Evolutionary Behavioural Finance Rabah Amir (University of Iowa) - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

evolutionary behavioural finance
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Evolutionary Behavioural Finance Rabah Amir (University of Iowa) - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Evolutionary Behavioural Finance Rabah Amir (University of Iowa) Igor Evstigneev (University of Manchester) Thorsten Hens (University of Zurich) Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hopp (University of Manchester) The talk introduces to a new research field


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Evolutionary Behavioural Finance

Rabah Amir (University of Iowa) Igor Evstigneev (University of Manchester) Thorsten Hens (University of Zurich) Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé (University of Manchester)

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The talk introduces to a new research field developing

evolutionary and behavioral approaches to the modeling of financial markets.

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The talk introduces to a new research field developing

evolutionary and behavioral approaches to the modeling of financial markets.

The general goal of this direction of research is to develop a

plausible alternative to the classical Walrasian General Equilibrium theory.

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The talk introduces to a new research field developing

evolutionary and behavioral approaches to the modeling of financial markets.

The general goal of this direction of research is to develop a

plausible alternative to the classical Walrasian General Equilibrium theory.

The models considered in this field combine elements of

stochastic dynamic games (strategic frameworks) and evolutionary game theory (solution concepts).

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Walrasian Equilibrium

Conventional models of equilibrium and dynamics of asset

markets are based on the principles of Walrasian General Equilibrium theory.

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Walrasian Equilibrium

Conventional models of equilibrium and dynamics of asset

markets are based on the principles of Walrasian General Equilibrium theory.

In its classical version, this theory assumes that market

participants act so as to maximize utilities of consumption subject to budget constraints.

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Walrasian Equilibrium

Conventional models of equilibrium and dynamics of asset

markets are based on the principles of Walrasian General Equilibrium theory.

In its classical version, this theory assumes that market

participants act so as to maximize utilities of consumption subject to budget constraints.

It is assumed that the objectives of economic agents can be

described in terms of well-defined and precisely stated constrained optimization problems.

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Behavioural equilibrium

The goal of the present study is to develop an alternative

equilibrium concept — behavioural equilibrium, admitting that market actors may have different patterns of behaviour determined by their individual psychology, which are not necessarily describable in terms of individual utility maximization.

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Behavioural equilibrium

The goal of the present study is to develop an alternative

equilibrium concept — behavioural equilibrium, admitting that market actors may have different patterns of behaviour determined by their individual psychology, which are not necessarily describable in terms of individual utility maximization.

Strategies may involve, for example, mimicking, satisficing,

rules of thumb based on experience, etc. Strategies might be interactive — depending on the behaviour of the others.

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Behavioural equilibrium

The goal of the present study is to develop an alternative

equilibrium concept — behavioural equilibrium, admitting that market actors may have different patterns of behaviour determined by their individual psychology, which are not necessarily describable in terms of individual utility maximization.

Strategies may involve, for example, mimicking, satisficing,

rules of thumb based on experience, etc. Strategies might be interactive — depending on the behaviour of the others.

Objectives might be of an evolutionary nature: survival

(especially in crisis environments), domination in a market segment, fastest capital growth, etc. They might be relative — taking into account the performance of the others.

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Evolutionary Behavioural Finance

SOURCES

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Evolutionary Behavioural Finance

SOURCES Behavioural economics — studies at the interface of

psychology and economics: Tversky, Kahneman, Smith, Shleifer (1990s); the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics: Kahneman and Smith

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Evolutionary Behavioural Finance

SOURCES Behavioural economics — studies at the interface of

psychology and economics: Tversky, Kahneman, Smith, Shleifer (1990s); the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics: Kahneman and Smith

Behavioural finance: Shiller (the 2013 Nobel Prize in

Economics) and others.

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Evolutionary Behavioural Finance

SOURCES Behavioural economics — studies at the interface of

psychology and economics: Tversky, Kahneman, Smith, Shleifer (1990s); the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics: Kahneman and Smith

Behavioural finance: Shiller (the 2013 Nobel Prize in

Economics) and others.

Evolutionary game theory: J. Maynard Smith and G. R.

Price (1973)

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Basic Model

I investors

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Basic Model

I investors K assets

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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i

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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i Vector of market prices pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K ) ∈ RK +

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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i Vector of market prices pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K ) ∈ RK + The value of the portfolio pt, xi t = ∑K k=1 pt,kxi t,k

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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i Vector of market prices pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K ) ∈ RK + The value of the portfolio pt, xi t = ∑K k=1 pt,kxi t,k Stochastic process of states of the world a1, a2, .... History of

the process at = (a1, ..., at)

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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i Vector of market prices pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K ) ∈ RK + The value of the portfolio pt, xi t = ∑K k=1 pt,kxi t,k Stochastic process of states of the world a1, a2, .... History of

the process at = (a1, ..., at)

