Counterfactual Donkeys Dont Get High Mike Deigan Yale University - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Counterfactual Donkeys Dont Get High Mike Deigan Yale University - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Counterfactual Donkeys Dont Get High Mike Deigan Yale University SuB22, Potsdam New Data 1 / 40 New Data Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didnt make anything yesterday. 1 / 40 New Data Suppose Allie and Bert


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SLIDE 1

Counterfactual Donkeys Don’t Get High

Mike Deigan Yale University SuB22, Potsdam

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SLIDE 2

New Data

1 / 40

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SLIDE 3

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday.

1 / 40

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SLIDE 4

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie:

1 / 40

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SLIDE 5

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass.

1 / 40

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SLIDE 6

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 1:

1 / 40

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SLIDE 7

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass.

1 / 40

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SLIDE 8

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass.

1 / 40

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SLIDE 9

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase

1 / 40

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SLIDE 10

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)!

1 / 40

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SLIDE 11

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✓ Case 1: Mary actually made two vases, both from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Judgements: (1) ✓ (2) ??

1 / 40

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SLIDE 12

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 2:

2 / 40

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SLIDE 13

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases.

2 / 40

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SLIDE 14

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)!

2 / 40

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SLIDE 15

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✗ Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)!

2 / 40

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SLIDE 16

New Data

Suppose Allie and Bert think Mary the potter probably didn’t make anything yesterday. (1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. ✗ Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Judgements: (1) ✗ (2) ✓

2 / 40

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SLIDE 17

New Data - Summary

(1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Case 1: Mary made two glass vases. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. Case 1 Case 2 (1) ✓ ✗ (2) ?? ✓

3 / 40

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SLIDE 18

So what?

4 / 40

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SLIDE 19

Old Data

(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it.

5 / 40

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SLIDE 20

Old Data

(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Apparent entailments: (4) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert.

5 / 40

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SLIDE 21

Old Data

(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Apparent entailments: (4) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore.

5 / 40

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SLIDE 22

Old Data

(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Apparent entailments: (4) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.

5 / 40

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SLIDE 23

Old Data - Two Accounts

Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:

6 / 40

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SLIDE 24

Old Data - Two Accounts

Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:

  • 1. let a special property of the closeness ordering do the work

6 / 40

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SLIDE 25

Old Data - Two Accounts

Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:

  • 1. let a special property of the closeness ordering do the work

(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))

6 / 40

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SLIDE 26

Old Data - Two Accounts

Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:

  • 1. let a special property of the closeness ordering do the work

(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))

  • 2. bake in universality semantically with a ‘high’ reading

6 / 40

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SLIDE 27

Old Data - Two Accounts

Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:

  • 1. let a special property of the closeness ordering do the work

(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))

  • 2. bake in universality semantically with a ‘high’ reading
  • n which

∃x[Px] Qx ⇔ ∀x[Px Qx]

6 / 40

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SLIDE 28

Old Data - Two Accounts

Two routes to accounting for universal entailments:

  • 1. let a special property of the closeness ordering do the work

(Walker and Romero (2015) on behalf of Wang (2009))

  • 2. bake in universality semantically with a ‘high’ reading
  • n which

∃x[Px] Qx ⇔ ∀x[Px Qx]

(van Rooij (2006), Walker and Romero (2015))

6 / 40

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SLIDE 29

Thesis

7 / 40

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SLIDE 30

Thesis We should take Route 1.

7 / 40

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SLIDE 31

Thesis We should take Route 1.

The special ordering-based accounts predict the new data.

7 / 40

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SLIDE 32

Thesis We should take Route 1.

The special ordering-based accounts predict the new data. High reading accounts don’t.

7 / 40

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SLIDE 33

In other words. . . Counterfactual donkeys

8 / 40

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SLIDE 34

In other words. . . Counterfactual donkeys don’t get high.

