Bitcoin and Beyond The World of CryptoCurrencies Math 2018 to date - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Bitcoin and Beyond The World of CryptoCurrencies Math 2018 to date - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Bitcoin and Beyond The World of CryptoCurrencies Math 2018 to date Lecturer, NTU, Singapore Math 2014 - 2017 Lecturer, ISI Kolkata, India EE, CS 2010 - 2014 PhD, Computer Science 2006 - 2008 MMath, Pure Mathematics 2002 -


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Bitcoin and Beyond

The World of Crypto—Currencies

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Sourav Sen Gupta

Lecturer, SCSE, NTU Singapore

sg.sourav@ntu.edu.sg

EE, CS Math CS Math

2018 to date Lecturer, NTU, Singapore 2014 - 2017 Lecturer, ISI Kolkata, India 2010 - 2014 PhD, Computer Science 2006 - 2008 MMath, Pure Mathematics 2002 - 2006 BTech, Electronics Engg. I teach Data Science and Machine Learning My research interests are in Cybersecurity I study all technical aspects of Blockchain

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Arise, you have nothing to lose but your barbed wire fences!

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Currency

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cur·ren·cy noun

Medium of Exchange

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Withdraw Deposit Spend

Centralized Accounting for some Two-Party Transaction

cur·ren·cy noun

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Withdraw Deposit Spend

Digital Representation of the Two-Party Transaction

digital currency

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Digital Representation of money can be Duplicated

digital currency

Double Spend

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Digital Representation with Unique Identifier for safety

digital currency

35624 35624 35624 35624 35624
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Digital Representation with Fraudulent Identifier

digital currency

35624 35624 35624 48913 48913

Fraud Currency

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Digital Representation with Authenticated Identifier

digital currency

35624 35624 35624 48913 48913
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Digital Representation of the no Individual Privacy

digital currency

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The concept of Untraceable e-Payments and e-Cash Blind Signature David Schaum, 1984

anonymous digital currency

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Commitment for e-Cash authorized by Blind Sign

anonymous digital currency

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Commitment verified by Zero-Knowledge Proof

anonymous digital currency

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Blind Signature and Zero-Knowledge Proof

anonymous digital currency

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Commitment + Encryption + Blind Signature connected by Zero-Knowledge Proof

anonymous digital currency

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What if anonymity is not enough, and you want to Decentralize the Currency?

decentralized digital currency

anyone?

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CypherPunks

RPoW 2004 HashCash 1997 B-Money 1998 PGP 1991 BitGold 1998

Phil Zimmermann Hal Finney Adam Back Wei Dai Nick Szabo

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Bitcoin

Satoshi Nakamoto

31 October 2008

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Centralized Transaction as we are all familiar with not Bitcoin

Tx

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Centralized Transaction based on a Centralized Account-based Ledger not Bitcoin

Tx

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Decentralized Transaction based on a Decentralized Account-based Ledger not Bitcoin yet

Tx

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Decentralized Transaction based on a Decentralized Transaction-based Ledger almost there …

Tx Tx Tx Tx Tx Tx Tx Tx

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Transaction

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Peer-to-Peer Network

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SGD 120 Transaction

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SGD 120 Record of Transactions

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SGD 120 SGD 100 Record of Transactions

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SGD 100 SGD 120 Connected Transactions

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SGD 170 SGD 100 SGD 120 Connected Transactions

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Digital Signature

Authentic Proof of Ownership Three algorithms sk, pk = keygen(n) s = sign(sk, m) verify(pk, m, s)

s = sign(sk,m) verify(pk,m,s)

pk sk

?

keygen(n)

1 2 3

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Format of a Transaction SGD 170 SGD 50 SGD 120

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SGD 170 SGD 50 SGD 120 Reporting of a Transaction

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SGD 170 SGD 50 SGD 120 Recording of a Transaction

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SGD 170 SGD 50 SGD 120 Verification of Transactions

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Public Ledger

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Appending

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Mining

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Challenge

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Voting

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12.5 BTC

Lifecycle of Transaction

Record Verify Mine Publish

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Consensus

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Mining

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0.53 BTC 6.25 BTC Incentive

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Incentive

Consensus Fee Verification Fee

0.53 BTC 6.25 BTC

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Blockchain

… from its two sides

Demand of End-Users

Creating a verifiable tamper-resilient ledger. Active network for End-Users to utilize reliably.

