SLIDE 1
Disputes between Nation- States Class 4 What is interstate - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Disputes between Nation- States Class 4 What is interstate - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Disputes between Nation- States Class 4 What is interstate conflict? What can states fight over? What can states fight over? Territory Access to natural resources. Ideology Security Hegemony Domestic Pressure for War
SLIDE 2
SLIDE 3
What can states fight over?
SLIDE 4
What can states fight over?
- Territory
- Access to natural resources.
- Ideology
- Security
- Hegemony
SLIDE 5
Domestic Pressure for War
- Interest groups can
exert disproportionate influence.
- Leaders may gain
from victory in interstate war
SLIDE 6
Is conflict between two states automatically an international political crisis?
SLIDE 7
Is conflict between two states automatically an international political crisis?
- Probably not. Border wars, small-scale wars
with minimal potential escalation are not as big of a deal
- As devastation, potential for system
increases, conflicts can become crises.
SLIDE 8
When are conflicts crises?
- Wars of territorial conquest.
○ Violates international norm against territorial conquest.
- Militarized disputes between two countries
with nuclear weapons.
○ i.e. India and Pakistan.
- Dispute between a rising power and
hegemon.
○ Can bring about systemic change.
SLIDE 9
Reasons for War
- Early perspectives:
○ Anarchy in the international system leads to conflict
- ver relative power (realism)
○ Leaders misperceive the capabilities of their adversaries. ○ Leaders are cognitively inclined toward war rather than peace (Stoessinger - the guy who used to teach this class!)
SLIDE 10
Fearon: Bargaining Model of War
- War should not occur
SLIDE 11
Fearon: Bargaining Model of War
- War should not occur
○ Wars are costly. ○ Both sides know the costs. ○ Given the costs, both sides should be able to come to an agreement.
SLIDE 12
Fearon: Bargaining Model of War
- War should not occur
○ Wars are costly. ○ Both sides know the costs. ○ Given the costs, both sides should be able to come to an agreement.
- Three conditions for peace:
SLIDE 13
Fearon: Bargaining Model of War
- War should not occur
○ Wars are costly. ○ Both sides know the costs. ○ Given the costs, both sides should be able to come to an agreement.
- Three conditions for peace:
○ States know some true probability of winning war. ○ States are risk-neutral. ○ The range of peaceful settlements is divisible
SLIDE 14
War occurs due to bargaining failure
Three broad reasons for bargaining failure:
SLIDE 15
War occurs due to bargaining failure
Three broad reasons for bargaining failure:
- Private information and incentives to
misrepresent capabilities.
- Lack of credible commitment.
- Indivisible Goods.
SLIDE 16
Private information
- Leaders may have private information that
they can’t reliably share.
SLIDE 17
Private information
- Leaders may have private information that
they can’t reliably share.
- This may be as a result of:
○ The potential that states are bluffing to improve on bargaining outcomes. ○ The need to maintain secrecy on military plans in case war is fought
SLIDE 18
Incentives to misrepresent information
- Misrepresenting information can lead
- pponents to have inaccurate picture of
capabilities:
○ Some states may hide their capabilities so as not to appear as aggressors or to maintain military advantages. ○ Other states may exaggerate capabilities to such an extent that they are seen as bluffing.
SLIDE 19
Lack of credible commitment
- States may not agree even if they perfectly
gauge capabilities may still fight.
SLIDE 20
Lack of credible commitment
- States may not agree even if they perfectly
gauge capabilities may still fight.
- One state’s relative power may increase in
the future, preventing current agreements.
○ i.e. Germany fears Russia before WWI or WWII.
SLIDE 21
Indivisible Goods
- The item being bargained over may not be
divisible.
- Could be more frequent cause of war than
we think:
○ Russia controls Crimea or Ukraine controls Crimea. ○ Saddam Hussein stays in power or Saddam Hussein is deposed. ○ Taliban turns over Osama bin Laden or not.
SLIDE 22
Example of bargaining model:
Iraq and US in 2003
United States Iraq
Iraqi WMDs + status of Hussein Regime.
SLIDE 23
True capabilities for both sides:
United States Iraq
SLIDE 24
There are costs to war:
United States Iraq Costs to Iraq Costs to United States
SLIDE 25
Costs create bargaining range
United States Iraq Range where both sides can come to agreement
SLIDE 26
What if US has private information about resolve?
United States Iraq Range where both sides can come to agreement
SLIDE 27
True capabilities are here:
United States Iraq
SLIDE 28
But, Iraq thinks the US will be unwilling to fight:
United States Iraq
SLIDE 29
Iraq will not make concessions within bargaining range, resulting in war:
United States Iraq
SLIDE 30
OR maybe US thinks any agreement will result in stronger Iraq:
United States Iraq
SLIDE 31
Making commitment impossible and giving US incentive to fight
United States Iraq
SLIDE 32
Bargaining Game:
Group work!
SLIDE 33
Are there problems with Fearon’s argument? Might war be more likely than he allows for? Less likely? Why or why not?
SLIDE 34
Bargaining Model and Solving disputes between nation-states
SLIDE 35
Review of reasons for war:
- Private information about capabilities.
- War as a way of revealing capabilities.
- War because of anticipated future gains.
- War due to indivisible bargaining goods.
SLIDE 36
If the bargaining model is correct, what can be done to avoid war?
SLIDE 37
Possible policy solutions
- Limiting private information:
○ Budget transparency. ○ Open war games. ○ Third-party monitoring of national military capabilities and public disclosure.
- Eliminating commitment problems:
○ Allowing for renegotiable agreements in long-term. ○ Increasing short-term costs for fighting rising powers.
SLIDE 38
What role can international
- rganizations play in
preventing bargaining failure?
SLIDE 39
IO solutions:
- Regulation for state behavior.
- Monitoring and enforcement
SLIDE 40
IO Problems:
- Agreements may not work when most
powerful states are involved.
- Perceptions of bias may derail compliance.
SLIDE 41
Why is interstate war so infrequent? Does it prove Fearon right (wrong)?
SLIDE 42
Class 6 Simulation:
Israel-Iran Nuclear Standoff:
- Iran and Israel are both nuclear armed states.
Israel has attempted and failed to destroy Iran’ s arsenal. Iran poised to retaliate.
- Summit organized by UNSC Big Five. Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Israel, Iran, Germany present.
SLIDE 43
Your job is to address three issues:
- Stable agreement to diffuse tensions
between Iran and Israel.
- A long-term solution to the question of
Iranian nuclear capabilities. A goal of non- nuclear Middle East.
- Credible third-party enforcement of any