Counterfactual Donkeys Don’t Get High
Mike Deigan Yale University SuB22, Potsdam
Counterfactual Donkeys Dont Get High Mike Deigan Yale University - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Counterfactual Donkeys Dont Get High Mike Deigan Yale University SuB22, Potsdam New Data 1 / 40 New Data Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didnt make anything yesterday. 1 / 40 New Data Suppose Allie and Bert
Mike Deigan Yale University SuB22, Potsdam
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday.
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie:
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass.
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 1:
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass.
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass.
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)!
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Judgements: (1) ✓ (2) ??
1 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 2:
2 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases.
2 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)!
2 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✗ Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)!
2 / 40
Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✗ Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Judgements: (1) ✗ (2) ✓
2 / 40
(1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Case 1: Mary made two glass vases. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. Case 1 Case 2 (1) ✓ ✗ (2) ?? ✓
3 / 40
4 / 40
(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it.
5 / 40
(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Apparent entailments: (4) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert.
5 / 40
(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Apparent entailments: (4) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore.
5 / 40
(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Apparent entailments: (4) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.
5 / 40
Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:
6 / 40
Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:
6 / 40
Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:
(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))
6 / 40
Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:
(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))
6 / 40
Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:
(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))
∃x[Px] Qx ⇔ ∀x[Px Qx]
6 / 40
Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:
(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))
∃x[Px] Qx ⇔ ∀x[Px Qx]
(van Rooij (2006), Walker and Romero (2015))
6 / 40
7 / 40
7 / 40
The special ordering-based accounts predict the new data.
7 / 40
The special ordering-based accounts predict the new data. High reading accounts don’t.
7 / 40
In other words. . . Counterfactual donkeys
8 / 40
In other words. . . Counterfactual donkeys don’t get high.
8 / 40
Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway
8 / 40
Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway
Familiar Stalnaker-Lewis style semantics.
9 / 40
Familiar Stalnaker-Lewis style semantics. Selection function: (5) f(A, w) = {w′ : w ∈ A ∧ ¬∃w′′(w′′ ∈ A ∧ w′′ <w w′)} The A-worlds nearest to w, according to <w.
9 / 40
Familiar Stalnaker-Lewis style semantics. Selection function: (5) f(A, w) = {w′ : w ∈ A ∧ ¬∃w′′(w′′ ∈ A ∧ w′′ <w w′)} The A-worlds nearest to w, according to <w. (6) A C = {w : ∀w′(w′ ∈ f(A, w) ⊃ w ∈ C)} C is true at all the nearest A-worlds.
9 / 40
DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996))
10 / 40
DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996)) possibility: world, assignment info state s: set of possibilities update function [·] from a state and sentence to a state
10 / 40
DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996)) possibility: world, assignment info state s: set of possibilities update function [·] from a state and sentence to a state (7) a. s[F(x)] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ wi ∈ F(gi(x))}
10 / 40
DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996)) possibility: world, assignment info state s: set of possibilities update function [·] from a state and sentence to a state (7) a. s[F(x)] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ wi ∈ F(gi(x))} b. s[∃x] = {i : ∃j∃d(j ∈ s ∧ d ∈ D ∧ wi = wj ∧ gi = gx→d
j
)}
10 / 40
11 / 40
j is an A-possibility for i (or j ∈ /A/i) iff ∃k(gk = gi ∧ j ∈ {k}[A]).
11 / 40
j is an A-possibility for i (or j ∈ /A/i) iff ∃k(gk = gi ∧ j ∈ {k}[A]). Selection function: (8) f(A, i) = {j : j ∈ /A/i ∧ ¬∃k(k ∈ /A/i ∧ wk <wi wj)}. Finds the nearest A-possibility, where possibilities are ordered by their worlds.
11 / 40
j is an A-possibility for i (or j ∈ /A/i) iff ∃k(gk = gi ∧ j ∈ {k}[A]). Selection function: (8) f(A, i) = {j : j ∈ /A/i ∧ ¬∃k(k ∈ /A/i ∧ wk <wi wj)}. Finds the nearest A-possibility, where possibilities are ordered by their worlds. (9) s[A C] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i) ⊃ {j}[C] ∅)} C is verified by all selected possibilities
11 / 40
(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it.
12 / 40
(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (10) ∃xDBO(x) BB(x)
12 / 40
w0
w0 ¬DBO DBO DBO = donkey that Balaam owns
w0 ¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB DBO = donkey that Balaam owns BB = thing that Balaam beats
w0 ¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO = donkey that Balaam owns BB = thing that Balaam beats e = Eeyore h = Herbert p = Platero
13 / 40
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = =
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
14 / 40
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x)
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅
{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)]
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅
{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)?
