E-Ticketing scheme for mobile devices with exculpability Arnau - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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E-Ticketing scheme for mobile devices with exculpability Arnau - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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E-Ticketing scheme for mobile devices with exculpability Arnau Vives-Guasch 1 , Magdalena Payeras-Capella 2 , Maci` a Mut-Puigserver 2 and Jordi Castell` a-Roca 1 1 Dept. de Ingenier a Inform atica y Matem aticas Universitat Rovira i

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E-Ticketing scheme for mobile devices with exculpability

Arnau Vives-Guasch1, Magdalena Payeras-Capella2, Maci` a Mut-Puigserver2 and Jordi Castell` a-Roca1

  • 1Dept. de Ingenier´

ıa Inform´ atica y Matem´ aticas Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain email: {arnau.vives, jordi.castella}@urv.cat

  • 2Dept. de Ciencias Matem´

aticas e Inform´ atica Universitat de les Illes Balears, Spain email: {mpayeras, macia.mut}@uib.es

Data Privacy Management - 5th International Workshop Athens, Greece. September 23, 2010

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 1 / 24

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1 Introduction 2 Previous works 3 Contribution 4 e-Ticketing scheme 5 Conclusions and further work

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Introduction

1 Introduction 2 Previous works 3 Contribution 4 e-Ticketing scheme 5 Conclusions and further work

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Introduction

Electronic ticket An electronic ticket is a contract, in digital format, between the user and the service provider. Information technologies (IT) are becoming usual in our society as they progressively replace the use of paper in many of our common operations. IT help to reduce both economic costs and time in many services such as air travel industries or public transport. The security of the system has to be strongly guaranteed, as well as the privacy of their users. Traditionally, smart-cards have been widely used in these systems. Nowadays, mobile devices are becoming more increasingly used.

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 4 / 24

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Previous works

1 Introduction 2 Previous works 3 Contribution 4 e-Ticketing scheme 5 Conclusions and further work

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 5 / 24

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Previous works Security requirements

Authenticity Non-repudiation Integrity Expiry date Reusability Anonymity Online/Offline Exculpability The service provider can not falsely accuse the user of ticket overspending, and the user is able to demonstrate that she has already validated the ticket before using it.

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 6 / 24

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Previous works Classification of proposals

Smart-card based proposals Smart-card-based proposals [3, 5, 9, 8, 10, 14, 13] establish a communication channel with the verification system for the most sensitive

  • perations.

The smart-card verifies each operation, so that users can not perform any non-allowed action: considered tamper-proof devices. Non-smart-card based proposals Non-smart-card-based systems [11, 4, 1, 6, 12, 7, 2] allow to perform applications with high computation requirements, offering high storage capacity and wireless short-range communication resources. High-level cryptographic protection is needed in order to assure the protocol is correctly executed: considered non-tamper-proof devices.

Non-Anonymous: [4, 1] Revocable-Anonymous: [11, 6, 12, 7, 2]

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 7 / 24

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Contribution

1 Introduction 2 Previous works 3 Contribution 4 e-Ticketing scheme 5 Conclusions and further work

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Contribution

We present an e-ticketing system that: Provides revocable anonymity to users Introduces exculpability as a security requirement

Use of crossed one-way collision-resistant hash functions.

Only one provider is able to give a certain service (for simplicity): offline verification. Is designed for its application with mobile devices for users

Reduce computation requirements in the user side

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 9 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme

1 Introduction 2 Previous works 3 Contribution 4 e-Ticketing scheme 5 Conclusions and further work

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 10 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme Participants

User (U) Pays for the ticket and receives the service. Service provider (P) Gives the service to U. Ticket issuer (I) Sends a valid ticket to U in order to further receive the according service. Trusted Third Party (T ) Preserves U’s anonymity, and also gives a valid non-identity-linkable pseudonym to U.

