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FIELD FAILURE REPRODUCTION USING SYMBOLIC EXECUTION AND GENETIC PROGRAMMING Alessandro (Alex) Orso School of Computer Science College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology Partially supported by: NSF, IBM, and MSR DSE SBST FIELD


  1. FIELD FAILURE REPRODUCTION USING SYMBOLIC EXECUTION AND GENETIC PROGRAMMING Alessandro (Alex) Orso School of Computer Science – College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology Partially supported by: NSF, IBM, and MSR

  2. DSE SBST FIELD FAILURE REPRODUCTION USING SYMBOLIC EXECUTION AND GENETIC PROGRAMMING Alessandro (Alex) Orso School of Computer Science – College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology Partially supported by: NSF, IBM, and MSR

  3. DSE SBST FIELD FAILURE REPRODUCTION USING SYMBOLIC EXECUTION AND GENETIC PROGRAMMING Alessandro (Alex) Orso School of Computer Science – College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology Partially supported by: NSF, IBM, and MSR

  4. DSE SBST FIELD FAILURE REPRODUCTION USING SYMBOLIC EXECUTION AND Field failures are GENETIC PROGRAMMING unavoidable! Alessandro (Alex) Orso School of Computer Science – College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology Partially supported by: NSF, IBM, and MSR

  5. DSE SBST FIELD FAILURE REPRODUCTION USING SYMBOLIC EXECUTION AND Field failures are GENETIC PROGRAMMING unavoidable! Alessandro (Alex) Orso School of Computer Science – College of Computing Georgia Institute of Technology Partially supported by: NSF, IBM, and MSR

  6. TYPICAL DEBUGGING PROCESS Bug Repository Very hard to (1) reproduce (2) debug

  7. TYPICAL DEBUGGING PROCESS Recent survey of Apache, Eclipse, and Mozilla developers: Information on how to reproduce field failures is the most valuable, and difficult to obtain, piece of information for investigating such failures. [Zimmermann10] Bug Repository Very hard to (1) reproduce (2) debug

  8. TYPICAL DEBUGGING PROCESS Recent survey of Apache, Eclipse, and Mozilla developers: Information on how to reproduce field failures is the most valuable, and difficult to obtain, piece of information for investigating such failures. [Zimmermann10] Bug Repository OVERARCHING GOAL : help developers (1) investigate field failures, Very hard to (2) understand their causes, and (1) reproduce (3) eliminate such causes. (2) debug

  9. OUR WORK SO FAR Recording and replaying executions [icsm 2007, icse 2007] Input minimization ✘ [woda 2006, icse 2007] Input anonymization [icse 2011] Mimicking field failures [icse 2012, icst 2014] Explaining field failures [issta 2013, TR]

  10. MIMICKING FIELD FAILURES User run ( R ) Mimicked run ( R’ ) • F’ is analogous to F • R’ is an actual execution in the field F F’ in house

  11. MIMICKING FIELD FAILURES User run ( R ) Relevant events Mimicked run ( R’ ) (breadcrumbs)

  12. OVERALL VISION In house In the field Software developer Application Instrumentation sed.c:8958 -> sed.c: 8958 sed.c:8993 -> sed.c: 9011 sed.c:8785 -> sed.c: 8786 sed.c:8786 -> sed.c: 8786 sed.c:990 -> sed.c: 990 Crash report Likely faults Field Failure Field Failure Synthesized (execution data) Reproduction Executions Debugging

  13. DSE SBST BUGREDUX/SBFR Crash report Field Failure Synthesized (execution data) Reproduction Executions

  14. BUGREDUX Joint work with Wei Jin Crash report (execution data) Synthesized Executions

  15. BUGREDUX Joint work with Wei Jin Crash report Test Input (execution data)

  16. BUGREDUX Joint work with Wei Jin Candidate input Input Oracle Crash report generator Test Input (execution data) • Execution data Point of failure (POF) • Failure call stack • Call sequence • Complete trace • • Input generation technique Guided symbolic execution •

  17. ALGORITHM (SIMPLIFIED) Input icfg for P goals (list of code locations) statesSet= {<cl, pc, ss, goal>} Output I f (candidate input) Main algorithm SelNextState minDis = ∞ init; currGoal = first(goals) repeat retState = null currState = SelNextState() if (!currState) backtrack or fail foreach state in statesSet if (currState.cl == currGoal) if (state.goal = currGoal) if (currGoal == last(goals)) if (state.cl can reach currGoal) return solve(currState.pc) d = |shortest path state.cl, currGoal| else if d < minDis currGoal = next(goals) minDis = d currState.goal = currGoal retState = state symbolicallyExec(currState) return retState

  18. ALGORITHM (SIMPLIFIED) Input icfg for P goals (list of code locations) statesSet= {<cl, pc, ss, goal>} Output I f (candidate input) Optimizations/Heuristics Main algorithm SelNextState Dynamic tainting to reduce the symbolic input space minDis = ∞ init; currGoal = first(goals) Program analysis information to prune the search space repeat retState = null Some randomness in the shortest path computation currState = SelNextState() if (!currState) backtrack or fail foreach state in statesSet if (currState.cl == currGoal) if (state.goal = currGoal) if (currGoal == last(goals)) if (state.cl can reach currGoal) return solve(currState.pc) d = |shortest path state.cl, currGoal| else if d < minDis currGoal = next(goals) minDis = d currState.goal = currGoal retState = state symbolicallyExec(currState) return retState

