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Block Ciphers Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 83 Block Ciphers (4) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Block Ciphers Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 83 Block Ciphers (4) Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers In practical ciphers the plaintext M is divided into fixed-length blocks M = M 1 M 2 . . . M N . Then, each block M i is encrypted to the

  1. Block Ciphers � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 83 Block Ciphers (4)

  2. Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers In practical ciphers the plaintext M is divided into fixed-length blocks M = M 1 M 2 . . . M N . Then, each block M i is encrypted to the ciphertext block C i = E K ( M i ), and the results are concatenated to the ciphertext C = C 1 C 2 . . . C N . There are two major kind of ciphers, which differ in the way the plaintexts are encrypted: � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 84 Block Ciphers (4) †

  3. Stream Ciphers The blocks are encrypted sequentially, each block is encrypted by a distinct transformation, which might depend on 1. the previous encrypted blocks, 2. the previous transformation, 3. the block number, 4. the key. This information from one block is kept in memory between the encryption of this block and the succeeding block, for use during the encryption of the succeeding block. Usually, stream ciphers use blocks of either one bit or eight bits (one character). � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 85 Block Ciphers (4)

  4. Block Ciphers All the blocks are encrypted in the same way, under exactly the same transfor- mation (no memory): C 1 = E ( M 1 ), C 2 = E ( M 2 ), etc. Encryption transformation should not be vulnerable to known plaintext attacks. Attacker should not be able to collect (almost) all the plaintext/ciphertext blocks pairs, keep the transformation table T ( M ) = C , and use it to en- crypt/decrypt if they do not know the mathematical formulation of the trans- formation (and in particular the key). Thus, the block size should be large , and the number of distinct possible values in a plaintext block should be larger than the minimal allowed complexity of an attack. In the past blocks of 64 bits were used, which have 2 64 possibilities, whose table storing costs at least 2 64 known plaintexts and memory space. Nowadays, the standard block size is 128 bits. � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 86 Block Ciphers (4)

  5. Block Ciphers Block ciphers are substitution ciphers in which the plaintext and the cipher- When N = 64 there are 2 64 text blocks are binary vectors of length N . different plaintexts/ciphertexts, and when N = 128 there are 2 128 different plaintexts/ciphertexts. For each key the encryption function E K ( · ) is a permutation from { 0 , 1 } N to itself. D K ( · ) is the decryption function (the inverse permutation), such that D K ( E K ( · )) = E K ( D K ( · )) = Identity. � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 87 Block Ciphers (4)

  6. The Data Encryption Standard - DES 1. The most widely used cipher in civilian applications. 2. Developed by IBM; Evolved from Lucifer. 3. Accepted as an US NBS standard in 1977, and later as an international standard. 4. A block cipher with N = 64 bit blocks . 5. 56-bit keys (eight bytes, in each byte seven bits are used; the eighth bit can be used as a parity bit). 6. Exhaustive search requires 2 56 encryption steps (2 55 on average). � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 88 Block Ciphers (4)

  7. �✁ ✂ ✄ ☎ The Data Encryption Standard - DES (cont.) 7. Iterates a round-function 16 times in 16 rounds ( ). The round- function mixes the data with the key. 8. Each round, the key information entered to the round function is called a subkey . The subkeys K 1 , . . . , K 16 are computed by a key scheduling algorithm . � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 89 Block Ciphers (4) †

  8. DES Outline Plaintext (P) Key (K) IP PC-1 C D K1 F ROL1 ROL1 PC-2 K2 F ROL1 ROL1 PC-2 K3 F ROL2 ROL2 PC-2 Ki F ROL ROL PC-2 K13 F ROL2 ROL2 PC-2 K14 F ROL2 ROL2 PC-2 K15 F ROL2 ROL2 PC-2 K16 F ROL1 ROL1 PC-2 FP Ciphertext (T) � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 90 Block Ciphers (4) †

  9. The F -Function input (32 bits) E 48 bits subkey (48 bits) S1E S2E S3E S4E S5E S6E S7E S8E S1K S2K S3K S4K S5K S6K S7K S8K S1I S2I S3I S4I S5I S6I S7I S8I S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S1O S2O S3O S4O S5O S6O S7O S8O P output (32 bits) � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 91 Block Ciphers (4)

  10. The Initial Permutation (IP) The following tables describe for each output bit the number of the input bit whose value enters to the output bit. For example, in IP , the 58’th bit in the input becomes the first bit of the output. FP=IP − 1 : IP: 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 40 8 48 16 56 24 64 32 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 39 7 47 15 55 23 63 31 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 38 6 46 14 54 22 62 30 64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 37 5 45 13 53 21 61 29 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 36 4 44 12 52 20 60 28 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 35 3 43 11 51 19 59 27 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 34 2 42 10 50 18 58 26 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 33 1 41 9 49 17 57 25 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 92 Block Ciphers (4)

