E STIMATE OF THE INVESTABLE MARKET (USD B N ) PE worldwide assets - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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E STIMATE OF THE INVESTABLE MARKET (USD B N ) PE worldwide assets - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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T HE C ASE FOR PE I NVESTMENT FOR A L ARGE I NSTITUTIONAL I NVESTOR P ER S TRMBERG SSE C ENTENNIAL P ROFESSOR OF F INANCE AND P RIVATE E QUITY , SSE AND SH O F EHL 2 ND A NNUAL P RIVATE M ARKETS R ESEARCH C ONFERENCE J ULY 5, 2018 Q UESTIONS

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THE CASE FOR PE INVESTMENT

FOR A LARGE INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTOR

PER STRÖMBERG

SSE CENTENNIAL PROFESSOR OF FINANCE AND PRIVATE EQUITY, SSE AND SHOF

EHL 2ND ANNUAL PRIVATE MARKETS RESEARCH CONFERENCE JULY 5, 2018

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QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN REPORT

  • 1. The PE governance model
  • 2. Market size
  • 3. PE risk and return
  • 4. Beating the average

– Access to top funds – Direct and Co-investments – Managed accounts and strategic partnerships – New fund models

  • 5. Implementation issues

⎬

Fee-reducing strategies

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PRIVATE EQUITY AS DELEGATED GOVERNANCE

Institutional investor Firm Private equity fund Fixed income Public equities Real estate

100%

Other assets

Strong corporate governance High degree of diversification

‹8›

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THE PE OWNERSHIP MODEL

  • Difference with other asset management: not a

zero-sum game!

  • Why hard to achieve in a public setting?

– Passive, uninformed shareholders in public companies – Trade-off: diversification and liquidity vs. active

  • wnership and informed governance
  • Top PE investors develop unique skills that are hard

to replicate

  • Financial, Governance, and Operational

engineering (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009) à Plenty of evidence on growth, productivity, and efficiency gains in companies.

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ESTIMATE OF THE INVESTABLE MARKET (USD BN)

Funds Co-investments Direct investments Total Venture Capital 387 35 30 451 19% 107 7% Growth Equity 305 27 34 367 15% 180 12% Buyout 1 241 112 104 1 457 61% 1 113 76% Distress and other 102 9 14 125 5% 67 5% All Private Equity 2 035 183 182 2 400 100% 1 467 100% 85% 8% 8% 100% "Dry powder" 1 165 687 % of total 49% 47% PE worldwide assets under management (June 2017) GPFG Investable market

Excludes (a) infrastructure, real estate, private debt (except distress), and natural resources funds; (b) direct investments in utilities, real estate and energy à~35% of private capital mkt. GPFG investable market excludes funds < USD 1Bn and direct investments < USD 100 M.

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ESTIMATE OF THE INVESTABLE MARKET (USD BN)

Funds Co-investments Direct investments Total Venture Capital 387 35 30 451 19% 107 7% Growth Equity 305 27 34 367 15% 180 12% Buyout 1 241 112 104 1 457 61% 1 113 76% Distress and other 102 9 14 125 5% 67 5% All Private Equity 2 035 183 182 2 400 100% 1 467 100% 85% 8% 8% 100% "Dry powder" 1 165 687 % of total 49% 47% PE worldwide assets under management (June 2017) GPFG Investable market

Excludes (a) infrastructure, real estate, private debt (except distress), and natural resources funds; (b) direct investments in utilities, real estate and energy à~35% of private capital mkt. GPFG investable market excludes funds < USD 1Bn and direct investments < USD 100 M.

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ESTIMATE OF THE INVESTABLE MARKET (USD BN)

Excludes (a) infrastructure, real estate, private debt (except distress), and natural resources funds; (b) direct investments in utilities, real estate and energy à~35% of private capital mkt. GPFG investable market excludes funds < USD 1Bn and direct investments < USD 100 M.

Funds Co-investments Direct investments Total Venture Capital 387 35 30 451 19% 107 7% Growth Equity 305 27 34 367 15% 180 12% Buyout 1 241 112 104 1 457 61% 1 113 76% Distress and other 102 9 14 125 5% 67 5% All Private Equity 2 035 183 182 2 400 100% 1 467 100% 85% 8% 8% 100% "Dry powder" 1 165 687 % of total 49% 47% PE worldwide assets under management (June 2017) GPFG Investable market

  • Market size is endogenous: More committed à larger market
  • In U.S., private firms account for 50% of profits and investment; 86% of firms > 500

employees.

