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HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 0 RSA cryptosystem Factoring integers, Producing primes and the RSA cryptosystem Harish-Chandra Research Institute Allahabad (UP), INDIA February, 2005 Universit` a Roma Tre HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 1

  1. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 8 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Contemporary Factoring ✝ ✆ ❶ 1994, Quadratic Sieve (QS): (8 months, 600 voluntaries, 20 countries) D.Atkins, M. Graff, A. Lenstra, P. Leyland RSA 129 = 114381625757888867669235779976146612010218296721242362562561842935706 935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 = = 3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 × 32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 Universit` a Roma Tre

  2. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 8 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Contemporary Factoring ✝ ✆ ❶ 1994, Quadratic Sieve (QS): (8 months, 600 voluntaries, 20 countries) D.Atkins, M. Graff, A. Lenstra, P. Leyland RSA 129 = 114381625757888867669235779976146612010218296721242362562561842935706 935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 = = 3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 × 32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 ❷ (February 2 1999), Number Fields Sieve (NFS): (160 Sun, 4 months) RSA 155 = 109417386415705274218097073220403576120037329454492059909138421314763499842 88934784717997257891267332497625752899781833797076537244027146743531593354333897 = = 102639592829741105772054196573991675900716567808038066803341933521790711307779 × 106603488380168454820927220360012878679207958575989291522270608237193062808643 Universit` a Roma Tre

  3. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 8 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Contemporary Factoring ✝ ✆ ❶ 1994, Quadratic Sieve (QS): (8 months, 600 voluntaries, 20 countries) D.Atkins, M. Graff, A. Lenstra, P. Leyland RSA 129 = 114381625757888867669235779976146612010218296721242362562561842935706 935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 = = 3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 × 32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 ❷ (February 2 1999), Number Fields Sieve (NFS): (160 Sun, 4 months) RSA 155 = 109417386415705274218097073220403576120037329454492059909138421314763499842 88934784717997257891267332497625752899781833797076537244027146743531593354333897 = = 102639592829741105772054196573991675900716567808038066803341933521790711307779 × 106603488380168454820927220360012878679207958575989291522270608237193062808643 ❸ (December 3, 2003) (NFS): J. Franke et al. (174 decimal digits) RSA 576 = 1881988129206079638386972394616504398071635633794173827007633564229888597152346 65485319060606504743045317388011303396716199692321205734031879550656996221305168759307650257059 = = 398075086424064937397125500550386491199064362342526708406385189575946388957261768583317 × 472772146107435302536223071973048224632914695302097116459852171130520711256363590397527 Universit` a Roma Tre

  4. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 8 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Contemporary Factoring ✝ ✆ ❶ 1994, Quadratic Sieve (QS): (8 months, 600 voluntaries, 20 countries) D.Atkins, M. Graff, A. Lenstra, P. Leyland RSA 129 = 114381625757888867669235779976146612010218296721242362562561842935706 935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 = = 3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 × 32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 ❷ (February 2 1999), Number Fields Sieve (NFS): (160 Sun, 4 months) RSA 155 = 109417386415705274218097073220403576120037329454492059909138421314763499842 88934784717997257891267332497625752899781833797076537244027146743531593354333897 = = 102639592829741105772054196573991675900716567808038066803341933521790711307779 × 106603488380168454820927220360012878679207958575989291522270608237193062808643 ❸ (December 3, 2003) (NFS): J. Franke et al. (174 decimal digits) RSA 576 = 1881988129206079638386972394616504398071635633794173827007633564229888597152346 65485319060606504743045317388011303396716199692321205734031879550656996221305168759307650257059 = = 398075086424064937397125500550386491199064362342526708406385189575946388957261768583317 × 472772146107435302536223071973048224632914695302097116459852171130520711256363590397527 ❹ Elliptic curves factoring: introduced by da H. Lenstra. suitable to find prime factors with 50 digits (small) Universit` a Roma Tre

