Bureaucrats in Policy-Making Process Obedient Bureaucrats Necessary? - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Meiji University Graduate School of Governance Studies hideakit@meiji.ac.jp

Hideaki TANAKA

Obedient Bureaucrats Necessary?

Septmber 2018

Political Leadership and the Role of Bureaucrats in Policy-Making Process

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Today's agenda

• 2. His success is mainly because of political and administrative

reforms in 1990s to strengthen the institutional capacity of prime minister, in a sense which seeks the governance of Westminster Model. But does it really improve the performance

• f major public policies? This presentation discuss the

transformation of Japanese politics and administration by focusing on the governance of policy-making process.

• 1. The second Abe administration continues for nearly six years,

and now is ranked as the third longest in terms of tenure. Abe succeeds in running the government. He is called “only

• ne big”, which means he can do whatever he wants. Japanese

politics really changes, different from traditional one where decision-making is fragmented.

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Outline

• 1. Background: the development since

1990s

• 2. Major issues and research framework
• 3. Changing governance and policy-

making process

• 4. Assessment on governance of Abe

administration

• 5. Conclusion

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1-1 Chronology of recent structural reforms

1994 Laws for electoral reform introducing first-past-the-post system 1997 Final Report by the Council for Administrative Reform(Hashimoto Adm.) 1998 Central Government Administrative Reform Act 1999 National Public Service Ethics Act 2001 Start of Central Government Administrative Reform realized by Koizumi Administration (until 2006) 2002 Policy Evaluation Act 2007 National Public Service Act amended for personnel assessment and strict regulation of Amakudari 2008 Basic Law for Reforming National Public Service 2009 DPJ coalition government(non-LDP government) try to strengthen political leadership and governance 2012 LDP-Komei coalition comes back, headed by Abe (the second Abe adm.) 2014 National Public Service Act amended based on Basic Law for Reforming National Public Service, Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs then political and administrative reforms nearly completed

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1-2 The Center enhanced by the Reform 2001

One of key reforms by the Central Government Administrative Reform is to strengthen the institutional capacity of prime minister for political leadership

• 2. Strengthening Cabinet Secretariat: special advisors to PM,

more other political appointees, more powerful capability for policy-planning and coordination

• 3. Creation of Cabinet Office: four special advisory councils

chaired by PM and Chief Cabinet Secretary, such as the Economic and Fiscal Policy Council

• 1. A prime minister’s capability to propose basic policies

independently through the amendment of the Cabinet Law

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1-3 The center of Japanese government

PM's Office

Cabinet

PM and 17 ministers

Cabinet Office Cabinet Secretariat

Chief Cabinet Secretary Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (2 politicians, 1 administrative ) Deputy CCS for Crisis Management Deputy CCS for Information Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (3) Cabinet Public Relations Secretary Director of Cabinet Intelligence Special advisors to PM Executive secretaries to PM Others

Legislation Bureau Financial Services Agency Consumers Affairs Agency

Cabinet Affairs offices

Other various kinds of agencies, policy councils and advisory committees

National Personnel Authority National Security Council

PM's Office is not an organization but a residence. Even tough, it works differently from Cabinet Secretariat, because CCS, advisors and other seniors are in PM's Office.

Fair Trade Commission

National Security Secretariat Other organizations Special Policy Councils (5) Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs

Internal offices

Ministers without portfolio(6) Deputy ministers (10) Parliamentary secretaries(10) Permanent Secretary

Internal offices

Other various kinds of policy councils based on relevant legislation

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1-4 The end of the 1955 Political System

• 2. The government’s ability to initiate and develop policy have become strengthened and

the contrasting authority of party institutions have declined relatively over time.

(Ellis S. Krauss & Robert J. Pekkanen, The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP. Political Party Organizations and Institutional History,Cornell University Press, 2011)

• 4. Liberal Democratic Party has been changing due to the electoral and other related

reforms, and become more right-wing political party.

(Koji Nakakita, Jimin-to Seiji no Henyo (Transformation of LDP), NHK Publication, 2014)

• 5. The power of prime minister has been strengthened through the electoral reform, the

amendment of Political Funds Control Act 1948, and the Central Government Administrative Reform in 1990s.