8 / 40

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SLIDE 35

Overview

Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway

8 / 40

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SLIDE 36

Overview

Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway

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SLIDE 37

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Familiar Stalnaker-Lewis style semantics.

9 / 40

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SLIDE 38

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Familiar Stalnaker-Lewis style semantics. Selection function: (5) f(A, w) = {w′ : w ∈ A ∧ ¬∃w′′(w′′ ∈ A ∧ w′′ <w w′)} The A-worlds nearest to w, according to <w.

9 / 40

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SLIDE 39

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Familiar Stalnaker-Lewis style semantics. Selection function: (5) f(A, w) = {w′ : w ∈ A ∧ ¬∃w′′(w′′ ∈ A ∧ w′′ <w w′)} The A-worlds nearest to w, according to <w. (6) A C = {w : ∀w′(w′ ∈ f(A, w) ⊃ w ∈ C)} C is true at all the nearest A-worlds.

9 / 40

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SLIDE 40

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996))

10 / 40

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SLIDE 41

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996)) possibility: world, assignment info state s: set of possibilities update function [·] from a state and sentence to a state

10 / 40

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SLIDE 42

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996)) possibility: world, assignment info state s: set of possibilities update function [·] from a state and sentence to a state (7) a. s[F(x)] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ wi ∈ F(gi(x))}

10 / 40

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SLIDE 43

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

DPL with possible worlds (based on Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman (1996)) possibility: world, assignment info state s: set of possibilities update function [·] from a state and sentence to a state (7) a. s[F(x)] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ wi ∈ F(gi(x))} b. s[∃x] = {i : ∃j∃d(j ∈ s ∧ d ∈ D ∧ wi = wj ∧ gi = gx→d

j

)}

10 / 40

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SLIDE 44

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

11 / 40

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SLIDE 45

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

j is an A-possibility for i (or j ∈ /A/i) iff ∃k(gk = gi ∧ j ∈ {k}[A]).

11 / 40

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SLIDE 46

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

j is an A-possibility for i (or j ∈ /A/i) iff ∃k(gk = gi ∧ j ∈ {k}[A]). Selection function: (8) f(A, i) = {j : j ∈ /A/i ∧ ¬∃k(k ∈ /A/i ∧ wk <wi wj)}. Finds the nearest A-possibility, where possibilities are ordered by their worlds.

11 / 40

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SLIDE 47

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

j is an A-possibility for i (or j ∈ /A/i) iff ∃k(gk = gi ∧ j ∈ {k}[A]). Selection function: (8) f(A, i) = {j : j ∈ /A/i ∧ ¬∃k(k ∈ /A/i ∧ wk <wi wj)}. Finds the nearest A-possibility, where possibilities are ordered by their worlds. (9) s[A C] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i) ⊃ {j}[C] ∅)} C is verified by all selected possibilities

11 / 40

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SLIDE 48

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it.

12 / 40

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SLIDE 49

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

(3) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (10) ∃xDBO(x) BB(x)

12 / 40

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SLIDE 50

Dynamic Binding + Ordering Semantics

w0

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SLIDE 51

Dynamic Binding + Ordering Semantics

w0 ¬DBO DBO DBO = donkey that Balaam owns

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SLIDE 52

Dynamic Binding + Ordering Semantics

w0 ¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB DBO = donkey that Balaam owns BB = thing that Balaam beats

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SLIDE 53

Dynamic Binding + Ordering Semantics

w0 ¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO = donkey that Balaam owns BB = thing that Balaam beats e = Eeyore h = Herbert p = Platero

13 / 40

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SLIDE 54

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p
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SLIDE 55

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

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SLIDE 56

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p
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SLIDE 57

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p
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SLIDE 58

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p
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SLIDE 59

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p

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SLIDE 60

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

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SLIDE 61

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = =

slide-62
SLIDE 62

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

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SLIDE 63

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

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SLIDE 64

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

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SLIDE 65

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

slide-66
SLIDE 66

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

14 / 40

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SLIDE 67

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

slide-68
SLIDE 68

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x)

slide-69
SLIDE 69

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅

slide-70
SLIDE 70

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅

{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)]

slide-71
SLIDE 71

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅

{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)?

