David Wartofsky POTOMAC AIRFIELD Before the FAA ADIZ Hearings Jan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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David Wartofsky POTOMAC AIRFIELD Before the FAA ADIZ Hearings Jan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

David Wartofsky POTOMAC AIRFIELD Before the FAA ADIZ Hearings Jan 2005 Serving no whine Just solutions TO BE ADDRESSED: IS THERE A THREAT? DOES ADIZ REDUCE ANY THREATS? WHAT IS A BETTER SOLUTION? NEXT STEPS? IS THERE


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David Wartofsky POTOMAC AIRFIELD

Before the FAA ADIZ Hearings – Jan 2005

“Serving no whine”

Just solutions

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TO BE ADDRESSED:

  • IS THERE A THREAT?
  • DOES ADIZ REDUCE ANY THREATS?
  • WHAT IS A BETTER SOLUTION?
  • NEXT STEPS?
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IS THERE A THREAT?

  • Not very likely

– DIA Threat Analysis on www.potomac-airfield.com – TSA’s Statement before NASAO in IOWA

“Just looking for a good story for Congress”

But THERE STILL MIGHT BE…

  • No one is willing to assume that risk
  • Government Security Agencies
  • General Public
  • Aviation Industry
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SINCE ‘AIR ATTACK’ LIKELY TO REMAIN “OF CONCERN…”

(Until Congress or Executive Office says it is not)

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DO SOMETHING

  • Effective
  • Efficient
  • Sustainable
  • Credible
  • Reasonable

“DEMONSTRATE GOOD STEWARDSHIP OF PUBLIC RESOURCES”

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Achieve Real Security Objectives

+ Address Public Concerns + Protect (Aviation) Commerce THEN “GET ON WITH YOUR LIVES”

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  • ENHANCE SECURITY

–MAXIMIZE the PHYSICAL THREAT – Against any real terrorist

  • PROTECT FREEDOM & COMMERCE

–MINIMIZE sanctions or impediments –Against legitimate pilots

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START WITH THE BASICS

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QUESTION #1:

WHERE CAN A HOSTILE AIRCRAFT COME FROM?

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Nearby Takeoff Locations By Type of Aircraft

JET AIRCRAFT

5,000 ft+ RUNWAY

500ft or more of level grass or road or… LEGEND Runways > 5,000 ft Commercial & Private Jets and smaller Runways >2,000 <5,000 Light General Aviation Takeoff Areas >500 <2000 Small GA, Experimental Helicopter or Ultralights <600ft 0 ft <250 ft <1000ft <500 ft

‘Runway’ required

LIGHT GA AIRCRAFT

3,000 ft+ RUNWAY

SMALL AIRCRAFT

500 ft+ RUNWAY

<1500ft

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‘Airport’ Security? Which Airport?

WHAT ABOUT EVERYWHERE ELSE?

?

MD-3 AIRPORTS = ?

? ?

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WHERE CAN THEY COME FROM?

ANSWER: FROM ANYWHERE

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CAN ‘AIRPORT SECURITY’ CONTROL THREAT?

‘Ground Security’ ‘Control Point’ Mon-Fri 8A-6P ONLY legitimate pilots are constrained by ground security

Hostile pilots, or pilots under duress (who are a real threat) Are not constrained by any rules, because they do not care about any rules, They will merely by-pass ground security, or even simpler, fly past overhead… HOSTILE INBOUND FLIGHT OVERHEAD

24/7 24/7 24/7 24/7 ANY REAL THREAT REMAINS FREE TO COME AND GO AT WILL

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Securing against Air Attack Through Airport Security..?

Not against this aircraft you’re not…

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ANSWER TO QUESTION #1

  • A HOSTILE PILOT USING A SMALL AIRCRAFT
  • REMAINS FREE TO TAKEOFF

– From ANYWHERE – At ANYTIME

  • AIRPORT SECURITY

– Cannot control threat – Not even at that airport

  • GROUND SECURITY

– Easily by-passed – Easily over-flown

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SO NOW WHAT?

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QUESTION #2: HOW TO DETECT

A POSSIBLE AIR ATTACK?

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REAL ATTACKER

  • MUST BE AIRBORNE

AND

  • MUST BE ATTACKING

REAL DEFENDER

WATCHES AIRSPACE

  • AIRBORNE MOVEMENTS
  • APPROACHING AREA

REQUIRES FLYING TOWARD THEIR TARGET

APPROACHING defended area

WITH OR WITHOUT A TRANSPONDER

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NEXT TASK BECOMES: ‘SORTING’ Nearby Radar “Targets of interest”

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IDENTIFIED – Trusted agent in control of their aircraft

Don’t worry about them, they are NOT A THREAT

UNKNOWN – Might be a threat, MOST LIKELY JUST LOST

(>2,000+)

THREAT = Unidentified intruder Determined to Approach Despite All Challenges THEN GO TO HIGH ALERT

? !