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅
{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)? ✓
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅
{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)? ✓ = {w1, gx→h} ∅
DBO ¬BB
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→h w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅
{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)? ✓ = {w1, gx→h} ∅
✓
15 / 40
Problem: no universal entailments
16 / 40
Problem: no universal entailments (11) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (12) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.
16 / 40
Problem: no universal entailments (11) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (12) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.
16 / 40
(12-b) If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. (13) DBO(e) BB(e)
17 / 40
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨
18 / 40
DBO ¬BB
w2
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p
DBO ¬BB
w2
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p
DBO(e) BB(e)
DBO ¬BB
w2
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p
DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅
DBO ¬BB
w2
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p
DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅
w2 ∈ BB(e)?
DBO ¬BB
w2
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p
DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅
w2 ∈ BB(e)? ✗
DBO ¬BB
w2
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
w3
w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p
DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅
w2 ∈ BB(e)? ✗
✗
19 / 40
Problem: no universal entailments (14) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (15) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.
20 / 40
Problem: no universal entailments (14) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (15) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero. How to fix this?
20 / 40
Problem: no universal entailments (14) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (15) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero. How to fix this? Route 1: special orderings Route 2: high readings
20 / 40
Walker and Romero (2015): universal entailments would follow from A C iff the closeness ordering were such that
21 / 40
Walker and Romero (2015): universal entailments would follow from A C iff the closeness ordering were such that for any a, b ∈ D, the closest world which combines with gx→a to form an A-possibility is as close as the closest world which combines with gx→b to form an A-possibility.
21 / 40
Walker and Romero (2015): universal entailments would follow from A C iff the closeness ordering were such that for any a, b ∈ D, the closest world which combines with gx→a to form an A-possibility is as close as the closest world which combines with gx→b to form an A-possibility. An ordering set S is special relative to a state s and sentence A iff (16) ∀i(i ∈ s ⊃ ∀j(j ∈ /A/i ⊃ ∃k(k ∈ f(A, i) ∧ gj = gk))) For all possibilities i in s, if j is an A-possibility for i, then among the nearest (relative to i) A-possibilities is a possibility which shares an assigment with j.
21 / 40
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w3, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w3, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w3, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w3, gx→p
22 / 40
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
=
w2
BB ¬BB
=
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ = =
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
=
w2
BB ¬BB
=
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ = =
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
=
w2
BB ¬BB
=
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ = =
23 / 40
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO ¬BB
=
w2
BB ¬BB
=
w3
BB ¬BB
w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO ¬BB
=
w2
BB ¬BB
=
w3
BB ¬BB
w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x)
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO ¬BB
=
w2
BB ¬BB
=
w3
BB ¬BB
w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ✗
24 / 40
Leave world ordering ≤ alone,
25 / 40
Leave world ordering ≤ alone, but define an assignment-sensitive similarity ordering ≤∗ based on it. (17) j ≤∗
i k iff wj ≤wi wk ∧ gj = gk
25 / 40
Leave world ordering ≤ alone, but define an assignment-sensitive similarity ordering ≤∗ based on it. (17) j ≤∗
i k iff wj ≤wi wk ∧ gj = gk
(18) f ∗(A, i) = {j : j ∈ /A/i ∧ ¬∃k(k ∈ /A/i ∧ k <∗
wi j)}.
(19) s[A C] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ ∀j(j ∈ f ∗(A, i) ⊃ {j}[C] ∅)}
25 / 40
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗
w0
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
∨
w1
BB ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p
<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗
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w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x)
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x)
w1
¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB
DBO ¬BB
∨
w2
BB ¬BB
∨
w3
BB ¬BB
w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p
∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ✗
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Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway
(1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Case 1: Mary made two glass vases. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. Case 1 Case 2 (1) ✓ ✗ (2) ?? ✓
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w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x) w1 ∈ G(c)?
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c
<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x) w1 ∈ G(c)? ✗
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Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1
30 / 40
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w1, gx→c
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w1, gx→c
w0
¬VMM VMM G ¬G
∨
w1
G ¬G
w1, gx→c ¬w0 <w0 w1
31 / 40
Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1
32 / 40
Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1.
32 / 40
Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1. No universal entailments for merely possible antecedent satisfiers.
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Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1. No universal entailments for merely possible antecedent satisfiers. (Possibly) universal entailments for (1) in Case 2.
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Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1. No universal entailments for merely possible antecedent satisfiers. (Possibly) universal entailments for (1) in Case 2. Right predictions about the new data.
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Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway
Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3.
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Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3. This vase case is just one of those.
33 / 40
Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3. This vase case is just one of those.
Case 3: Mary made one glass vase and one clay vase.