slide-72
SLIDE 72

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅

{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)? ✓

slide-73
SLIDE 73

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅

{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)? ✓ = {w1, gx→h} ∅

slide-74
SLIDE 74

DBO ¬BB

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→h w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(x)] ∅

{w1, gx→h}[BB(x)] w1 ∈ BB(h)? ✓ = {w1, gx→h} ∅

15 / 40

slide-75
SLIDE 75

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Problem: no universal entailments

16 / 40

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SLIDE 76

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Problem: no universal entailments (11) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (12) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.

16 / 40

slide-77
SLIDE 77

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Problem: no universal entailments (11) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (12) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.

16 / 40

slide-78
SLIDE 78

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

(12-b) If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. (13) DBO(e) BB(e)

17 / 40

slide-79
SLIDE 79

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

slide-80
SLIDE 80

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

slide-81
SLIDE 81

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ ∨ ∨

18 / 40

slide-82
SLIDE 82

DBO ¬BB

w2

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p

slide-83
SLIDE 83

DBO ¬BB

w2

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p

DBO(e) BB(e)

slide-84
SLIDE 84

DBO ¬BB

w2

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p

DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅

slide-85
SLIDE 85

DBO ¬BB

w2

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p

DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅

w2 ∈ BB(e)?

slide-86
SLIDE 86

DBO ¬BB

w2

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p

DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅

w2 ∈ BB(e)? ✗

slide-87
SLIDE 87

DBO ¬BB

w2

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p

DBO(e) BB(e) ∀j(j ∈ f(A, i){j}[BB(e)] ∅

w2 ∈ BB(e)? ✗

19 / 40

slide-88
SLIDE 88

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Problem: no universal entailments (14) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (15) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero.

20 / 40

slide-89
SLIDE 89

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Problem: no universal entailments (14) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (15) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero. How to fix this?

20 / 40

slide-90
SLIDE 90

Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding

Problem: no universal entailments (14) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. (15) a. If Herbert were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Herbert. b. If Eeyore were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Eeyore. c. If Platero were a donkey Balaam owned, Balaam would beat Platero. How to fix this? Route 1: special orderings Route 2: high readings

20 / 40

slide-91
SLIDE 91

Route 1: Special Orderings

Walker and Romero (2015): universal entailments would follow from A C iff the closeness ordering were such that

21 / 40

slide-92
SLIDE 92

Route 1: Special Orderings

Walker and Romero (2015): universal entailments would follow from A C iff the closeness ordering were such that for any a, b ∈ D, the closest world which combines with gx→a to form an A-possibility is as close as the closest world which combines with gx→b to form an A-possibility.

21 / 40

slide-93
SLIDE 93

Route 1: Special Orderings

Walker and Romero (2015): universal entailments would follow from A C iff the closeness ordering were such that for any a, b ∈ D, the closest world which combines with gx→a to form an A-possibility is as close as the closest world which combines with gx→b to form an A-possibility. An ordering set S is special relative to a state s and sentence A iff (16) ∀i(i ∈ s ⊃ ∀j(j ∈ /A/i ⊃ ∃k(k ∈ f(A, i) ∧ gj = gk))) For all possibilities i in s, if j is an A-possibility for i, then among the nearest (relative to i) A-possibilities is a possibility which shares an assigment with j.

