"CYBER SECURITY AND SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. - - PDF document

"CYBER SECURITY AND SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

• PROTECTION. STUDY CASE: SATCOM" - 67 slides

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DURING THE LAST DECADES THE IMPACT OF ICT, QUANTUM PHYSICS & NEW MATERIALS REVOLUTION ON THE SPACE INDUSTRY HAS CHANGED THE WAY BUSINESS IS TRANSACTED, GOVERNMENT OPERATES, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ARE CONDUCTED. THOSE FUNCTIONS NOW DEPENDS ON THE INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (SCI)) AND CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (CII) INCLUDING THEIR PERMANENT PROTECTION AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS AND NOT ONLY.

THE IMPACT OF ICT REVOLUTION ON THE SPACE INDUSTRY

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SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (I)

THE SATELLITES = MAJOR

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE  HEAVILY USED IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO FACILITATE AND SUPPORT:

• COMMUNICATION FUNCTIONS;
• ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEMS;
• WEATHER FORECASTING;
• SEARCH & RESCUE FUNCTIONS;
• GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS;
• NATIONAL DEFENSE AND

INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS.

• Fig. 1: CANADA – 10 CIP SECTORS
• Fig. 2: USA – 16 CIP SECTORS

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SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (II)

 AT NATIONAL LEVEL CI SYSTEMS ARE INCORPORATED IN SO – CALLED NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (NIPP).  NO NIPP SECTOR EXCLUSIVELY ADDRESSES THE SPACE- BASED SYSTEMS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR FUNCTIONS THAT HAVE BECOME ESSENTIAL IN OUR SOCIETY.  SPACE COMPONENTS ARE INCORPORATED INTO VARIOUS OTHER RELATED SECTORS, SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS & NATIONAL DEFENSE.  BETWEEN OTHERS, THE SPACE SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS DUTIES - SUPPORT CRUCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR NAT’L DEFENCE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER.

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• Fig. 3: Main Analysis Domains

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THE CYBER TERRORISM IS DEFINED IDENTICALLY, IT DOESN'T MATTER THE ENVIRONMENT WHERE IT TAKES PLACE - INCLUDING SPACE.  CONVERGENCE OF CYBERSPACE AND TERRORISM / MERGE OF TERRORISM AND TECHNOLOGY;

CYBER TERRORISTS - AT LEAST 3 GOALS IN MIND: (1) INFORMATION THEFT = STEALING DATA (2) INFORMATION DISRUPTION = DEFACEMENT (3) INFORMATION DENIAL = DESTRUCTION

DEFINING THE CYBER TERRORISM

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DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY ON ON NET NETWORK WORK-BA BASED SED SYS SYSTE TEMS MS

 THE DEGREE THAT ANY CRITICAL COMPONENT OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE, INCLUDING SPACE - IS VULNERABLE, IS DEPENDENT UPON A NUMBER OF CHARACTERISTICS:  TYPE OF ATTACK;  SCOPE OF IMPACT;  TIME OF ATTACK;  DURATION OF OUTAGE.

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THE FOUR MOST COMMON SOURCES OF THREATS :

• 1. NATION

NATION ST STATE TES - LAUNCH OF MAJOR CYBER

ATTACKS IN SPACE AGAINST ONE ANOTHER – THE THE REAL DANGER DANGER

• 2. TERRORISTS – READY TO EXPAND THEIR CAPABILITY

INTO THE SPACE UNDER POLITICAL AND/OR FINANCIAL MOTIVATION – POTE POTENTI NTIAL AL TH THREAT REATS

• 3. TERRORIST SYMPATHIZERS: NOT

NOT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT

• 4. SENSATION HUNTERS: – THE GRAY HACKERS NOT

NOT TAKE TAKEN INT INTO ACCO ACCOUNT UNT CYBER THREATS SOURCES AND THEIR POTENTIAL RISK LEVEL FOR SPACE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (SCI)

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STUDY CASE: THE SATELLITES

• 1. RENDERING COLLISIONS WITH

EVEN SMALL SPACE DEBRIS ARE DISASTROUS;

• 2. TRAVEL ON ORBIT (EVEN GEO)

AT EXTRAORDINARY SPEEDS;

• 3. NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HIDE -

JUST AS SATELLITES CAN VIEW LARGE SWATHS OF THE EARTH, THEY ARE ALSO VISIBLE TO OBSERVERS OVER LARGE AREAS.