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 11 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme Security Requirements

Authenticity Non-repudiation Integrity Expiry date Non-overspending Revocable Anonymity Offline verification Exculpability

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 12 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme Tickets’ Information

Ticket Information (T) Serial number Sn Issuer Is Service Sv Terms and conditions Tc User pseudonym PseuU Attributes At Type of ticket Ty Encrypted verification data δT ,P Validity time Tv Date of issue Ti Exculpability (U) hrU Exculpability (P) hrI Digital signature of I SignI(T) Receipt Information (R) Encrypted exculpability (P) AP Timestamp τi Ticket serial number T.Sn Digital signature of P SignP(R)

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 13 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme System Phases

Pseudonym Renewal U obtains a new temporal pseudonym from T to be used in the system without linkage to user’s identity (if user behaves correctly). Ticket Purchase U pays for the service and receives the ticket from the ticket issuer I. Ticket Verification U shows the ticket to the service provider P in order to verify that ticket and receive the service. Claims Dispute resolution protocols in case of misbehaviour of any actor to preserve system security. They can contact the TTP T with: Claim m2 Not Received (m2: Ticket acceptance by P) Claim m3 Not Received (m3: U’s exculpability proof) Claim m4 Not Received (m4: P’s exculpability proof (Receipt))

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 14 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme System Phases

Pseudonym Renewal

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e-Ticketing scheme System Phases

Ticket Purchase

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e-Ticketing scheme System Phases

Ticket Verification

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e-Ticketing scheme System Phases

Claim m2 not Received (m2: Ticket acceptance by P) U can contact T if m1 has been sent and m2 has not been received from P U sends the m1 to T . If valid, T signs the information with a timestamp and gives the proof to U and P. P is requested to follow the protocol. Claim m3 not Received (m3: U’s exculpability proof) P blocks till the reception of m3 by U. P could contact T if U repeatedly misbehaves. Claim m4 not Received (m4: P’s exculpability proof (Receipt)) U can contact T if m3 has been sent and m4 has not been received from P U sends (m1, m2, m3) to T . If valid, T signs the information with (AU, AP) and a timestamp and gives the proof to U. U can obtain the rI.

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 18 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme Multiple providers

Multiple providers Multiple providers could give the same service with the ticket. Online verification between all the providers to avoid ticket overspending. Special care to the distribution and control of used tickets (existence of rU in a central DB). Expired tickets removed from the database for storage efficiency.

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 19 / 24

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e-Ticketing scheme System security and privacy

System security In the security analysis of the paper, we detail how the security requirements have been achieved: authenticity, non-repudiation, integrity, expiry date, non-overspending, offline verification, and also exculpability. Users’ privacy In the security analysis of the paper, we detail how the revocable anonymity has been achieved for honest users by using temporal pseudonyms.

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 20 / 24

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Conclusions and further work

1 Introduction 2 Previous works 3 Contribution 4 e-Ticketing scheme 5 Conclusions and further work

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 21 / 24

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Conclusions and further work

Conclusions We have presented an e-ticketing scheme with revocable anonymity, and exculpability as a novel security requirement. Use of personal mobile devices. Only one provider is able to give a certain service: offline verification. Further work Develop a prototype for mobile devices with short-range contactless communication (Near Field Communication).

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 22 / 24

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Conclusions and further work

E-Ticketing scheme for mobile devices with exculpability

Arnau Vives-Guasch1, Magdalena Payeras-Capella2, Maci` a Mut-Puigserver2 and Jordi Castell` a-Roca1

  • 1Dept. de Ingenier´

ıa Inform´ atica y Matem´ aticas Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain email: {arnau.vives, jordi.castella}@urv.cat

  • 2Dept. de Ciencias Matem´

aticas e Inform´ atica Universitat de les Illes Balears, Spain email: {mpayeras, macia.mut}@uib.es

Data Privacy Management - 5th International Workshop Athens, Greece. September 23, 2010

Vives, Payeras, Mut, Castell` a (URV-UIB) DPM 2010 23 / 24

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Conclusions and further work

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Electronic ticketing: risks in e-commerce applications. Digital excellence, pages 55–66, 2008. Springer-Verlag, ISBN 3540726209.

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