Evading Cellular Data Monitoring With Human Movement Networks Adam - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Evading Cellular Data Monitoring With Human Movement Networks Adam - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Evading Cellular Data Monitoring With Human Movement Networks Adam J. Aviv, Micah Sherr*, Matt Blaze, and Jonathan M. Smith University of Pennsylvania, *Georgetown University Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 1 Motivation


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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 1

Evading Cellular Data Monitoring With Human Movement Networks

Adam J. Aviv, Micah Sherr*, Matt Blaze, and Jonathan M. Smith

University of Pennsylvania, *Georgetown University

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 2

Motivation

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 3

Goal

Out-of-Band communication

Unmonitored and completely decentralized

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 4

HumaNet

Human-to-Human Mobile Ad-Hoc Network

Humans + Smartphones

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 5

HumaNet

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 6

Design Trade-ofs

Complete Centralization Epidemic Random Walk

HumaNet

Reliability Network Load Latency Anonymity

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 7

Regularity of Movement Patterns

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 8

Return-to-Home Principle

A person is likely to return to places frequented in the past

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 9

HumaNet Protocol Idea

No further duplication of messages Address message to recipient's likely future locations Local routing decision based on movement history

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 10

A B

?

Alice and Bob ...

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 11

C A

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 12 `

D D

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 13

C B D A

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 14

Routing Refnements

Local Timeout Global Timeout Last Mile Flooding

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 15

Constructing a Profle

One Day's GPS locations

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Cluster Points

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 17

One Day's Homes

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 18

Combine With Other Days

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Trace Driven Simulation

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Data Source

Cabspotting Dataset

20 days, 536 Cabs in San Francisco

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Comparison

Epidemic Flooding Probabilistic Flooding Random Walk

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#Messages Required

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 23

Message Latency

76% w/in 1 day

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 24

Successful Delivery

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 25

Challenges

Reliability Routing Attacks Location Privacy Anonymity

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Reliability and Routing Attacks

Best-Efort routing

How reliable would we need?

Peer-to-Peer System

Vulnerable to same class of attacks, but how feasible are they here?

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 27

Location Privacy

Periodic broadcasts of location information

Peoples willingness to participate? Reveal surprising locations?

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 28

Anonymity

Can this system provide Anonymity?

Sender Anonymity

message timeout leaks info

Receiver Anonymity

Message no longer being passed

Broadcast in crowds (k-anonymity)

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 29

Brain Storming ...

Attacking HumaNet, how would you do it?

Necessary resources? Feasible?

Would you participate?

If not, what would you need to say yes?

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 30

Thanks

Questions, Discussion?

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 31

Generate a Home

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 32

How Predictive?

Average:

65% of GPS coordinates fell within homes 65% of the day (time)

Worst Case:

39% of GPS coordinates fell within homes 45% of the day (time)

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Adam J. Aviv University of Pennsylvania HotSec '10 33

Other Routing Protocols

Epidemic

Pocket Switched Networks [CHCDGS'07] Pollen [GSM'01]

Ad-Hoc

DREAM [BCSW'98] GPSR [KK'00]

Geographic Ad-Hoc'ish