dagstuhl workshop quantum cryptanalysis schloss dagstuhl
play

Dagstuhl Workshop Quantum Cryptanalysis Schloss Dagstuhl / - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dagstuhl Workshop Quantum Cryptanalysis Schloss Dagstuhl / Leibniz-Zentrum fr Informatik, October 2, 2017 5 [Shor94], [Kitaev95], [Brassard/Hyer97], [ Eker ert /Mosca98] 6 Shors algorithm for dlogs: Step 1: Create


  1. Dagstuhl Workshop “Quantum Cryptanalysis” Schloss Dagstuhl / Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, October 2, 2017

  2. 5

  3. [Shor’94], [Kitaev’95], [Brassard/Høyer’97], [ Eker ert /Mosca’98] 6

  4. Shor’s algorithm for dlogs: Step 1: Create σ 𝑙∈ 0,1 𝑜 𝑙 1 , … , 𝑙 𝑜 ⊗ σ ℓ∈ 0,1 𝑜 ℓ 1 , … , ℓ 𝑜 ⊗ |𝒫 〉 by applying Hadamard gates to 2 registers of 𝑜 qubits ; 𝑜 = ⌈log 𝑝𝑠𝑒 𝑄 ⌉ Step 2: For fixed generator 𝑄 and fixed target 𝑅 ∈ 𝑄 compute the transformation that maps this state to ෍ 𝑙 ⊗ ෍ ℓ ⊗ |𝑙𝑄 + ℓ𝑅〉 𝑙∈ 0,1 𝑜 ℓ∈ 0,1 𝑜 Step 3: Measure the 3 rd register. Obtain a result 𝑆. Letting 𝑅 = 𝛽𝑄 and 𝑆 = 𝛾𝑄, we obtain a state corresponding to a “line” ෍ 𝑙 ⊗ ℓ ⊗ 𝑆 = ෍ 𝛾 − 𝛽ℓ ⊗ ℓ 𝑙,ℓ∈ 0,1 𝑜 : ℓ∈ 0,1 𝑜 𝑙+𝛽ℓ=𝛾 Step 4: Apply 𝑅𝐺𝑈 ⊗ 𝑅𝐺𝑈 and measure to sample from the line { 𝑦, 𝛽𝑦 , 𝑦 ∈ 0, . . , 2 𝑜 − 1 . If 𝑦 is a unit, we obtain 𝛽. 7

  5. [Proo oos , Zalka’03] 8

  6. Universal gate sets Important universal gate set “ Clifford + T ” (for logical operations): Consists of all Clifford operations (i.e., the group generated by 𝐼 2 , 𝐷𝑂𝑃𝑈 and 𝑒𝑗𝑏𝑕(1, 𝑗)) and the “T gate” T = 𝑒𝑗𝑏𝑕(1, 𝜕 8 ) . Can be shown to be universal, i.e., for any unitary U and any given 𝜗 > 0, there exists an element A in the Clifford+T group such that || 𝑉 − 𝐵 || ≤ 𝜗 . • This gate set arises naturally in the context of fault-tolerant computing for several quantum codes. The T gates are usually implemented via a process called “magic state distillation” which is expensive. • Common metrics used to measure resources: • T-count = total number of T gates used in a circuit • T-depth = number of T-layers • #qubits = total number of qubits used, including “ancillas” (=scratch space) • Toffoli gate: [Amy, Maslov, Mosca, R., TCAD 2013] 9

  7. Using already allocated memory as scratch space Can we apply tricks similar to the above (Barenco et al, PRA’95) to use “dirty” ancillas for optimization? In a sense: “yes”… [Buhrman, Cleve, Koucky, Loff , Speelman, ‘14] 11

  8. How to increment a quantum register? Problem oblem: How can we implement 𝑦 ↦ 𝑦 + 1 𝑛𝑝𝑒 2 𝑜 , which cyclically shifts the basis states of an 𝑜 qubit register? Solutio ution 1: Recu cursive sive Solutio ution 2: 2: Draper er-style style 12

  9. How to increment a quantum register? Solutio ution 3: 3: Using regul ular ar adder r + co constant tant folding ing Question: Qu tion: Is there e a s solution lution that at co combi bines es all good featu tures? es? 13

  10. Incrementer “+1” by Craig Gidney • Based on the following trick: 𝑦 𝑕 ↦ 𝑦 − 𝑕 |𝑕⟩ ↦ |𝑦 − 𝑕⟩ 𝑕 ′ − 1 ↦ 𝑦 − 𝑕 − 𝑕 ′ + 1 ↦ 𝑦 + 1 |𝑕⟩ • Here 𝑕 denotes a qubit in an unknown state (it can be entangled with the rest of the quantum memory). We denote such qubits as dirty qubits. • Denote the one’s complement ( i.e, flip all bits) of a state by 𝑕 , and the two’s complement by 𝑕 ′ (i.e., 𝑕 + 𝑕 ′ = 0) , then it is known that 𝑕 ′ = 𝑕 + 1 . • If 𝑜 dirty qubits are available, the above trick allows to implement a “+1” incrementer using only 𝑃(𝑜) Toffoli gates. • If only 1 dirty qubit is available, then one can precompute the final carry, apply a splitting step & recurse. The result is an 𝑃(𝑜 log 𝑜) algorithm. 14