  5. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 8 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Contemporary Factoring ✝ ✆ ❶ 1994, Quadratic Sieve (QS): (8 months, 600 voluntaries, 20 countries) D.Atkins, M. Graff, A. Lenstra, P. Leyland RSA 129 = 114381625757888867669235779976146612010218296721242362562561842935706 935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 = = 3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 × 32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 ❷ (February 2 1999), Number Fields Sieve (NFS): (160 Sun, 4 months) RSA 155 = 109417386415705274218097073220403576120037329454492059909138421314763499842 88934784717997257891267332497625752899781833797076537244027146743531593354333897 = = 102639592829741105772054196573991675900716567808038066803341933521790711307779 × 106603488380168454820927220360012878679207958575989291522270608237193062808643 ❸ (December 3, 2003) (NFS): J. Franke et al. (174 decimal digits) RSA 576 = 1881988129206079638386972394616504398071635633794173827007633564229888597152346 65485319060606504743045317388011303396716199692321205734031879550656996221305168759307650257059 = = 398075086424064937397125500550386491199064362342526708406385189575946388957261768583317 × 472772146107435302536223071973048224632914695302097116459852171130520711256363590397527 ❹ Elliptic curves factoring: introduced by da H. Lenstra. suitable to find prime factors with 50 digits (small) Universit` a Roma Tre

  6. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 9 RSA cryptosystem All: ”sub–exponential running time” Universit` a Roma Tre

  7. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 10 RSA cryptosystem RSA Adi Shamir, Ron L. Rivest, Leonard Adleman (1978) Universit` a Roma Tre

  8. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  9. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Universit` a Roma Tre

  10. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Problem: Alice wants to send the message P to Bob so that Charles cannot read it Universit` a Roma Tre

  11. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Problem: Alice wants to send the message P to Bob so that Charles cannot read it A ( Alice ) − − − − − − → B ( Bob ) ↑ C ( Charles ) Universit` a Roma Tre

  12. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Problem: Alice wants to send the message P to Bob so that Charles cannot read it A ( Alice ) − − − − − − → B ( Bob ) ↑ C ( Charles ) ❶ ❷ ❸ ❹ Universit` a Roma Tre

  13. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Problem: Alice wants to send the message P to Bob so that Charles cannot read it A ( Alice ) − − − − − − → B ( Bob ) ↑ C ( Charles ) ❶ Key generation Bob has to do it ❷ ❸ ❹ Universit` a Roma Tre

  14. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Problem: Alice wants to send the message P to Bob so that Charles cannot read it A ( Alice ) − − − − − − → B ( Bob ) ↑ C ( Charles ) ❶ Key generation Bob has to do it ❷ Encryption Alice has to do it ❸ ❹ Universit` a Roma Tre

  15. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Problem: Alice wants to send the message P to Bob so that Charles cannot read it A ( Alice ) − − − − − − → B ( Bob ) ↑ C ( Charles ) ❶ Key generation Bob has to do it ❷ Encryption Alice has to do it ❸ Decryption Bob has to do it ❹ Universit` a Roma Tre

  16. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 11 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ The RSA cryptosystem ✝ ✆ 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adleman (Patent expired in 1998) Problem: Alice wants to send the message P to Bob so that Charles cannot read it A ( Alice ) − − − − − − → B ( Bob ) ↑ C ( Charles ) ❶ Key generation Bob has to do it ❷ Encryption Alice has to do it ❸ Decryption Bob has to do it ❹ Attack Charles would like to do it Universit` a Roma Tre