21 / 40

slide-94
SLIDE 94

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3, gx→p

slide-95
SLIDE 95

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3, gx→p

slide-96
SLIDE 96

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3, gx→p

slide-97
SLIDE 97

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3, gx→p

22 / 40

slide-98
SLIDE 98

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ = =

slide-99
SLIDE 99

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ = =

slide-100
SLIDE 100

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p = = = = = = = = ∨ = =

23 / 40

slide-101
SLIDE 101

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO ¬BB

=

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p

slide-102
SLIDE 102

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO ¬BB

=

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x)

slide-103
SLIDE 103

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO ¬BB

=

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

=

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ✗

24 / 40

slide-104
SLIDE 104

Route 2: High Readings

Leave world ordering ≤ alone,

25 / 40

slide-105
SLIDE 105

Route 2: High Readings

Leave world ordering ≤ alone, but define an assignment-sensitive similarity ordering ≤∗ based on it. (17) j ≤∗

i k iff wj ≤wi wk ∧ gj = gk

25 / 40

slide-106
SLIDE 106

Route 2: High Readings

Leave world ordering ≤ alone, but define an assignment-sensitive similarity ordering ≤∗ based on it. (17) j ≤∗

i k iff wj ≤wi wk ∧ gj = gk

(18) f ∗(A, i) = {j : j ∈ /A/i ∧ ¬∃k(k ∈ /A/i ∧ k <∗

wi j)}.

(19) s[A C] = {i : i ∈ s ∧ ∀j(j ∈ f ∗(A, i) ⊃ {j}[C] ∅)}

25 / 40

slide-107
SLIDE 107

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p
slide-108
SLIDE 108

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

slide-109
SLIDE 109

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

slide-110
SLIDE 110

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

slide-111
SLIDE 111

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗

slide-112
SLIDE 112

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗

slide-113
SLIDE 113

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗

slide-114
SLIDE 114

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗

slide-115
SLIDE 115

w0

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w0, gx→h w0, gx→e w0, gx→p w1, gx→h w1, gx→e w1, gx→p w2, gx→h w2, gx→e w2, gx→p w3, gx→h w3, gx→e w3, gx→p

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗ <∗

26 / 40

slide-116
SLIDE 116

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO ¬BB

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p

slide-117
SLIDE 117

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO ¬BB

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x)

slide-118
SLIDE 118

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO ¬BB

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x)

slide-119
SLIDE 119

w1

¬DBO DBO BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

DBO ¬BB

w2

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w3

BB ¬BB

  • h
  • e
  • p

w1, gx→h w2, gx→e w3, gx→p

∃xDBO(x) BB(x) ✗

27 / 40

slide-120
SLIDE 120

Overview

Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway

slide-121
SLIDE 121

New Data - Summary

(1) Allie: If Mary had made a vase, she would have made it from glass. (2) Bert: But she could have made a clay vase (and she wouldn’t have made that from glass)! Case 1: Mary made two glass vases. Case 2: Mary did not make any vases. Case 1 Case 2 (1) ✓ ✗ (2) ?? ✓

28 / 40

slide-122
SLIDE 122

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
slide-123
SLIDE 123

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

slide-124
SLIDE 124

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c
slide-125
SLIDE 125

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c

slide-126
SLIDE 126

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

slide-127
SLIDE 127

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

slide-128
SLIDE 128

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗

slide-129
SLIDE 129

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)

slide-130
SLIDE 130

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)

slide-131
SLIDE 131

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)

slide-132
SLIDE 132

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)

slide-133
SLIDE 133

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)

slide-134
SLIDE 134

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)

slide-135
SLIDE 135

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x)

slide-136
SLIDE 136

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x) w1 ∈ G(c)?

slide-137
SLIDE 137

Problem for High Readings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w0, gx→g1 w0, gx→g2 w0, gx→c w1, gx→g1 w1, gx→g2 w1, gx→c

  • <∗

<∗ <∗ ∃xVMM(x) G(x) w1 ∈ G(c)? ✗

29 / 40

slide-138
SLIDE 138

Success of Special Orderings

Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1

30 / 40

slide-139
SLIDE 139

Success of Special Orderings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
slide-140
SLIDE 140

Success of Special Orderings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

slide-141
SLIDE 141

Success of Special Orderings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c
slide-142
SLIDE 142

Success of Special Orderings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w1, gx→c

slide-143
SLIDE 143

Success of Special Orderings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w1, gx→c

slide-144
SLIDE 144

Success of Special Orderings

w0

¬VMM VMM G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2

w1

G ¬G

  • g1
  • g2
  • c

w1, gx→c ¬w0 <w0 w1

31 / 40

slide-145
SLIDE 145

Success of Special Orderings

Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1

32 / 40

slide-146
SLIDE 146

Success of Special Orderings

Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1.

