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CS419 Spring 2010 Computer Security Vinod Ganapathy Lecture 13 Chapter 6: Intrusion Detection Security Intrusion & Detection Security Intrusion a security event, or combination of multiple security events, that constitutes a security


  1. CS419 – Spring 2010 Computer Security Vinod Ganapathy Lecture 13 Chapter 6: Intrusion Detection

  2. Security Intrusion & Detection Security Intrusion a security event, or combination of multiple security events, that constitutes a security incident in which an intruder gains, or attempts to gain, access to a system (or system resource) without having authorization to do so. Intrusion Detection a security service that monitors and analyzes system events for the purpose of finding, and providing real- time or near real-time warning of attempts to access system resources in an unauthorized manner.

  3. Principles of Intrusion Detection • Characteristics of systems not under attack – User, process actions conform to statistically predictable pattern – User, process actions do not include sequences of actions that subvert the security policy – Process actions correspond to a set of specifications describing what the processes are allowed to do • Systems under attack do not meet at least one of these

  4. Example • Goal: insert a back door into a system – Intruder will modify system configuration file or program – Requires privilege; attacker enters system as an unprivileged user and must acquire privilege • Nonprivileged user may not normally acquire privilege (violates #1) • Attacker may break in using sequence of commands that violate security policy (violates #2) • Attacker may cause program to act in ways that violate program’s specification

  5. Goals of IDS • Detect wide variety of intrusions – Previously known and unknown attacks – Suggests need to learn/adapt to new attacks or changes in behavior • Detect intrusions in timely fashion – May need to be be real-time, especially when system responds to intrusion • Problem: analyzing commands may impact response time of system – May suffice to report intrusion occurred a few minutes or hours ago

  6. Goals of IDS • Present analysis in simple, easy-to- understand format – Ideally a binary indicator – Usually more complex, allowing analyst to examine suspected attack – User interface critical, especially when monitoring many systems • Be accurate – Minimize false positives, false negatives – Minimize time spent verifying attacks, looking for them

  7. Intrusion Techniques  objective to gain access or increase privileges  initial attacks often exploit system or software vulnerabilities to execute code to get backdoor  e.g. buffer overflow  or to gain protected information  e.g. password guessing or acquisition

  8. Intrusion Detection Systems  classify intrusion detection systems (IDSs) as:  Host-based IDS: monitor single host activity  Network-based IDS: monitor network traffic  logical components:  sensors - collect data  analyzers - determine if intrusion has occurred  user interface - manage / direct / view IDS

  9. Models of Intrusion Detection • Anomaly detection – What is usual, is known – What is unusual, is bad • Misuse detection – What is bad, is known – What is not bad, is good • Specification-based detection – What is good, is known – What is not good, is bad

  10. IDS Principles  assume intruder behavior differs from legitimate users  expect overlap as shown  observe deviations from past history  problems of: • false positives • false negatives • must compromise

  11. IDS Requirements  run continually  be fault tolerant  resist subversion  impose a minimal overhead on system  configured according to system security policies  adapt to changes in systems and users  scale to monitor large numbers of systems  provide graceful degradation of service  allow dynamic reconfiguration

  12. IDS Architecture • Basically, a sophisticated audit system – Sensor: gathers data for analysis – Analyzer: it analyzes data obtained from the sensor according to its internal rules – Notifier obtains results from analyzer, and takes some action • May simply notify security officer • May reconfigure agents, director to alter collection, analysis methods • May activate response mechanism

  13. Sensors • Obtains information and sends to analyzer • May put information into another form – Preprocessing of records to extract relevant parts • May delete unneeded information • Analyzer may request agent send other information

  14. Example • IDS uses failed login attempts in its analysis • Sensor scans login log every 5 minutes, sends director for each new login attempt: – Time of failed login – Account name and entered password • Analyzer requests all records of login (failed or not) for particular user – Suspecting a brute-force cracking attempt

  15. Host-Based Sensors • Obtain information from logs – May use many logs as sources – May be security-related or not – May be virtual logs if agent is part of the kernel • Very non-portable • Sensor generates its information – Scans information needed by IDS, turns it into equivalent of log record – Typically, check policy; may be very complex

  16. Network-Based Sensors • Detects network-oriented attacks – Denial of service attack introduced by flooding a network • Monitor traffic for a large number of hosts • Examine the contents of the traffic itself • Agent must have same view of traffic as destination – TTL tricks, fragmentation may obscure this • End-to-end encryption defeats content monitoring – Not traffic analysis, though

  17. Network Issues • Network architecture dictates agent placement – Ethernet or broadcast medium: one agent per subnet – Point-to-point medium: one agent per connection, or agent at distribution/routing point • Focus is usually on intruders entering network – If few entry points, place network agents behind them – Does not help if inside attacks to be monitored

  18. Analyzer • Reduces information from sensors – Eliminates unnecessary, redundant records • Analyzes remaining information to determine if attack under way – Analysis engine can use a number of techniques, discussed before, to do this • Usually run on separate system – Does not impact performance of monitored systems – Rules, profiles not available to ordinary users

  19. Notifier • Accepts information from director • Takes appropriate action – Notify system security officer – Respond to attack • Often GUIs – Well-designed ones use visualization to convey information

  20. Example GUI D B E A C • GUI showing the progress of a worm as it spreads through network • Left is early in spread • Right is later on

  21. Host-Based IDS  specialized software to monitor system activity to detect suspicious behavior  primary purpose is to detect intrusions, log suspicious events, and send alerts  can detect both external and internal intrusions  two approaches, often used in combination:  anomaly detection - defines normal/expected behavior • threshold detection • profile based  signature detection - defines (im)proper behavior

  22. Audit Records  a fundamental tool for intrusion detection  two variants:  native audit records - provided by O/S • always available but may not be optimum  detection-specific audit records - IDS specific • additional overhead but specific to IDS task • often log individual elementary actions • e.g. may contain fields for: subject, action, object, exception-condition, resource-usage, time-stamp

  23. Anomaly Detection  threshold detection  checks excessive event occurrences over time  alone a crude and ineffective intruder detector  must determine both thresholds and time intervals  profile based  characterize past behavior of users / groups  then detect significant deviations  based on analysis of audit records • gather metrics: counter, guage, interval timer, resource utilization • analyze: mean and standard deviation, multivariate, markov process, time series, operational model

  24. Threshold Metrics • Counts number of events that occur – Between m and n events (inclusive) expected to occur – If number falls outside this range, anomalous • Example – Windows: lock user out after k failed sequential login attempts. Range is (0, k – 1). • k or more failed logins deemed anomalous

  25. Difficulties • Appropriate threshold may depend on non-obvious factors – Typing skill of users – If keyboards are US keyboards, and most users are French, typing errors very common • Dvorak vs. non-Dvorak within the US

  26. Statistical Moments • Analyzer computes standard deviation , other measures of correlation – If measured values fall outside expected intervals, anomalous • Potential problem – Profile may evolve over time; solution is to weigh data appropriately or alter rules to take changes into account

  27. Example: IDES • Developed at SRI International – Represent users, login session, other entities as ordered sequence of statistics < q 0, j , …, q n , j > – q i , j (statistic i for day j ) is count or time interval – Weighting favors recent behavior over past behavior • A k , j sum of counts making up metric of k th statistic on j th day • q k , l +1 = A k , l +1 – A k , l + 2 – rt q k , l where t is number of log entries/total time since start, r factor determined through experience

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