Goal of the System

Inclusion of records in the distributed ledger. Value of records greater than verification cost.

6.25 BTC

Consensus Fee Verification Fee

0.53 BTC

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Consensus

Who pays the Fee?

Design of Incentives

Built into the system/software to ensure that the Players of the “Blockchain Game” play honestly.

Economic Incentives

Incentives within the System to motivate honesty and Reward or Punishment to motivate Behavior.

6.25 BTC

Consensus Fee Verification Fee

0.53 BTC

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Verification

Who pays the Fee?

6.25 BTC

Consensus Fee Verification Fee

0.53 BTC

Penalizing Spams

Built into the system/software for End-Users to incentivize the miners for Inclusion of Records.

Cost of Verification

Set to a minimum to ensure less spamming by End-Users as well as an active Mining Network.

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Bitcoin

Satoshi’s Brilliance

Built into the system/software to reward Miners with Bitcoin, as well as regulates Bitcoin creation.

Economic Incentives Reusable Proof-of-Work

Built into the system/software to elect Miners for block creation, as well as to moderate Hardness.

hash (

)

= 0x 00…00 XX…XX

#

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Miners

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Dominant Miners

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Consensus

Proof-of-Work

Hashrate distribution of Proof-of-Work systems generally end up biased to a few Miners/Pools.

Uneven Hash Power Severely non-Green

Proof-of-Work puzzles are extremely costly but

  • therwise completely useless computations.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-He70rznIQ

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Check Out

Bitcoin Demo https://coindemo.io/ Bitcoin Blockchain https://www.blockchain.com/explorer Cryptocurrency Market https://coinmarketcap.com/

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Abstraction

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Blockchain

Distributed Ledger

Publicly Verifiable Tamper Resilient Eventually Consistent Semi Decentralized

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Shared State

Ledger of Records Transparency Immutability

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Consistency

Consensus Protocol Immutability Decentralization

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Attribution

Digital Identity

1BvBMSEYstWe tqTFn5Au4m4 GFg7xJaNVN2

Decentralization Provenance

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Authenticity

Challenge-Response Provenance Accountability

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Signature Digital Wallet

Cryptocurrencies

Blockchain Consensus

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Bitcoin

Blockchain Proof-of-Work Signature Pseudonymous

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Bitcoin Cash

Blockchain* Proof-of-Work Signature Pseudonymous

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Litecoin

Blockchain* Proof-of-Work* Signature Pseudonymous

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Monero

Blockchain* Proof-of-Work* Ring-Signature Un-Linkable

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ZCash

Blockchain* Proof-of-Work* Zero-Knowledge Anonymous

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Ripple

Blockchain* Ripple-Protocol Payments Registered

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Blockchain

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Blockchain

The Full-Stack View

BLOCKCHAIN PLATFORM

BLOCKCHAIN API PLATFORM API

APPS

SMART CONTRACTS USER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANAGEMENT D-APPS PLUGINS MODULES DASH

BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM

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Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Networks

Immutability : High | Scalability : Low

Decentralized Groups or Organizations

Immutability : Medium | Scalability : Medium

Intra-Organization Groups or Networks

Immutability : Medium | Scalability : Medium

Organizational Restricted Ledgers

Immutability : Low | Scalability : High

Permissioned Permissionless Public Private

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Smart Contract

and Blockchain Software

Hyperledger Chaincode Ethereum Solidity Bitcoin Script

… and many more

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Scalability

for Usable Latency

Layer N and Channels Sharding Mechanisms Off-Chain Transactions

Counterfactual Generalized State Channels … and many more

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Interoperability

for “Internet of Blockchains”

