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Do Electricity Prices Reflect Economic Fundamentals?: Evidence from - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Do Electricity Prices Reflect Economic Fundamentals?: Evidence from the California ISO Kevin F. Forbes and Ernest M. Zampelli Department of Business and Economics The Center for the Study of Energy and Environmental Stewardship The Catholic


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SLIDE 1

Do Electricity Prices Reflect Economic Fundamentals?: Evidence from the California ISO

Kevin F. Forbes and Ernest M. Zampelli Department of Business and Economics The Center for the Study of Energy and Environmental Stewardship The Catholic University of America Washington, DC Forbes@CUA.edu

31st USAEE/IAEE North American Conference Austin, Texas 7 November 2012

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SLIDE 2

A Country Divided

  • RTOs and ISOs serve a substantial portion of

the U.S. Population

  • Yet, the use of markets to coordinate

electricity generation appears to have reached a plateau.

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SLIDE 3

A Divided Continent in Terms of Electricity Markets

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SLIDE 4

Has Restructuring been a Failure?

  • Blumsack and Lave (2006) have argued that

the restructuring of the electricity sector has been a failure because of market manipulation

  • Van Doren and Taylor (2004) have also

concluded that electricity restructuring has been a failure and that “vertical integration may be the most efficient organizational structure for the electricity industry.”

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SLIDE 5

Load Forecasting

  • Whether or not electricity generation is

coordinated through markets, minimizing generation costs requires highly accurate day‐ ahead forecasts of electricity demand.

  • In the Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) aggregation

zone managed by the California Independent System Operator (ISO), the root mean squared forecast error was approximately 3.8 percent of mean load over the period 1 April 2009 through 31 March 2010.

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SLIDE 6

PG&E’s Service Territory

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SLIDE 7

The “Delta Breeze” Phenomenon

  • A load forecasting challenge faced by the California ISO

(CAISO) is the “Delta Breeze” phenomenon, a sea breeze carrying cool air from the ocean into the San Francisco Bay area and up to 100 miles inland.

  • An absence of the breeze can lead to significantly higher

electricity load.

  • If a Delta Breeze occurs but is unanticipated, forecasted load

will be substantially higher than actual and CAISO will have

  • ver committed to generation supply.
  • If a Delta Breeze is forecast but does not occur, then reliability

may be challenged because of inadequate scheduled generation.

  • The CAISO has reported difficulty in predicting the Delta

Breeze.

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SLIDE 8

Load Forecasting Errors and Reliability

On May 28 2003, the day‐ahead peak forecasted load in CAISO was 35,012 MW while the actual peak load was 39,577 MW. As a consequence, a stage 1 alert had to be declared.

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SLIDE 9

CAISO Peak Load Forecast Problems (May 28, 2003)

Source:Scripps Institute of Oceanography and Science Applications International Corporation

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SLIDE 10

Load Forecasting Errors Have Economic Consequences: The Case of Outcomes in PJM’s Real‐Time Market for Energy

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SLIDE 11

Load Forecasting Errors Have Consequences: The Case of PJM (Continued)

  • From 1 June 2007 through 31 December 2009,

the average real‐time price of electricity in the PJM RTO was approximately 12 percent higher relative to the day‐ahead price when actual load was higher than forecasted.

  • The average real‐time price of electricity in

the PJM RTO was approximately 5 percent lower relative to the day‐ahead price when actual load was less than forecasted.

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SLIDE 12

Day–Ahead Load Forecast Errors in Other Control Areas

  • Approximately 16 percent of the days in New

York City had a root‐mean‐squared‐day‐ahead‐ forecast‐error in excess of five percent of daily mean load over 1 January 2000 ‐ 31 December 2008 period.

  • Approximately seven percent of the days in

France had a root‐mean‐squared‐day‐ahead‐ forecast‐error in excess of five percent of daily mean load over the 1 November 2003 ‐ 31 December 2007 period .