  17. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  18. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ✍ ✍ ✍ ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  19. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ ✍ ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  20. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  21. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  22. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ ϕ ( M ) and gcd( e, ϕ ( M )) = 1 ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  23. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ ϕ ( M ) and gcd( e, ϕ ( M )) = 1 Note. One could take e = 3 and p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3 ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  24. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ ϕ ( M ) and gcd( e, ϕ ( M )) = 1 Note. One could take e = 3 and p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3 Experts recommend e = 2 16 + 1 ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  25. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ ϕ ( M ) and gcd( e, ϕ ( M )) = 1 Note. One could take e = 3 and p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3 Experts recommend e = 2 16 + 1 ✍ He computes arithmetic inverse d of e modulo ϕ ( M ) ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  26. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ ϕ ( M ) and gcd( e, ϕ ( M )) = 1 Note. One could take e = 3 and p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3 Experts recommend e = 2 16 + 1 ✍ He computes arithmetic inverse d of e modulo ϕ ( M ) (i.e. d ∈ N (unique ≤ ϕ ( M )) s.t. e × d ≡ 1 (mod ϕ ( M ))) ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  27. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ ϕ ( M ) and gcd( e, ϕ ( M )) = 1 Note. One could take e = 3 and p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3 Experts recommend e = 2 16 + 1 ✍ He computes arithmetic inverse d of e modulo ϕ ( M ) (i.e. d ∈ N (unique ≤ ϕ ( M )) s.t. e × d ≡ 1 (mod ϕ ( M ))) ✍ Publishes ( M, e ) public key and hides secret key d Universit` a Roma Tre

  28. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 12 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Key generation ✝ ✆ ( p, q ≈ 10 100 ) ✍ He chooses randomly p and q primes ✍ He computes M = p × q , ϕ ( M ) = ( p − 1) × ( q − 1) ✍ He chooses an integer e s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ ϕ ( M ) and gcd( e, ϕ ( M )) = 1 Note. One could take e = 3 and p ≡ q ≡ 2 mod 3 Experts recommend e = 2 16 + 1 ✍ He computes arithmetic inverse d of e modulo ϕ ( M ) (i.e. d ∈ N (unique ≤ ϕ ( M )) s.t. e × d ≡ 1 (mod ϕ ( M ))) ✍ Publishes ( M, e ) public key and hides secret key d Problem: How does Bob do all this?- We will go came back to it! Universit` a Roma Tre

  29. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 13 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Alice: Encryption ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  30. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 13 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Alice: Encryption ✝ ✆ Represent the message P as an element of Z /M Z Universit` a Roma Tre

  31. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 13 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Alice: Encryption ✝ ✆ Represent the message P as an element of Z /M Z (for example) A ↔ 1 B ↔ 2 C ↔ 3 . . . Z ↔ 26 AA ↔ 27 . . . Universit` a Roma Tre

  32. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 13 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Alice: Encryption ✝ ✆ Represent the message P as an element of Z /M Z (for example) A ↔ 1 B ↔ 2 C ↔ 3 . . . Z ↔ 26 AA ↔ 27 . . . Sukumar ↔ 19 · 26 6 + 21 · 26 5 + 11 · 26 4 + 21 · 26 3 + 12 · 26 2 + 1 · 26 + 18 = 6124312628 Note. Better if texts are not too short. Otherwise one performs some padding Universit` a Roma Tre

  33. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 13 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Alice: Encryption ✝ ✆ Represent the message P as an element of Z /M Z (for example) A ↔ 1 B ↔ 2 C ↔ 3 . . . Z ↔ 26 AA ↔ 27 . . . Sukumar ↔ 19 · 26 6 + 21 · 26 5 + 11 · 26 4 + 21 · 26 3 + 12 · 26 2 + 1 · 26 + 18 = 6124312628 Note. Better if texts are not too short. Otherwise one performs some padding C = E ( P ) = P e (mod M ) Universit` a Roma Tre

  34. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 13 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Alice: Encryption ✝ ✆ Represent the message P as an element of Z /M Z (for example) A ↔ 1 B ↔ 2 C ↔ 3 . . . Z ↔ 26 AA ↔ 27 . . . Sukumar ↔ 19 · 26 6 + 21 · 26 5 + 11 · 26 4 + 21 · 26 3 + 12 · 26 2 + 1 · 26 + 18 = 6124312628 Note. Better if texts are not too short. Otherwise one performs some padding C = E ( P ) = P e (mod M ) Example: p = 9049465727, q = 8789181607, M = 79537397720925283289, e = 2 16 + 1 = 65537, P = Sukumar : Universit` a Roma Tre