(Harutaka Takenaka, Shushou Shihai (Prime Minister’s Reign), Chuko-shinsho, 2006)

• 3. Japanese politics has been moving toward the Westminster Model through political

and administrative reforms in 1990s. (Satoshi Machidori, Shushou Seiji no Seido-Bunseki (Institutional

Analysis on Prime Minister’s Politics), Chikura-shobo, 2012)

1.The governance of Japanese parliamentary system has been transforming from “Bureaucratic cabinet” to the cabinet defined by the Constitution in 1990s.

(Jun Iio, Nihon no Tochi Kozo (Governance Structure of Japan), Chuko-shinsho, 2007)

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Basic Law for Reforming National Pubic Service 2008 “Managing senior executive services by the cabinet” based on the amendment of NPS Act 2014

• 1. Qualification assessment and Candidate List of SESs
• 2. Appointment to each position after the consultation between Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet

Secretary and a relevant minister

• 3. Can demote SESs
• 4. Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs
• 5. Special Advisors to Prime Minister and ministers

1-5 The final political/administrative reform

• 1. Japanese civil service system follows the British model basically in terms of merit-

base and political neutrality, but NPA stipulates ministers including PM appoint all civil services, so they could be appointed politically. Such appointments were not common in the past, because civil services were powerful and autonomous.

• 2. The original idea of the reform above is to appoint best senior officials across the

government based on their performance, but in reality they are much more vulnerable to political control than before.

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1-6 The structure of the government

MPs of ruling party

Civil services

Cabinet

PM Ministers Core group Ruling P

“Cabinet government"

Cabinet

PM Ministers

Civil services

MPs of ruling party "ZOKU"

Government

"Party-bureaucratic government"

Ruling P

Government

Really?

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2-1 What goes wrong?

• 1. Abe administration is exercising the institutional capacity of prime

minister, which has been strengthened through recent reforms. It is now called “Only one big Abe”, and he looks like Tony Blair. Be careful that a PM is not always strong as Abe after the reforms.

• 2. Abe administration accomplished some difficult agenda such as National

Security Bill and deregulation of agriculture, but is governance really enhanced? In particular, is policy-making process improved to achieve better

• utcomes?
• 3. This presentation is to evaluate “governance” in policy-making process of

Abe administration, by focusing on the relationship between PM and line ministries, politicians and bureaucrats, executive and ruling parties.

• 4. In short, Abe administration improves the efficiency of decisions, but

undermines consensus building, political neutrality of civil services, and the function of verification /assessment /scrutiny.

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2-2 Literature review -1

• 2. Structure of government including parties and parliament

(1)Blondel and Cotta(1996,2000): The types of party government depends on ①party-government relationships taking place on three planes such as policy-making, appointments and patronage, ②the strength of the rapport between governments and the parties. Party governments can be classified into ①Patrimonial party government(Italy, Belgium, Austria), ②Partisan government(UK, Germany, France), ③Limited party-dependent government(Finland), ④Semi-autonomous government(Netherlands) (2) Blondel and Müller-Rommel (1993): They analyze decision-making process based on collegiality and collectivity. Germany, Belgium and UK deviate from collegiality, while Austria, Netherlands and Finland don't. UK, Austria, Netherlands and France deviate from collectivity in terms of use of cabinet committees, while Sweden and Ireland don't. (3)Moury(2013): The author compares cabinets between four European countries based on collegiality and collectivity. They are classified; Collective-Belgium,Germany,Netherlands,Italy-Fragmented, Collegial-Nethelands,Italy(left),Belgium,Italy(right),Germany-(Monocratic) (4) Bergman et al.(2003): They analyse institutional capacity of prime minister based on criteria such as cabinet decision rule, PM right to appoint, PM right to decide ministry jurisdiction, PM coordination rights, control over cabinet agenda, and administrative structure under PM's supervision. Spain, Germany, UK, France have strong PM, while Italy, Netherlands, and Austria have weak PM. Belgium, Denmark, Sweden are in the middle of them. (5) Poguntke and Webb(2005): A political leader uses autonomy to his/her political party and resource in majority system, while he/she uses resources to strengthen his/her power to other actors such as coalition partners and state governments in consensus system.

