Block-Supply Chain: A New Anti- Counterfeiting Supply Chain Using - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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block supply chain a new anti counterfeiting supply chain

Block-Supply Chain: A New Anti- Counterfeiting Supply Chain Using - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dec 14, 2023 375 likes •924 views

Block-Supply Chain: A New Anti- Counterfeiting Supply Chain Using NFC and Blockchain By: Naif Alzahrani Nirupama Bulusu Portland State University Motivation Products Counterfeiting World Health Organization (WHO) 2008 [1]: 30% of

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Block-Supply Chain: A New Anti- Counterfeiting Supply Chain Using NFC and Blockchain

By: Naif Alzahrani Nirupama Bulusu Portland State University

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World Health Organization (WHO) 2008 [1]: 30% of

medical products are counterfeit in developing countries

MarkMonitor, 2011 [2]: counterfeit sales cost about

$135 billion in online shopping

2017: 40–50% of antimalarials are counterfeit in

countries like SoutheastAsia and Africa [3]

Motivation

Products’ Counterfeiting

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Existing Solutions

Existing Approaches Cryptographic Track &Trace

Challenge Response Protocol

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Challenge Response Protocol

Sever Tag

1. Generates a random Challenge

Challenge

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Challenge Response Protocol

Sever Tag

1. Generates a random Challenge

Challenge Response Challenge Sign Private key Response 2.

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Challenge Response Protocol

Sever Tag

1. Generates a random Challenge

Challenge Response Challenge Sign Private key Response 2. Verify Public key Response 3. Challenge

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Existing Solutions

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1. Modification

Genuine Product Legitimate Tag

Expiration Date

Modifies Data

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Counterfeiting Attacks

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2. Cloning

Genuine Product Counterfeit Product Copies and Writes Data

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Counterfeiting Attacks

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3. Tag Reapplication

Genuine Product Legitimate Tag Counterfeit Product Removes and Reapplies Tag

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Counterfeiting Attacks

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Block-Supply Chain: decentralized supply chain to:

Track and trace product
Detect:

Modifiction Cloning Tag reapplication

Contribution

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Block-Supply Chain

Initialization Phase Verification Phase

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Initialization Phase

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B0

Manufacturer

Initialization Phase

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B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

Initialization Phase

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B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

Initialization Phase

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Initialization Phase

B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

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Block-Supply Chain

Initialization Phase Verification Phase

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Verification Phase

B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

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Verification Phase

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

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Verification Phase

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

Local Authentication

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B2

Verification Phase

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

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B2 B2 B2 B2 B2 B2

Verification Phase

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

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B2

Verification Phase

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

Global Authentication Global Authentication Global Authentication Global Authentication Global Authentication

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B2

Verification Phase

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0

Global Authentication Global Authentication Global Authentication Global Authentication

B2 Valid?

Global Authentication

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B2

Verification Phase

B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B1 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B0 B2 B2 B2 B2 B2

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1. Trace-and-track products
2. Detects:
Modification
Cloning
Tag reapplication

Local Authentication Global Authentication

+

Verification Phase

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Consensus Protocol

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Existing Protocols

Proof of Work (PoW)

Solve a challenge: compute a cryptographic

hashes

If succeed, submit the block to the network

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Existing Protocols

Proof of Work (PoW)

Issues:
1. Huge computational effort
2. Energy and computing resources

consumption

3. Relies on a few mining pools (raises

doubts on the decentralization)

4. Frequently fork

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Existing Protocols

Fixed-Validators Decentralization

Small fixed number of nodes chosen to be

validators

Proof of Stake (PoS): e.g. the voting power
Committee size —> Computation and

communication overhead

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Existing Protocols

Fixed-Validators Decentralization

Examples:
1. Tendermint
2. Hyperledger Fabric
1/3 byzantine nodes

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Existing Protocols

Fixed-Validators Decentralization

Issues:
1. Strong trust assumption
2. Fixed committee of validators is

vulnerable to adversarial attacks

DoS attack
Powerful adversary can corrupt or

bribe most of them over time

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Existing Protocols

Fixed-Validators Decentralization

Issues:
3. Fairness of selection
4. Small committee + massive number of

transactions —> performance bottleneck

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Design Goals

1. Efficiency:
Small number of validators
2. Security:
Random rotating-validators’ selection
3. Validators’ selection fairness
Selection with equal probability

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New consensus protocol that:

Utilizes different set of validators
n every block proposal
Maintains security by employing

random validators’ selection

Achieves efficiency by employing

small number of validators

Contribution

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Proposed Protocol

Based on Tendermint
Select different set of validators on every

block proposal

Balances between efficiency and security

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Four types of nodes:
1. Proposer: proposes the new block
2. Validation-leader: selects the validators
3. Validator: validates the proposed block
4. Idle: waits for the consensus on the block

Proposed Protocol

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At the genesis state
Each proposer is randomly mapped to a

validation-leader

The validation-leader is activated upon

receiving the block from its proposer

Proposer to validation-leader mapping

Proposed Protocol

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On proposing a new block
Each validation-leader randomly selects Log

n validators

A validator is activated upon receiving a

‘validate’ message from its validation-leader

Validators Selection

Proposed Protocol

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Evaluation

Security

0.33% random malicious nodes

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Evaluation

Efficiency

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Limitation 1: the number of validators is static

Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood

Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation-

leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders

Limitations

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Future Work

Limitation 1: the number of validators is static

Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood

Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation-

leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders

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Limitation 1: the number of validators is static

Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood

Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation-

leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders

Limitations

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Future Work

Limitation 1: the number of validators is static

Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood

Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation-

leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders

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Limitation 3: always-validation mode

Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood

Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their

proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.

Limitations

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Future Work

Limitation 3: always-validation mode

Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood

Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their

proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.

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Limitation 3: always-validation mode

Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood

Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their

proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.

Limitations

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Future Work

Limitation 3: always-validation mode

Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood

Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their

proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.

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Tianks Questjons