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SLIDE 13

Day–Ahead Load Forecast Errors in Other Control Areas (Cont’d)

  • Belgium: The RMSE of the day‐ahead forecast of system load

was approximately 4.6 percent of mean load over the period 1 January 2010 – 31 December 2010.

  • ERCOT: The RMSE of the day‐ahead forecast of system load

was approximately 4.6 percent of mean load over the period 5 December 2009 – 30 November 2010.

  • PJM: The RMSE of the day‐ahead forecast of system load was

approximately 3 percent of mean load over the period over the period 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2009

  • Amprion (Germany): The RMSE of the day‐ahead forecast of

demand was approximately 4.2 percent over the period 1 April 2008 – 31 December 2010.

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SLIDE 14

The Efficient Market Hypothesis as

Applied to Day‐Ahead Electricity Markets

If day-ahead markets for electricity are informationally efficient, then day-ahead prices will reflect the load forecast generated by the system operator as well as information processed by and consequent insights of all market participants.

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SLIDE 15

Can Day‐Ahead Market Outcomes Contribute to More Accurate Load Forecasts?

  • Market efficiency implies that day‐

ahead prices will reflect all available meteorological information including the forecasts by any proprietary models that are more accurate than that employed by the system operator.

  • On this basis, we hypothesize that day‐

ahead prices will be useful in predicting the day‐ahead load.

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SLIDE 16

The Day‐Ahead Sparks Ratio: A Key Metric of the Expected Outcome

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SLIDE 17

Day‐Ahead Sparks Ratio and Actual Load for the PG&E LAP in the California ISO, 1 April 2009 – 31 March 2010

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 Load The Sparks Ratio

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SLIDE 18

 The Dependent Variable: Natural logarithm of the ratio of actual hourly load  The Explanatory Variable: The Sparks Ratio

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SLIDE 19

The Model

(1) ) ( ln

hd hd

  • SparksRati

f Load 

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SLIDE 20

Data and Sample

  • The model employs data from the PGE aggregation

zone.

  • All electricity and fuel prices obtained from CAISO.
  • The sparks ratio was calculated using PGE apnode

reference and natural gas prices.

  • The gas prices were normalized to their MWh

equivalent

  • Sample Period: 1 April 2009 – 31 March 2010,

excluding days with non‐positive (≤ 0) PGE reference prices.

  • Number of observations: 8,514
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SLIDE 21

Econometric Issues

  • Functional Form: Though the relationships

are highly unlikely to be strictly linear, there is no basis, theoretical or otherwise, to assume any particular nonlinear form.

  • ARMA disturbances: Time series regressions

using high frequency data are often plagued by autoregressive error structures that are not easily accommodated using standard AR(p) methods.

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SLIDE 22

Functional Form

The model was estimated using the multivariable fractional polynomial (MFP) model. This is a useful technique when one suspects that some or all of the relationships between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are non‐linear (Royston and Altman, 2008), but there is little or no basis, theoretical or otherwise, on which to select particular functional forms.

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SLIDE 23

Results of the MFP Analysis

  • The MFP analysis recommends that the Sparks Ratio

be represented in the model in terms of its square root.

  • The coefficient on the Spark Ratio variable is positive

and statistically significant

  • There is the issue of autocorrelation. The autoregressive

error structure is not easily accommodated using standard AR(p) methods.

  • Moreover, there is evidence that the disturbances in the

residuals do not monotonically decline with the number

  • f lags.
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SLIDE 24

Residual Autocorrelations Before ARMA Estimations

  • 0.20

0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 Autocorrelations of ehat 50 100 150 200 Lag

Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands

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SLIDE 25

Portmanteau (Q) Tests for White Noise

  • Portmanteau (Q) tests for white noise were

conducted for lags 1 through 100, 120, 144, and 168.

  • All p‐values were well below 0.01 and thus

the null hypothesis of a white noise error structure was rejected.

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SLIDE 26

Modeling the ARMA Disturbances

  • AR(p): The modeled lag lengths are p = 1

through 36, 48, 72, 96, 120, 144, 168, and 192.