32 / 40

slide-147
SLIDE 147

Success of Special Orderings

Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1. No universal entailments for merely possible antecedent satisfiers.

32 / 40

slide-148
SLIDE 148

Success of Special Orderings

Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1. No universal entailments for merely possible antecedent satisfiers. (Possibly) universal entailments for (1) in Case 2.

32 / 40

slide-149
SLIDE 149

Success of Special Orderings

Assumption: ≤ is strongly centered: w0 <w0 w1 Result: no special order in Case 1. No universal entailments for merely possible antecedent satisfiers. (Possibly) universal entailments for (1) in Case 2. Right predictions about the new data.

32 / 40

slide-150
SLIDE 150

Overview

Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway

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SLIDE 151

Saving High Readings: Weak?

Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3.

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SLIDE 152

Saving High Readings: Weak?

Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3. This vase case is just one of those.

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SLIDE 153

Saving High Readings: Weak?

Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3. This vase case is just one of those.

  • No. Consider

Case 3: Mary made one glass vase and one clay vase.

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SLIDE 154

Saving High Readings: Weak?

Objection: the high reading accounts have ways of dealing with weak/low readings as well. (20) a. If I had a dime, I would put it in the meter. b. If I had picked a number, I would have picked 3. This vase case is just one of those.

  • No. Consider

Case 3: Mary made one glass vase and one clay vase. (1) false in this case, which is not what we’d expect on a weak/low reading.

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SLIDE 155

Saving High Readings: QDR?

c in Case 1 gets ignored due to quantifier domain restriction.

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SLIDE 156

Saving High Readings: QDR?

c in Case 1 gets ignored due to quantifier domain restriction. Maybe, but how can this get Case 2 right?

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SLIDE 157

Saving High Readings: QDR?

c in Case 1 gets ignored due to quantifier domain restriction. Maybe, but how can this get Case 2 right? Shouldn’t the possible clay vase be irrelevant still?

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SLIDE 158

Problem for Special Orderings?

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SLIDE 159

Problem for Special Orderings?

Walker and Romero (2015): cases of universal entailments without special order.

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SLIDE 160

Problem for Special Orderings?

Walker and Romero (2015): cases of universal entailments without special order. (21) Scenario: Balaam took part in a game show which had the following format. If you win the easy first round, you win Herbert, an obnoxious and disobedient

  • donkey. The reward for the much more difficult second

and third rounds are the well-mannered and obedient donkeys Eeyore and Platero, respectively. Losing a round of the game eliminates the player, keeping them from advancing to any later rounds. Balaam was eliminated in the first round, and so remains donkeyless.

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SLIDE 161

Problem for Special Orderings?

John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it.

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SLIDE 162

Problem for Special Orderings?

John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Sarah, who has more information about the game, corrects him with (23). (23) No, Balaam could have won Platero or Eeyore too, and he wouldn’t beat either of them if he owned them.

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SLIDE 163

Problem for Special Orderings?

John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Sarah, who has more information about the game, corrects him with (23). (23) No, Balaam could have won Platero or Eeyore too, and he wouldn’t beat either of them if he owned them. Seems like Sarah is right, so there are universal entailments.

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SLIDE 164

Problem for Special Orderings?

John, only aware of the game’s first round, asserts (22), since he knows about Balaam’s short temper. (22) If Balaam owned a donkey, he would beat it. Sarah, who has more information about the game, corrects him with (23). (23) No, Balaam could have won Platero or Eeyore too, and he wouldn’t beat either of them if he owned them. Seems like Sarah is right, so there are universal entailments. But intuitively, the world where Balaam wins only one round is more similar to the actual world than ones where he wins two

  • r three. So no special order.

