Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 [] All Your Baseband Are over-the-air - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

All Your Baseband Are over-the-air exploitation of memory corruptions in GSM software Ralf-Philipp Weinmann Laboratory for Algorithmics, Cryptology & Computer Security University of Luxembourg https://cryptolux.org Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Outline  GSM / Smartphone basics  Baseband software (in)security  How to find bugs  Practicality of exploitation  Scenarios for the “baseband apocalypse”  Disclosure, outlook & conclusions Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Part I: GSM and smartphone basics Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Lay of the GSM/UMTS land MS links to (Mobile outside world Station) [BSCs, VLR, HLR/AUC, SS7] Um (air) interface BTS (base transceiver station) [Usually located at cell tower] Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Layers of the GSM Um Connection Management (MM) Layer 3 Mobility Management (MM) Radio Resource (RR) LAPDm (Layer 2) Layer 1 Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Smartphones • Somewhen in the late 20 th century, PDAs and cellular phones merged • Result: smartphones • Have driven PDAs into extinction • Usually a multi-CPU architecture: application processor (APP) and baseband (BB) processor • In 99% of all cases, ARM CPUs used for both • Trend: single-chip APP/BB (for cost Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Dominant Smartphone archs vs. Application Application Processor RAM Processor (slave) Serial communication RAM or shared memory Digital Baseband Processor Digital Baseband RAM (master) Processor Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Let’s do some quick market research before we dive into the technical details... Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Baseband market shares 3Q2009 Qualcomm Mediatek Texas Instruments ST-Ericsson Infineon Broadcom Freescale Other Source: Strategy Analytics Cellular Baseband Suppliers & their 3Q’ 09 shipment share) Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Part II: Baseband (in)security Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Baseband (in)security • Code base created in the 1990s… • … with a 1990s attitude towards security • Network elements are considered trusted • Both GSM and UMTS protocols have many, many length fields • (Almost) no exploit mitigations [one counter-example: XMM6180 on iPhone4 has hardware DEP enabled] Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

I know you forgot what the GSM protocol stack looks like, so let’s see it once more before we proceed. Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Layers of the GSM Um Connection Management (MM) Layer 3 Mobility Management (MM) Radio Resource (RR) LAPDm (Layer 2) Layer 1 Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Where to look for bugs • Layer 1 not fruitful • Layer 2: messages to short • Layer 3: specified in GSM 04.08 – allows for variable length messages (TLV and LV) – Maximum length: 255 octets (length field: one octet) • However: ASN.1 used as well (e.g. RRLP) • GPRS layer very fruitful as well – GPRS not supported by OpenBTS – layer 1 di fg erent Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Where to look for bugs • Layer 1 not fruitful • Layer 2: messages to short • Layer 3: specified in GSM 04.08 – allows for variable length messages (TLV and LV) – Maximum length: 255 octets (length field: one octet) • However: ASN.1 used as well (e.g. RRLP) • GPRS layer very fruitful as well – GPRS not supported by OpenBTS – layer 1 di fg erent Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Where to look for bugs Things get interesting • Layer 1 not fruitful • Layer 2: messages to short • Layer 3: specified in GSM 04.08 – allows for variable length messages (TLV and LV) – Maximum length: 255 octets (length field: one octet) • However: ASN.1 used as well (e.g. RRLP) • GPRS layer very fruitful as well – GPRS not supported by OpenBTS – layer 1 di fg erent Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Initial Targets Image credit: Yutaka Tsutano Image credit: Jose A. Gelado Apple iPhones HTC Dream [G1] (Infineon (Qualcomm baseband) baseband) Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

How were the bugs found? • Fuzzing was not successful – Lots of crashes, but no easy way to triage • Static analysis • No source code publicly available – exception: TSM30 src was available for some years • Conclusion: reverse-engineer binaries Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

How do we start? • Firmware updates often contain baseband firmware as well • Packed multiple times, need to extract • Tools for iPhone and HTC phones to do that • Qualcomm firmwares: ELF files • Infineon needs custom loaders/relocator • Later: ability to dump memory/MMU 17 Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Reverse-engineering • Bootstrap: use BinDi fg to port symbols from known libraries (i.e. compiler runtimes) • Identify functions that do memory transfers using REIL and BinNavi • Lots of strings and assertions (!) in firmwares • Often: clean-cut regions for RR/MM/AT command parser in binary 18 Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

