BitmasK: BitmasK: encryption for encryption for mere mortals - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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BitmasK: BitmasK: encryption for encryption for mere mortals - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Mar 27, 2024 158 likes •686 views

# # BitmasK: BitmasK: encryption for encryption for mere mortals mere mortals FOSDEM 2018 FOSDEM 2018 kali - meskio - kwadronaut kali - meskio - kwadronaut https://leap.se Problem: encrypted email is Problem: encrypted email is

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# #

BitmasK: BitmasK: encryption for encryption for mere mortals mere mortals

FOSDEM 2018 FOSDEM 2018 kali - meskio - kwadronaut kali - meskio - kwadronaut

https://leap.se

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Problem: encrypted email is Problem: encrypted email is ...complicated ...complicated

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Problem: Problem: providers providers

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Peer to peer? Peer to peer?

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Better Better federation! federation!

Protect providers from their users Protect providers from their users Protect users from the provider Protect users from the provider

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What does What does LEAP do? LEAP do?

LEAP Platform: toolkit to make it easier to run a service provider New protocols: so no need to trust your connection provider Bitmask client: smooth working client with compatible providers

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leap mail service leap mail service

End-to-end encryption Backwards compatible with email and current OpenPGP usage Service provider has no access to user data Automatic key discovery and validation Cloud synchronized for high availability on multiple devices

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email service email service

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soledad soledad

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mx mx

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generic rules for automatic key management, transition from TOFU to more advanced ruleset.

transitional key validation transitional key validation

bind key <-> email address key directory endorser (provider) binding info: evidence for "educated guess" veried key transition (automatic) [leap.se/en/docs/design/transitional-key-validation]

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With a bunch of exceptions

TOFU TOFU

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  • 1. First Contact
  • 1. First Contact

When one or more keys are rst discovered for a particular email address, the key with the highest validation level is registered.

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  • 2. Regular Refresh
  • 2. Regular Refresh

All keys are regularly refreshed to check for modied expirations, or new subkeys, or new keys signed by old keys.

This refresh SHOULD happen via some anonymizing mechanism.

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  • 3. Key Replacement
  • 3. Key Replacement

A registered key MUST be replaced by a new key in one of the following situations, and ONLY these situations: Veried key transitions. If the user manually veries the ngerprint of the new key. If the registered key is expired or revoked and the new key is of equal or higher validation level. If the registered key has never been successfully used and the new key has a higher validation level. If the registered key has no expiration date.

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VPN VPN

Prevent eavesdropping. Circunvent internet censorship. Prevent leaks (DNS, IPv6, ...).

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LEAP platform LEAP platform

sudo gem install leap_cli leap new example --domain example.org cd example leap add-user --self leap cert ca leap cert dh leap cert csr leap node add blueberry services:openvpn \ ip_address:1.1.1.1 openvpn.gateway_address:1.1.1.2 leap node add raspberry services:couchdb,webapp \ ip_address:1.1.1.3 leap init node leap deploy

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sysadmins are human sysadmins are human

and deserve usability too and deserve usability too

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"leap deploy" "leap deploy"

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show me the code! show me the code!

https://0xacab.org/leap/ ~10 important repos GPL code

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current state current state

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Email Beta (0.10…) Email Beta (0.10…)

works on Linux works on Linux

Bitmask VPN Bitmask VPN

works on Linux && Android works on Linux && Android

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next steps next steps

OSX and windows

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let a thousand providers let a thousand providers bloom bloom

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🐨 thanks! questions? 🐨 thanks! questions?

https://bitmask.net https://bitmask.net https://leap.se https://leap.se 😽 katzenpost.mixnetworks.org katzenpost.mixnetworks.org

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  • 2. ability to use multiple
  • 2. ability to use multiple

devices devices

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🔒 🔒 🔅

Synchronization Of Synchronization Of Locally Encrypted Data Among Devices Locally Encrypted Data Among Devices

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data = 🖃 data = 🖃 + 🔒 + 🔒

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bitmask keymanager bitmask keymanager requires no user interaction requires no user interaction

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interoperability is a must interoperability is a must

many projects converging many projects converging

(Watch AUTOCRYPT: Enigmail, K9, Mailpile, Bitmask) (Watch AUTOCRYPT: Enigmail, K9, Mailpile, Bitmask)

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SOLEDAD SOLEDAD

Synchronization of Locally Encrypted Data Among Devices auth: srp kdf: scrypt AES-256-GCM built on top of canonical's u1db vector clocks clientside: sqlcipher backend serverside: couchdb cluster

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Problem: Attachments Problem: Attachments

Syncing blobs in a convoluted store Pluggable BlobsIO backend for server (in dev) FS as MVP, others welcome!

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Validation levels Validation levels

low == less trust on the source

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  • 1. Weak Chain
  • 1. Weak Chain

sks key servers, email attached key, OpenPGP header, ...

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  • 2. Provider Trust
  • 2. Provider Trust

webnger, provider mailvelope

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  • 3. Provider Endorsement
  • 3. Provider Endorsement

NickNym

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  • 4. Historical Auditing
  • 4. Historical Auditing

CONIKS, google's transparent keyserver

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  • 5. Known Key
  • 5. Known Key

client pinned keys

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  • 6. Fingerprint
  • 6. Fingerprint

manual verication