• I. WHAT MEANS “VULNERABILITIES” IN CASE OF SATELLITES?
• THE VULNERABILITIES OF SATELLITE SYSTEMS ARE INTRODUCED

BY THEIR INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES:

• FIG. 4

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• 1. SINCE 1957, 4.900 LAUNCHES PLACING

INTO ORBIT MORE THAN 6.600 SATELLITES  3.600 STILL IN SPACE ONLY 1.000 STILL ACTIVE  ACTIVE: 502 - US, 188 – RUSSIA, 116 - CHINA

• 2. US SPACE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK

TRACKING REGULARLY:  > 23,000 DEBRIS  TOTAL WEIGHT 6,500 To.:  5-10 CM IN LEO: 500,000;  > 10 CM IN GEO : 21,000.

COURTESY OF NASA COURTESY OF NASA

• Fig. 6: LEO

Space Debris Density (not size) mapping for 2009.

• Fig. 5: Space

Debris Distribution around Earth

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• FIG. 3
• FIG. 7

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SPACE DEBRIS REMOVAL: TECHNOLOGIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION

ELECTRIC TETHERS: ATTACHED BY MICRO-ROVERS COULD DRAG SPACE JUNK DRAG JUNK DOWN AS THE CURRENT IN THE TETHER INTERACTS WITH EARTH’S MAGNETIC FIELD COLLECTOR SATELLITES COULD CAPTURE LARGE JUNK IN NETS AND RELEASEIT INTO LOWER ORBIT FROM WHICH IT WOULD REENTER THE ATMOSPHERE

SPACE LASERS COULD NUDGE JUNK PIECES INTO DECAYING ORBITS THREE IDEAS FOR CLEANING SPACE OF JUNK – INCLUDING THE DEBRIS OF TWO SATELLITES THAT COLIDED IN 2009 – WOULD SPEED THE RATE AT WHICH THE DEBRIS FAILS INTO THE ATMOSPHERE AND BURNS

SPACE BORNE LASER

• FIG. 8 - Image Source:

NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC

(37) Michael J. Muolo et al.: Space Handbook, Volume 1: A War Fighter’s Guide to Space, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, December 1993), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au- 18/au180001.htm (38) Sunil D. S.: “Gps Based Space Debris Removal System”, Vemana Institute Of Technology - Department of Electronics & Communications

• Engineering. In: Engineering, April 24, 2015. USN No: 1vi11ec078

http://www.wedemain.fr/Trois-projets-des-terriens-pour-nettoyer-l-espace_a402.html

MAMAIA – RO / 9=10.08.2016 MAJOR–GENERAL (RET.) PROF. MARIUS – EUGEN OPRAN 14

FIG.9: MAJOR SPACE ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS ON CSI

COURTESY OF :

(14) E. MAZUR, P. O’BRIEN, J. F. FENNELL: “Space Environment Effects on Space Systems”. Presentation at the Workshop on Science Associated with the Lunar Exploration Architecture, February 26-March 2, 2007.

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• Fig. 10

SATCOM

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I.

• I. SATE

SATELL LLIT ITE E SYS SYSTE TEMS MS COMPONENTS (Fig.6) COMPONENTS (Fig.6) SOME OF WHICH MAKE BETTER TARGETS THAN OTHERS 1. THE SATELLITE ITSELF;

• 2. THE GROUND STATIONS USED TO OPERATE AND

CONTROL THEM;

• 3. THE LINKS BETWEEN THEM.

II

• II. SA

SATELLITES ELLITES BA BASI SIC ELEMENTS ELEMENTS 1. A STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM OR BUS.

• 2. A THERMAL REGULATION

SUBSYSTEM,

• 3. A POWER SOURCE, OFTEN

THE SOLAR PANELS

• Fig. 11

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TYPES OF ORBITS

• GEOSYNCHRONOUS

1. SAME ROTATIONAL VELOCITY AS EARTH

• 2. MAINTAINS POSITION RELATIVE TO EARTH
• 3. ALTITUDE - 35 786 KM
• 4. VELOCITY - 11 300 KM/HR
• ASYNCHRONOUS

1. MUCH LOWER ALTITUDE

• 2. MUCH HIGHER VELOCITY
• 3. POSITION OVER EARTH

CONSTANTLY CHANGING

• Fig. 12

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VULNERABILIT VULNERABILITIES IES

 INTRODUCED BY THEIR INTRINSIC ATTRIBUTES

• 1. SATELLITE’S MOTION IS PREDICTABLE;
• 2. CHANGING THE ORBIT = SIGNIFICANT EFFORT;
• 3. DIFFICULT TO PROTECT: LAUNCH MASS IS AT A

PREMIUM, SO ARMOR AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES COME AT SOME PRICE;

• 4. THE SENSITIVITY OF SATCOM: EASILY ACCESSED

BY USERS, CAN BE EXPLOITED TO HARM OR INTERFERE WITH THEM;

• 5. SATELLITES CAN’T BE REPAIRED IN SPACE.