  • MA(q): The modeled lag lengths are q = 1

through 36, 48, 65, 72, 96, 120, 144, 168, and 192

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SLIDE 27

Estimation Results

  • The coefficient on the Sparks Ratio is positive

and statistically significant.

  • A large number of the MA terms are also

statistically significant.

  • Only seven of the AR terms are significant at

five percent.

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SLIDE 28

Residual Autocorrelations After ARMA Estimation

  • 0.04
  • 0.02

0.00 0.02 0.04 Autocorrelations of ehat 50 100 150 200 Lag

Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands

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SLIDE 29
  • The p‐values were well above standard

significance levels, failing to reject the null hypothesis of a white noise error structure.

  • For example, the smallest p value is 0.6702

which is well above the standard significance level of 0.05.

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SLIDE 30

Out of Sample Forecast

  • Using the parameter estimates, an out of sample dynamic forecast

was performed for the period 1 April 2010 through 31 March 2011.

  • Care was taken to ensure that the forecasts did not utilize

information that only becomes known during the operating day. This was done by making use of lagged predicted as opposed to lagged actual values as 14 March 2010.

  • Over this time period, the RMSE of the day‐ahead forecast was 485

MWh which is equivalent to about 4 percent of mean load.

  • The RMSE of the revised forecast is 164 MWh which is equivalent

to about 1.37 percent of mean load.

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SLIDE 31

CAISO’s Day‐Ahead Forecasted and Actual Load for the PG&E TAC, 1 April 2010‐ 31 March 2011.

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SLIDE 32

The Revised Forecast and the Actual Load for the PG&E TAC, 1 April 2010 ‐ 31 March 2011

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SLIDE 33

Out of Sample Forecasting Results for Selected Hours, 1 April 2010 ‐ 31 March 2011

Hour Ending RMSE of the Revised Forecasts as a Percent

  • f Mean Actual Load

RMSE of CAISO’s Forecasts as a Percent

  • f Mean Actual Load

RMSE of the Revised Forecasts in MWh RMSE of CAISO’s Forecasts in MWh

8 1.93 4.32 229 511 9 1.65 3.26 200 396 10 1.22 2.76 152 344 11 0.88 2.61 112 330 12 0.96 2.54 122 324 13 1.03 2.78 131 355 14 1.01 2.96 130 379 15 0.96 3.14 124 405 16 0.87 3.40 113 442

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SLIDE 34

Out of Sample Forecasting Results for Selected Hours, 1 April 2010 ‐ 31 March 2011

Hour Ending RMSE of the Revised Forecasts as a Percent of Mean Actual Load RMSE of CAISO’s Forecasts as a Percent

  • f Mean Actual Load

RMSE of the Revised Forecasts in MWh RMSE of CAISO’s Forecasts in MWh

17

0.92 4.43 121 588

18

1.06 4.28 145 581

19

1.00 3.43 136 467

20

0.97 3.24 131 439

21

0.84 2.91 112 388

22

0.95 4.15 119 521

23

0.94 4.81 108 554

24

1.35 4.08 144 435

Peak Forecast Hour

0.88 3.02 121 419

All Hours

1.37 4.06 164 487

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SLIDE 35

Future Research Efforts

  • Apply the modeling framework to other

control areas.

  • How does the model perform when natural

gas is not the dominant fuel?

  • How does the model perform for markets that

are “lightly” regulated?

  • Incorporate predicted weather conditions into

the analysis.

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SLIDE 36

Conclusions

  • The results indicate that it is possible to reduce

substantially the load forecasting errors by revising the forecasts based on day‐ahead market outcomes and estimates of the ARMA disturbances

  • The out‐of‐sample reduction in the forecast error suggests

that application of the methodology has potential to enhance reliability and reduce balancing costs.

  • More generally, the results are consistent with the view

that market prices in California’s electricity market are determined by economic fundamentals.

  • In general, the results suggest that there is merit in using

markets to allocate scarce resources efficiently.