  11. Carry prediction with dirty ancillas [Haener, R., Svore, QIC 2017] [Gidney, arXiv:1706.07884] 15 Based on this, on can build constant folded modular arithmetic (+,*,exp)

  12. Putting it all together: addition-by-a-constant 16

  13. Modular addition: requires 3 integer additions 17

  14. [Bernstein, Lange: Database of explicit ECC formulas: http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/] 19

  15. 20

  16. Why garbage is fatal for interference • By inserting polarization filters, the paths can be made distinguishable. The interference pattern disappears. Example using reversible functions: 𝑦 0 |0⟩ ↦ 𝑦 𝑔 𝑦 |𝑕 𝑦 ⟩ • Quantum eraser experiment: ([Wheeler ‘78], [Scully et al, ‘82 and ‘99]): “Erase” polarization information after the photon passed the slits. The interference pattern re-appears! Example using reversible functions: 𝑦 0 |0⟩ ↦ 𝑦 𝑔 𝑦 |0⟩ 21 [Pictures credit: Wikipedia]

  17. How to avoid garbage? • Replacing each gate with a reversible one works fine, however, it produces “garbage”, i.e., help registers will be in a state different from 0 at the end. • There is a principled way out of this dilemma: the Bennett trick Forward computation: |x ⟩ |0 ⟩ |0 ⟩ |0 ⟩ ↦ 𝑦 𝑔 𝑦 𝑕𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑏𝑕𝑓 𝑦 0 ↦ 𝑦 𝑔 𝑦 𝑕𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑏𝑕𝑓 𝑦 𝑔(𝑦) Copy the result: ↦ 𝑦 0 0 𝑔(𝑦) Reverse computation: Idea: “ uncompute ” the garbage by running the computation backwards. Problem: this leads to a large quantum memory footprint. 22

  18. • Requires to handle a WHILE loop (with known upper bound (here: 2n)) • Implemented in LIQ Ui|>, including [B. Kaliski, IEEE Trans. Comp. 44(8), 1995] P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 23

  19. 𝑣 /2 /2 - - + - 𝑤 /2 /2 𝑡 •2 •2 + + •2 𝑠 •2 𝑦 (𝑗) 𝑧 (𝑗) 𝑏 these qubits can be reused 𝑔 𝑙 INC 24

  20. 25

  21. 26

  22. 27

  23. 28

  24. T esting and debugging large quantum algorithms Toffoli networks can be classically simulated. This can be used to localize (systematic) faults! 30

  25. Modular Inverse a la Fermat? Idea: • Let 𝑞 be prime, let 𝑦 ∈ 1, … , 𝑞 − 2 . • Recall that in any finite group: 𝑦 |𝐻| = 𝑓. • When applied to 𝐻𝐺 𝑞 × this implies • 𝑦 𝑞−1 ≡ 1 𝑞 𝑦 𝑦 MUL 𝑧 𝑧 A • Or in other words: 𝑦 𝑞−2 ⋅ 𝑦 ≡ 1 𝑞 𝑨 𝑨 + 𝑦𝑧 • Or in other words: 𝑦 −1 ≡ 𝑦 𝑞−2 𝑞 • That means we can compute the inverse by exponentiation of the (unknown) 𝑦 for the (known, fixed) exponent 𝑞. 31

  26. Square & multiply by unrolling 𝑦 𝑦 - MUL 𝑦 A 𝑦 2 + - MUL 0 A 𝑦 4 + 𝑦 8 … 𝑦 16 … Depth: 2𝑜 × 𝑒𝑓𝑞𝑢ℎ 𝑁𝑉𝑀 + 2𝑒𝑓𝑞𝑢ℎ 𝐵𝐸𝐸 ) + 𝑜 Width: 2𝑜 × 𝑜 = 𝑜 2 • Here 𝑜 is the bit-size of 𝑦 Use binary representation of 𝑞 − 2 to compute 𝑦 𝑞−2 • Unknown whether linear space can be achieved by this approach! 32

  27. Shor for factoring vs ECC dlog [Proos, Zalka, quant-ph/0301141] • Suggests that quantum attacks on ECC/dlog can be done more efficiently than RSA/factoring with comparable level of security. • Circuits are somewhat non-trivial to implement and to layout. • Only short Weierstrass forms considered, unclear how classical optimizations of point additions can be leveraged. 33

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend