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Automatic Inference of High-Level Network Intents by Mining Forwarding Patterns Ali Kheradmand University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1 SOSR, March 2020 Typical network configuration procedure Mostly manual in todays networks


  1. Automatic Inference of High-Level Network Intents by Mining Forwarding Patterns Ali Kheradmand University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1 SOSR, March 2020

  2. Typical network configuration procedure • Mostly manual in today’s networks • Alas, the semantic gap! ??? Operator Network High-level Intents Configurations (informal) 2

  3. 3

  4. How to bridge the gap? Operator Network High-level Intents Configurations (informal) 4

  5. Current approaches Model of Configured network Verification system S Verifier Does S satisfy Ψ? High-level intents Property Ψ Formal specification Synthesis/Compilation High-level intents Compiler Configurations Network Formal specification 5

  6. Reality • Formal specifications not existing / maybe not even known • Operator is given an informal description of networking objectives • Intents are implicit • Operators inherit legacy networks • Asked to maintain it • 82% concerned that changes would cause problems with existing functionality [Kim et al, NSDI’15] 6

  7. A new approach • Idea: automatically infer high-level intents by looking at the low-level network forwarding behavior How about going this way? High-level Intents Operator Network Configurations 7

  8. Automatic Network Intent Miner (Anime) Inferred intents Observed behavior Anime (high-level) (low-level) Data plane/control plane/configuration analysis Live traffic monitoring … Inferred Possible Observed 8

  9. Applications • Streamline “Intent Based Networking” • Verification/Synthesis • Automatic migration from legacy networks to cloud, SDN, … • Transparent optimizations, automatic repair, etc. • Network behavior summarization • Debugging and management • Anomaly analysis • Misconfiguration detection 9

  10. Example Observed low-level behavior Inferred high-level intent dstIP: 10.0.1.2, start: U1, waypoint: F1, end: S1 User U 1 U 2 U 3 dstIP: 10.0.1.2, start: U2, waypoint: F1, end: S1 dstIP: 10.0.1.2, start: User, waypoint: Firewall, end: S1 dstIP: 10.0.1.2, start: U3, waypoint: F2, end: S1 Firewall FW 1 FW 2 dstIP: 10.0.1.3, start: U1, waypoint: F1, end: S2 Server S 1 S 2 dstIP: 10.0.1.3, start: U2, waypoint: F2, end: S2 dstIP: 10.0.1.3, start: User, waypoint: Firewall, end: S2 10.0.1.2 10.0.1.3 dstIP: 10.0.1.3, start: U3, waypoint: F2, end: S2 dstIP: 10.0.1.2/31, start: User, waypoint: Firewall, end: Server Inferred higher-level intent 10

  11. Expressing behavior and intents • Using features • Each corresponding to one aspect of an observed behavior • Devices: e.g. start, waypoint, end, entire forwarding path • Header information: e.g. source/destination address or port • Conditions/state, e.g. temporal (snapshot timestamp), topological (link failures). device (connection state) • Each has a set of labels associated with it: • Device: U1, U2, U3, S1, S2, FW1, FW2, User, Firewall, Server, Any • IP: 10.0.1.2, 10.0.1.2/31, 10.0.0.0/8, ... dstIP : 10.0.1.2, start : U1, waypoint : F1, end : S1 11

  12. Insight • Networks are hierarchical • E.g. IP hierarchy (CIDR), device role hierarchy • Idea: use hierarchical labels IP Device coverage 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 / 0 : 2 32 Any:7 ... User:3 Firewall:2 Server:2 10 . 0 . 1 . 2 / 31 : 2 U 1 :1 U 2 :1 U 3 :1 F 1 :1 F 2 :1 S 1 :1 S 2 :1 10 . 0 . 1 . 2 / 32 : 1 10 . 0 . 1 . 3 / 32 : 1 specifity 12

