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CS344M Autonomous Multiagent Systems Todd Hester Department of Computer Science The University of Texas at Austin Good Afternoon, Colleagues Are there any questions? Todd Hester Good Afternoon, Colleagues Are there any questions? Todd


  1. CS344M Autonomous Multiagent Systems Todd Hester Department of Computer Science The University of Texas at Austin

  2. Good Afternoon, Colleagues Are there any questions? Todd Hester

  3. Good Afternoon, Colleagues Are there any questions? Todd Hester

  4. Logistics • Progress reports due in 2 weeks Todd Hester

  5. Logistics • Progress reports due in 2 weeks • Readings for next week Todd Hester

  6. Game Theory Premises • Simultaneous actions • No communication • Outcome depends on combination of actions • Utility (payoff) encapsulates everything about preferences over outcomes Todd Hester

  7. Solution Concepts • Dominant strategy • Nash equilibrium • Pareto optimality • Maximum social welfare • Maximin strategy Todd Hester

  8. Prisoner’s Dilemma ❈♦❧✉♠♥ ❈✭✶✮ ❉✭✷✮ ❈✭✶✮ ✸✱✸ ✵✱✺ ❘♦✇ ❉✭✷✮ ✺✱✵ ✶✱✶ Todd Hester

  9. Chicken ❈♦❧✉♠♥ ❈✭✶✮ ❉✭✷✮ ❈✭✶✮ ✸✱✸ ✶✱✺ ❘♦✇ ❉✭✷✮ ✺✱✶ ✵✱✵ Todd Hester

  10. Bach/Stravinsky • My wife and I agree to meet at a concert Todd Hester

  11. Bach/Stravinsky • My wife and I agree to meet at a concert • Unfortunately, there are 2: Bach and Stravinsky Todd Hester

  12. Bach/Stravinsky • My wife and I agree to meet at a concert • Unfortunately, there are 2: Bach and Stravinsky • No time to get in touch with each other Todd Hester

  13. Bach/Stravinsky • My wife and I agree to meet at a concert • Unfortunately, there are 2: Bach and Stravinsky • No time to get in touch with each other • I prefer Stravinsky, she prefers Bach Todd Hester

  14. Bach/Stravinsky • My wife and I agree to meet at a concert • Unfortunately, there are 2: Bach and Stravinsky • No time to get in touch with each other • I prefer Stravinsky, she prefers Bach • But most of all, we want to be together Todd Hester

  15. Bach/Stravinsky • My wife and I agree to meet at a concert • Unfortunately, there are 2: Bach and Stravinsky • No time to get in touch with each other • I prefer Stravinsky, she prefers Bach • But most of all, we want to be together – If not, so distraught we don’t care what we’re listening to Todd Hester

  16. Bach/Stravinsky • My wife and I agree to meet at a concert • Unfortunately, there are 2: Bach and Stravinsky • No time to get in touch with each other • I prefer Stravinsky, she prefers Bach • But most of all, we want to be together – If not, so distraught we don’t care what we’re listening to • Propose a payoff matrix Todd Hester

  17. Bach/Stravinsky ❲✐❢❡ ❙ ❇ ❙ ✷✱✶ ✵✱✵ ▼❡ ❇ ✵✱✵ ✶✱✷ Todd Hester

  18. Nash Equilibrium • Does every game have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium? Todd Hester

  19. Matching Pennies • We each put a penny down covered • If they match, I win, if they don’t, you win Todd Hester

  20. Matching Pennies • We each put a penny down covered • If they match, I win, if they don’t, you win P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❍ ❚ ❍ ✶✱✲✶ ✲✶✱✶ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❚ ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ Todd Hester

  21. Matching Pennies • We each put a penny down covered • If they match, I win, if they don’t, you win P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❍ ❚ ❍ ✶✱✲✶ ✲✶✱✶ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❚ ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ Nash equilibrium? Todd Hester

  22. Nash Equilibrium • Every game has at least one Nash equilibrium Todd Hester

  23. Nash Equilibrium • Every game has at least one Nash equilibrium – Nobel prize and academy award! Todd Hester

  24. Nash Equilibrium • Every game has at least one Nash equilibrium – Nobel prize and academy award! • Not known if complexity of finding one is NP-complete or in P Todd Hester

  25. Some theory • Prove that if each player plays a dominant strategy, the result is a Nash equilibrium Todd Hester

  26. Some theory • Prove that if each player plays a dominant strategy, the result is a Nash equilibrium • Are all Nash equilibria the result of playing dominant strategies? Todd Hester

  27. Some theory • Prove that if each player plays a dominant strategy, the result is a Nash equilibrium • Are all Nash equilibria the result of playing dominant strategies? • Is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium necessarily Pareto optimal? Todd Hester