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THE SOLUTION???

LASERS!!!

• Fig. 13
• Fig. 14

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What type of Laser is used?

• NEODYMIUM: YTTRIUM, ALUMINIUM,

GARNET (ND:YAG) = ROD OF CRYSTALLINE YAG LIGHTLY DOPED WITH Nd  = 1.664 µM

• 1. WHAT TYPE OF LASER IS USED?
• BIREFRINGENCE

MODULATOR - MOST USEFUL

• USES ELECTRIC-FIELD

INDUCED BIREFRINGENCE OF THE CRYSTAL TO ROTATE POLARIZED LIGHT

• 2. WHAT KIND OF MODULATION?

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PULSE INTERVAL MODULATION

• MOST EFFICIENT TYPE OF MODULATION
• “N” SEPARATE TIME SLOTS IN PULSE INTERVAL

 TRANSMIT LOG2(N) BITS PER PULSE

• PULSE SENT DURING ONE OF THESE TIME SLOTS
• TIME SLOT IS VALUE

OF THE WORD TRANS- LATED IN BINARY DATA

• Fig. 16

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CONCLUSION

• SATELLITES ARE VERY IMPORTANT FOR MODERN

COMMUNICATIONS

• RADIO FREQUENCY COMMUNICATION REACHING

THE END OF ITS USEFULNESS

• LASER COMMUNICATIONS REPRESENTS THE

FUTURE METHOD OF CHOICE FOR SATELLITES  DISTANCE INSENSITIVE AND FLEXIBLE;  RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE;  AVAILABLE WHEN THE TERRESTRIAL INFRASTRUC- TURE IS OVER - INOPERABLE OR DOESN’T EXISTS.

WHY SATCOM?

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GOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS via SATCOM

 GROWING DEMAND FOR UNIQUE SATCOM CAPABILITIES IN BOTH DEFENCE AND CIVILIAN SECURITY  UNIQUE CAPABILITIES OF SATCOM: LONG DISTANCE COMMUNICA- TIONS, USE OF MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS, SUBSTITUTE AND COMPLEMENT GROUND INFRASTRUCTURE, ENABLING THE EXCHANGE OF LARGE DATA

• Fig. 17

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SATELLI SATELLITES TES BASI BASIC C ELEME ELEMENTS NTS

• 1. AN ON-BOARD COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEM

CIP MEASURES: H 2020 ESA PLANNED ACTIONS:  Incorporation of Sophisticated Anti-Jamming Hardware;  Inter-Satellite Links Technology  2nd Gen Crypto Board  IF SOMEONE GAINED CONTROL OF THE SATELLITE’S COMPUTER,

THE SATELLITE COULD BE MADE USELESS BY ITS LEGAL OWNERS;  COMPUTER SYSTEMS MAY SHUT DOWN OR REBOOT DURING SOLAR STORMS OR IF BARRAGED BY HIGH LEVELS OF E.M. RADIATION.

• 2. A COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

 SATELLITE TO/FROM ITS GROUND STATIONS;  SATELLITE TO/FROM OTHER SATELLITES.

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THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

• 1. THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM GENERALLY CONSISTS OF:

 A RECEIVER;  A TRANSMITTER;  ONE OR MORE RADIO ANTENNAE.

• CIP: THE RADIO LINKS SATELLITE TO/FROM GROUND

STATIONS ARE ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL AND MOST VULNERABLE PARTS OF A SATELLITE SYSTEM.

• 2. ALL SATELLITES REQUIRE A LINK TO AND FROM THE

GROUND TO PERFORM “TELEMETRY, TRACKING, AND COMMAND” (TT&C) FUNCTIONS:  OPERATES THE SATELLITE;  EVALUATES THE HEALTH OF OTHER SATELLITE SYSTEMS

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• Fig. 18

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• Fig. 19

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MAINSTREAM PROTECTION TECHNIQUES

 ENCRYPTION  DIGITAL SIGNATURE  ACCESS CONTROL: VARIOUS LEVELS ON SYSTEM & NETWORK  VERIFICATION EXCHANGE: DATA SOURCE & ID  LOOPHOLE SCANNING AND DETECTION  INTRUSION DETECTION, RESPONSE AND RESTORE  ANTI-INFO LEAKAGE AND ELECTROMAGNETIC SOLIDIFICATION  SECURITY ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION  ETC.