• 1. Definition and idea of "governance"

(1)World Bank(1992): "The manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development."(p.1) (2) World Bank(1994):"Good governance is epitomized by predictable; open, and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions, and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law."(p.vii) (3) Hill and Lynn Jr(2004): Their definition of governance includes public management: the behaviors and contributions to governmental performance of actors performing managerial roles. They argues an objective of governance research is to identify the determinants of governmental performance in order to inform administrative reform, public policy design, and public management practice. (4)OECD(2002): What is needed for improved capacity relating to governance is better diagnostic and risk analysis tools, civil service culture and leadership, more empirical research and data on behavioural change, improved intervention and change strategies. (5) Kooiman and Van Vliet(1993): They argues what is needed for governance of central government is coordination to involve major stakeholders, collaboration and steering to better outcomes, and integration and regulation to function institutions and processes.

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2-2 Literature review -2

• 3. Policy-making process

(1) Stein and Tommasi(2008): "The policy-making process can be understood as a process of bargains and exchanges (or transactions) among political actors". "The behavior of political actors in the policymaking process -as shaped by their roles, incentives, and constraints

• will depend, in turn, on the workings of political institutions (such as congress, the party system, or the judiciary) and on more basic

institutional rules (such as electoral rules and constitutional rules) that determine the roles of each of the players". (2) Rhodes and Dunleavy(1995): A theory of core-executive suggests policy-making process of the central government is the inter-relation between prime minister, cabinet, ministers and bureaucrats, and the exchange of their resources. (3) IDB(2006): The features of public policies include stability, adaptability, Coherence and coordination, quality of implementation and enforcement, public-regardedness. (4) World Bank(2010): Criteria for good policies include consensus-built among key stakeholders, economically sound, implementable politically, implementable technically, sustainable, stable. Best practices of OECD countries are political authority and technical expertise at the center-of-government; an organizational system that coordinates policy making; senior public servants who provide expert policy advice and coordinate between policy making and implementation; strong capacity of the line ministries; strong capacity of the legislature; active alternative channels of policy advice exist. (5) Stoeckel and Fisher(2008): "Transparency emphasises the role of good public governance that leads to policy improvements and better

• utcomes for society. It emphasises the need for results to be believed, which involves some combination of professional credibility,

independence and contestability of the results. Transparency is about understanding the effects of policies." Transparency comprises credible, believable findings, accountability and coherent policies in the national interest, and implies independent contestable review, systematic review of all areas over time, findings a formal input into government decision-making, economywide cost benefit analysis. (6) Martin and Vanberg(2011): They develop an index of legislative policing strength based on legislative institutions including the number

• f legislative committees, binding plenary debate before the committee stage and rewrite authority, and analyze 16 European countries

based on such index. Strong parliaments are Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, while weak ones are UK, Ireland, France and Greece. (7) Frognier(1993): The type of government such as single-party minority-majority and coalition decides conflict management procedures like consensus, committees, prime minister imposes, departmental decision and votes. (8)Bergman et al.(2003): They analyze conflict management mechanism of Europe, and Nordic Countries have cabinet-dominated systems, Germany and Italy have party-dominated ones, and Austria and Netherlands have mixed systems. (9) Blondel and Nousianen(2000): The key of policy-making depends on the nature of relationship between governments and supporting

• parties. It has four characteristics such as how both sides and others participate, whether the elaboration is conflictual or not, whether the

process is protracted or rapid, whether this process is harmonious or one side is adamant to impose.

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Dimensions of government decision-making

• 1. Government's strategic planning capacity: Strategic planning, Scientific advice, Preparation
• 2. Legislative influence: Obtain documents, Summoning ministers, summoning experts
• 3. Executive concentration: PM expertise, PM gatekeeper, PM involvement, Ministerial

compliance, PM monitoring ministers, Coherent communication

• 4. Consensus building with extra-parliamentary actors: Mobilizing public support, Association

competence, Association relevance

Consensus building Low High Efficiency Low

Italy, Greece, Austria, Poland Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic

High

UK, Hungary, France, Spain, Portugal Norway, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Denmark

