Disputes between Nation- States Class 4 What is interstate - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Disputes between Nation- States Class 4 What is interstate - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Disputes between Nation- States Class 4 What is interstate conflict? What can states fight over? What can states fight over? Territory Access to natural resources. Ideology Security Hegemony Domestic Pressure for War


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Disputes between Nation- States

Class 4

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SLIDE 2

What is interstate conflict?

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What can states fight over?

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SLIDE 4

What can states fight over?

  • Territory
  • Access to natural resources.
  • Ideology
  • Security
  • Hegemony
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Domestic Pressure for War

  • Interest groups can

exert disproportionate influence.

  • Leaders may gain

from victory in interstate war

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Is conflict between two states automatically an international political crisis?

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Is conflict between two states automatically an international political crisis?

  • Probably not. Border wars, small-scale wars

with minimal potential escalation are not as big of a deal

  • As devastation, potential for system

increases, conflicts can become crises.

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When are conflicts crises?

  • Wars of territorial conquest.

○ Violates international norm against territorial conquest.

  • Militarized disputes between two countries

with nuclear weapons.

○ i.e. India and Pakistan.

  • Dispute between a rising power and

hegemon.

○ Can bring about systemic change.

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Reasons for War

  • Early perspectives:

○ Anarchy in the international system leads to conflict

  • ver relative power (realism)

○ Leaders misperceive the capabilities of their adversaries. ○ Leaders are cognitively inclined toward war rather than peace (Stoessinger - the guy who used to teach this class!)

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Fearon: Bargaining Model of War

  • War should not occur
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Fearon: Bargaining Model of War

  • War should not occur

○ Wars are costly. ○ Both sides know the costs. ○ Given the costs, both sides should be able to come to an agreement.

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Fearon: Bargaining Model of War

  • War should not occur

○ Wars are costly. ○ Both sides know the costs. ○ Given the costs, both sides should be able to come to an agreement.

  • Three conditions for peace:
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Fearon: Bargaining Model of War

  • War should not occur

○ Wars are costly. ○ Both sides know the costs. ○ Given the costs, both sides should be able to come to an agreement.

  • Three conditions for peace:

○ States know some true probability of winning war. ○ States are risk-neutral. ○ The range of peaceful settlements is divisible

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War occurs due to bargaining failure

Three broad reasons for bargaining failure:

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War occurs due to bargaining failure

Three broad reasons for bargaining failure:

  • Private information and incentives to

misrepresent capabilities.

  • Lack of credible commitment.
  • Indivisible Goods.
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Private information

  • Leaders may have private information that

they can’t reliably share.

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Private information

  • Leaders may have private information that

they can’t reliably share.

  • This may be as a result of:

○ The potential that states are bluffing to improve on bargaining outcomes. ○ The need to maintain secrecy on military plans in case war is fought

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Incentives to misrepresent information

  • Misrepresenting information can lead
  • pponents to have inaccurate picture of

capabilities:

○ Some states may hide their capabilities so as not to appear as aggressors or to maintain military advantages. ○ Other states may exaggerate capabilities to such an extent that they are seen as bluffing.

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Lack of credible commitment

  • States may not agree even if they perfectly

gauge capabilities may still fight.

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Lack of credible commitment

  • States may not agree even if they perfectly

gauge capabilities may still fight.

  • One state’s relative power may increase in

the future, preventing current agreements.

○ i.e. Germany fears Russia before WWI or WWII.

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Indivisible Goods

  • The item being bargained over may not be

divisible.

  • Could be more frequent cause of war than

we think:

○ Russia controls Crimea or Ukraine controls Crimea. ○ Saddam Hussein stays in power or Saddam Hussein is deposed. ○ Taliban turns over Osama bin Laden or not.

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Example of bargaining model:

Iraq and US in 2003

United States Iraq

Iraqi WMDs + status of Hussein Regime.

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True capabilities for both sides:

United States Iraq

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There are costs to war:

United States Iraq Costs to Iraq Costs to United States

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Costs create bargaining range

United States Iraq Range where both sides can come to agreement

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What if US has private information about resolve?

United States Iraq Range where both sides can come to agreement

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True capabilities are here:

United States Iraq

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But, Iraq thinks the US will be unwilling to fight:

United States Iraq

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Iraq will not make concessions within bargaining range, resulting in war:

United States Iraq

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OR maybe US thinks any agreement will result in stronger Iraq:

United States Iraq

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Making commitment impossible and giving US incentive to fight

United States Iraq

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Bargaining Game:

Group work!

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Are there problems with Fearon’s argument? Might war be more likely than he allows for? Less likely? Why or why not?

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Bargaining Model and Solving disputes between nation-states

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Review of reasons for war:

  • Private information about capabilities.
  • War as a way of revealing capabilities.
  • War because of anticipated future gains.
  • War due to indivisible bargaining goods.
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If the bargaining model is correct, what can be done to avoid war?

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Possible policy solutions

  • Limiting private information:

○ Budget transparency. ○ Open war games. ○ Third-party monitoring of national military capabilities and public disclosure.

  • Eliminating commitment problems:

○ Allowing for renegotiable agreements in long-term. ○ Increasing short-term costs for fighting rising powers.

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What role can international

  • rganizations play in

preventing bargaining failure?

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IO solutions:

  • Regulation for state behavior.
  • Monitoring and enforcement
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IO Problems:

  • Agreements may not work when most

powerful states are involved.

  • Perceptions of bias may derail compliance.
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Why is interstate war so infrequent? Does it prove Fearon right (wrong)?

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Class 6 Simulation:

Israel-Iran Nuclear Standoff:

  • Iran and Israel are both nuclear armed states.

Israel has attempted and failed to destroy Iran’ s arsenal. Iran poised to retaliate.

  • Summit organized by UNSC Big Five. Saudi

Arabia, Turkey, Israel, Iran, Germany present.

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Your job is to address three issues:

  • Stable agreement to diffuse tensions

between Iran and Israel.

  • A long-term solution to the question of

Iranian nuclear capabilities. A goal of non- nuclear Middle East.

  • Credible third-party enforcement of any

nuclear disarmament agreement.