HOW TO COUNTER?

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• 1. JAMMING: RECEIVERS ON SATELLITE AND ON

GROUND OVERWHELMED BY AN INTRUDING SIGNAL.  THE JAMMING ATTACK IS MOUNTED FROM THE

BROADCAST AND RECEPTION AREA OF THE TT&C COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL;

• 2. SPOOFING: INFORMATION CONFUSED BY FALSE

SIGNALS

• SPOOFING

MIMICS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUE SIGNAL SO THAT THE USER RECEIVES THE FAKE (OR SPOOFED) SIGNAL INSTEAD OF THE REAL ONE.

MAJOR CYBER THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (I)

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 THE TT&C CHANNELS ARE USUALLY WELL PROTECTED WITH ENCRYPTION AND ENCODING, AVOIDING A GREAT DEAL OF DAMAGE GENERATED BY INTERFERING;  THE MORE VULNERABLE PIECE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS IS THAT USED FOR MISSION - SPECIFIC COMMUNICATIONS. MAJOR CYBER THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (II)

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CIP MEASURES: RESTRICTING THE SIZE OF THIS AREA BY INCREASING THE ANTENNA’S DIRECTIONALITY PROTECT THESE CHANNELS FROM ATTACK BY REDUCING THE REGION FROM WHICH THE JAMMING COULD TAKE PLACE;  IS NOT A VIABLE SOLUTION FOR SATELLITES THAT NEED TO SUPPORT USERS FROM A BROAD GEOGRAPHIC AREA; MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (III)

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• GROUND

STATIONS FOR SATELLITES MONITORING & CONTROL.  GENERALLY NOT HIGHLY PROTECTED FROM PHYSICAL ATTACKS.  COMPUTERS AT CONTROL CENTERS MAY BE VULNERABLE ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE CONNECTED TO THE INTERNET. MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (IV)

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JAMMING THE LINKS (I)

• 1. DOWNLINK CASE: ATTACKER PREVENTS A

GROUND STATION FROM RECEIVING A USABLE SIGNAL FROM THE SATELLITE;  A DOWNLINK JAMMER COULD BE PLACED IN LEO - 50 TO 100x CLOSER TO THE RECEIVER THAN A SATELLITE IN GEO - JAMMING TRANSMISSIONS FROM SATELLITES IN HIGH ORBIT BY GENERATING SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER SIGNALS AT THE RECEIVER.

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• 2. JAMMING THE UPLINK:

 JAMMING UPLINKS TO SATELLITES OTHER THAN COMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST SATELLITES IN GEO IS TECHNICALLY MORE DEMANDING, SINCE THE ATTACKER NEEDS TO LOCATE AND PERHAPS TRACK THE SATELLITE.  THIS WOULD BE THE CASE FOR ANY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS BASED IN LEO (AS THE IRIDIUM SYSTEM) AND FOR ANY SATELLITE NOT IN GEO.

JAMMING THE LINKS (II)

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 THE ANTI-JAMMING SYSTEMS MAY JUMP BETWEEN FREQUENCY BANDS USING A PATTERN KNOWN ONLY TO THE LEGITIMATE USER;  IF A JAMMER CAN BE LOCATED, IT CAN BE ATTACKED DIRECTLY - WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE SEEN AS A LEGITIMATE ACTION DURING A MILITARY CRISIS. ANTI - JAMMING ACTIONS

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 SPOOFING: INFORMATION CONFUSED BY FALSE SIGNALS - SPOOFING MIMICS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUE SIGNAL SO THAT THE USER RECEIVES THE FAKE (OR SPOOFED) SIGNAL INSTEAD OF THE REAL ONE;  TO COUNTER - SPOOFING, THE SIGNAL FROM THE SATELLITE CAN BE ENCRYPTED BEFORE IT IS SENT AND DE-ENCRYPTED AFTER RECEIPT.

