Binding Rules Can Binding Rules Be Used to Play Democracy as a - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Binding Rules Can Binding Rules Be Used to Play Democracy as a - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Binding Rules Can Binding Rules Be Used to Play Democracy as a Strategic Game? Zden ek Rosenberg Masaryk University Cambridge, 24 th June 2014 Cambridge, 24 th June 2014 Zden ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules 1 / 8


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SLIDE 1

Binding Rules

Can Binding Rules Be Used to Play Democracy as a Strategic Game? Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg

Masaryk University

Cambridge, 24th June 2014

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 1 / 8

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SLIDE 2

Imposing the binding rules

In this thought experiment I examine the possibility of minor political party imposing on itself binding set of rules.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 2 / 8

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SLIDE 3

Imposing the binding rules

In this thought experiment I examine the possibility of minor political party imposing on itself binding set of rules. Voters of such party would prefer to use their vote on support of selected rules over all other topics in politics.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 2 / 8

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SLIDE 4

Imposing the binding rules

In this thought experiment I examine the possibility of minor political party imposing on itself binding set of rules. Voters of such party would prefer to use their vote on support of selected rules over all other topics in politics. Number of these rules must be low (around three).

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 2 / 8

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SLIDE 5

Imposing the binding rules

In this thought experiment I examine the possibility of minor political party imposing on itself binding set of rules. Voters of such party would prefer to use their vote on support of selected rules over all other topics in politics. Number of these rules must be low (around three). These binding rules would lower value of a party to any coalition it may possibly form. Party would never support any action going against their binding rules. On the other hand party politics in any

  • ther area may be more flexible than those of traditional parties to

compensate for this.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 2 / 8

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SLIDE 6

Imposing the binding rules

In this thought experiment I examine the possibility of minor political party imposing on itself binding set of rules. Voters of such party would prefer to use their vote on support of selected rules over all other topics in politics. Number of these rules must be low (around three). These binding rules would lower value of a party to any coalition it may possibly form. Party would never support any action going against their binding rules. On the other hand party politics in any

  • ther area may be more flexible than those of traditional parties to

compensate for this. Any member of the party is subjected to these rules and failing them means exclusion from the party.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 2 / 8

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Rules

These rules must be simple and very clear.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 3 / 8

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Rules

These rules must be simple and very clear. Neat mechanism such as voting within party on all its levels must be set to prevent possible breach of these rules by minority within a party. The whole party is the guarantee. These mechanisms would determine:

who and under what circumstances can suggest a vote on the possible breach of the rule.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 3 / 8

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Rules

These rules must be simple and very clear. Neat mechanism such as voting within party on all its levels must be set to prevent possible breach of these rules by minority within a party. The whole party is the guarantee. These mechanisms would determine:

who and under what circumstances can suggest a vote on the possible breach of the rule. how many members are needed to actually declare the vote.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 3 / 8

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Rules

These rules must be simple and very clear. Neat mechanism such as voting within party on all its levels must be set to prevent possible breach of these rules by minority within a party. The whole party is the guarantee. These mechanisms would determine:

who and under what circumstances can suggest a vote on the possible breach of the rule. how many members are needed to actually declare the vote. This can work well when there is enough time. Many practical real time political decisions would have to be evaluated only ex post.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 3 / 8

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SLIDE 11

Rules

These rules must be simple and very clear. Neat mechanism such as voting within party on all its levels must be set to prevent possible breach of these rules by minority within a party. The whole party is the guarantee. These mechanisms would determine:

who and under what circumstances can suggest a vote on the possible breach of the rule. how many members are needed to actually declare the vote. This can work well when there is enough time. Many practical real time political decisions would have to be evaluated only ex post.

No to all uncompensated budget cuts in selected resort or no to any law leading to increase in income inequality may be examples

  • f such a binding rules.

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 3 / 8

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Modification for individual politicians

Any politician can impose individual rules on herself or himself. This may be problematic in some countries. Also it is nothing more than a promise (penalty mechanism cannot be properly enforced).

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 4 / 8

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Why now? (1)

Is general dissatisfaction with politics increasing?

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 5 / 8

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Why now? (2)

There is the demand for change (Occupy movement, Iceland).

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 6 / 8

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Why now? (3)

Technology - access to information and ability to vote online for the party members. Is there any chance you would for such a party? Can you imagine somebody who would? Could it encourage enough voters to make a difference? Could there be a space for a fact based competition in politics?

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 7 / 8

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The End

Thank You for Your Attention! zros@mail.muni.cz

Zdenˇ ek Rosenberg (Masaryk University) Binding Rules Cambridge, 24th June 2014 8 / 8