WHEN THE ALARM GOES OFF

  • r

HEAD THEM AWAY

  • Cooperation with air-traffic control
  • Chased off by air interdiction

?

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QUESTION #3:

HOW TO DEFEND AGAINST POSSIBLE AIR ATTACK?

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IF a threat is inbound WHO can DEFEND? AIRBORNE DESTRUCTION

AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSE

USAF AIR NATIONAL GUARD USCG CUSTOMS

SURFACE TO AIR DEFENSE

AIR-DEFENSE BATTERY

TO THE REAL ATTACKER NOTHING ELSE MATTERS

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SECURITY STRATEGY DETECTS & SORTS TARGETS

  • KEEPS INNOCENTS FROM COMING TO HARM
  • MAKES DEFENSE SUSTAINABLE

BAD GUY ELIMINATED

?

+

=

PROBABLE DETECTION POTENTIAL DESTRUCTION

DETECTION DEFENSE

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NOW MAKE IT

SUSTAINABLE

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‘CLOSING’ AIRSPACE IS NON-SUSTAINABLE NEXT QUESTION #4:

HOW DO YOU MAKE SECURITY SUSTAINABLE?

? AMO / CBP NEAD ADA NORAD FAA-ATC

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OPTIONS:

  • CONTINUE THE ADIZ
  • EXPAND THE FRZ
  • OR SOMETHING ELSE…
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THE ADIZ

DOES NOT SORT AIRBORNE TARGETS

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ADIZ DEFENDERS CANNOT TELL FRIEND FROM FOE

CURRENT ADIZ PROCEDURES

Fill out FAA paperwork correctly Keep FAA documents current File flight-plan (No authentication) Follow PUBLIC procedures

FRIEND & FOE FOLLOW THE SAME PUBLIC RULES

FOE FRIEND

? ?

WHICH RADAR TARGET IS WHICH ?

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THE ADIZ

  • FAILS as motion detector

– Detects everything without discrimination

  • FAILS to sort targets

– Cannot distinguish FRIEND from FOE

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THE NOTORIOUS FRZ…

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FRZ

DEFENDERS CAN TELL FRIEND FROM FOE

  • FRIEND

– Pre-approved for security clearance – Approved pilot

authenticates

  • FOE

Without prior security clearance – Cannot authenticate airspace clearance – Cannot obtain ‘safe passage’ past defenses CURRENT FRZ PROCEDURES ‘SAFE PASSAGE’

DEFENDED AIRSPACE REMAINS TOO DANGEROUS

ASSURES IN-COCKPIT CONTROL BY TRUSTED AGENT

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FRZ ‘Safe Passage’ Procedures

– ONLY given to pre-approved pilots – ALL pilots are welcome to apply

– SIMPLE to use for approved pilots

DEFEND THE CAPITAL, THE ECONOMY and FREEDOM

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THE FRZ

SUCCEEDS

– Discriminates as a detector of airborne movements – Reduces unknown targets within an area of concern – Separates FRIEND from FOE

BUT….

A CONTINUOUS 30 MILE ADIZ or FRZ WOULD BE ECONOMICALLY CATASTROPHIC

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OR SOMETHING ELSE…

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NEXT STEPS

Replace something Not secure (ADIZ) …With something More secure National Security Airspace (aka FRZ)

But ONLY When you really need it

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NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA

NATIONAL SECURITY AIRSPACE

EAA ALMOST GOT IT RIGHT! EXCEPT

  • Replace ‘ADIZ’ with National Security Airspace (NSA)
  • NSA CIRCLE is PREDICTABLE & NAVIGABLE boundary for EMERGENCY
  • Pilots welcome to apply for clearance, in case FRZ expands
  • WHEN NO EMERGENCY

GOOD GUYS COME AND GO NORMALLY

  • WHEN DECLARED EMERGENCY

GOOD GUYS COME AND GO NORMALLY BAD GUYS DARE NOT COME OR GO

EFFECTIVE & SUSTAINABLE

NSA

FRZ only expands during DECLARED emergencies NOT CASUALLY NOT PERMANENTLY

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ADDRESSED:

  • IS THERE A THREAT?

– ANSWER: MAYBE

  • DOES ADIZ REDUCE ANY THREATS?

– ANSWER: ADIZ ADDS NO SECURITY

  • WHAT IS A BETTER SOLUTION?

– ANSWER: POP-OUT NSA / FRZ DURING EMERGENCY

  • NEXT STEP

– ANSWER – REPLACE ADIZ WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AIRSPACE

NATIONAL SECURITY AIRSPACE TO BE EXERCISED AS FRZ ONLY DURING AN EMERGENCY

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THANK YOU

David Wartofsky bigcheese@potomac-airfield.com

www.POTOMAC-AIRFIELD.com