SPOOFING / COUNTER-SPOOFING

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ASAT: DEDICATED SATELLITES CARRYING WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR ATTACKING OTHER SATELLITES OR TARGETS ON THE GROUND OR IN THE ATMOSPHERE:  A LASER SYSTEM;  FUEL AND MIRRORS NEEDED TO USE THE LASER;  EXPLOSIVE CHARGE TO DESTROY ANOTHER SATELLITE. THE ANTI – SATELLITES (ASAT - I)

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 ASAT LASER SYSTEMS CAN BE BASED ON THE GROUND, AT SEA, IN THE AIR, OR IN SPACE.  GROUND AND AIR-BASED LASER ASAT SYSTEMS WOULD OPERATE AT VISIBLE AND INFRARED WAVE- LENGTHS - THAT CAN PROPAGATE THROUGH THE ATMOSPHERE.

THE ANTI – SATELLITES (ASAT - II)

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 LASER TECHNOLOGY IS MATURE – A VARIETY OF LASER MATERIALS & TECHNIQUES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED WITH A RANGE OF POWER LEVELS.  NEED TO CHOOSE A FREQUENCY THAT PENETRATES THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE CASE OF A GROUND-BASED LASER.

LASER ATTACKS ON SATELLITE SENSORS (I)

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A LASER ASAT SYSTEM ALSO REQUIRES:  A TRACKING AND POINTING SYSTEM.  A MOVABLE MIRROR CAN BE USED BOTH TO DIRECT THE LASER BEAM TOWARD THE SATELLITE AND TO FOCUS THE BEAM.

LASER ATTACKS ON SATELLITE SENSORS (II)

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 LASERS ARE ESPECIALLY USEFUL FOR DIRECTED ENERGY ATTACKS BECAUSE THEY CAN EMIT A LARGE AMOUNT OF ENERGY IN A NARROW BEAM AND A NARROW BAND OF FREQUENCIES.  ALLOW THE ATTACKER TO EFFICIENTLY DIRECT ENERGY TO THE RIGHT SPOT ON A SATELLITE WITH THE PROPER FREQUENCY TO INFLICT DAMAGE. LASER ATTACKS ON SATELLITE SENSORS (III)

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LASERS - TWO GENERAL CATEGORIES:

• CONTINUOUS WAVE (CW) LASERS;
• SHORT,

REPEATED BURSTS

• PULSED

LASERS). DISTINCTION - IMPORTANT FOR ASAT EFFECTS:

• CW LASERS DELIVER A CONTINUOUS

STREAM OF ENERGY. LASER ATTACKS ON SATELLITE SENSORS (IV)

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• PULSED LASERS GENERATE VERY

HIGH POWER LEVELS OVER SMALL FRACTIONS OF A SECOND (REFERRED TO AS PEAK POWER), WHILE HAVING MODEST AVERAGE POWER LEVELS (WHEN AVERAGED OVER SECONDS).

LASER ATTACKS ON SATELLITE SENSORS (V)

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 THE PULSE LENGTH AND TOTAL ENERGY PER PULSE ARE THE HIGHEST POWER COMMERCIAL.  CAN DELIVER TERAWATTS / PETAWATTS OF PEAK POWER, BUT ONLY IN VERY SHORT PULSES, GIVING AN ENERGY PER PULSE (AVERAGE POWER TIMES PULSE LENGTH) OF 20 J;

LASER ATTACKS ON SATELLITE SENSORS (VI)

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DAZZLING:

USING THE LASERS FOR TEMPORARILY INTERFERING WITH THE SENSOR OF A SATELLITE THAT TAKE IMAGES OF OBJECTS ON THE GROUND.  LASERS ARE COMMONLY MENTIONED AS BEING USEFUL FOR TEMPORARILY INTERFERING WITH THE SENSOR A SATELLITE THAT TAKE IMAGES OF OBJECTS ON THE GROUND. LASER LASER DAZZLING DAZZLING ATTACKS ATTACKS ON SATELLIT ON SATELLITE E SENS SENSORS ORS (I) (I)

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 SUCH TEMPORARY INTERFERENCE IS CALLED DAZZLING.  JUST AS A SATELLITE’S RECEIVER CAN BE SWAMPED BY A JAMMING SIGNAL, A SATELLITE’S OPTICAL SENSOR CAN BE DAZZLED BY SWAMPING IT WITH LIGHT THAT IS BRIGHTER THAN WHAT IT IS TRYING TO IMAGE.