  28. Some theory • Prove that if each player plays a dominant strategy, the result is a Nash equilibrium • Are all Nash equilibria the result of playing dominant strategies? • Is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium necessarily Pareto optimal? • Is a Pareto optimal outcome necessarily the result of Nash equilibrium strategies? Todd Hester

  29. Some theory • Prove that if each player plays a dominant strategy, the result is a Nash equilibrium • Are all Nash equilibria the result of playing dominant strategies? • Is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium necessarily Pareto optimal? • Is a Pareto optimal outcome necessarily the result of Nash equilibrium strategies? • Is the maximum social welfare outcome necessarily Pareto optimal? Todd Hester

  30. Some theory • Prove that if each player plays a dominant strategy, the result is a Nash equilibrium • Are all Nash equilibria the result of playing dominant strategies? • Is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium necessarily Pareto optimal? • Is a Pareto optimal outcome necessarily the result of Nash equilibrium strategies? • Is the maximum social welfare outcome necessarily Pareto optimal? • If both players play maximin, is it necessarily a Nash equilibrium? Todd Hester

  31. Activity P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❘♦❝❦ P❛♣❡r ❙❝✐ss♦rs ❘♦❝❦ ✵✱✵ ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ P❧❛②❡r ✶ P❛♣❡r ✶✱✲✶ ✵✱✵ ✲✶✱✶ ❙❝✐ss♦rs ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ ✵✱✵ Todd Hester

  32. Activity P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❘♦❝❦ P❛♣❡r ❙❝✐ss♦rs ❘♦❝❦ ✵✱✵ ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ P❧❛②❡r ✶ P❛♣❡r ✶✱✲✶ ✵✱✵ ✲✶✱✶ ❙❝✐ss♦rs ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ ✵✱✵ Todd Hester

  33. Mixed strategy equilibrium P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ✹✱✽ ✷✱✵ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ✻✱✷ ✵✱✽ Todd Hester

  34. Mixed strategy equilibrium P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ✹✱✽ ✷✱✵ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ✻✱✷ ✵✱✽ • What if player 2 picks action 1 3/4 of the time? Todd Hester

  35. Mixed strategy equilibrium P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ✹✱✽ ✷✱✵ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ✻✱✷ ✵✱✽ • What if player 2 picks action 1 3/4 of the time? • What if player 2 picks action 1 1/4 of the time? Todd Hester

  36. Mixed strategy equilibrium P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ✹✱✽ ✷✱✵ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ✻✱✷ ✵✱✽ • What if player 2 picks action 1 3/4 of the time? • What if player 2 picks action 1 1/4 of the time? • Player 1 must be indifferent between actions 1 and 2 Todd Hester

  37. Mixed strategy equilibrium P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ✹✱✽ ✷✱✵ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ✻✱✷ ✵✱✽ • What if player 2 picks action 1 3/4 of the time? • What if player 2 picks action 1 1/4 of the time? • Player 1 must be indifferent between actions 1 and 2 • Player 2 must be indifferent between actions 1 and 2 Todd Hester

  38. Mixed strategy equilibrium P❧❛②❡r ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✶ ✹✱✽ ✷✱✵ P❧❛②❡r ✶ ❆❝t✐♦♥ ✷ ✻✱✷ ✵✱✽ • What if player 2 picks action 1 3/4 of the time? • What if player 2 picks action 1 1/4 of the time? • Player 1 must be indifferent between actions 1 and 2 • Player 2 must be indifferent between actions 1 and 2 Do actual numbers matter? Todd Hester

  39. Rock/Paper/Scissors • Nash equilibrium? Todd Hester

  40. Rock/Paper/Scissors • Nash equilibrium? • Why is anything else not an equilibrium? Todd Hester

  41. Rock/Paper/Scissors • Nash equilibrium? • Why is anything else not an equilibrium? • Rock Paper Scissors tournament Todd Hester

  42. Rock/Paper/Scissors • Nash equilibrium? • Why is anything else not an equilibrium? • Rock Paper Scissors tournament • Poker Todd Hester

  43. Discussion • What is an example game within robot soccer? Todd Hester

  44. Discussion • What is an example game within robot soccer? ●♦❛❧✐❡ ❇❧♦❝❦ ❘✐❣❤t ▲❡❢t ▲❡❢t ✶✱✲✶ ✲✶✱✶ ❑✐❝❦❡r ❘✐❣❤t ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ Todd Hester

  45. Discussion • What is an example game within robot soccer? ●♦❛❧✐❡ ❇❧♦❝❦ ❘✐❣❤t ▲❡❢t ▲❡❢t ✶✱✲✶ ✲✶✱✶ ❑✐❝❦❡r ❘✐❣❤t ✲✶✱✶ ✶✱✲✶ • Can we use game theory to devise better strategies? Todd Hester

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