Detleff Jabn (2012.), "Dimensions of Government Decision-Making Structures in European OECD Countries" in H. Keman and F. Müller-Rommel(eds), Party Government in the New Europe, Routledge

2-3 Efficiency vs consensus

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2-4 Sustainable Governance Index 2017

3.Governance

(1)Executive Capacity: Strategic Capacity, Inter-ministerial Coordination(GO Expertise, GO Gatekeeping, Line Ministries, Cabinet Communication, Ministerial Bureaucracy, Informal Coordination), Evidence-based Instruments, Societal Consultation, Policy Communication, Effective Implementation, Adaptability, Organization Reform Capacity (2)Executive Accountability: Citizens’ Participatory Competence, Legislative Actors’ Resources, Media Political and Interest Association(Intra-Party Democracy, Association Competence(Business), Association Competence(Others)

1.Policy Performance

(1)Economic Policies: Economy, Labor Market, Taxes, Budgets, Research & Innovation, Global Financial Markets (2)Social Policies: Education, Social Inclusion, Health, Families, Pension, Integration, Safe Living, Global Inequalities (3)Environmental Policies: Environmental Policies, Environmental Protection Regimes

2.Quality of Democracy

(1)Electoral Processes: Candidacy Procedures, Media Access, Voting and Registration Rights, Party Financing (2)Access to Information: Media Freedom, Media Pluralism, Access to Government Information (3)Civil Rights and Political Liberties: Civil Rights, Political Liberties, Non-discrimination (4)Rule of Law: Legal Certainty, .Judicial Review, Appointment of Justices, Corruption Prevention

“Policy Performance and Governance Capacity in the OECD and EU: SGI2017” (Bertlesmann Stiftung)

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“Policy Performance and Governance Capacity in the OECD and EU: SGI2017” (Bertlesmann Stiftung)

Governance Policy Performance Quality of Democracy

2-5 Japan’s score by SGI 2017

Japan UK UK UK Japan Japan

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2-6 Fiscal transparency by Tanaka (2011)

USA UK UK NZ NZ AUS CAN GER FRA ITA SWE NET JPN 1-1 Analysis on forecasts & assumptions ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ ○ △ ○ ○ △ 1-2 Medium-term fiscal framework ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ 1-3 Fiscal rules △ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ 1-4 Comprehensive fiscal indicators △ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ 1-5 Reconciliation of forecast and result ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ △ ○ ○ × 1-6 Analysis on fiscal risks ○ ○ ○ ○ △ × ○ × ○ ○ × 1-7 Sensitivity analysis of economic growth ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ × ○ × ○ ○ △ 1-8 Financial statements by accrual ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ × ○ ○ ○ × △ 2-1 Performance information ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ × ○ × ○ ○ △ 2-2 Contingency liabilities ○ △ △ ○ ○ ○ ○ × ○ ○ △ 2-3 Tax expenditures ○ △ na ○ ○ △ ○ × ○ ○ ○ 2-4 Quasi fiscal activities ○ △ na × × △ × × ○ △ ○ 2-5 Impact analysis of new policies ○ ○ ○ ○ △ × ○ ○ △ ○ × 3-1 Assessment by independent institutions ○ ○ △ ○ ○ △ △ △ ○ ○ × 3-2 Financial statements audited ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ △ ○ ○ ○ ○ × 4-1 Pre-budget report △ ○ ○ × × × × × ○ × × 4-2 Mid-year report ○ × ○ ○ ○ × ○ ○ △ ○ × 4-3 Final account (within 6 months) ○ △ ○ ○ ○ △ ○ ○ △ ○ ○ 4-4 Election report × × ○ ○ × × × × × ○ × 4-5 Long-term fiscal report ○ ○ ○ ○ × ○ ○ ○ ○ △ × Total al scores es (full is 20 point nts) 17.5 16 16 17.5 18 18 15 15 9 16 16 10.5 18 18 17 17 7

○：fully met /1 point, △：partially met /0.5 point, ×： 0 point

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2-7 Types of senior civil service

Korea USA UK France NZ

Australia

Germany Japan

Closed

Appointment based on merit

Open recruitment

Political appointee

Tanaka(2010)

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Constitution Electoral system Nature of political party Nature of parliament Type of government Nature of cabinet Ministries and bureaucracy Political and administrative structure

Criteria for results

2-8 Analytical framework

• 1. Efficiency
• 2. Consensus

building

• 3. Analysis&

evaluation Election manifesto& coalition agreement Strategic planning Appointment of ministers and civil services Decision-making rule

• f cabinet

PM's power Conflict management Institutions and measures for governance

To analyse the nature and transformation of decision-making process among OECD countries including Australia, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK by focusing mainly on analytical capacity, evaluation, evidenced-policy making, and contestability.

