Enhancing participation in the Confidence Building Measure system, - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Enhancing participation in the Confidence Building Measure system, in terms of both quantity and quality

WUXI WORKSHOP 5-7 September 2016 Julia Nordmann Germany

CBMs…

CBMs were agreed upon in 1986 promote transparency increase confidence in compliance Goal is to demonstrate political commitment in the absence of a verification protocol provide a useful review of the status of national implementation  bottom line: we depend on this alternative way of demonstrating compliance.

Advantages of CBMs

• CBMs are a familiar aspect of the BWC, having existed for over

twenty years;

• most information requested on CBM forms is still relevant in the

BWC context;

• CBMs are state-led, adaptable and promote openness;
• CBMs are synergistic;
• provide a bridge between diverse reporting structures at the

national, international and civil society level, and, finally,

• CBMs can be improved at a low cost with positive impacts.

Disadvantages of CBMs

• CBMs were intended to be an interim solution, not a permanent

fixture of the BWC;

• the CBM mechanism maintains an ambiguous relationship

between Article V, on compliance, and Article X, on cooperation;

• CBMs are a bolted on “extra,” having not been integrated into

accountability, compliance or implementation frameworks, and,

• finally, CBMs provide partial transparency between states and are
• paque to the outside world.

Challenges

• submission rate is low
• value of information
• no follow-up / analysis of CBMs provided

 Key question: how can we make more effective use of CBMs?

Positive indicators for change

• an interest on behalf of States Parties in CBMs and their further

development;

• contributions made by civil society in preparation for the

RevCons

• room for creativity and scope for improvement.

Key Question

• How can we make better use of this tool and improve quality and

quantity of CBMs?

• Quality:
• Is the information relevant? Is it useful?
• Quantity:
• What are obstacles in the CBM submission process? How can we
• vercome them?

BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.5

Position of the EU relating to the Eighth Review Conference of the BWC

WEOG

EU

BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.9

Strengthening the ability to take action: an essential agenda for the Eighth RevCon

WEOG

USA

BWC/MSP/2015/WP.3

Strengthening the ability to take action: A realistic agenda for the Eighth Review Conference

WEOG

USA

BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.6

Strengthening confidence-building and consultative mechanisms under the BWC

WEOG

USA

BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.6/Rev.1

Strengthening confidence building and consultative mechanisms under the Biological Weapons Convention

WEOG

USA

BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.35

Strengthening confidence-building measures in regard to dual use materials

WEOG

DEU

BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.34

Working Paper on providing reassurance on Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) implementation

GS

AUS CAN CHL COL CRI ECU GHA JPN MYS NOR PHL KOR CHE THA

BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.36

Step-by-step approach in CBM participation (2016)

GS

AUS CAN JPN MYS KOR CHE

CBM Quantity

• both ISU and States Parties have offered assistance related to the

CBM process

• Guide to Participating in the CBMs (UNODA 2015)
• submission rate remains below the states parties political

commitments and therefore our expectations.

• open dialogue in order to find out how implementation of this

provision of the Convention could be enhanced.

• CBM submission requires effort and coordination among

internal ministries and agencies

• efforts of all member states are required.

Sources of advice and assistance

• Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit,

Geneva

• WMD Strategy and Council Decisions in support of BWC and

biosafety and biosecurity, Brussels

• CBRN risks and threats mitigation, Brussels
• Instrument for Stability, Nuclear Safety, Brussels

Proposals to improve quantity

• increase ISU support (WP.5 by the EU)
• CBM guide (WP.5)
• step by step submission (WP.36)
• CBM assistance network coordinated by ISU (WP.6)
• training, translation, workshops and electronic submission(WP.6)
• formalize ISU role (receiving CBMs) (WP.21)

CBM Quality

• Does the information provided correspond to relevant S&T

developments?

• Is it useful?
• Dual use capabilities of hazardous biological materials = key items of

discussion in BTWC context

• CBMs however do not yet include information on the export control
• f genetically modified organisms

 (German proposal: amend Form E of CBMs to include this.)

Proposals to improve quality

• examine and analyze submissions
• expand functionality of electronic platform to enable analysis
• revise Form A and Form E (WP.6): military and civilian,

implementation measures

• informal procedures to clarify information (WP.6)

German Proposal

• Amend Form E to include information on the export control of

genetically modified organism and specific genetic elements linked to export controlled microorganisms and toxins

• Why?
• Genetically modified organism and synthesized genetic sequences

were not on the screen when drafting form E.

• Today: major dual use risk.

Outlook

• CBMs have a huge potential that is not yet fully explored.
• Eighth RevCon = opportunity to improve the CBM system in order

to provide better data, of more member states, to the use of States Parties

• Germany is looking forward to an inclusive and dynamic dialogue
• n this subject.
• Thank you for your attention.