  • Recent game changer in VC not reflected in data
  • Excludes $100Bn Vision Fund, and large Chinese funds raised H2 -17.
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PE NET RETURNS HAVE EXCEEDED THE PUBLIC INDEX

Buyout PMEs (701 funds) VC PMEs (1085 funds) Average (S&P 500) Median (S&P 500) Weighted average (S&P 500) Average (S&P 500) Median (S&P 500) Weighted average (S&P 500) Whole pd Direct alpha 1.20 3.07% 1.14 2.40% 1.25 3.16% 1.35 2.07% 0.97

  • 2.93%

1.46 0.47% 2000s 1.23 1.19 1.28 0.96 0.81 0.99 1990s 1.23 1.16 1.25 2.05 1.26 2.26 1980s 1.16 1.09 1.25 0.89 0.76 0.98

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WHY ARE PE RETURNS HIGHER THAN PUBLIC?

  • Compensation for risk

– A market cannot have an “alpha”… 1. Compensation for illiquidity risk 2. Different loadings on public equity risk factors 3. PE-specific exposures

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(1) TIME-VARYING ILLIQUIDITY PREMIUM

0.00% 0.20% 0.40% 0.60% 0.80% 1.00% 1.20% 1.40% 1.60% 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 All US PE fundraising/Stock mkt cap BO funds / stock mkt cap VC & growth funds / stock mkt cap

U.S. PE fundraising relative to public stock market capitalization

(1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Capital- Weighted PME Buyouts Avg Net Multiple Buyouts Capital- Weighted PME Venture Avg Net Multiple Venture Commitments to US BO funds / stock mkt cap

  • 33.702**
  • 162.306***
  • 2.185
  • 3.187

Commitments to VC and growth funds / stock mkt cap

  • 240.386
  • 646.655**
  • 1.316
  • 2.527

Constant 1.369*** 2.563*** 1.782*** 3.300*** 23.642 13.408 5.663 7.486 Observations 28 28 28 28 R-squared 0.155 0.281 0.062 0.197

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(2) DIFFERENT LOADINGS ON (PUBLIC) FACTORS

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(2) DIFFERENT LOADINGS ON (PUBLIC) FACTORS

Public-Index Replication seems premature:

  • Factor estimates unstable across methodologies, samples.
  • Proposed mimicking portfolios involve investment in relatively illiquid /

small stocks with limited investment capacity

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(3) PE-SPECIFIC EXPOSURES

  • Results in Ang, Chen, Goetzmann, & Phalippou (2017)

suggests PE risks not spanned by public market

  • I consider three mechanisms

1. Access to different industries 2. Access to different geographies 3. Increasing divergence between private and public markets

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INDUSTRIES AND GEOGRAPHIES

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INCREASING DIVERGENCE PUBLIC VS PRIVATE EQUITY

  • Fewer, larger public companies
  • Firms stay private longer, unicorn phenomenon
  • Trend since post -1990s tech boom
  • T

emporary or permanent phenomenon?

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HOW CAN INVESTOR DO BETTER THAN AVERAGE? TWO “BEST PRACTICE” MODELS

1. “Endowment model” (e.g. Yale) – Access to oversubscribed funds by top-performing GPs – Almost exclusively external fund managers – Small staff – Capture illiquidity premium through liquidity risk management, flexible governance 2. “Canadian model” (e.g. CPPIB) – Focus on fee-reduction strategies, economies of scale – More reliance on internal investment teams – Large staff – Capture illiquidity premium through long-term liabilities, liquid asset portfolio, flexible governance

  • EM has longer track record, CM somewhat unproven
  • CM more scalable, EM harder to implement for large

institutional investor

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METHOD (1): CAPTURING ILLIQUIDITY PREMIUM

  • Avoid pro-cyclical PE allocations

– Hard to be countercyclical due to pro-cyclicality in fund raising and investment – Can at least avoid return-chasing, aim for stable allocations

  • Ways to increase allocation when illiquidity premium high:

– Direct investments

  • E.g. CPPIB investments in Skype, Tomkins plc in 2009-2010

– Opportunistic co-investments

  • E.g. acquiring buyout debt portfolios in 2009

– Secondary transactions at large discounts

  • Value transfer from less liquid to more liquid investors
  • Increasing competition? Worked in 2002 as well as 2009…
  • Importance of LP governance

– Flexible asset allocation mandates (e.g. avoid denominator effect) – Board willing “double down” when past returns look poor?

