Engine leasing, financing and investment Airline Economics School - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Engine leasing, financing and investment Airline Economics School - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Engine leasing, financing and investment Airline Economics School Hong Kong 2016 *** Jon Sharp President and CEO Engine Lease Finance Corporation Spare engine leasing Introduction Market size Business models Short and


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Engine leasing, financing and investment Airline Economics School Hong Kong 2016 *** Jon Sharp President and CEO Engine Lease Finance Corporation

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Spare engine leasing

  • Introduction
  • Market size
  • Business models
  • Short and long term leasing considerations
  • Economic life cycle
  • Impact of OEM market influence
  • End of life exits
  • Conclusions
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The world’s leading spare engine lessor c.300 engines $2.5bn portfolio value 130 customers 5 joint venture partners

Engine Lease Finance Corporation

This image cannot currently be displayed.

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SLIDE 4

Company Structure

Mitsubishi UFJ Lease & Finance Company Limited (“MUL”)

ELFC Singapore

  • Pte. Ltd.

ELF London Limited Aviation Lease Finance LLC Engine Lease Finance Corporation SPCs & JVs

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Market Overview – engine operating leases

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  • How many aircraft?
  • What numbers leased?
  • How many spare engines leased?
  • How many spare engines?
  • What dollar value?
  • Potential market

Engine Operating Leasing Market Size – Analysis methodology

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SLIDE 6

Market Overview – engine operating leases

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ü Forecast c. 2,450 spare engines will be delivered and placed on operating lease between 2016 and 2035 ü Total value = $50bn (2015 $) ü Average = $2.5bn pa new engine operating lease market ü OEM share 50% ü Relatively small market remains for non-OEM lessors = $1.25bn pa

New Engine Operating Leasing Market Growth

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1. Long term operating leases

1. Sale and leaseback/Purchase and lease 2. Third-party engine and portfolio management and remarketing services

2. Short-term leases / AOG support

1. Leasing of assets returned from operating leases 2. Greentime burnoff/refurbish

3. End of life exit

1. Part out 2. Sell as is

Engine lessor business model

Engine Life cycle

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SLIDE 8

Segmentation and change in the spare engine leasing market

Long-term Operating lease Second lease Short term lease and pooling Greentime burn

  • ff and part-out,

EoL Life- cycle

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Long term v Short term spare engine leases

Long term

  • 5 – 10 years
  • Normal operational risk = Lessee
  • Negotiated contract
  • Minimum return conditions
  • Reserves a credit issue
  • Rental a function of engine price and

lessor cost of funds

  • Planned transaction
  • Credit/investment committee approval
  • “Money”

Short term

  • 3 months +/-
  • Normal operational risk = lessor

(FOD, misuse excluded)

  • Standard shortform
  • As is
  • Reserves retained by lessor
  • Rental & Usage = Market rates
  • Event driven
  • Local approval only
  • “Metal”
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Historical Residual Value Model (0% Inflation)

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Engine and spare parts pricing structure – cause and effect

  • OEMs sell engines at a loss, rely upon revenues from spare sales.
  • Resultant high spares prices has created a market for PMA and DER – but

small percentage of the market (2% - 3%),

  • And a boom in the USM market

– 60+ companies breaking engines, refurbishing and selling spares – $5bnp.a.

  • OEMs proliferate this by keeping spares prices high – whilst at the same

have countered in a number of ways to exclude PMA, DER and USM.

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New OEM parts escalation: LLPs

Q SV Costs are typically 70-80% material and the balance being labour & repair Q Graph reflects LLP Parts Escalation § Research shows LLP costs (generally reflect top 50 line items) § => LLP escalation is a good indicator for material price inflation Q Reviewed LLP increases since 2006 on 16 engine models from all OEM’s: § Model Average Range 5.5% - 7.5% p.a. § Overall Average 6% p.a. § Material prices double every 11 years!