  35. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 13 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Alice: Encryption ✝ ✆ Represent the message P as an element of Z /M Z (for example) A ↔ 1 B ↔ 2 C ↔ 3 . . . Z ↔ 26 AA ↔ 27 . . . Sukumar ↔ 19 · 26 6 + 21 · 26 5 + 11 · 26 4 + 21 · 26 3 + 12 · 26 2 + 1 · 26 + 18 = 6124312628 Note. Better if texts are not too short. Otherwise one performs some padding C = E ( P ) = P e (mod M ) Example: p = 9049465727, q = 8789181607, M = 79537397720925283289, e = 2 16 + 1 = 65537, P = Sukumar : E ( Sukumar ) = 6124312628 65537 (mod79537397720925283289) = 25439695120356558116 = C = JGEBNBAUYTCOFJ Universit` a Roma Tre

  36. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 14 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Decryption ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  37. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 14 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Decryption ✝ ✆ P = D ( C ) = C d (mod M ) Universit` a Roma Tre

  38. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 14 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Decryption ✝ ✆ P = D ( C ) = C d (mod M ) Note. Bob decrypts because he is the only one that knows d . Universit` a Roma Tre

  39. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 14 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Decryption ✝ ✆ P = D ( C ) = C d (mod M ) Note. Bob decrypts because he is the only one that knows d . Theorem. (Euler) If a, m ∈ N , gcd( a, m ) = 1, a ϕ ( m ) ≡ 1 (mod m ) . If n 1 ≡ n 2 mod ϕ ( m ) then a n 1 ≡ a n 2 mod m . Universit` a Roma Tre

  40. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 14 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Decryption ✝ ✆ P = D ( C ) = C d (mod M ) Note. Bob decrypts because he is the only one that knows d . Theorem. (Euler) If a, m ∈ N , gcd( a, m ) = 1, a ϕ ( m ) ≡ 1 (mod m ) . If n 1 ≡ n 2 mod ϕ ( m ) then a n 1 ≡ a n 2 mod m . Therefore ( ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ ( M )) D ( E ( P )) = P ed ≡ P mod M Universit` a Roma Tre

  41. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 14 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Bob: Decryption ✝ ✆ P = D ( C ) = C d (mod M ) Note. Bob decrypts because he is the only one that knows d . Theorem. (Euler) If a, m ∈ N , gcd( a, m ) = 1, a ϕ ( m ) ≡ 1 (mod m ) . If n 1 ≡ n 2 mod ϕ ( m ) then a n 1 ≡ a n 2 mod m . Therefore ( ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ ( M )) D ( E ( P )) = P ed ≡ P mod M Example(cont.): d = 65537 − 1 mod ϕ (9049465727 · 8789181607) = 57173914060643780153 D ( JGEBNBAUYTCOFJ ) = 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) = Sukumar Universit` a Roma Tre

  42. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 15 RSA cryptosystem RSA at work Universit` a Roma Tre

  43. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  44. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? Universit` a Roma Tre

  45. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) Universit` a Roma Tre

  46. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) ✍ ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  47. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) [log 2 b ] � ǫ j 2 j ✍ Compute the binary expansion b = j =0 ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  48. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) [log 2 b ] � ǫ j 2 j ✍ Compute the binary expansion b = j =0 57173914060643780153= 110001100101110010100010111110101011110011011000100100011000111001 ✍ ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  49. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) [log 2 b ] � ǫ j 2 j ✍ Compute the binary expansion b = j =0 57173914060643780153= 110001100101110010100010111110101011110011011000100100011000111001 ✍ Compute recursively a 2 j mod c, j = 1 , . . . , [log 2 b ]: ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  50. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) [log 2 b ] � ǫ j 2 j ✍ Compute the binary expansion b = j =0 57173914060643780153= 110001100101110010100010111110101011110011011000100100011000111001 ✍ Compute recursively a 2 j mod c, j = 1 , . . . , [log 2 b ]: a 2 j mod c = a 2 j − 1 mod c � 2 � mod c ✍ Universit` a Roma Tre

