverse engineered DGAs Adaptable defense counters adaptive offense
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Academic research and our Booz Allen deployments have proven the efficacy of these models in implementation and test. When trained at scale, deep neural networks can learn the underlying framework used by a DGA to build out a breadth of malicious domains, moving beyond memorization of “known bads” toward an understanding of adversarial toolkits
Proven Model Architectures1 Both the LSTM and the CNN use simple, lightweight architectures (see Yu et al 2007)
performance in holdout test
inference at network speed Training Approach Fuses multiple approaches into a complete learning scheme
DGA Dataset (4M)
web intel collection
Optimized Hardware Deployment
Performance
If an endpoint is compromised, its behavior will change as a result of the intrusion. Cyber MI must flag potential compromise and alert when behavioral models notice a simultaneous change.
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Network traffic off sensor Database Layer (e.g. Timescale / PostgreSQL & MapD): All traffic is held for periods dependent on degree of connotated risk of malicious action Analytic Layer (e.g. CNN and Behavioral Model):
Model
Model alerts
Application Layer
Analyst inputs
Existing SIEM (e.g. Splunk) DGA Detection: Models flag logs that reflect potential compromise Behavioral Models: Bayesian models flag endpoints that break from endpoint norm Cyber Precog allows analysts to investigate and flag legitimate alerts All model
and Precog alerts integrate seamlessly with existing SIEMs
Flagged traffic
Historically, machine learning in cyber has been stigmatized due to high false positive rates of ML-enabled alerting systems. As the adversarial tactics are rapidly changing, models that train offline and are slow to update rarely perform well and
to a flagged domain and deviates from its established behavioral baseline
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Beaconing PowerShell Scripting Network Scanning DNS Exfiltration Port/Protocol Anomalies Graph/Network Connection Anomalies DGA Detection
Comprehensive, adaptive cyber defensive posture requires collaborative work between ML engineers and SMEs.
Optimized,
capabilities Identified gaps and needs, responses to new adversary tactics
Required to keep pace with adversaries
Tailored solutions on high velocity data
drivers and shapers of MI
AI Defense Cyber Talent
Optimized, MI-informed cyber defensive posture: ➢ Leverages MI and AI ➢ Ensembles models in a cyber informed manner ➢ Demands domain acumen for both analysis and design
Proven Prototypes
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➢ CNN: Vectorized Domain -> Embedding -> Convolution (1D) -> Dropout -> Flatten -> Dense -> Dense -> Sigmoid Activation ➢ LSTM: Vectorized Domain -> Embedding -> LSTM -> Dropout -> Dense -> Dense -> Sigmoid Activation