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3-1 Characteristics of Japanese governments

Parliament

Ruling party vs Opposition

Ruling party

PM and ministers vs ruling party

Cabinet

PM vs ministers vs bureaucracy

LDP single majority government 1955-1993 Almost always majority in both houses Normally ruling party has a veto power Weak cabinet sometimes PM exercises leadership Normally ministers have a veto power (weak PM) Strong bureaucracy Sometimes PM exercises leadership LDP majority coalition government 1994- 2009 Often no majority in the upper house DPJ majority coalition Government 2009-2012 No majority in the upper house Ambiguous relationship between Relatively PM exercises power LDP majority coalition Government 2012- Majority in both houses Strong PM controls ruling party PM’s leadership Weak bureaucrats Westminster model UK, Australia, NZ Normally majority in the lower house Sometimes no majority in the upper house Cabinet's superiority Backbenchers not involved in policy making Often decision- making with cabinet committees PM's leadership Politically neutral bureaucrats

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3-2 Four models of governance and policy-making

• 4. Abe administration model:

“PM Office’s dominance including advisors” “Decisions by them before analysis and discussion”

• 1. The traditional LDP model:

“Party-bureaucratic government”

• 2. Koizumi administration model:

“Discussion in Economic and Fiscal Council” then PM decides

• 3. DPJ administration model:

“Decisions by ministers, deputy and parliamentary secretary without civil services”

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Office of Secretary-General

(Abolish Research Council)

Decision by Ministers, Deputy & PS Request

DPJ by Hatoyama

Cabinet decision Each division ↓ Research Council ↓ General Council Ministries

Cabinet committee

Policy function of party Explanation & coordination Policy function of the government

LDP

3-3 Changing in governance and policy-making①

Cabinet decision Approval

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Each division ↓ Board ↓ Senior members ↓ Head of Policy Council

Policy Council & division Propose

Minister for Strategy →Coordination H E A D

Ministers, deputy & PS Executive & party summit meeting

※One politician for two posts

Agreement

3-3 Changing in governance and policy-making②

DPJ by Noda DPJ by Kan

Policy function of party Policy function of the government Cabinet decision

Ministers, deputy&PS

Cabinet decision Explanation & coordination

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Types Hatoyama Kan Noda Total Budget 9（29m） 12（23m） 6（17m） 27（24m） Global Heating 8（50m） 2（46m） 2（21m） 12（44m） Basic Policy 7（40m） 7（40m） FTA 1（39m） 2（71m） 1（42m） 4（56m） Economic Affairs 4（27m） 4（27m） Defense 4（25m） 4（25m） Total 29（37m） 20（31m） 9（21m） 58（32m）

Source: the author’s estimates based on Asahi, Nikkei and Yomiuri news papers Notes: the figures are the number of times of meeting, “m” is the average of duration in minutes

3-4 Cabinet committee by DPJ

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PM Office

PM, Chief & Deputy Cabinet Secretary, Advisors, seconded bureaucrats Policy Councils

3-5 Governance in Abe administration

Policy function of party Policy function of the government Each division ↓ Research Council ↓ General Council Ministries Explanation & coordination Cabinet decision Approval

On some issues such as security, sensitive ones

Who takes responsibilities of decisions is often ambiguous, because PM or his office is always behind the scene when ruling party decides and instructs.

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• 7. Policy-making by many policy & advisory councils controlled

by Cabinet Secretariat but often their conclusion predetermined

• 1. Using institutional capacity of PM strengthened by the reforms
• 2. Learn the failures of the first Abe administration and DPJ
• 4. Fragmented oppositions and LDP’s dominance in both houses
• 6. Govern top & senior officials through appointment system

including the Governor of BOJ and heads of agencies

• 5. Hostility towards bureaucrats in the first administration, but

control them through seconded or retired ones in the second adm.

