Crude Oil Price Differentials and Pipeline Investment Shaun McRae - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Crude Oil Price Differentials and Pipeline Investment Shaun McRae - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Crude Oil Price Differentials and Pipeline Investment Shaun McRae January 5, 2018 ITAM Rapid growth in production since 2011 has reshaped geography of oil markets in the US 10.0 7.5 Million barrels/day U.S. Oil Production 5.0 2.5 0.0
Rapid growth in production since 2011 has reshaped geography
- f oil markets in the US
U.S. Oil Production
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Million barrels/day
Source: EIA crude oil production
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Total length of US crude oil pipelines increased by 37% between 2010 and 2016
20 40 60 80 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Miles (thousands)
Source: PHMSA Annual Hazardous Liquids data
2
Economic costs and benefits of major oil pipeline projects are ignored or misstated in media reports
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-benefits-from-the-keystone-xl-pipeline-and-dakota-access-pipeline-pros- cons/
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This paper studies the economic effects of additions to pipeline capacity
- Additional pipelines displace shipment by more
expensive alternatives (such as rail or trucks)
- Greater use of cheaper pipelines reduces the price
dispersion across regions and the price discount to world prices
- Refiners pay more for their inputs
- Oil producers receive more for their output
- Possible environmental effects from displacement of
rail—not considered here
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Oil deliveries by pipeline to refineries increased by a third since 2009, matching increase in overall pipeline length
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Million barrels/day
Pipeline
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Rail
Source: EIA refinery receipts of crude oil by pipeline and rail
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Monthly oil shipments by rail in 2016 less than half their level during 2015
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 2005 2010 2015
Million barrels/day
Source: EIA movements of crude oil by rail
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Large decline in the mean absolute deviation in US wellhead prices since its peak in 2011 and 2012
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 2005 2010 2015
Mean absolute price differential ($/barrel)
Source: EIA state-level crude oil first purchase prices
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Similar decline in the mean discount of US wellhead prices from benchmark price (LLS)
10 20 30 2005 2010 2015
Mean wellhead discount to LLS ($/barrel)
Source: EIA state-level crude oil first purchase prices; Bloomberg
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Stylized economic framework
Suppose we have an isolated region with oil production and in- elastic oil demand from local refineries Q P
Oil supply Refinery demand
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Without any trade (“autarky”) the price of oil in this region will be very low Q P Paut Qaut
Oil supply Refinery demand
10
The world price of oil is much higher... but the oil needs to be transported out of the region to a market hub Q P Paut Qaut
Oil supply Refinery demand
Pworld
11
There are low and high cost methods for transporting the oil, each with a limited capacity Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Pworld
12
Local oil producers will receive price P1, discounted from the world price to reflect the cost of transporting the last barrel Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q1 P1 Pworld
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Suppose there is an expansion in pipeline capacity out of the region, so that all exported oil can be carried by pipeline Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q1 P1
Expansion
Pworld
14
The price received by local oil producers increases from P1 to P2, reducing the discount from the world price Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q2 P2 Q1 P1
Expansion
Pworld
15
Local oil producers will be better off as a result of the higher price (and slightly higher production quantity) Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q2 P2 Q1 P1
Expansion
Pworld
16
Local oil refineries are worse off because now they pay a higher price P2 for their crude oil input Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q2 P2 Q1 P1
Expansion
Pworld
17
Oil shippers with access to the original pipeline are also worse
- ff, because they can no longer profit from buying oil at P1
Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q2 P2 Q1 P1
Expansion
Pworld
18
Overall welfare increases after the pipeline expansion, due to reduction in transportation costs and higher oil production Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q2 P2 Q1 P1
Expansion
Pworld
19
Pipeline expansions in the Permian basin
Oil production in the Permian basin increased by 1.2 million bar- rels/day between 2010 and 2016
Production
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Million barrels/day
Source: EIA Drilling Productivity Report
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Only four pipelines out of Permian basin in 2010: Borger, Basin, Centurion, West Texas Gulf
Original pipeline New pipeline after 2012 Oil refinery Main Permian fields Rail loading terminal Rail unloading terminal Source: EIA geographical shape files
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Rail loading terminals in Permian and Eagle Ford allowed ship- ment by rail to Gulf Coast refineries