LASER LASER DA DAZZLING ZZLING ATTA ATTACKS CKS ON ON SATELLITE SATELLITE SENSORS SENSORS (II) (II)

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 REMOTE SENSING SATELLITES THAT TAKE HIGH-RESOLUTION IMAGES OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL IMPORTANCE MAY BE ATTRACTIVE TARGETS FOR SENSOR INTERFERENCE.  TO COUNTER A DAZZLING ATTACK: THE SATELLITE COULD CHANGE THE DIRECTION IT WAS LOOKING OR CLOSE A SHUTTER TO KEEP LIGHT FROM REACHING THE SENSOR.

LASER LASER DA DAZZLING ZZLING ATTA ATTACKS CKS ON ON SATELLITE SATELLITE SENSORS SENSORS (III) (III)

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AT SUFFICIENTLY HIGH INTENSITIES, LASER LIGHT CAN PERMANENTLY DAMAGE THE SENSORS OF IMAGING SATELLITES. EXPERTS REFERS TO SUCH DAMAGE AS PARTIAL BLINDING e.g. DAMAGE ONLY A PORTION OF THE SENSOR. THE HIGH INTENSITY CAN CAUSE THE DETECTOR MATERIAL TO ABLATE OR EVAPORATE FROM PARTS OF THE DETECTOR.

LASE LASER R PART PARTIAL BLI IAL BLIND NDIN ING G ATTAC ATTACKS KS ON ON SATELLIT SATELLITE E SEN SENSO SORS RS (I) (I)

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 IT CAN MELT THE MATERIAL OR ITS FRAGILE ELECTRONIC CONNECTIONS.  IN ADDITION, THE LARGE TEMPERATURE GRADIENTS PRO- DUCED BY HEAT FROM THE LASER BEAM CAN PRODUCE THERMO- MECHANICAL STRESSES.

PARTIAL BLINDING (I):

LASER LASER PART PARTIAL BLIN IAL BLINDIN DING G ATTACKS ATTACKS ON SATELLITE ON SATELLITE SENSO SENSORS (II) RS (II)

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THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES A SATELLITE COULD TAKE:  HARDENING EXPOSED SURFACES;  BUILDING IN REDUNDANCY;  DEPLOYING A PROTECTIVE SHIELD AGAINST THE LASER LIGHT

HIGH POWER LASER ATTACKS ON SATELLITES

HEATING AND STRUCTURAL DAMAGE

(54) MICHAEL J. MUOLO et al.: Space Handbook, Volume 2 - An Analyst’s Guide, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, December 1993); Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985);

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• Fig. 21

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OTHER MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES

HIGH HIGH-POWERED POWERED MIC MICROW ROWAVE AVE ATT ATTACK ACKS S  SECOND DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON AGAINST SATELLITES: A DEVICE THAT PRODUCES HIGH- POWERED MICROWAVES (HPM) = EM WAVES WITH  SHORTER THAN RF WAVES BUT CONSIDERABLY LONGER THAN VISIBLE LIGHT. COMMONLY USED BY RADARS;  IN BACK DOOR ATTACKS, THE MICROWAVES ENTER THE SATELLITE BY SOME OTHER MEANS THAN AN ANTENNA.

(55) PHILIP E. NIELSE: Effects of Directed Energy Weapons, (National Defense University, 1994), http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/directed_ energy.ht. (56) MICHAEL J. MUOLO et al.: Space Handbook, Volume 2 - An Analyst’s Guide, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, December 1993); Office of technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985);

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OTHER MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES

KINETIC ENERGY KINETIC ENERGY ATT ATTACK ACKS S (I) (I)

 ATTACKS THAT ATTEMPT TO DAMAGE OR DESTROY A SATELLITE THROUGH HIGH- SPEED COLLISIONS WITH ANOTHER OBJECT ARE CALLED KINETIC ENERGY ATTACKS;  THE FASTER TWO OBJECTS ARE MOVING RELATIVE TO ONE ANOTHER, THE MORE KINETIC ENERGY IS AVAILABLE TO BE TURNED INTO DESTRUCTIVE FORCE WHEN THEY COLLIDE.

(57) Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense, July 2003, http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmd03.html.

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 KINETIC ENERGY IS THE ENERGY IN THE MOTION OF AN OBJECT;  SINCE SATELLITES MOVE AT HIGH SPEEDS, A COLLISION WITH EVEN A SMALL OBJECT CAN SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THEM. EVEN A COLLISION THAT LEAVES THE SATELLITE LARGELY INTACT COULD CAUSE IT TO TUMBLE.

(58) PHILIP E. NIELSEN:, Effects of Directed Energy Weapons, (National Defense University, 1994), http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/directed_ energy.htm.