• 3. Senior politicians retired and no rival in LDP

3-6 Characteristics of Abe administration

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4-1 Six years of Abe Administration

Year Politics and public administration Economics and public finance 2012 Dec: The second Abe administration 2013 Jul: Upper House election Jan: “Three Arrows”, Economic Regeneration Headquarters, Competitive Council Apr: Kuroda Governor of BOJ, Extra-easing monetary policy Jun: “Revitalization Strategy”, “Economic & Fiscal Basic Policy” with Fiscal Consolidation Plan 2014 May: Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affair Dec: Lower House election Apr: Consumption tax from 5→8% Jun: “New Growth Strategy” Nov: Decision to postpone consumption tax hike 2015 Sep: Abe reelected as the head of LDP National Security Bill Jun: “Economic and Fiscal Regeneration Plan” Oct: Council to Promote Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens Dec: Decision to introduce lower rate of Consumption Tax 2016 Jun: Ise-Shima G7 Summit Meeting Jul: Upper House election Jan: BOJ negative interest rate Jun: Decision to postpone consumption tax hike 2017 May: Manifestation on the amendment constitution Oct: Lower House Election Jun: “Growth Strategy 2017” Sep: Council to Discuss for 100-Year-Life Dec: “New Economic Package” including free education 2018 Jun: MOF Report on falsified official documents relating to Moritomo School Apr: Kuroda Governor reappointed Jun: Postpone the target of fiscal consolidation from 2020 to 2025, “Basic Policy for Human Resource Development”

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4-2 Stock price and exchange rate

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Projection errors Nominal GDP Real GDP ME MAE ME MAE FY1970-2016

• 1.10

2.07

• 0.85

1.61 FY2000-09

• 1.54

1.78

• 0.70

1.58 FY 2010-16

• 1.23

1.28

• 0.37

1.00 FY2010-12 DPJ FY2013-16 Abe adm

• 1.30

1.77 0.30 1.50

• 1.18

1.23

• 0.88

0.88

Source: Estimate based on Government’s economic projections by Cabinet Office ME（average error）＝（actual-projection）/（the number of years） MAE（average absolute error）＝｜actual－projection｜/（the number of years）

Average GDP growth per annum Nominal Real FY2001-09（8 years）

• 0.7%

0.4% FY2009-12（3 years） DPJ 1.6% 1.5% FY2012-16（4 years） Abe administration 2.2% 1.2%

4-3 Economic performance

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4-4 Economic & Fiscal projections

Primary balance PB target changed from FY2020 to FY2025

Blue line: baseline scenario Red line: economic growth achieved scenario Cabinet Office July 2018

Real GDP growth

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4-5 Projections and results of nominal GDP

※The author’s calculations based on “Economic and Fiscal Projections” by the Cabinet Office

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4-6 Projections and results of primary balance

※The author’s calculations based on “Economic and Fiscal Projections” by the Cabinet Office

31 Before Abe adm Total Abe adm (FY2012-2018) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Legislation

21 12 6 3 1 2

Cabinet decision

5 16 5 2 3 1 3 1 1

Cabinet oral agreement

4 6 1 1 1 1 2

PM's decision

2 24 3 4 1 5 6 5

Chief Cabinet Secretary's decision

1 6 2 1 1 1 1

Minister's decision and others

1 37 3 10 6 4 9 4 1

Total

34 101 14 24 15 13 22 10 3

4-7 The total number of councils

Source: the author's estimate based on the web site from PM's Office Notes: 1. Councils include both policy councils(mainly ministers) and advisory councils(mainly experts)

• 2. "Before Abe adm" means councils continue to exist before Ave administration

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Subjects of councils Before Ave adm Ave administration Parent Subsidiary Parent Subsidiary General economic policies