Original pipeline New pipeline after 2012 Oil refinery Main Permian fields Rail loading terminal Rail unloading terminal Source: EIA geographical shape files
22
Six new pipelines were constructed (or converted) between 2012 and 2016, increasing access to Gulf Coast
Original pipeline New pipeline after 2012 Oil refinery Main Permian fields Rail loading terminal Rail unloading terminal Source: EIA geographical shape files, Sunoco Logistics
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Permian production exceeded refinery and pipeline capacity in 2012 and again in 2014
Production Refinery + pipeline capacity
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Million barrels/day
Sources: EIA oil production; EIA refinery capacity utilization; RBN Energy and other news reports
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Periods with excess supply associated with large price differen- tials between Permian (WTI Midland) and Gulf Coast (LLS)
Monthly Permian Basin production, less refining and pipeline capacity Excess supply −0.4 −0.2 0.0
Million barrels/day
WTI Midland discount to LLS 10 20 30 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
$/barrel
Sources: Excess supply calculation (previous slide); Bloomberg
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Periods with excess supply associated with large price differen- tials between Permian (WTI Midland) and WTI Cushing
Sources: Excess supply calculation (previous slide); Bloomberg
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Periods with excess supply associated with large price differen- tials between Permian (WTI Midland) and Gulf Coast (LLS)
10 20 30 −0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1
Excess supply (million barrels/day) Price difference ($/barrel)
Sources: Excess supply calculation (previous slide); Bloomberg
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Empirically analyze the relationship between price differences and excess supply
- Allow WTI Cushing-LLS price differential to matter when
marginal oil is sent to Cushing
- Include year fixed effects
- Change definition of refinery capacity
28
Societal benefits of $1.9 million/day compare to pipeline rev- enues of $0.3 million/day
Decompose the change in revenues and costs as a result of a hypothetical pipeline expansion $ million/day Higher oil producer revenue $17.6 Higher oil refinery costs $2.7 Lower oil shipper profits $13.0 Lower transportation costs $0.9 Higher oil production $1.0
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Higher input costs (mostly) reduced refinery profits rather than being passed on to gasoline consumers
Gasoline (Houston − Midland) Crude oil (LLS − WTI Midland) −0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 Jan 2013 Jan 2014 Jan 2015 Jan 2016 Jan 2017
Price difference ($/gallon)
Gasoline (Houston − El Paso) Crude oil (LLS − WTI Midland) −0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 Jan 2013 Jan 2014 Jan 2015 Jan 2016 Jan 2017
Price difference ($/gallon)
Source: GasBuddy.com
30
Refinery capacity utilization was already high and did not change as a result of the lower prices
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 10 20 30
LLS − WTI Midland differential Refinery capacity utilization
Inland Texas Refineries
5 10 15
LLS − WTI Midland differential Refinery
Big Spring El Paso
Individual Refineries
Source: EIA, Texas Railroad Commission
31
Analysis for other oil producing regions
Colorado: Increase of about 250,000 barrels/day in oil produc- tion as well as greater oil pipeline capacity
Production Refinery + pipeline capacity
0.0 0.2 0.4 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Million barrels/day
Sources: EIA oil production; EIA refinery capacity utilization; RBN Energy and other news reports
32
Colorado–WTI Cushing price differentials are higher in periods with shortfall in pipeline capacity
5 10 15 −0.2 −0.1 0.0 0.1
Excess supply (million barrels/day) Price difference ($/barrel)
Sources: Excess supply calculation (previous slide); Bloomberg; own calculations
33
Large increase in Bakken production not matched by additions to pipeline capacity
Production Refinery + pipeline capacity
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Million barrels/day
Sources: EIA Drilling Productivity Report; EIA refinery capacity utilization; ND Pipeline Authority and news reports
34
No obvious relationship between North Dakota–WTI Cushing price differential and excess supply measure
5 10 15 20 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Excess supply (million barrels/day) Price difference ($/barrel)
Sources: Excess supply calculation (previous slide); Bloomberg; own calculations
35
Note the pipeline expansions in North Dakota have been infra- marginal—implying no change in local price Q P
Oil supply Pipeline Rail Local+export demand
Q1 P1
Expansion
Pworld
36
Other issues that complicate analysis of effect of pipeline in- frastructure investment in other region
- Source of price data: market data vs. monthly average
wellhead prices
- Capacity constraints in other parts of pipeline network
- Optimal flows through interconnected network
37
Conclusion
This paper has studied the economic effects of expansions to the crude oil pipeline network
- Length of crude oil pipeline network has increased by
37% between 2010 and 2016
- Additional pipelines have reduced the variance across
regions in oil producer prices
- Magnitude of reduction depends on whether new
pipelines are inframarginal
- Most of the benefits for producers are a transfer from
refiners and shippers
- Net welfare benefits are due to reducing cost of shipment
and increasing oil production
- These exceed revenue for pipeline owners