  51. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) [log 2 b ] � ǫ j 2 j ✍ Compute the binary expansion b = j =0 57173914060643780153= 110001100101110010100010111110101011110011011000100100011000111001 ✍ Compute recursively a 2 j mod c, j = 1 , . . . , [log 2 b ]: a 2 j mod c = a 2 j − 1 mod c � 2 � mod c ✍ Multiply the a 2 j mod c with ǫ j = 1 Universit` a Roma Tre

  52. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 16 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Repeated squaring algorithm ✝ ✆ Problem: How does one compute a b mod c ? 25439695120356558116 57173914060643780153 (mod79537397720925283289) [log 2 b ] � ǫ j 2 j ✍ Compute the binary expansion b = j =0 57173914060643780153= 110001100101110010100010111110101011110011011000100100011000111001 ✍ Compute recursively a 2 j mod c, j = 1 , . . . , [log 2 b ]: a 2 j mod c = a 2 j − 1 mod c � 2 � mod c ✍ Multiply the a 2 j mod c with ǫ j = 1 j =0 ,ǫ j =1 a 2 j mod c �� [log 2 b ] � a b mod c = mod c Universit` a Roma Tre

  53. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 17 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ # { oper. in Z /c Z to compute a b mod c } ≤ 2 log 2 b ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  54. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 17 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ # { oper. in Z /c Z to compute a b mod c } ≤ 2 log 2 b ✝ ✆ JGEBNBAUYTCOFJ is decrypted with 131 operations in Z / 79537397720925283289 Z Universit` a Roma Tre

  55. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 17 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ # { oper. in Z /c Z to compute a b mod c } ≤ 2 log 2 b ✝ ✆ JGEBNBAUYTCOFJ is decrypted with 131 operations in Z / 79537397720925283289 Z Pseudo code: e c ( a, b ) = a b mod c Universit` a Roma Tre

  56. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 17 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ # { oper. in Z /c Z to compute a b mod c } ≤ 2 log 2 b ✝ ✆ JGEBNBAUYTCOFJ is decrypted with 131 operations in Z / 79537397720925283289 Z Pseudo code: e c ( a, b ) = a b mod c e c ( a, b ) b = 1 a mod c = if then 2 ) 2 mod c e c ( a, b 2 | b if then 2 ) 2 mod c a ∗ e c ( a, b − 1 else Universit` a Roma Tre

  57. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 17 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ # { oper. in Z /c Z to compute a b mod c } ≤ 2 log 2 b ✝ ✆ JGEBNBAUYTCOFJ is decrypted with 131 operations in Z / 79537397720925283289 Z Pseudo code: e c ( a, b ) = a b mod c e c ( a, b ) b = 1 a mod c = if then 2 ) 2 mod c e c ( a, b 2 | b if then 2 ) 2 mod c a ∗ e c ( a, b − 1 else To encrypt with e = 2 16 + 1, only 17 operations in Z /M Z are enough Universit` a Roma Tre

  58. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 18 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Key generation ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  59. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 18 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Key generation ✝ ✆ Problem. Produce a random prime p ≈ 10 100 Probabilistic algorithm (type Las Vegas) Let p = Random (10 100 ) 1. If isprime ( p )=1 then Output = p else goto 1 2. Universit` a Roma Tre

  60. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 18 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Key generation ✝ ✆ Problem. Produce a random prime p ≈ 10 100 Probabilistic algorithm (type Las Vegas) Let p = Random (10 100 ) 1. If isprime ( p )=1 then Output = p else goto 1 2. subproblems: Universit` a Roma Tre

