Boardroom Liabilities Protecting Directors in a Sea of Risk - - PDF document

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Boardroom Liabilities Protecting Directors in a Sea of Risk - - PDF document

2007 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT Boardroom Liabilities Protecting Directors in a Sea of Risk Securities Claims against Directors and Officers: D&O Insurance, a Bridge over Troubled Waters By CAROLYN H. ROSENBERG AND SARAH R. WOLFF Similarly, when


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Boardroom Liabilities

Protecting Directors in a Sea of Risk

2007 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

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Securities Claims against Directors and Officers: D&O Insurance, a Bridge over Troubled Waters

By CAROLYN H. ROSENBERG AND SARAH R. WOLFF

In the blockbuster movie Jaws, the shark seemed to bite just when everyone thought it was safe to go back in the water. Directors

and officers today may well question whether the waters are safe for them. The Enron shareholder lawsuits live on, and we anticipate another significant Supreme Court

  • pinion resulting from them next term. Meanwhile, the

Securities and Exchange Commission continues to announce new options backdating investigations even as it files complaints arising from current investigations against directors and officers. On the flip side, the Supreme Court recently issued its much-anticipated decision in the Tellabs case, adopting a heightened pleading burden for plaintiffs bringing securities fraud claims under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Although directors and officers can take comfort from the opinion, the court declined to impose a more draconian pleading burden on future

  • plaintiffs. Directors and officers also need to be

concerned with the growing number of institutional shareholder lawsuits, shareholder class actions, and regulatory investigations filed in foreign jurisdictions against U.S. companies. These days, companies and their directors and

  • fficers are also increasingly exposed to triple

jeopardy–private securities class actions, SEC and Department of Justice investigations, and state regulatory proceedings. As the SEC and DOJ continue to pursue parallel investigations, directors and officers need to consider how corporate cooperation with the government, including waiver of attorney-client privilege, may impact them. For example, will having a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ make it more likely that a company’s directors and officers will be pursued? Finally, companies continue to restate their

  • financials. The SEC inevitably investigates these cases,
  • ften with significant implications for directors and
  • fficers. In May, the SEC pulled another weapon from its

arsenal in settling the Mercury Interactive options backdating case. Even as the SEC settled with Mercury, it filed securities fraud charges against Mercury’s former CEO and CFO and for the first time used a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that allows the commission to seek repayment of bonuses and stock sale profits received by CEOs and CFOs when financial results are later restated. Similarly, when notified of restatements, some D&O insurers are asserting that, like shareholders, they based agreements to provide insurance on false financials, and are threatening to bring rescission actions to void entire policies, thereby potentially leaving the directors and

  • fficers with no coverage.

No wonder a recent survey by Towers Perrin found that directors are increasingly concerned about their personal

  • liability. Outside directors continue to be squarely in the

SEC’s sights. And just last year, five former outside directors of the bankrupt company Just for Feet paid a combined $41.5 million to settle claims brought against them by the bankruptcy trustee—payments reportedly made personally by the directors. Faced with a potentially wild ride ahead, what should directors and officers look for in their D&O coverage?

1) A Broad Definition of Claim that Covers Investigations

Because coverage is generally triggered under a D&O policy when a claim is made, the definition of claim is

  • important. That definition typically encompasses lawsuits

and may include written demands for monetary or nonmonetary relief. Criminal, regulatory, and investigative proceedings should also be covered, including formal and informal requests for information.

2) Choice of Counsel and Advancement

  • f Defense Costs

Most D&O policies allow the insured to choose counsel with the carrier’s consent, with the payment of defense costs depleting the limits of the policy. For defense of securities claims, at least one major D&O carrier requires its insureds to use law firms designated on a panel counsel list, unless the insureds can show a conflict or

  • ther justification to go outside the panel list. Insureds

who wish to select their own counsel may want to negotiate to include additional firms on a panel counsel list or seek to delete this requirement. Defense costs incurred by individual insureds are typically indemnified by the company, which then seeks reimbursement from the carrier. D&O policies should provide that the carrier will advance defense costs on a current or periodic basis. Individual directors and officers are well served to negotiate a provision that obligates the insurer to advance defense costs where the company may be disputing advancement obligations, without the individual

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insured incurring what could be a high retention before triggering the coverage.

3) Severable Conduct Exclusions That Apply Only When Misconduct Is Adjudicated in the Underlying Claim

Two exclusions frequently asserted by carriers, particularly with respect to securities claims, are conduct exclusions: the deliberate fraudulent acts or dishonest conduct exclusion and the illegal personal profit or advantage exclusion. The requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley with respect to the conduct of, and remedies imposed against, directors and officers may increase insurers’ attempts to deny coverage based on these exclusions. Where possible, these exclusions should be negotiated so that the carrier may not rely on them to defeat coverage unless there is a final adjudication of fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or personal profit or advantage, in the context of the underlying claim. Insureds should try to make these exclusions severable as well.

4) A Broad Definition of Loss

D&O policies often exclude such things as taxes, fines, penalties, the multiplied portion of any multiplied damage awards, and punitive damages from the definition of loss. Insurers have, however, agreed to cover at least some punitive and multiplied damages awarded. Some carriers cover punitive damages for securities claims if they are insurable under the law pursuant to which the policy is

  • construed. Other carriers cover all punitive or multiplied

damages, so long as it is not against public policy to insure them. Policies may further provide that the law of the jurisdiction most favorable to coverage will be applied to the disputes. The efficacy of and any restrictions on these most favorable law provisions, however, should be reviewed under the law of any jurisdiction that may apply to a policy or claim.

5) Worldwide Coverage

Directors and officers should assess if their current program will adequately cover them for claims and regulatory proceedings in foreign jurisdictions. Possible issues to consider include requirements to purchase policies in the host country, adequacy of limits, and the choice of law and forum to resolve a coverage dispute.

6) Nonrescindable Coverage for Nonindemnifiable Claims against Directors and Officers

Side A coverage responds to loss that the company cannot (because of insolvency) or is not permitted to (under its bylaws or applicable law) indemnify for directors and officers. Most policies provide that no retention will be applied to Side A claims. As the Side A coverage is typically the last resort for directors and

  • fficers if they are not indemnified, directors and officers

are best protected when the insurer agrees it will not rescind the coverage for any reason.

7) Separate Side A Coverage

Directors and officers are increasingly demanding that they be provided separate Side A coverage. They desire separate limits of coverage untapped by claims against the company. The Side A stand-alone policy that is most favorable is a drop down, difference–in-conditions (DIC)

  • coverage. In this case, the policy drops down and

functions as primary coverage in the event the full-side policy’s Side A coverage does not apply. This could occur if the underlying policy contains an exclusion that the Side A stand-alone policy does not. The Side-A-only policy also functions as traditional excess coverage for nonindemnifiable claims against directors and officers in that it sits on top of the underlying full-side coverage. Typically, Side A DIC policies are nonrescindable. Although proposing these seven suggestions may be taken as a lucky omen, most directors and officers we counsel prefer to avoid chance and proactively negotiate their coverage, saving the shark-infested waters for more daring souls. Carolyn H. Rosenberg is a senior partner in the Insurance Recovery Group and Sarah R. Wolff heads the Securities Litigation and Enforcement Practice Group at Reed Smith LLP. For more information about Reed Smith visit www.reedsmith.com

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