Cosmos and Tendermint Atomic Swaps on Chains Decentralized Exchanges

Cosmos Network Tendermint Consensus … and many more

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Security

Chain of Layers

Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability Integrity*, Availability*, Consistency Integrity*, Availability*, Verifiability Integrity*, Verifiability*, Correctness

Each layer in a Blockchain architecture has its requirements for Security

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Attacks

Hijacking Bitcoin (IEEE S&P 2017), Eclipse (USENIX Security 2015) Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Routing Attacks

Attacker controls enough nodes or IPs in the network to isolate one or more valid miners

  • r participants in the Blockchain protocol.
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Attacks

Attacks on Bitcoin/Cryptocurrency Wallets and Blockchain Exchanges Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Private Key Stealing

Attacker steals, destroys or compromises the private keys of miners/validators and regular participants in the Blockchain protocol.

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Attacks

Hash Power (2014), Selfish Mining (2014), Block Withholding (2011) Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Majority Control

Attacker controls the majority of the “power” in mining/validating the transactions posted by participants in the Blockchain protocol.

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Attacks

Transaction Malleability (FC 2015), Time Jacking (2011) Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Transaction Malleability

Attacker changes or destroys the primary data

  • r meta data of the transactions posted by

participants in the Blockchain protocol.

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Attacks

The DAO Attack (2016), Parity MultiSig Attack (2017) Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Buggy Contracts

Attacker exploits the software vulnerabilities discovered in Smart Contracts instantiated by participants in public Blockchain platforms.

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Prevention

Oyente (2016), MAIAN (2017), Zeus , Securify (2018), Vultron (2019) Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Vulnerability Analysis

Discovers vulnerabilities in logic, through symbolic execution to capture the traces. Checks both Source Codes and Byte Codes. Uses the Blockchain VM with Satisfiability.

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Privacy

Chain of Layers

Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Data Confidentiality, Anonymity Access Control, Private Retrieval Access Control, Anonymity Unlinkability, Private Verifiability Anonymity, Verifiable Computation

Each layer in a Blockchain architecture has its requirements for Privacy

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Attacks

Elliptic and ChainAnalysis provide solutions for AML, Law Enforcement. Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Link Analysis

Primarily Graph Mining tools for Blockchain. Clusters wallets and addresses in the network by heuristics learned through graph analytics. Use auxiliary data for user De-Anonymization.

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Prevention

Linakability works over Tor as well. Monero is still somewhat linkable. Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Anonymity and Unlinkability

Mixing Protocols — CoinJoin, CoinShuffle, etc. Distributed Mixers — MixCoin, TumbleBit, etc. Ring/Blind Signatures — Monero, BlindCoin. Zero Knowledge Proof — ZeroCoin, ZCash, etc.

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Attacks

Transactions in case of Smart Contracts are the Contracts and Inputs. Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Public Data Exploits

Attacker exploits the known inputs to invoke the Smart Contracts, posted by participants. Example: Second-Price Auction with Bidders. Attacker can out-smart other bidders to Win.

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Prevention

NuCypher : Proxy Re-Encryption and Fully Homomorphic Encryption Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Privacy-Preserving Contracts

Uses zk-SNARK — Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive ARgument of Knowledge Pinochhio (2013) — Verifiable Computation Bulletproofs (2018) — zk-SNARK using MPC

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Smart Contracts Peer-To-Peer Network Storage and Database Consensus Mechanism Transaction Recording

Pen-Tests?

BLOCKCHAIN PLATFORM

BLOCKCHAIN API PLATFORM API

APPS

SMART CONTRACTS USER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANAGEMENT D-APPS PLUGINS MODULES DASH

BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM

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If you have

for an ACADEMIC for a DEVELOPER for almost ANYONE more time to kill …