  61. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 18 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Key generation ✝ ✆ Problem. Produce a random prime p ≈ 10 100 Probabilistic algorithm (type Las Vegas) Let p = Random (10 100 ) 1. If isprime ( p )=1 then Output = p else goto 1 2. subproblems: A. How many iterations are necessary? (i.e. how are primes distributes?) Universit` a Roma Tre

  62. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 18 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Key generation ✝ ✆ Problem. Produce a random prime p ≈ 10 100 Probabilistic algorithm (type Las Vegas) Let p = Random (10 100 ) 1. If isprime ( p )=1 then Output = p else goto 1 2. subproblems: A. How many iterations are necessary? (i.e. how are primes distributes?) B. How does one check if p is prime? (i.e. how does one compute isprime ( p )?) � Primality test Universit` a Roma Tre

  63. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 18 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ Key generation ✝ ✆ Problem. Produce a random prime p ≈ 10 100 Probabilistic algorithm (type Las Vegas) Let p = Random (10 100 ) 1. If isprime ( p )=1 then Output = p else goto 1 2. subproblems: A. How many iterations are necessary? (i.e. how are primes distributes?) B. How does one check if p is prime? (i.e. how does one compute isprime ( p )?) � Primality test False Metropolitan Legend: Check primality is equivalent to factoring Universit` a Roma Tre

  64. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 19 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ A. Distribution of prime numbers ✝ ✆ Universit` a Roma Tre

  65. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 19 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ A. Distribution of prime numbers ✝ ✆ π ( x ) = # { p ≤ x t. c. p is prime } Universit` a Roma Tre

  66. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 19 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ A. Distribution of prime numbers ✝ ✆ π ( x ) = # { p ≤ x t. c. p is prime } Theorem. (Hadamard - de la vallee Pussen - 1897) x π ( x ) ∼ log x Universit` a Roma Tre

  67. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 19 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ A. Distribution of prime numbers ✝ ✆ π ( x ) = # { p ≤ x t. c. p is prime } Theorem. (Hadamard - de la vallee Pussen - 1897) x π ( x ) ∼ log x Quantitative version: Theorem. (Rosser - Schoenfeld) if x ≥ 67 x x log x − 1 / 2 < π ( x ) < log x − 3 / 2 Universit` a Roma Tre

  68. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 19 RSA cryptosystem ✞ ☎ A. Distribution of prime numbers ✝ ✆ π ( x ) = # { p ≤ x t. c. p is prime } Theorem. (Hadamard - de la vallee Pussen - 1897) x π ( x ) ∼ log x Quantitative version: Theorem. (Rosser - Schoenfeld) if x ≥ 67 x x log x − 1 / 2 < π ( x ) < log x − 3 / 2 Therefore ( Random (10 100 ) = prime � ✁ 0 . 0043523959267 < Prob < 0 . 004371422086 Universit` a Roma Tre

  69. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 20 RSA cryptosystem If P k is the probability that among k random numbers ≤ 10 100 there is a prime one, then Universit` a Roma Tre

  70. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 20 RSA cryptosystem If P k is the probability that among k random numbers ≤ 10 100 there is a prime one, then � k 1 − π (10 100 ) � P k = 1 − 10 100 Universit` a Roma Tre

  71. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 20 RSA cryptosystem If P k is the probability that among k random numbers ≤ 10 100 there is a prime one, then � k 1 − π (10 100 ) � P k = 1 − 10 100 Therefore 0 . 663942 < P 250 < 0 . 66554440 Universit` a Roma Tre

  72. HRI, Allahabad, February, 2005 20 RSA cryptosystem If P k is the probability that among k random numbers ≤ 10 100 there is a prime one, then � k 1 − π (10 100 ) � P k = 1 − 10 100 Therefore 0 . 663942 < P 250 < 0 . 66554440 To speed up the process: One can consider only odd random numbers not divisible by 3 nor by 5. Universit` a Roma Tre

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