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METHOD (2): ACCESS TO TOP FUNDS

  • Overstated? Previous fund performance not known at

time of fundraising (Phalippou, 2010; Korteweg & Sorensen, 2017)

  • Understated? LPs have access to more info than just

past performance (Hüther, Robinson, Sievers, 2015)

Source: Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan, and Stucke (2014)

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METHOD (2): ACCESS TO TOP FUNDS

Persistence going down in buyout, not VC.

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METHOD (2): ACCESS TO TOP FUNDS

Persistence going down in buyout, not VC. Why?

  • BO scalable à larger funds à decreasing marginal returns?

– Lower returns but higher NPV? – Superior access does not scale easily (even for Yale…)

  • Teams spinning off

– Persistence in teams, not PE firms?

  • PE skill-set becoming less proprietary?

– If so, do we need to pay these fees?

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METHOD (3): REDUCE FEES THROUGH DIRECT INVESTMENT STRATEGIES

All-in fee estimates vary between 5-7% of invested assets à Scope for higher returns through reducing fees (even at the expense of lower gross alpha)

Source: McKinsey (2017) using data from CEM Benchmarking

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FORMS OF INVESTING DIRECTLY IN COMPANY

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FORMS OF INVESTING DIRECTLY IN COMPANY

  • No systematic large-sample evidence on returns to direct invest.
  • Adverse selection unlikely in deals chosen for co-investment, more

likely in which funds offering them

  • Some evidence that direct investment strategies in buyout have
  • utperformed fund investments.
  • Large public pensions are unlikely to be able to build in-house value-

added teams à go for minority investments or “easier” deals (e.g. infrastructure)

  • Anecdotal evidence of family offices creating successful in-house

teams leading deals in small/mid-cap buyout and growth.

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METHOD (4): USING LP BARGAINING POWER TO

IMPROVE FUND TERMS

  • Better terms in exchange for larger and/or longer-term

capital commitments – Less likely for most popular, oversubscribed funds – More likely for “mega”, multi-product alternative asset managers

  • Some scope for “price discrimination” in LPAs

– Mgmt fee reductions, co-investment opportunities, …

  • Managed accounts, strategic partnerships

– Scope for reducing fees – Possible to get “bespoke” investment mandates

  • ESG, sectors, geographies
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CAN WE IMPROVE THE LP-GP CONTRACT?

  • Considerable evidence of GP-LP agency costs

– Excessive leverage and overpaying for deals (Axelson et al, 2013) – Overinvestment (Axelson et al, 2009; Degeorge et al 2016; Arcot et al 2015) – Raising too much money (Lopez-de-Silanes et al, 2015) – Exiting investments too early (Gompers, 1996; Robinson & Sensoy 2013)) – IRR gaming (Phalippou, 2009) – Hidden fees (Phalippou, 2009) – Lack of risk- & market benchmarking (Axelson et al, 2013; Strömberg 2015)

  • Can we improve fund structures? E.g.:

– Longer / evergreen funds? – Base carry on relative, risk-adjusted performance? – Base management fee on actual costs?

  • Beware of going from second- to third best. E.g.:

– Ability to hold on to investments vs. lack of fundraising discipline? – Rel. performance pay vs. incentive alignment along LP-GP-PC chain? – Adverse selection in GP teams?

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OTHER IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

  • Difficulty in performance measurement relative to liquid asset

classes – Takes time, effort, and patience to evaluate performance

  • E.g. CPPIB quant team

– Leads to lack of accountability?

  • Non-financial risks

– Political horizon < PE investment horizon – Agency issues within LP organization

  • Pay-to-play, risk-taking

– ESG and headline risk

  • Environment, labor, taxes, governance scandals…
  • Particularly for LPs investing directly

– Organizational and compensation risk

  • Attracting and retaining talent under acceptable, transparent pay

schemes?

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GPGF

  • Unique characteristics:

– Size – Long-term focus – Transparency and public accountability

  • Positives:

– Economies of scale: bargaining power, internal teams – Capacity to carry liquidity risk – Reputation for transparency and responsibility

  • Negatives/challenges:

– Diseconomies of scale, e.g. top VC funds – Need for transparency and political accountability à governance challenge, e.g. in performance measurement, compensation of team – Current timing not ideal, with so much money in the PE market?

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