4 8

Regulation, industry and market

6 13 15 70

Public finance and tax

1 2

Public administration

1 13 8

Social welfare and labour

5 12 14

Education and culture

1 8 15

Local & regional development

4 1 9 22

National security and foreign affairs

3 1 19 6

Law and order

9 1 15 9

Total

34 16 101 144

4-8 The number of councils by subjects

Source: the author's estimate based on the web site from PM's Office Notes: Subsidiary councils means organization or committee set by parent's councils

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4-9 Analysis on council's reports

The total number of reports is 341 (until July 2018)

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4-10 Policy process on national security bill

The Japan’s Constitution prohibits war as a sovereign right of the nation and war potential, and all previous governments retained the constitutional interpretation that the right of collective defense could not be exerted regardless of the provision of the Japan-US Security Treaty. This interpretation was changed by PM Abe, whose key approaches were the following:

• 1. Replacing the Cabinet Legislation Bureau Director-General opposing Abe’s plan.
• 2. Persuading reluctant Komeito in high level talks top talk between Komeito and the LDP outside of

the parliament; the talks also involved a few top officials seconded to the Cabinet Secretariat

2015 Feb: Negotiation between LDP and Komeito began to formulate the national security bill including the right of collective defense. Apr: The LDP and Komeito cut the deail on the relevant legislation including several conditions for collective defense May: The National Security Bill was submitted to the Diet [parliament]. Sep: The Diet endorsed the Bill despite a significant number of legal experts highlighting its unconstitutionality. 2016 Apr: The Bill came into force. 2013 Feb: Advisory Council for National Security was set up. Aug: Mr. Komatsu appointed irregularly as the DG of Cabinet Legislation Bureau; he was a former ambassador and a strong support of Abe’s idea. 2014 May: The Council issued its Report; much of it was prepared by civil servants. Jul: The Cabinet adopted the decision on the change of interpretation of the Constitution regarding the right of collective defense, following intensive negotiations between LDP and Komeito.

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4-11 Policy process on consumption tax hike

In 2012, the previous government led by DPJ legislated consumption tax hike from 5 to 8% in April 2014, and 5 to 10% in Oct 2015 with the cooperation of LDP and Komeito. With “Abenomics” assuming higher economic growth can consolidate public finance without tax hike, Abe postpones tax hike twice. The key points of this development are:

• 1. There was little discussion on the postponement of tax hike within the government; even the

Finance Minister and the head of LDP’s Tax Council were not informed beforehand.

• 2. Only a few in the PM Office were involved in this maneuver.

2016 May 27: Abe abruptly presented a paper that claimed that higher risks than the World Financial Crisis in 2008 were looming to the G7 Summit Meeting. The possibility of the immediate financial crisis was promptly rejected by other G7 leaders. Jun 1: PM Abe announced the postponement of tax hike from 8 to 10% in October 2019, while saying the financial crisis is not happening actually. 2014 Apr: Consumption tax hike from 5 to 8% as scheduled May: The Abe administration appointed Mr. Tanaka as the MOF Vice-Minister, he was a secretary to PM Abe in 2006. Nov: The Advisory Council to analyzes the economy, rather than Economic & Fiscal Policy Council Nov 17: Quarterly GDP Estimate showed GDP growth of the third quarter 2014 was minus together with the second quarter. Nov 18: Abe announced the postponement of tax hike (8 to 10%) to April 2017, with no further delay. He called a snap general election, claiming that he needed the public approval for his approach.

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4-12 Policy process on free education

In 2017, PM Abe proposed to include free education from early childhood to higher education in the proposal to amend the Constitution before the Upper House election. Then after the details of reforms came up in short time. The key is as follows:

• 1. The idea of free education is used for the reason of sudden dissolve of the Lower House, although

LDP opposed such idea when they were an opposition party.

• 2. At the beginning, PM Abe asked the relevant council to discuss human resource development

including education, but everything was decided before the Council proposed.

• 3. Subsidy to education is likely to be regressive, but there is little analysis and discussion on it.
• 4. About 40% of universities in Japan have their students below the enrollment limit, so free education

may reduce the quality of higher education.

• 5. The government introduces some additional regulations for schools and universities, so some

universities are against free education.