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SLIDE 165

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 1:

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SLIDE 166

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering.

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SLIDE 167

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗

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SLIDE 168

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗ Disaster for ordering semantics?

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SLIDE 169

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗ Disaster for ordering semantics? Lewis (1979): weight violations of law more than disparities in

  • ther facts.

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SLIDE 170

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 1: closeness ordering need not correspond to intuitive ordering. Recall Fine (1975): (24) a. If Nixon pressed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust. ✓ b. If Nixon had pressed the button, the wire would have miraculously malfunctioned. ✗ Disaster for ordering semantics? Lewis (1979): weight violations of law more than disparities in

  • ther facts.

We still need a theory of the closeness ordering that predicts special orderings in the right cases, but nothing has ruled this

  • ut yet.

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SLIDE 171

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 2: actually, the high reading account needs special orderings too.

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SLIDE 172

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 2: actually, the high reading account needs special orderings too. (25) Scenario: Cory, who is donkeyless, is a bit crazy. He’s disposed to take out his anger on his most prized

  • possession. He also took part in the game show

described in (21), but also lost in the first round. Had he won any rounds, the prize from the most advanced round he won would have become his prized possession, and he would have beaten it, but he wouldn’t beat anything else. Now consider the following. (26) If Cory owned a donkey, he would beat it.

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SLIDE 173

Problem for Special Orderings?

Response part 2: actually, the high reading account needs special orderings too. (25) Scenario: Cory, who is donkeyless, is a bit crazy. He’s disposed to take out his anger on his most prized

  • possession. He also took part in the game show

described in (21), but also lost in the first round. Had he won any rounds, the prize from the most advanced round he won would have become his prized possession, and he would have beaten it, but he wouldn’t beat anything else. Now consider the following. (26) If Cory owned a donkey, he would beat it. In this scenario, the salient reading of (26) seems false. If Cory had owned Eeyore, he would own but not beat Herbert.

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SLIDE 174

Problem for Special Orderings?

To get this right, the high reading account needs the worlds where Cory wins 2 or 3 donkeys to be as close as the one where he wins 1. It needs a special ordering. But then we can get the right results from the special ordering alone, without the high reading.

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SLIDE 175

Overview

Accounting for the Old Data Ordering Semantics + Dynamic Binding Route 1: Special Orderings Route 2: High Readings Returning to the New Data The Problem for High Readings The Success of Special Orderings Some Objections and Replies Saving High Readings? Problem for Special Orderings? Takeaway

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SLIDE 176

Takeaway

Counterfactual donkey sentences have universal entailments, but not of the sort we’d expect from high reading accounts. The special ordering account seems to get things right. But we still need a theory of how these orderings arise.

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SLIDE 177

Thanks!

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SLIDE 178

References

Fine, Kit (1975). “Critical Notice of David Lewis’s Counterfactuals”. In: Mind 84, pp. 451–458. Groenendijk, Jeroen and Martin Stokhof (1991). “Dynamic Predicate Logic”. In: Linguistics and Philosophy 14, pp. 39–100. Groenendijk, Jeroen, Martin Stokhof, and Frank Veltman (1996). “Coreference and Modality”. In: The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Ed. by Shalom Lappin. Blackwell, pp. 179–213. Lewis, David (1979). “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”. In: Noˆ us 13, pp. 455–476. Van Rooij, Robert (2006). “Free choice counterfactual donkeys”. In: Journal of Semantics 23.4, pp. 383–402. Walker, Andreas and Maribel Romero (2015). “Counterfactual donkey sentences: A strict conditional analysis”. In: Proceedings of SALT 25, pp. 288–307. Wang, Yingying (2009). “Counterfactual donkey sentences: a response to Robert van Rooij”. In: Journal of Semantics 26.3,

  • pp. 317–328.