Big Data Security: How to efficiently perform data analytics over - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Big Data Security: How to efficiently perform data analytics over - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Big Data Security: How to efficiently perform data analytics over encrypted data? Adrian Perrig Network Security Group ETH Zrich 1 Why worry about Big Data Security? Security is well understood and well handled! Really? 2 Problem


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SLIDE 1

Big Data Security: How to efficiently perform data analytics over encrypted data? Adrian Perrig Network Security Group ETH Zürich

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SLIDE 2

Why worry about Big Data Security?

  • Security is well understood and well handled!
  • Really?

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SLIDE 3

Problem Setting

  • Corporations perform transactions in the cloud

and store user content in the cloud

  • Core security challenges
  • Malicious user
  • Malicious corporation
  • Malicious cloud provider
  • Malicious administrator

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Users Corporations Cloud Providers

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SLIDE 4

Missing Link: Secure Computation

Existing security techniques are incomplete

  • Good data-in-motion protections
  • VPNs, SSL, IPsec
  • Good data-at-rest protections
  • Full disk encryption
  • Self-encrypting disk drives
  • Eventually the data must be used!
  • Cannot assume the absence of malware
  • Malware may be in peripherals (disk, keyboard, GPU)
  • Malicious insider / administrator has full access
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SLIDE 5

Observation

  • Need complete set of data protections, including
  • Isolated execution
  • Secure loading
  • Secure execution
  • Secure state storage,

preventing replay attacks

  • Secure backup
  • Verifiable deletion

data in-situ data in transit data at rest

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SLIDE 6

Approaches

  • Trust: rely on cloud provider for security
  • Pro: Efficient
  • Con: Misaligned incentives, lack of liability in case of

attacks

  • Cryptography: secure multi-party computation
  • Pro: no need to trust execution
  • Con: inefficient, 10000-1000000x slower
  • Trusted hardware
  • Pro: efficient and relatively easy to use
  • Con: trust in manufacturer, increased HW cost

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SLIDE 7

Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Overview

  • Trusted Computing Group (TCG) proposed Trusted

Platform Module (TPM) chip

  • Already included in many platforms (over 600 million devices

deployed by Spring 2011)

  • Cost per chip around $1
  • Modern microprocessors provide special instructions

that interact with TPM chip

  • AMD SVM: SKINIT instruction
  • Intel TXT/LT: GETSEC[SENTER] instruction
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SLIDE 8

Creation of Isolated Execution Environment

  • AMD / Intel late launch extensions
  • Secure Loader Block (SLB) to execute in IEE
  • SKINIT / SENTER execute atomically
  • Sets CPU state similar to INIT (soft reset)
  • Resets dynamic PCRs
  • Enables DMA protection for entire SLB
  • Sends SLB contents to TPM
  • Begins executing at SLB’s entry point

SLB SKINIT SENTER

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SLIDE 9

How to Remotely Verify/Attest?

Nonce N Nonce N

S N S

V

N S N S Means H(S) and N are signed by platform key

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SLIDE 10

Systems Built with these Primitives

  • Jonathan M. McCune, Bryan Parno, Adrian

Perrig, Michael K. Reiter, and Hiroshi Isozaki, "Flicker: An Execution Infrastructure for TCB Minimization". ACM European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys), March 2008.

  • Jonathan McCune, Yanlin Li, Ning Qu, Zongwei

Zhou, Anupam Datta, Virgil Gligor, and Adrian Perrig, "TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation". IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2010.

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SLIDE 11

Flicker

  • Goals
  • Isolated execution of security-sensitive code S
  • Attested execution of Output = S( Input )
  • Minimal TCB

HW

Shim

OS App App

S

V Untrusted Trusted Verified

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SLIDE 12

TrustVisor

  • Goals
  • Similar to Flicker, trade off TCB size with high efficiency
  • Isolated execution of security-sensitive code S
  • Attested execution of Output = S( Input )

HW OS App App

S

V

TrustVisor

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SLIDE 13

User-Verifiable Trusted Environment Setup

HW OS App App

S

Untrusted Trusted Verified Legend:

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SLIDE 14

Trusted Channels btw Protected Partitions

HW OS App App

S TrustVisor

HW OS App App

S TrustVisor

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SLIDE 15

Strong Isolation for Data Secrecy/Integrity

HW OS App App

S TrustVisor

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Summary

  • Secure HW enables powerful properties in the cloud
  • Verification of hardware platform
  • Attestation of software executing in cloud
  • Isolation of secure execution environment
  • Protection against malicious administrator
  • Protection against malicious peripherals, OS, VMM
  • Low performance overhead
  • Readily applicable to current applications, minor

modifications required

  • Flicker and TrustVisor are free and open-source

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