Total amount of asset k in period t: Vt,k(at) > 0

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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i Vector of market prices pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K ) ∈ RK + The value of the portfolio pt, xi t = ∑K k=1 pt,kxi t,k Stochastic process of states of the world a1, a2, .... History of

the process at = (a1, ..., at)

Total amount of asset k in period t: Vt,k(at) > 0 Dividend of asset k in period t: Dt,k(at) ≥ 0

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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i Vector of market prices pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K ) ∈ RK + The value of the portfolio pt, xi t = ∑K k=1 pt,kxi t,k Stochastic process of states of the world a1, a2, .... History of

the process at = (a1, ..., at)

Total amount of asset k in period t: Vt,k(at) > 0 Dividend of asset k in period t: Dt,k(at) ≥ 0 Vector of investment proportions λi t = (λi t,1, ..., λi t,K ) selected

by trader i, λi

t = λi t (at)
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Basic Model

I investors K assets Portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ) ∈ RK + of investor i Vector of market prices pt = (pt,1, ..., pt,K ) ∈ RK + The value of the portfolio pt, xi t = ∑K k=1 pt,kxi t,k Stochastic process of states of the world a1, a2, .... History of

the process at = (a1, ..., at)

Total amount of asset k in period t: Vt,k(at) > 0 Dividend of asset k in period t: Dt,k(at) ≥ 0 Vector of investment proportions λi t = (λi t,1, ..., λi t,K ) selected

by trader i, λi

t = λi t (at) λi t ∈ ∆K , ∆K = {(c1, ..., cK ) ∈ RK + : c1 + ... + cK = 1}

(action of i)

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Strategic framework

Strategy (portfolio rule) of investor i: a rule

λi

t = Λi t(at, Ht)

prescribing what vector λi

t of investment proportions to select

at each time t depending on the history at = (a1, ..., at) of states of the world and the history of play Ht = {λi

s : s < t, i = 1, ..., I}.
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Strategic framework

Strategy (portfolio rule) of investor i: a rule

λi

t = Λi t(at, Ht)

prescribing what vector λi

t of investment proportions to select

at each time t depending on the history at = (a1, ..., at) of states of the world and the history of play Ht = {λi

s : s < t, i = 1, ..., I}. Basic strategy: Λi t = Λi t(at) depends only on at and not on

Ht.

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Short-run equilibrium

Short-run equilibrium:

pt,kVt,k = α

I

i=1

λi

t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

(1)

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Short-run equilibrium

Short-run equilibrium:

pt,kVt,k = α

I

i=1

λi

t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

(1)

pt,k equilibrium price of asset k

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Short-run equilibrium

Short-run equilibrium:

pt,kVt,k = α

I

i=1

λi

t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

(1)

pt,k equilibrium price of asset k investor i’s wealth: wi t = pt + Dt, xi t−1

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Short-run equilibrium

Short-run equilibrium:

pt,kVt,k = α

I

i=1

λi

t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

(1)

pt,k equilibrium price of asset k investor i’s wealth: wi t = pt + Dt, xi t−1 0 < α < 1 investment rate

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Short-run equilibrium

Short-run equilibrium:

pt,kVt,k = α

I

i=1

λi

t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

(1)

pt,k equilibrium price of asset k investor i’s wealth: wi t = pt + Dt, xi t−1 0 < α < 1 investment rate investor i’s portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ):

xi

t,k = αλi t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

pt,k = αλi

t,kwi t

pt,k

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Short-run equilibrium

Short-run equilibrium:

pt,kVt,k = α

I

i=1

λi

t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

(1)

pt,k equilibrium price of asset k investor i’s wealth: wi t = pt + Dt, xi t−1 0 < α < 1 investment rate investor i’s portfolio xi t = (xi t,1, ..., xi t,K ):

xi

t,k = αλi t,kpt + Dt, xi t−1

pt,k = αλi

t,kwi t

pt,k

Equations (1) can be written as

Vt,k =

I

i=1

xi

t,k (supply = demand)
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  • Dynamics. Outcome of the game

Fix a strategy profile Λ = (Λ1, ..., ΛI ) of I investors.

Generate step by step, from t to t + 1 equilibrium asset price vectors pt and for each investor i, vectors of investment proportions λi

t, and portfolios xi t.
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  • Dynamics. Outcome of the game

Fix a strategy profile Λ = (Λ1, ..., ΛI ) of I investors.

Generate step by step, from t to t + 1 equilibrium asset price vectors pt and for each investor i, vectors of investment proportions λi

t, and portfolios xi t. Compute for each t,i investor i’s wealth wi t = pt + Dt, xi t−1,

the total market wealth Wt := ∑I

i=1 wi t and investors’ market

shares ri

t := wi t /Wt.
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  • Dynamics. Outcome of the game

Fix a strategy profile Λ = (Λ1, ..., ΛI ) of I investors.

