Du Cercle The APTs That Werent La cuadrature du cercle La - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Du Cercle The APTs That Werent La cuadrature du cercle La - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

La Quadrature Du Cercle The APTs That Werent La cuadrature du cercle La cuadratura del circulo Die Quadratur des Kreises Squaring the circle Marion Marschalek marion@cyphort.com @pinkflawd What makes


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La Quadrature Du Cercle

The APTs That Weren‘t

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La cuadrature du cercle La cuadratura del circulo Die Quadratur des Kreises Squaring the circle

квадрату́ра кру́га

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Marion Marschalek

marion@cyphort.com @pinkflawd

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What makes an APT

Reconnaissance – gather information Incursion – break in Discovery – look around Capture – collect goods Exfiltration – get goods out

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The single most beautiful APT

November 2013 Target Corporation suffered one of the most severe large-scale retail hacks in US history

Memory scraping on running processes, fetching card data Dumping data to a file on a share, regularly pushing out to C&C

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ADVANCED [ədˈvɑ:n :n(t) (t)st st] PERSISTENT [pəˈsɪst stənt nt]

we don‘t un under dersta stand it nd it we det e detect ected it ed it to too

  • la

late te

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Why oh why can‘t we find it? Threat detection always relies

  • n patterns.

Hashes Signatures Behavior IOCs Anomalies

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I can see dead patterns ...

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Cheshire Cat

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200 2002

Checking for running security processes Orchestrator component executing binaries from disk

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200 2002

Prepared to run on _old_ Windows versions Using APIs deprecated after Win95/98/ME Function to check for the MZ value, the PE value and the NE value

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200 2007-200 2009

Implementation traits and user agent string indicate Win NT 4.0 as target platform Persists as shell extension for the icon handler Wants to run in the context of the ‘Progman’ window Implant to monitor network activity

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200 2007-200 2009

Evasive when network sniffer products are running Super stealthy network communication: Versatile communication method 9+ C&C servers, infrequent intervals Communication done through injected standard browser instance

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201 2011

Fine tuned to paddle around Kaspersky security products

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~DF DF

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Nation State

Cy Cybe ber Espionage ?

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Fr From

  • m Bah

Bahrai rain W n With ith Lo Love ve

FinFisher Suite from Gamma International UK Ltd. Sent to Bahraini pro-democracy activists

http://citizenlab.org/2012/07/from-bahrain-with-love-finfishers-spy-kit-exposed/
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MAL MALWARE ARE /ˈmal malwɛːɐ ̯ /

Software that doesn‘t come with an EULA

  • Morgan Marquis-Boire
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Of Offens fense Goi Going ng Co Comme mmercial rcial

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Nat Natio ion n St States ates Go Going ing Cr Crimi imina nal

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Industrial Espionage

Canada spying on Brazil‘s Mines and Energy Ministery NSA spying on Brazil‘s Petrobras France spying on IBM/Texas Instruments in late 80s China spying on about everyone

State Sponsored

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brazil-canada-espionage-which-countries-are-we-spying-on-1.1930522 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-08/u-s-government-spied-on-brazil-s-petrobras-globo-tv-reports http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/18/world/french-said-to-spy-on-us-computer-companies.html

Threat Detection Industry

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How Threat-Detection went Threat-Intel Malware.. ‘watching’ Actor tracking Publicity APT numbering, logos & names

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Fr Frene enemi mies & Th es & The F e Fung ungus us Amo Amongu ngus

Or: When Malware Became Intellectual Property

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Int Intell elli.. i.. wot?

  • t?
  • Reverse

se engineer erin ing g turns s politic tical l when you take apart the wrong binaries ies

  • mass malware => targeted malware => nation state malware
  • mass malware <= targeted malware <= nation state malware
  • Marketin

ting g and p publicity licity?

  • Bad for business in the long run
  • Blowing up e.g. Spanish government ops might not help contracting with them in the

future

  • Providi

ding g offende ders s with h free e audi dits

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Ethical Questions In APT Research

“… if the malware is detected, it will also make it eas asie ier r fo for extremi tremists sts to protect tect thems mselves elves against cyber spying attempts.” “ … the researcher’s insight into the operation […] is always

  • superficial. At first glance, it might appear that the targ

rgeted eted ent ntity ity is is “in inno nocent ent”, such as an academic or a journalist, but in reality they could d be a radical ical academ demic ic or a terroris rorism-facilitatin facilitating g jour urnalist nalist.”

http://www.securityweek.com/long-term-strategy-needed-when-analyzing-apts-researcher
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OPwot OPwot?

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Ah Ahmed Ma Mans nsoo

  • or

and the UAE Five

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Ahmed Mansoor and the UAE Five

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Sometimes Attribution isn’t Tricky

83.111.56.188 inetnum: 83.111.56.184 – 83.111.56.191 netname: minaoffice-EMIRNET descr: Office Of Sh. Tahnoon Bin Zayed Al Nahyan descr: P.O. Box 5151 ,Abu Dhabi, UAE country: AE

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APT Attribution Cheatsheet

Any need for actor att ttributio ibution? – Most likely no no. Any need for actor tr tracking king? – In certain cases, ma mayb ybe. Any need for actor(-tool) recog

  • gniti

nition

  • n? – Probably, ye

yes.

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[ sony.attributed.to ]

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Squaring The Circle?

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“An attacker only needs to find one weakness while the defender needs to find every one.”

“Defender Economics”, Andreas Lindh, Troopers15

Risk = Vulnerability * Thre reat * Impact Thre reat = Intent * Capability * Opportunity

„When Threat Intel met DFIR“ Chopitea & Mouchoux, hack.lu 2015

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Threat modeling Compartmentalization 2-factor Authentication Encryption Secrecy

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ma mario ion@cy n@cyphor phort.com t.com @pin inkflawd kflawd

Thank You

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Resources

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brazil-canada-espionage-which-countries-are-we-spying-on-1.1930522 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-08/u-s-government-spied-on-brazil-s-petrobras-globo-tv-reports http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/18/world/french-said-to-spy-on-us-computer-companies.html http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/ftp/cyber_espionage/ http://media.kaspersky.com/pdf/Guerrero-Saade-VB2015.pdf http://www.securityweek.com/long-term-strategy-needed-when-analyzing-apts-researcher https://cryptome.org/2013/03/call-to-cyber-arms.pdf http://archive.hack.lu/2015/When%20threat%20intel%20met%20DFIR.pdf http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1305571.shtml http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34360934