  11. The P Permutation and the E Expansion P Permutes the order of 32 bits. E Expands 32 bits to 48 bits by duplicating 16 bits twice. P : E : 16 7 20 21 32 1 2 3 4 5 29 12 28 17 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 15 23 26 8 9 10 11 12 13 5 18 31 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 2 8 24 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 32 27 3 9 20 21 22 23 24 25 19 13 30 6 24 25 26 27 28 29 22 11 4 25 28 29 30 31 32 1 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 93 Block Ciphers (4)

  12. The S Boxes S box S1 : 14 4 13 1 2 15 11 8 3 10 6 12 5 9 0 7 0 15 7 4 14 2 13 1 10 6 12 11 9 5 3 8 4 1 14 8 13 6 2 11 15 12 9 7 3 10 5 0 15 12 8 2 4 9 1 7 5 11 3 14 10 0 6 13 S box S2 : 15 1 8 14 6 11 3 4 9 7 2 13 12 0 5 10 3 13 4 7 15 2 8 14 12 0 1 10 6 9 11 5 0 14 7 11 10 4 13 1 5 8 12 6 9 3 2 15 13 8 10 1 3 15 4 2 11 6 7 12 0 5 14 9 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 94 Block Ciphers (4)

  13. The S Boxes (cont.) S box S3 : 10 0 9 14 6 3 15 5 1 13 12 7 11 4 2 8 13 7 0 9 3 4 6 10 2 8 5 14 12 11 15 1 13 6 4 9 8 15 3 0 11 1 2 12 5 10 14 7 1 10 13 0 6 9 8 7 4 15 14 3 11 5 2 12 S box S4 : 7 13 14 3 0 6 9 10 1 2 8 5 11 12 4 15 13 8 11 5 6 15 0 3 4 7 2 12 1 10 14 9 10 6 9 0 12 11 7 13 15 1 3 14 5 2 8 4 3 15 0 6 10 1 13 8 9 4 5 11 12 7 2 14 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 95 Block Ciphers (4)

  14. The S Boxes (cont.) S box S5 : 2 12 4 1 7 10 11 6 8 5 3 15 13 0 14 9 14 11 2 12 4 7 13 1 5 0 15 10 3 9 8 6 4 2 1 11 10 13 7 8 15 9 12 5 6 3 0 14 11 8 12 7 1 14 2 13 6 15 0 9 10 4 5 3 S box S6 : 12 1 10 15 9 2 6 8 0 13 3 4 14 7 5 11 10 15 4 2 7 12 9 5 6 1 13 14 0 11 3 8 9 14 15 5 2 8 12 3 7 0 4 10 1 13 11 6 4 3 2 12 9 5 15 10 11 14 1 7 6 0 8 13 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 96 Block Ciphers (4)

  15. The S Boxes (cont.) S box S7 : 4 11 2 14 15 0 8 13 3 12 9 7 5 10 6 1 13 0 11 7 4 9 1 10 14 3 5 12 2 15 8 6 1 4 11 13 12 3 7 14 10 15 6 8 0 5 9 2 6 11 13 8 1 4 10 7 9 5 0 15 14 2 3 12 S box S8 : 13 2 8 4 6 15 11 1 10 9 3 14 5 0 12 7 1 15 13 8 10 3 7 4 12 5 6 11 0 14 9 2 7 11 4 1 9 12 14 2 0 6 10 13 15 3 5 8 2 1 14 7 4 10 8 13 15 12 9 0 3 5 6 11 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 97 Block Ciphers (4)

  16. The S Boxes (cont.) How to interpret the S boxes : The representation of the S boxes use the first and sixth bits of the input as a line index (between 0 and 3), and the four middle bits as the row index (between 0 and 15). Thus, the input values which correspond to the standard description of the S boxes are 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 98 Block Ciphers (4)

  17. The S Boxes (cont.) Note that all the operations are linear, except for the S boxes . Thus, the strength of DES crucially depends on the choice of the S boxes . If the S boxes would be affine, the cipher becomes affine, and thus easily break- able. The S boxes were chosen with some criteria to prevent attacks. � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 99 Block Ciphers (4) †

  18. The Key Scheduling Algorithm The key scheduling algorithm generates the 16 48-bit subkeys from the 56-bit key, by duplicating each key bit into about 14 of the subkeys in a particular order. PC-1 : 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 60 52 44 36 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 28 20 12 4 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 100 Block Ciphers (4)

  19. The Key Scheduling Algorithm (cont.) Number of rotations in the key scheduling algorithm : Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Rotations 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 PC-2 : 14 17 11 24 1 5 3 28 15 6 21 10 23 19 12 4 26 8 16 7 27 20 13 2 41 52 31 37 47 55 30 40 51 45 33 48 44 49 39 56 34 53 46 42 50 36 29 32 � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 101 Block Ciphers (4) †

  20. Decryption Decryption is done by the same algorithm as encryption, except that the order of the subkeys is reversed (i.e., K16 is used instead of K1, K15 instead of K2, . . . , and K1 instead of K16.). � Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 102 Block Ciphers (4) †

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