Generate step by step, from t to t + 1 equilibrium asset price vectors pt and for each investor i, vectors of investment proportions λi

t, and portfolios xi t. Compute for each t,i investor i’s wealth wi t = pt + Dt, xi t−1,

the total market wealth Wt := ∑I

i=1 wi t and investors’ market

shares ri

t := wi t /Wt. Outcome of the game for player i is the random sequence of

i’s market shares ri

0, ri 1, ri 2, ....
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Solution concept: Survival strategy

A strategy Λi of player i is called a survival strategy if for any strategies Λj of players j = i the market share ri

t of player i is

bounded away from zero almost surely: inf

t ri t > 0 almost surely.
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Central Results

Assumption 1. For all t, k with strictly positive probability,

EtDt+s,k > 0 for some s ≥ 1.

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Central Results

Assumption 1. For all t, k with strictly positive probability,

EtDt+s,k > 0 for some s ≥ 1.

Assumption 2. Vt,k = γtVk, γ ≥ 1.

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Central Results

Assumption 1. For all t, k with strictly positive probability,

EtDt+s,k > 0 for some s ≥ 1.

Assumption 2. Vt,k = γtVk, γ ≥ 1. Define: ρ = α/γ and Rt,k = Dt,kVk/ ∑K m=1 Dt,mVm (relative

dividends).

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Central Results

Assumption 1. For all t, k with strictly positive probability,

EtDt+s,k > 0 for some s ≥ 1.

Assumption 2. Vt,k = γtVk, γ ≥ 1. Define: ρ = α/γ and Rt,k = Dt,kVk/ ∑K m=1 Dt,mVm (relative

dividends).

Consider the basic portfolio rule Λ∗ = (λ∗ t ), where

λ∗

t,k = Et ∞

l=1

(1 − ρ)ρl−1Rt+l,k

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Central Results

Assumption 1. For all t, k with strictly positive probability,

EtDt+s,k > 0 for some s ≥ 1.

Assumption 2. Vt,k = γtVk, γ ≥ 1. Define: ρ = α/γ and Rt,k = Dt,kVk/ ∑K m=1 Dt,mVm (relative

dividends).

Consider the basic portfolio rule Λ∗ = (λ∗ t ), where

λ∗

t,k = Et ∞

l=1

(1 − ρ)ρl−1Rt+l,k

Theorem 1. The portfolio rule Λ∗ is a survival strategy.

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Central Results

Assumption 1. For all t, k with strictly positive probability,

EtDt+s,k > 0 for some s ≥ 1.

Assumption 2. Vt,k = γtVk, γ ≥ 1. Define: ρ = α/γ and Rt,k = Dt,kVk/ ∑K m=1 Dt,mVm (relative

dividends).

Consider the basic portfolio rule Λ∗ = (λ∗ t ), where

λ∗

t,k = Et ∞

l=1

(1 − ρ)ρl−1Rt+l,k

Theorem 1. The portfolio rule Λ∗ is a survival strategy. Theorem 2. If Λ = (λt) is a basic survival strategy, then

∑∞

t=0 ||λ∗ t − λt||2 < ∞ (a.s.).
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Central Results

Assumption 1. For all t, k with strictly positive probability,

EtDt+s,k > 0 for some s ≥ 1.

Assumption 2. Vt,k = γtVk, γ ≥ 1. Define: ρ = α/γ and Rt,k = Dt,kVk/ ∑K m=1 Dt,mVm (relative

dividends).

Consider the basic portfolio rule Λ∗ = (λ∗ t ), where

λ∗

t,k = Et ∞

l=1

(1 − ρ)ρl−1Rt+l,k

Theorem 1. The portfolio rule Λ∗ is a survival strategy. Theorem 2. If Λ = (λt) is a basic survival strategy, then

∑∞

t=0 ||λ∗ t − λt||2 < ∞ (a.s.). Theorems 1 and 2: existence and asymptotic uniqueness of

survival strategy.

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Some References

I.E., T. Hens, K.R. Schenk-Hoppé, Evolutionary stable stock

markets, Economic Theory (2006)

I.E., T. Hens, K.R. Schenk-Hoppé, Globally evolutionarily

stable portfolio rules, Journal of Economic Theory (2008)

  • R. Amir, I.E., T. Hens and L. Xu, Evolutionary finance and

dynamic games, 2011, Mathematics and Financial Economics (2011)

  • R. Amir, I.E., K.R. Schenk-Hoppé, Asset market games of

survival: A synthesis of evolutionary and dynamic games, Annals of Finance (2013)

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1

Mathematical Financial Economics

Evstigneev · Hens Schenk-Hoppé

Springer Texts in Business and Economics

Igor Evstigneev Thorsten Hens Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé A Basic Introduction

Mathematical Financial Economics

Springer Texts in Business and Economics Igor Evstigneev · Thorsten Hens · Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé

Mathematical Financial Economics

A Basic Introduction

Business / Economics

9 7 8 3 3 1 9 1 6 5 7 0 7 ISBN 978-3-319-16570-7

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