OTHER MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES

KINETIC ENERGY KINETIC ENERGY ATT ATTACK ACKS S (II) (II)

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 KINETIC ENERGY ATTACKS THAT ARE LAUNCHED FROM THE EARTH AND ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE SATELLITE WITHOUT PLACING AN OBJECT INTO ORBIT ARE REFERRED TO AS DIRECT-ASCENT ATTACKS.  SUCH AN ATTACK MAY USE A HOMING

• INTERCEPTOR. THE ASAT WOULD BE LAUNCHED

ON A MISSILE THAT CARRIES IT ABOVE THE ATMOSPHERE AND RELEASES IT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE TARGET SATELLITE.

OTHER MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES

DIRECT KINETIC ENERGY ATTACKS

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OTHER MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES

SPACE SPACE MI MINES NES (I) (I)

 ASATS MAY ALSO BE DEPLOYED IN SPACE WELL BEFORE THEY ARE USED; SUCH ASATS ARE CALLED SPACE MINES.  LIKE DIRECT - ASCENT ASATS, SPACE-BASED ASATS CAN USE: (1) UNGUIDED CLOUDS OF PELLETS OR: (2) HOMING INTERCEPTORS.

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 A CLOUD OF PELLETS WOULD BE RELEASED IN AN ORBIT THAT CROSSES THE SATELLITE’S ORBIT OR IN THE SAME ORBIT AS THE TARGET SATELLITE, BUT MOVING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION;  A HOMING INTERCEPTOR COULD BE PLACED IN A CROSSING ORBIT TO ALLOW A HIGH-SPEED

• COLLISION. IT COULD BE PLACED IN THE SAME

ORBIT.

OTHER MAJOR THREATS AGAINST SATELLITES

SPACE MINES SPACE MINES (II) (II)

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ATT ATTACKS ACKS USING USING EMP EMP GENE GENERATE RATED D BY A BY A HI HIGH GH-ALTIT ALTITUDE UDE NUCLEAR EXPL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIO OSION N (I) (I)

 A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AT AN ALTITUDE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOMETERS WOULD CREATE AN INTENSE EMP THAT WOULD LIKELY DESTROY ALL UNSHIELDED SATELLITES IN LEO THAT ARE IN THE LINE OF SIGHT OF THE EXPLOSION.

(60) Defense Threat Reduction Agency: “High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) Against Low Earth Orbit Satellites (HALEOS),” briefing slides, April 2001, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/ program/asat/haleos.pdf. In: Emergency Management.

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 DETONATING A NUCLEAR WEAPON IN SPACE COULD BE A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE TERRORIST - STYLE ATTACK BY A COUNTRY THAT HAD A NUCLEAR WEAPON AND A MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE TO LAUNCH IT.  THE OUTER SPACE TREATY PROHIBITS FROM PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ORBIT.

AT ATTA TACKS CKS USING USING EMP EMP GE GENE NERAT RATED ED BY A Y A HI HIGH GH-ALT ALTIT ITUDE UDE NUCLE NUCLEAR E AR EXPLO XPLOSIO SION N (II (II)

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NANOSATELLITES (I)

 NANOSATELLITES - A LOW-COST SOLUTION FOR BEYOND-LINE-OF-SIGHT (BLOS) COMMUNICATIONS  MINIATURISED ARTIFICIAL SATELLITES WITH A MASS OF 1-10 KILOGRAMMES.  TYPICAL MISSIONS FOR NANOSATS TODAY : COMMUNICATION & IMAGING DATA COLLECTION  CAN BE PLACED IN ORBIT LAUNCHED IN LARGE NUMBERS SIMULTANEOUSLY AS PAYLOAD ON THE SAME LAUNCHER; REPLACING OTHER KINDS OF LOW COST SATELLITES - SUCH AS OVERFLYING SAME AREA EVERY 3-4 H INSTEAD OF 15-20 H IN CASE OF μSATS.

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 THE US ARMY IS TESTING NANOSATS IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH REMOTE OPERATIVE SCENARIOS IN AN EFFORT CALLED SMDC-ONE (SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND-ORBITAL NANOSATELLITE EFFECT);  SMDC-ONE IS CHARACTERISED BY A CONSTELLATION COMPOSED OF 12 NANOSATS THAT WILL PROVIDE REAL-TIME AND 24/7 COMMUNICATIONS;  THE FIRST SMDC-ONE WAS SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED AT THE END OF 2010.