100.00 120.00 140.00 160.00 180.00 200.00 220.00 240.00 260.00 280.00 2000 2005 2010 2015

LLP Escalation Factor

CFM56-5B CFM56-7B V2500-A5 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

LLP Escalation Factor

CFM56-5B CFM56-7B V2500-A5 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 200.00 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

LLP Escalation Factor

CFM56-5B CFM56-7B V2500-A5 T772 CF6-80E PW4-100 100.00 110.00 120.00 130.00 140.00 150.00 160.00 170.00 180.00 190.00 200.00 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

LLP Escalation Factor

CFM56-5B CFM56-7B V2500-A5 T772 CF6-80E PW4-100

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OEM’s have used a multi faceted approach to achieve a dominant aftermarket position:- 1.Increase in OEM owned MRO supply 2.Proliferation of flight hour agreements 3.Reduction in repair availability and restrictions on performing repairs 4.Effective elimination in use of PMA & DER in gas-path 5.Continuous enhancements, modifications and upgrades 6.Control of new parts prices and increased presence in used serviceable material market 7.Discounting of value for Non OEM maintained engines e.g. “TruEngine” and “Pure-V”

1 3 1

OEM Control – Multiple Counters

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Q In 1995 Engine OEM’s had 15% of a $6.25bn MRO market Q In 2005 - 45% of a $12.5bn MRO market Q In 2015 - 55%+ of a $25bn MRO market Q In 2025 OEM will have ??? of an estimated $37bn MRO market

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OEMs dominate MRO market

(Source: ICF International)

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  • Chart includes:-

– airline orders only (no lessors) –

  • nly orders where engine

selection has been made – Firm orders only (no options)

  • Very long term agreements 10 – 20

years.

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OEM Flight Hour Maintenance Agreements contracted at point of engine sale

200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 B737MAX (LEAP- X) A320 LEAP-X A320 PW1000

Airline Orders as of July 2016

Engine Only Engine + Maint.

17% 33% 70% A320 PW1100

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Non-OEM lessors’ problems with integrated packages

  • Lack of security - no reserves
  • Restriction on portability of fund
  • Questionable adequacy of fund
  • Inflexibility of workscope
  • Extra legal and management costs
  • Restriction of end of life exits

Some banks find engines a difficult asset to fund for these reasons. Some lessors are refusing to invest in aircraft powered by certain manufacturer’s types. OEMs doing ‘something’ about it

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OEMs dominate engine leasing market

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Ranking of leading engine leasing companies by engines (owned and managed)

Engine lessor # Engines est. Comment

GEEL 450 OEM – includes MCPH RRPF 400 OEM – includes Total Care

Engine Lease Finance 300 Financial institution

SES 240 OEM Pooling WLFC 250 Independent Sumisho 35 Financial institution New entrants 2012-16 50 Various

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End of life solutions vitally important

  • The leasing community employs many different business models.
  • All those business models have two common elements –
  • Buy the right asset at the right price (and lease it making money over

money) and

  • Ultimately, monetarise the asset at the optimum time in its life cycle.
  • Decisions and constantly made: refurbish or sell? It is a market judgement.
  • Ultimately, Lessors sell their end of life assets (engines) to MROs or parts

companies.

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Challenges regarding traditional end of life solutions

  • OEMs introducing schemes such as ‘TRUEngine’ /‘Pure-V’ retrospectively.
  • Buyers of EoL engines (and parts from them) sell to OEM controlled MROs.
  • They demand Back to Birth trace certifying no ‘influencing parts’.
  • Effort to trace B to B is costly even if possible, scheme may have been introduced many years after the asset

was acquired.

  • Lessor’s asset therefore has lost value or at worst is unsaleable.
  • More crucial with earlier breaking of aircraft.

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“The Erosion of Choice”.

  • OEMs dominance of the aftermarket –

– Engine leasing – MRO – Parts supply

  • Airlines and lessors are facing “The Erosion of Choice”.
  • IATA is on the case of potential anti competitive behaviour and now the EU Commissioner for Competition is

investigating at IATA’s request.

  • Independent service providers must form part of the solution.
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Some conclusions

  • 1. The engine lease market is robust but small in scale.

2.The short term and long term engine lease markets are very different propositions:-

  • 1. They have different market dynamics.
  • 2. They have to be managed separately.

3.Leasing of engines and aircraft have different dynamics. 4.Business models for engines need more emphasis on management of ‘metal’ than

  • n credit or finance.

5.The OEMs have driven radical market change, airlines’ choices have been eroded, but Independents do provide a solution to maintain airlines’ choice.

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www.elfc.com