More reversing • Identified functions handling GSM frames – Problem: apparently di fg erent tasks – Assertions/logging functions very helpful 19 Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Types of bugs found • Many, many unchecked memory copies (can be found in binary once memcpy() et al. identified) • Object/structure lifecycle issues (e.g. use after free, uninitialized variables, state engine confusion), can lead to infoleaks as well • Protocol foo-bars: Code paths normally used for UMTS / CDMA can be triggered using GSM frames Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

An example (in ICE • TMSI reallocation: – TMSI always, always, always is 32 bits – nonetheless encoded as TLV • Infineon stack uses length in L3 packet • Results: heap overflow • Somewhat tricky to exploit in stable way • iPhone 2/3G/3GS vs. iPhone 4: di fg erent RTOS – old iPhones: Nucleus – iPhone 4: ThreadX Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

An example (in QCOM • GSM & UMTS use challenge-response auth • Originally: fixed-length challenge in GSM – 16 bytes RAND • 3GPP specification 24.008 added variable length challenge (AUTN) • Functionality not needed in GSM! • Allows to overwrite stack (limit 251 bytes) • Result: remote code exec, pre-auth • QCOM fixed after disclosure (pushed to OEMs) Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Baseband Exploitation • Baseband: what operating system? • Unlock teams often have good info on this (iPhone dev team, XDA developers) • Locate bu fg ers used for GSM L3 messages • Write custom code or use existing features (e.g. AT+S0=x handler in Infineon baseband) • Debugging is hard, write own debugger Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

The AT+S0=n feature • Hayes command to turn on auto-answer • present in some software stacks (verified for Infineon & QCOM) • Enable with *5005*AANS# on iPhones, disable with #5005*AANS# • Excellent target to demonstrate memory corruptions • Auto-answer can be made silent/ Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Part III: Practicality Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Why should we care • New base stations: expensive (cheapest: 25k USD) • Old gear however often is sold on eBay • Threat model has entirely changed: hardware has become cheap, open-source SW appeared • Open-source projects for running GSM base stations: OpenBSC & OpenBTS • OpenBTS provided service at Burning Man 2008-2010 • HAR2009 had OpenBSC test network Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

• Siemens BS11 • used by OpenBSC • HEAVY • E1/Abis interface • cheap: EUR 250 • hard to come by now. Image credit: Björn Heller Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

• ip.access nanoBTS • supported by OpenBSC as well • Abis over IPv4 • approx. USD 4500 • di fg erent versions for GSM900/1800, GSM850/1900 • supports GPRS Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Our gear: Ettus USRPv1 • price: approx USD 1250 plus good clock Image credit: Synthesis Studios • software defined radio (SDR) • versatile (di fg erent daughterboards) • OpenBTS support, GSM850/900, GSM1800/1900 • no GPRS since layer 1 is di fg erent there • clock: wrong freq (64Mhz) and imprecise Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Part IV: Demo Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Common failures (my experience) • Lacking clock precision • Misinterpreting stack traces • Triggering the wrong bug ;) • Overlooking code is placed is non-exec page Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Some words about clocks • Get a good one, seriously! – GSM spec requires 0.05ppm – equiv. to 50Hz in 900MHz band • Time is too precious for fixing clock issues • Using FA-SY on the road (EUR 40) – Si570 based design – not optimal: 20ppm uncalibrated – approx. 1ppm when calibrated Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

Part V: The Baseband Apocalypse Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

The “Baseband Apocalypse” • Place fake BTS in crowded/sensitive areas: airport lounges, financial districts, near embassies • Stealth room monitor: record audio, compress, store in RAM, piggy-back onto next data connection (mic/camera usually hang o fg BB CPU) • Shared mem CPUs: compromise APP CPU as well, place backdoor/rootkit Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []

The “Baseband Apocalypse” • Ping-pong games: compromise cellphone, then BTS/BSC, infect more phones from there • Brick phones permanently (e.g. erase SecZone on iPhone) • No easy forensics possible in BB land (JTAG disabled to prevent easy unlocks). Need exploits to perform forensics Dienstag 30. Nov. 10 []