NANOSATELLITES (II)

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NEW TECHNOLOGIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS (I)

• 1. EUROPEAN DATA RELAY SYSTEM (EDRS): A NEW OPTICAL COMM

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED UNDER THIS PROJECT – FOR:  THE EUROPEAN DATA RELAY SYSTEM (EDRS) ITSELF;  A DIRECT LEO TO GROUND LINK SOLUTION (OPTEL-MU);  THE DEEP-SPACE AIM MISSION (OPTEL-D).

 ADVANTAGES OF OPTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS ARE:

 SMALL SIZE OF THE SPACE TERMINAL (MADE POSSIBLE BY THE LARGE ANTENNA GAIN OF OPTICAL TELESCOPES)  UNLIMITED BANDWIDTH THAT IS LICENSE AND INTERFERENCE FREE.

 AN ADDITIONAL OPTICAL COMMUNICATION TERMINAL CAN BE

USED - FOR:  PLANETARY IMAGING;  LIDAR APPLICATIONS

Bibliography: “Optical communications for future space missions” by Nikos Karafolas (TEC-MME, ESA-ESTEC), 2015

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NEW TECHNOLOGIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS (II)

• 2. NEW RELEVANT ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES FOR GROUND

SEGMENT AND OPERATIONS, NAMELY IN THE AREAS OF:  MISSION OPERATIONS AND GROUND DATA SYSTEMS;  FLIGHT DYNAMICS AND GNSS;  SPACE DEBRIS;  GROUND STATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS. NEW TECHNOLOGIES ENABLING FUTURE MISSIONS - i.e.:  AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS & PLANNING;  ADVANCED FLIGHT DYNAMICS & NAVIGATION TECHNOLOGIES;  TECHNOLOGIES FOR SPACE DEBRIS OBSERVATION;  OPERATIONAL SPACE DEBRIS SERVICES;  RISK AND MITIGATION ANALYSIS

Bibliography: “Ground Segment Technologies enabling Mission Operations” by Juan Miro Carretero (OPS-G, ESA-ESOC), 2015

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• 3. OPTICAL “DIRECT-TO-EARTH” (DTE) COMM PROVIDE PAYLOAD DATA

VOLUME TRANSFERS FROM DEEP SPACE HIGHER THAN RF SOLUTIONS;

 ACTUAL COST TO FULLY EXPLOIT OPTICAL COMM POTENTIAL FROM DEEP

SPACE DISTANCES IN HIGH PHOTON EFFICIENT COMMUNICATION CHANNELS APPEARS PROHIBITIVELY HIGH – BECAUSE OF:  LARGE OPTICAL TERRESTRIAL ANTENNAE WITH 4-TO-12M DIAMETER;  OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES: 24/7 DAY AND NIGHT OPERATION;  POINTING CAPABILITY CLOSE TO THE SUN;  POINTING ACCURACY OF LESS THAN 1 ARCSEC UNDER ALL SUN ILLUMINATION & ENVIRONMENTAL (TEMPERATURE, WIND) CONDITIONS.

 A NEW CONCEPT WAS DEVELOPED BASED ON SOMEWHAT RELAXED

OPTICAL IMAGING REQUIREMENT FOR SINGLE PHOTON DETECTION, COMBINED WITH INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR THERMO-MECHANICAL POINTING REQUIREMENT;

 DEVELOPMENT COSTS ARE COMPARABLE TO ARRAYS OF RF ANTENNAE.

Bibliography: “Low Cost Optical Ground Antennae” by Klaus-Juergen Schulz (OPS-GS, ESA-ESOC) “ Antennae”

NEW TECHNOLOGIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS (III)

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• 4. A NEW SET OF GROUND DATA SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES

DEVELOPED TO FULFIL THE OPERATIONAL NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES OF ALL FUTURE MISSIONS ENTRUSTED TO ESA/ESOC – INCLUDING:  FILE BASED OPERATIONS;  GROUND STATION AND OPERATIONS AUTOMATION;  MODEL - BASED OPERATIONS DESIGN, PLANNING AND EXECUTION;  MISSION OPERATIONS SERVICES;  TELEROBOTICS OPERATIONS;  CYBER SECURITY & CIP

Bibliography: “Ground Data System Technologies for future missions” BY Nestor Peccia (OPS-GI, ESA-ESOC), 2015

NEW TECHNOLOGIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS (IV)

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• Fig. 22

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General**(Ret.) Prof. Marius Eugen Opran EESC / ROSA / INFLPR / IFIN-HH / ELI-NP