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Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3. This vase case is just one of those.
Case 3: Mary made one glass vase and one clay vase. (1) false in this case, which is not what we’d expect on a weak/low reading.
33 / 40
c in Case 1 gets ignored due to quantifier domain restriction.
34 / 40
c in Case 1 gets ignored due to quantifier domain restriction. Maybe, but how can this get Case 2 right?
34 / 40
c in Case 1 gets ignored due to quantifier domain restriction. Maybe, but how can this get Case 2 right? Shouldn’t the possible clay vase be irrelevant still?
34 / 40
35 / 40
Walker and Romero (2015): cases of universal entailments without special order.
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Walker and Romero (2015): cases of universal entailments without special order. (21) Scenario: Balaam took part in a game show which had the following format. If you win the easy first round, you win Herbert, an obnoxious and disobedient
and third rounds are the well-mannered and obedient donkeys Eeyore and Platero, respectively. Losing a round of the game eliminates the player, keeping them from advancing to any later rounds. Balaam was eliminated in the first round, and so remains donkeyless.
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John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it.
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John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Sarah, who has more information about the game, corrects him with (23). (23) No, Balaam could have won Platero or Eeyore too, and he wouldn’t beat either of them if he owned them.
36 / 40
John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Sarah, who has more information about the game, corrects him with (23). (23) No, Balaam could have won Platero or Eeyore too, and he wouldn’t beat either of them if he owned them. Seems like Sarah is right, so there are universal entailments.
36 / 40
John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Sarah, who has more information about the game, corrects him with (23). (23) No, Balaam could have won Platero or Eeyore too, and he wouldn’t beat either of them if he owned them. Seems like Sarah is right, so there are universal entailments. But intuitively, the world where Balaam wins only one round is more similar to the actual world than ones where he wins two
36 / 40
Response part 1:
37 / 40
Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering.
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Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗
37 / 40
Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗ Disaster for ordering semantics?
37 / 40
Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗ Disaster for ordering semantics? Lewis (1979): weight violations of law more than disparities in
37 / 40
Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗ Disaster for ordering semantics? Lewis (1979): weight violations of law more than disparities in
We still need a theory of the closeness ordering that predicts special orderings in the right cases, but nothing has ruled this
37 / 40
Response part 2: actually, the high reading account needs special orderings too.
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Response part 2: actually, the high reading account needs special orderings too. (25) Scenario: Cory, who is donkeyless, is a bit crazy. He’s disposed to take out his anger on his most prized
described in (21), but also lost in the first round. Had he won any rounds, the prize from the most advanced round he won would have become his prized possession, and he would have beaten it, but he wouldn’t beat anything else. Now consider the following. (26) If Cory owned a donkey, he would beat it.
38 / 40
Response part 2: actually, the high reading account needs special orderings too. (25) Scenario: Cory, who is donkeyless, is a bit crazy. He’s disposed to take out his anger on his most prized
described in (21), but also lost in the first round. Had he won any rounds, the prize from the most advanced round he won would have become his prized possession, and he would have beaten it, but he wouldn’t beat anything else. Now consider the following. (26) If Cory owned a donkey, he would beat it. In this scenario, the salient reading of (26) seems false. If Cory had owned Eeyore, he would own but not beat Herbert.
38 / 40
To get this right, the high reading account needs the worlds where Cory wins 2 or 3 donkeys to be as close as the one where he wins 1. It needs a special ordering. But then we can get the right results from the special ordering alone, without the high reading.
39 / 40
Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway
Counterfactual donkey sentences have universal entailments, but not of the sort we’d expect from high reading accounts. The special ordering account seems to get things right. But we still need a theory of how these orderings arise.
40 / 40
Fine, Kit (1975). “Critical Notice of David Lewis’s Counterfactuals”. In: Mind 84, pp. 451–458. Groenendijk, Jeroen and Martin Stokhof (1991). “Dynamic Predicate Logic”. In: Linguistics and Philosophy 14, pp. 39–100. Groenendijk, Jeroen, Martin Stokhof, and Frank Veltman (1996). “Coreference and Modality”. In: The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Ed. by Shalom Lappin. Blackwell, pp. 179–213. Lewis, David (1979). “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”. In: Noˆ us 13, pp. 455–476. Van Rooij, Robert (2006). “Free choice counterfactual donkeys”. In: Journal of Semantics 23.4, pp. 383–402. Walker, Andreas and Maribel Romero (2015). “Counterfactual donkey sentences: A strict conditional analysis”. In: Proceedings of SALT 25, pp. 288–307. Wang, Yingying (2009). “Counterfactual donkey sentences: a response to Robert van Rooij”. In: Journal of Semantics 26.3,