BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Daniele Antonioli (EPFL), Nils - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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bias bluetooth impersonation attacks

BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Daniele Antonioli (EPFL), Nils - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Feb 18, 2024 561 likes •926 views

IEEE S&P 2020 BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Daniele Antonioli (EPFL), Nils Tippenhauer (CISPA), Kasper Rasmussen (Oxford Univ.) Daniele Antonioli ( @francozappa ) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS 1 Bluetooth standard

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IEEE S&P 2020

BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS

Daniele Antonioli (EPFL), Nils Tippenhauer (CISPA), Kasper Rasmussen (Oxford Univ.)

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS 1

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Bluetooth standard

Bluetooth standard

◮ Specifies Bluetooth Classic (BT) and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) ◮ 1 vulnerability in the standard = billions of exploitable devices Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Cover 2

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Contribution: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)

Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)

◮ Exploiting standard-compliant vulnerabilities in Bluetooth authentication ◮ To impersonate any Bluetooth device without having to authenticate Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Cover 3

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Contribution: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)

Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)

◮ Exploiting standard-compliant vulnerabilities in Bluetooth authentication ◮ To impersonate any Bluetooth device without having to authenticate Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Cover 3

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Bluetooth Threat Model

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS 4

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Bluetooth Threat Model

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Bluetooth Threat Model

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Bluetooth Threat Model

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Bluetooth Threat Model

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Bluetooth Threat Model

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Bluetooth Threat Model

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Bluetooth Threat Model

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BIAS Attacks on Bluetooth Session Establishment

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BIAS Attacks on Bluetooth Session Establishment

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BIAS Attacks on Bluetooth Session Establishment

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Legacy Secure Connection (LSC) Authentication

Alice (slave) A Bob (master) B B, LSC A, LSC CB RA = H(CB, A, KL) RA check

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on LSC 6

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Standard-Compliant Vulnerabilities in LSC Authentication

1 LSC authentication is not used mutually for session establishment 2 A device can switch authentication role

Alice (slave) A Bob (master) B B, LSC A, LSC CB RA = H(CB, A, KL) RA check

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on LSC 7

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BIAS Attack on LSC: Master Impersonation

Alice (slave) A Charlie as Bob (master) C B, LSC A, LSC CC RA = H(CC, A, KL) Skip RA check

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on LSC 8

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BIAS Attack on LSC: Slave Impersonation

Charlie as Alice (slave) C Bob (master) B B, LSC A, Role Switch, LSC Accept Role Switch Charlie is the master (verifier) CC RB = H(CC, B, KL) Skip RB check

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on LSC 9

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Secure Connections (SC) Authentication

Alice (slave) A Bob (master) B B, SC A, SC CB CA RB, RA = H(CB, CA, B, A, KL) RB, RA = H(CB, CA, B, A, KL) RA RB RB check RA check

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on SC 10

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Standard-Compliant Issues with SC Authentication

1 SC negotiation is not integrity-protected 2 SC support is not enforced for pairing and session establishment

Alice (slave) A Bob (master) B B, SC A, SC CB CA RB, RA = H(CB, CA, B, A, KL) RB, RA = H(CB, CA, B, A, KL) RA RB RB check RA check

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on SC 11

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BIAS Attack on SC: Master Impersonation

Alice (slave) A Charlie as Bob (master) C B, LSC A, SC SC downgraded to LSC BIAS master impersonation on LSC

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on SC 12

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BIAS Attack on SC: Slave Impersonation

Charlie as Alice (slave) C Bob (master) B B, SC A, LSC SC downgraded to LSC BIAS slave impersonation on LSC

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on SC 13

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Very Secure Connections (VSC) ?!

Let’s define Very Secure Connections (fictional security mode)

◮ Use SC authentication (mutual) ◮ Not vulnerable to SC downgrade

Are we safe against impersonation attacks on VSC?

◮ No, VSC is vulnerable to master and slave reflection attacks ◮ See the paper for the details Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS on VSC 14

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Implementation of the BIAS Attacks

https://github.com/francozappa/bias

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Implementation 15

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Evaluation: BIAS Attacks on 31 Devices (28 BT Chips)

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Evaluation 16

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Evaluation: BIAS Attacks on 31 Devices (28 BT Chips)

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BIAS + KNOB: Break Bluetooth Session Establishment

Alice (master) A Bob (slave) B Phase 1: pairing key authentication Phase 2: session key negotation Phase 3: secure session

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS + KNOB 17

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BIAS + KNOB: Break Bluetooth Session Establishment

Alice (master) A Charlie as Bob (slave) B Phase 1: pairing key authentication (BIAS attack) Phase 2: session key negotation Phase 3: secure session

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS + KNOB 17

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BIAS + KNOB: Break Bluetooth Session Establishment

Alice (master) A Charlie as Bob (slave) B Phase 1: pairing key authentication (BIAS attack) Phase 2: session key negotation (KNOB attack [SEC19]) Phase 3: secure session

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS + KNOB 17

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BIAS + KNOB: Break Bluetooth Session Establishment

Alice (master) A Charlie as Bob (slave) B Phase 1: pairing key authentication (BIAS attack) Phase 2: session key negotation (KNOB attack [SEC19]) Phase 3: secure session (Charlie is Bob)

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS + KNOB 17

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BIAS + KNOB: Break Bluetooth Session Establishment

Charlie as Alice (master) A Bob (slave) B Phase 1: pairing key authentication (BIAS attack) Phase 2: session key negotation (KNOB attack [SEC19]) Phase 3: secure session (Charlie is Alice)

Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS BIAS + KNOB 17

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BIAS Attacks Countermeasures and Disclosure

We propose a set of countermeasures

◮ Use LSC authentication mutually during session establishment ◮ Integrity-protect session establishment with the pairing key ◮ Enforce SC support across pairing and session establishment

We disclosed the BIAS attacks, and the Bluetooth standard has been updated

◮ However, most of the devices are still vulnerable ◮ E.g., no user or device updates, no device recalls Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Conclusion 18

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Conclusion: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)

Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS)

◮ Exploiting standard-compliant vulnerabilities in Bluetooth authentication ◮ To impersonate any Bluetooth device without having to authenticate ◮ Website: https://francozappa.github.io/about-bias/ ◮ Code: https://github.com/francozappa/bias Daniele Antonioli (@francozappa) BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS Conclusion 19