  19. BUGREDUX EVALUATION – FAILURES CONSIDERED Name Repository Size(KLOC) # Faults sed SIR 14 2 grep SIR 10 1 gzip SIR 5 2 ncompress BugBench 2 1 polymorph BugBench 1 1 aeon exploit-db 3 1 glftpd exploit-db 6 1 htget exploit-db 3 1 socat exploit-db 35 1 tipxd exploit-db 7 1 aspell exploit-db 0.5 1 exim exploit-db 241 1 rsync exploit-db 67 1 xmail exploit-db 1 1

  20. BUGREDUX EVALUATION – FAILURES CONSIDERED Name Repository Size(KLOC) # Faults sed SIR 14 2 grep SIR 10 1 gzip SIR 5 2 ncompress BugBench 2 1 polymorph BugBench 1 1 None of these faults can be discovered by aeon exploit-db 3 1 a vanilla KLEE with a timeout of 72 hours glftpd exploit-db 6 1 htget exploit-db 3 1 socat exploit-db 35 1 tipxd exploit-db 7 1 aspell exploit-db 0.5 1 exim exploit-db 241 1 rsync exploit-db 67 1 xmail exploit-db 1 1

  21. BUGREDUX EVALUATION – RESULTS Name POF Call Stack Call Seq. Compl. Trace sed #1 sed #2 grep gzip #1 gzip #2 ncompress One of three outcomes: polymorph ✘ : fail aeon ~ : synthesize rsync ✔ : (synthesize and) mimic glftpd htget socat tipxd aspell xmail exim

  22. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ BUGREDUX EVALUATION – RESULTS Synth.: 10/16 Synth.: 16/16 Synth.: 2/16 Synth.: 9/16 Mimic: 6/16 Mimic: 16/16 Mimic: 2/16 Mimic: 6/16 Name POF Call Stack Call Seq. Compl. Trace sed #1 ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ sed #2 ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ grep ✘ ✔ ✘ gzip #1 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ gzip #2 ✔ ✘ ncompress ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ polymorph ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ aeon ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ rsync ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ glftpd ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ htget ✔ ✘ socat ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ tipxd ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ aspell ✔ ✘ xmail ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ exim ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔

  23. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ BUGREDUX EVALUATION – RESULTS Synth.: 10/16 Synth.: 16/16 Synth.: 2/16 Synth.: 9/16 Mimic: 6/16 Mimic: 16/16 Mimic: 2/16 Mimic: 6/16 Name POF Call Stack Call Seq. Compl. Trace sed #1 ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ sed #2 ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ grep ✘ ✔ ✘ Observations: gzip #1 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ gzip #2 • Faults can be distant from ✔ ✘ ncompress ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ the failure points: polymorph ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ => POFs and call stacks aeon ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ unlikely to help rsync ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ • More information is not glftpd ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ htget ✔ ✘ always better • Symbolic execution can socat ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ tipxd be a limiting factor ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ aspell ✔ ✘ xmail ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ exim ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔

  24. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ BUGREDUX EVALUATION – RESULTS Synth.: 10/16 Synth.: 16/16 Synth.: 2/16 Synth.: 9/16 Mimic: 6/16 Mimic: 16/16 Mimic: 2/16 Mimic: 6/16 Name POF Call Stack Call Seq. Compl. Trace sed #1 ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ sed #2 ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ grep ✘ ✔ ✘ Observations: n a c n o i t gzip #1 u ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ c e x e c i l o b m y S r o f gzip #2 e • Faults can be distant from v ✔ ✘ i t c e f f e n i e b ncompress ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ the failure points: polymorph y ✔ h l ✔ ✔ ✘ g h i h t => POFs and call stacks i w s m a r g o r p • aeon ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ t s u p n i d e u r c t u r s t unlikely to help • programs that interact rsync ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ • More information is not glftpd ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ with external libraries htget • large complex programs ✔ ✘ always better • Symbolic execution can socat ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ in general tipxd be a limiting factor ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ aspell ✔ ✘ xmail ✘ ✘ ✔ ✘ exim ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔

  25. SBFR Joint work with Kifetew, Jin, Tiella, Tonella Crash report Test Input (execution data) • Execution data Call sequence • • Input generation technique Genetic Programming •

  26. SBFR Joint work with Kifetew, Jin, Tiella, Tonella <a> ::= <b> | λ Grammar Crash report Test Input (execution data)

  27. SBFR Joint work with Kifetew, Jin, Tiella, Tonella <a> ::= <b> | λ Grammar Derivation Tree Genetic Programming Crash report Test Input (execution data) Sentence derivation from the grammar: Random application of grammar rules • Uniform • 80/20 • Stochastic (from a corpus)

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