CONSENSUAL NOT POLITICAL 1 0 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 7 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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CONSENSUAL NOT POLITICAL 1 0 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 7 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mar 06, 2024 23 likes •255 views

CONSENSUAL NOT POLITICAL 1 0 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 7 CONSENSUAL NOT POLITICAL 1 0 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 7 I CANT MINE, ITS TOO CENTRALIZED. J U S T L E T T H AT S I N K I N . Libbitcoin Developer (4 years) E R I

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SLIDE 1

CONSENSUAL NOT POLITICAL

1 0 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 7

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SLIDE 2

CONSENSUAL NOT POLITICAL

1 0 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 7

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SLIDE 3

“I CAN’T MINE, IT’S TOO CENTRALIZED.”

J U S T L E T T H AT S I N K I N .

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SLIDE 4

E R I C VO S K U I L

  • Libbitcoin Developer (4 years)
  • Investor/Advisor (10 years)
  • Microsoft Architect (3 years)
  • Entrepreneur (18 years)
  • Traveler (65 countries)
  • USN Fighter Pilot (10 years)
  • Martial Artist (25 years)
  • Anarcho-Capitalist (25 years)
  • Computer Scientist (36 years)

eric@voskuil.org https://github.com/evoskuil https://twitter.com/evoskuil https://linkedin.com/in/evoskuil

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SLIDE 5

L I B B I T C O I N

Cross Platform C++ Developer Toolkit

  • libbitcoin (system)
  • libbitcoin-blockchain
  • libbitcoin-build
  • libbitcoin-client
  • libbitcoin-consensus
  • libbitcoin-database
  • libbitcoin-explorer
  • libbitcoin-network
  • libbitcoin-node
  • libbitcoin-protocol
  • libbitcoin-server
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SLIDE 6

B I T C O I N E X P L O R E R

Command Line T

  • ol
  • Wallet (17)
  • Key Encryption (9)
  • Stealth (5)
  • Messaging (2)
  • Transaction (9)
  • Online (16)
  • Encoding (13)
  • Hash (6)
  • Math (8)
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SLIDE 7

B I T C O I N S E RV E R

Full Node and Query Server

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SLIDE 8

BREAKING BROKEN BITCOIN

K N O W YO U R E N E M Y A N D K N O W YO U R S E L F

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SLIDE 9

RISK SHARING PRINCIPLE

P E O P L E S E C U R E B I T C O I N .

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SLIDE 10

RISK SHARING PRINCIPLE

P E O P L E S E C U R E B I T C O I N .

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SLIDE 11

AXIOM OF RESISTANCE

B I T C O I N C A N F E N D O F F T H E S TAT E .

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SLIDE 12

HEARN ERROR

“ S TAT E S C A N N OT B A N P O P U L A R T H I N G S .”

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SLIDE 13

E X E C U T I V E O R D E R 6 1 0 2

“Executive Order 6102 required all persons to deliver on or before May 1, 1933, all but a small amount of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates

  • wned by them to the Federal

Reserve, in exchange for $20.67 per troy ounce… thereafter raised to $35.00… The resulting profit [seigniorage]… funded the Exchange Stabilization Fund... This price remained in effect until August 15, 1971 [when it went to infinity]… parties could again include so-called gold clauses in contracts formed after 1977.”

  • Wikipedia
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SLIDE 14

IT WAS NEVER REALLY ABOUT THE FORKS AT ALL.

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SLIDE 15

THREAT MODEL

Perception Reality

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SLIDE 16

BALANCE OF POWER FALLACY

“ M I N I N G I S H O S T I L E TO M E R C H A N T S .”

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IMPOTENT MINING FALLACY

“ M I N I N G H A S N O P OW E R .”

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SLIDE 18

IMPOTENT MINING FALLACY

“ M I N I N G H A S N O P OW E R .”

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SLIDE 19

PROOF OF WORK FALLACY

“ I N C A S E O F AT TA C K , S H O OT S E L F.”

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SLIDE 20

PROOF OF WORK FALLACY

  • Buyers can always obsolete specialized equipment by abandoning its product (not unique).
  • There is no reason that existing miners would exit, it is common for businesses to rebuild.
  • New miners will likely make the same decisions, as they are in the same business.
  • Larger miners are disproportionately more profitable and therefore better capitalized.
  • Smaller miners operate closer to the margin and will fail as larger miners retool.
  • Experienced miners have an inherent advantage, and therefore greater access to capital.
  • If the state is attacking, its co-opted miners will continue at a declining energy cost.
  • Future miners must insure against a similar event, increasing the cost of hash power.
  • The economy ends up with higher fees, the same problem miners and greater centralization.
  • It’s not a “nuclear option” it’s a suicide attack.
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SLIDE 21

INDIVIDUALS MUST MINE.

O R O B V I O U S LY I T W I L L B E C E N T R A L I Z E D.

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SUMMARY

PERCEPTION

  • Miners and merchants are adversarial.
  • Mining is controlled by the economy.
  • Miners cannot afford to attack.
  • Bitcoin is defenseless against the state.
  • States cannot ban popular things.
  • A PoW change mitigates pooling.
  • Authoritarian tx ordering is sufficient.
  • Crypto secures Bitcoin.

REALITY

  • Miners and merchants are trading partners.
  • Miner and economic powers are orthogonal.
  • Miners are not the threat.
  • Bitcoin must defend against the state.
  • States prefer to ban popular things.
  • A PoW change exacerbates pooling.
  • Resistance to authority is Bitcoin’s innovation.
  • People secure Bitcoin.
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SLIDE 23

QUESTIONS