Block-Supply Chain: A New Anti- Counterfeiting Supply Chain Using NFC and Blockchain By: Naif Alzahrani Nirupama Bulusu Portland State University
Motivation Products’ Counterfeiting • World Health Organization (WHO) 2008 [1]: 30% of medical products are counterfeit in developing countries • MarkMonitor, 2011 [2]: counterfeit sales cost about $135 billion in online shopping • 2017: 40–50% of antimalarials are counterfeit in countries like SoutheastAsia and Africa [3]
Existing Solutions Existing Approaches Cryptographic Track &Trace Challenge Response Protocol
Challenge Response Protocol Sever Tag 1. Generates a random Challenge Challenge 4
Challenge Response Protocol Sever Tag 1. Generates a random Challenge Challenge 2. Private key Challenge Sign Response Response 5
Challenge Response Protocol Sever Tag 1. Generates a random Challenge Challenge 2. Private key Challenge Sign Response Response 3. Challenge Response Verify Public key 6
Existing Solutions 7
Counterfeiting Attacks 1. Modification Legitimate Tag Expiration Date Modifies Data Genuine Product 8
Counterfeiting Attacks 2. Cloning Copies and Writes Data Genuine Product Counterfeit Product 9
Counterfeiting Attacks 3. Tag Reapplication Legitimate Tag Removes and Reapplies Tag Genuine Product Counterfeit Product 10
Contribution Block-Supply Chain: decentralized supply chain to: • Track and trace product • Detect: Modifiction Cloning Tag reapplication
Block-Supply Chain Initialization Verification Phase Phase
Initialization Phase
Initialization Phase B 0 Manufacturer
Initialization Phase B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0
Initialization Phase B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0
Initialization Phase B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0
Block-Supply Chain Initialization Verification Phase Phase
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0 B 0
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 B 0 B 1 B 0 B 1 B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 Local Authentication B 0 B 1 B 0 B 1 B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 B 2 B 0 B 1 B 0 B 1 B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 B 2 B 2 B 2 B 0 B 1 B 2 B 2 B 2 B 0 B 1 B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 B 2 Global Authentication B 0 B 1 Global Authentication B 0 B 1 B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 Global Authentication Global Authentication Global Authentication
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 B 2 Global Authentication B 0 B 1 B 2 Valid? Global Authentication B 0 B 1 B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 Global Authentication Global Authentication Global Authentication
Verification Phase B 0 B 0 B 1 B 1 B 2 B 2 B 0 B 1 B 2 B 0 B 1 B 0 B 0 B 2 B 1 B 1 B 2 B 2
Verification Phase + Local Authentication Global Authentication 1. Trace-and-track products 2. Detects: • Modification • Cloning • Tag reapplication
Consensus Protocol
Existing Protocols Proof of Work (PoW) • Solve a challenge: compute a cryptographic hashes • If succeed, submit the block to the network
Existing Protocols Proof of Work (PoW) • Issues: 1. Huge computational effort 2. Energy and computing resources consumption 3. Relies on a few mining pools (raises doubts on the decentralization) 4. Frequently fork
Existing Protocols Fixed-Validators Decentralization • Small fixed number of nodes chosen to be validators • Proof of Stake (PoS): e.g. the voting power • Committee size —> Computation and communication overhead
Existing Protocols Fixed-Validators Decentralization • Examples: 1. Tendermint 2. Hyperledger Fabric • 1/3 byzantine nodes
Existing Protocols Fixed-Validators Decentralization • Issues: 1. Strong trust assumption 2. Fixed committee of validators is vulnerable to adversarial attacks • DoS attack • Powerful adversary can corrupt or bribe most of them over time
Existing Protocols Fixed-Validators Decentralization • Issues: 3. Fairness of selection 4. Small committee + massive number of transactions —> performance bottleneck
Design Goals 1. Efficiency: • Small number of validators 2. Security: • Random rotating-validators’ selection 3. Validators’ selection fairness • Selection with equal probability
Contribution New consensus protocol that: • Utilizes different set of validators on every block proposal • Maintains security by employing random validators’ selection • Achieves efficiency by employing small number of validators
Proposed Protocol • Based on Tendermint • Select different set of validators on every block proposal • Balances between efficiency and security
Proposed Protocol • Four types of nodes: 1. Proposer: proposes the new block 2. Validation-leader: selects the validators 3. Validator: validates the proposed block 4. Idle: waits for the consensus on the block
Proposed Protocol Proposer to validation-leader mapping • At the genesis state • Each proposer is randomly mapped to a validation-leader • The validation-leader is activated upon receiving the block from its proposer
Proposed Protocol Validators Selection • On proposing a new block • Each validation-leader randomly selects Log n validators • A validator is activated upon receiving a ‘ validate’ message from its validation-leader
Evaluation Security 0.33% random malicious nodes
Evaluation Efficiency
Limitations • Limitation 1: the number of validators is static Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood • Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation- leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders
Future Work • Limitation 1: the number of validators is static Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood • Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation- leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders
Limitations • Limitation 1: the number of validators is static Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood • Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation- leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders
Future Work • Limitation 1: the number of validators is static Future solution: dynamic variable number of validators based on a risk likelihood • Limitation 2: Malicious or lazy validation- leaders Future solution: a game theoretical model to reward and punish validation-leaders
Limitations • Limitation 3: always-validation mode Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood • Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.
Future Work • Limitation 3: always-validation mode Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood • Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.
Limitations • Limitation 3: always-validation mode Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood • Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.
Future Work • Limitation 3: always-validation mode Future solution: a game theoretical model to validate with probability according to the proposing node risk likelihood • Limitation 4: validation-leaders know their proposers in advance Future solution: blind proposers validation- leaders mapping.
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