2017 May: Abe proposed the idea of free education in Yomiuri Newspaper’s interview. Jun: The government’s annual budget and economic policy guidelines “Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2017” disclosed that the government considered relevant measures e.g. free preschool education and the newly introduced student grant system. Aug: The Council to Discuss for 100-Year-Life was set up to discuss the free education issue. Oct: The Lower House General Election. Dec: The government’s “New Economic Package” revealed the details of relevant measures, e.g. the reallocation of ¥ 2 trill. from the additional tax revenue generated by consumption tax hike. After this, the Council published its interim report that copied New Economic Package’s measures.

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• 3. Major policies and initiatives such as consumption tax hike postponement and

free education were introduced without detailed analysis and discussion within the government & ruling parties. A few staff including political advisors in PM Office have maneuvered policy-making on key issues by controlling both ruling parties & relevant ministries. Senior civil servants looked like "yes-men" to PM.

4-13 Problems on policy-making process

• 1. Major economic policy packges such as “Three Arrows” and “Revitalization

Strategy” come one after another without the review of the previous ones; it seems that a new policy package comes every six months.

• 4. The Abe administration is strong enough to engage in structural reforms that

prompt significant objections; as an example, it enacted the national security

• legislation. But this event was exceptional; indeed, they are not interested in

urgently needed fiscal consolidation and social welfare reforms, because addressing these issues will negatively affect their electoral prospect.

• 2. Great many policy and advisory councils have been set up to discuss these

economic policies, but key issues have already been decided by the government. So, these councils only played the role of political shows.

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4-14 the UK-Blair vs Japan-Abe

Tony Blair, born in 1953 Shinzo Abe, born in 1954 Similarities

• 1. Strong prime minister

Longer tenure, May 1997-June 2007

• 2. Expanding capacity of the centre such as Number

10 and Cabinet Office, then PM's policy-making capacity enhanced Increase in the number of staff, political advisers Re-organised Policy Unit National Economic Council

• 3. Policy advise function of civil servants weakened,

departments more responsive to Number 10

• 4. Dislike civil servants
• 5. No experience as minister
• 6. Popular politician, media
• 1. Strong prime minister

Longer tenure, Dec 2012-

• 2. Expanding of the centre such as Cabinet Secretariat

and Cabinet Office, then PM's policy-making capacity enhanced Increase in the number of staff, political advisers Economic and Fiscal Council and other numerous policy & advisory councils

• 3. Policy advise function of civil servants weakened,

departments more responsive to PM Office

• 4. Dislike civil servants
• 5. No experience as minister
• 6. Popular politician, media

Differences

• 1. Gordon Brown, prominent rival

Doing a lot of fiscal reforms, achieving fiscal surplus, although larger deficits after the Crisis

• 2. Initiatives for evidenced-based policy making such

as "What Works Centre".

• 3. Several rebellions from the Party, although the

autonomy of PM is enhanced more than before

• 4. Much more politically neutral of civil servants
• 5. More powerful parliament such as select

committees, Public Accounting Committee

• 6. No tenure as the PM or the head of the party
• 1. Taro Aso, Finance Minister/former PM, fiscal

deficits increasing, fiscal discipline undermined more obedient to PM

• 2. Lack of analysis and discussion, more often PM's

decision in advance

• 3. Few explicit objection from LDP to PM
• 4. Senior civil servants nearly politically appointed
• 5. Monitoring and scrutiny of the ruling party very

weak, opposition parties fragmented

• 6. Three-year fix term of the head of LDP, but Abe

extend the tenure by amending party rules

※The author’s observations based on relevant literature including Patrick Diamond(2014)"Governing Britain"

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Strong PM / political leadership is necessary, but

reforms needed

5-1 Conclusion

• 1. Parliamentary oversight
• committee, independent fiscal institutions
• 2. Political neutrality of civil serviants
• professionalism, training and rigorous assessment,
• pen recruitment, effective SESs
• 1. “Check and balance” needs the further enhancement.
• 2. Political neutrality of civil servants is undermined; they are politicized to

the extent that the system seems to be mobilised by political appointment now, despite the legal provision that requires a merit based system.

• 3. Overall, the reform undermines the quality of policy-making; many policies

were formulated without analysis and discussion, e.g. free education /child care, the postponement of VAT rate increase.