Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web Srijan Kumar William - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web Srijan Kumar William - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web Srijan Kumar William Hamilton Jure Leskovec Dan Jurafsky @srijankr @williamleif @jure @jurafsky 1 Why study inter-community interactions? Users form communities Communities interact


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Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web

Srijan Kumar @srijankr William Hamilton @williamleif Jure Leskovec @jure Dan Jurafsky @jurafsky

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Why study inter-community interactions?

  • Users form communities
  • Communities interact with one another
  • Little is known about how community interaction
  • ccurs
  • So, we study inter-community interactions between

20,000+ communities on Reddit

2 Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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“Come look at all the brainwashed idiots in Documentaries….” Members go and post negative/hateful comments

  • Can disrupt communities
  • Can decrease long-term

engagement

Conspiracy Documentaries

Conflict across communities

Understanding how communities fight and how to prevent conflicts is important to foster a healthy online environment.

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Reddit Dataset

We use public Reddit data for this study

  • 40 months (2014—2017)
  • 1.8+ billion comments
  • 100+ million users
  • 20,000+ communities

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But… There are no labels of community interactions and conflicts. How to define these?

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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“Come look at all the brainwashed idiots in Documentaries….”

Defining inter-community interactions

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Members of source may be mobilized to comment in the linked target post Source community links to a post in target community

Inter-community interaction happens if a hyperlink mobilizes users from the source to the target community

Attackers Defenders

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Defining conflicts using crowdsourcing

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How does the left (source) post refer to the right (target) post? A.With neutral or no opinion B.With a negative opinion

Source post Target post

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Defining conflicts using crowdsourcing

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Conflicts = Interactions initiated by negative-sentiment source post

  • Turkers labeled 1000 pairs of source-to-target posts
  • We developed text classifier (0.80 AUC) to label remaining pairs
  • We define conflicts as interactions that are initiated with negative

sentiment.

  • Identified 1800 conflicts

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Our model: Three phases of conflict

8 Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Which communities engage in conflicts?

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Question: Are all communities prone to conflict, or is it restricted to a few bad apples?

Community nodes User nodes Posting edges

Our solution:

  • Create who-posts-where network
  • Generate embedding vector for

each user and community, similar to word2vec

  • Vectors learned to maximize

probability of a user posting in a community

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Dot = community Blue dot = community that initiates fewer conflicts Red dot = community that initiates more conflict 1% of communities start 74% of all conflicts Conflicts are concentrated in some areas

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Who do communities attack?

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Question: Do communities attack other random communities, or is there a relation between the source and target community?

Highly similar communities attack each other

Our solution:

  • TF-IDF similarity between communities:
  • Create word vector for each community from its posts
  • Calculate cosine similarity between source and target community
  • TF-IDF similarity is 1.5x expected value

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Phases of conflict

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  • Initiated by

handful of communities

  • Attack similar,

but opposing, communities

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Attacker-Defender Interactions

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Hypothesis 2: attackers and defenders primarily reply to users of the same type Hypothesis 1: attackers and defenders reply significantly to

  • ne another

Attacker node Defender node Legend:

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Attacker-PageRank and Defender-PageRank

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A-PageRank: Run PageRank but restrict the teleport set to just attackers.

  • Quantifies node centrality with respect to all attackers.

Attacker node Defender node Legend:

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Echo-chambers form during conflicts

Attackers

0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00

Average A-PageRank Score

Defenders

Attackers have higher average A-PageRank scores than defenders. So, attackers are closer to other attackers. Defenders have higher average D-PageRank scores than attackers. So, defenders are closer to other defenders.

Attackers

0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00

Average D-PageRank Score

Defenders

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Echo-chambers form during conflicts

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Hypothesis 2: attackers and defenders primarily reply to other users of the same type Hypothesis 1: attackers and defenders reply significantly to

  • ne another

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Ganging-up effect during conflicts

  • Some defenders are very close to attackers:

10x average A-PageRank score

  • Most defenders are unreachable: zero A-

PageRank score

  • Linguistic analysis shows attackers swear

more in replies to defenders Attackers “gang-up” on some defenders during conflicts

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Phases of conflict

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  • Initiated by

handful of communities

  • Attack similar,

but opposing, communities

  • Conflicts

create echo- chambers

  • Attackers

gang-up on defenders

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What prevents colonization?

Do conflicts change future engagement?

If activity increases, then conflicts make users more loyal and active OR If activity decreases, then conflicts drive users away

Attackers “colonize” the target community and defenders leave.

Future activity - previous activity in target community

1% 0.5% 0%

  • 0.5%

More active Less active

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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How to defend against attacks?

(Defenders become less active) (Defenders become more active) Successful-attack

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Successful vs unsuccessful defense properties

When defense is successful:

  • Defenders reply directly more to attackers
  • Attackers and defenders are closer to each other in the reply network
  • Defenders tend to use more `anger’ words

Direct and angry replies to attackers (“fighting-back”) marks a successful defense.

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Phases of conflict

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  • Initiated by

handful of communities

  • Attack similar,

but opposing, communities

  • Conflicts

create echo- chambers

  • Attackers

gang-up on defenders

  • Conflicts lead

to colonization

  • Successful

defense: direct heated engagement with attackers

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Can we predict conflicts before they happen?

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Mobilization

  • f attackers

Task: Given a post from source to target community, will it lead to a conflict?

No mobilization

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Predicting conflicts

  • We create a “socially-primed” LSTM

structure.

  • Takes user, community, and word

embeddings as input for the prediction.

  • A strong feature baseline gets 0.67

AUC

  • Socially-primed LSTM gets 0.72 AUC
  • Combination of both gets 0.76 AUC

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target

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.

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Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web

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  • Initiated by handful
  • f communities
  • Attack similar, but
  • pposing,

communities

  • Conflicts create

echo-chambers

  • Attackers

gang-up on defenders

  • Conflicts lead to

colonization

  • Successful defense

by direct heated engagement with attackers

  • Conflicts predicted with 0.76 AUC
  • More results on positive inter-community interactions in the paper

Data and code: snap.stanford.edu/conflict

Community Interaction and Conflict on the Web. Kumar et al. WWW 2018.