  13. Library of feature templates 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 / 0 : 2 32 Any:7 [0 , 255] : 256 Any:n ... User:3 Firewall:2 Server:2 [0 , 1] : 2 [100 , 255] : 156 ... L 1 :1 L 2 :1 ... L n :1 10 . 0 . 1 . 2 / 31 : 2 U 1 :1 U 2 :1 U 3 :1 F 1 :1 F 2 :1 S 1 :1 S 2 :1 0 : 1 1 : 1 100 : 1 255 : 1 ... 10 . 0 . 1 . 2 / 32 : 1 10 . 0 . 1 . 3 / 32 : 1 DAG <V,E> Flat<{L 1 ,L 2 ,…,L n }> Range IP Prefix Any:n AS1.R1.Internal+.R5.AS2 xx : 4 { L 1 , ..., L b } : b { L n − b +1 , ..., L n } : b ... … AS1.R1.Internal.R5.AS2 AS1.R1.Internal.Internal.R5.AS2 ... ... 0 x : 2 1 x : 2 ... { L 1 , L 2 } : 2 { L n − 1 , L n } : 2 AS1.R1.R2.R5.AS2 AS1.R1.R3.R4.R5.AS2 00 : 1 01 : 1 10 : 1 11 : 1 L 1 :1 L 2 :1 L n − 1 :1 L n :1 Set<{L 1 ,L 2 ,…,L n }, b> TBV<n> Hierarchical Reduced Regex (HRE) 13

  14. Expressing behavior and intents • Combine multiple features (Tuple<F 1 ,...,F n >) to express behavior and intents • E.g. Tuple<dstIP, start, waypoint, end> 0.0.0.0/0,Any,Any,Any … Potential high-level intents 10.0.1.2/31,User,Firewall,Server cost 10.0.1.3,User,Firewall,S2 10.0.1.2,User,Firewall,S1 … 10.0.1.3,User,F2,S2 10.0.1.2,User,F1,S1 … … … … … … … … … 10.0.1.2,U1,F1,S1 10.0.1.2,U2,F1,S1 10.0.1.2, U3,F2,S1 10.0.1.3,U1,F1,S2 10.0.1.2,U2,F2,S2 10.0.1.3,U3,F2,S2 … Expressible low-level behavior 14

  15. Problem definition • Given • A set of observed behavior ! = {$ % , … , $ ( } • Limit * on the number of inferred intents cost • Find , < • Intents + = , % , … , , - . (* 0 ≤ *) , -0 • Such that , % • Each behavior in ! is represented by at least one intent from + $ % $ ( $ ; • Minimizes ∑ 4567(,) 8∈: NP-Hard 15

  16. Heuristic solution Least cost common ancestor =5,> ? : Single best intent representing all behavior in g Efficient ? 1 ? 3 =5,> ? 1 {$ % ,…,$ ( } =5,> ? 2 $ 8 =5,> ? 3 … Clustering methods $ ; ? 2 cost(=5,>(p 1 ,p 2 ) ) Insight: cost of =5,> ? inversely related to similarity of behavior in ? Any:7 =5,> I1, I2 = I6KL (cost: 3) User:3 Firewall:2 Server:2 =5,> I1, MN1 = O>P (cost: 7) U 1 :1 U 2 :1 U 3 :1 F 1 :1 F 2 :1 S 1 :1 S 2 :1

  17. Evaluation Quality of inferred intents Performance Refer to the paper 17

  18. Evaluation (objective quality metrics) Inferred Possible Predicted N P [\ Precision: � Specificity TP FN [\]^\ P (exclusion of impossible behavior) Actual [\ Recall: � Coverage N FP TN [\]^_ (inclusion of possible behavior) 18 Whitelist assumption: any behavior not explicitly allowed by any intent in a set of intents is disallowed by that set

  19. Evaluation (comparison with Net2Text) • Re-implemented Compass algorithm from Net2Text [Birkner et al, NSDI18] 1 . 0 • Summarize forwarding traffic Net2Text, Recall: 0.26 Anime, Recall: 1 • “as much as possible” 0 . 8 • No use of hierarchy • Net2Text dataset Precision 0 . 6 • Simplified ISP , Real-world topologies, IPv4 RIB, and AS-to-organization information 0 . 4 • No hierarchy (to be fair) • AT&T topology, 25 nodes, 5 egresses, 100 0 . 2 prefixes, 2500 paths • Perfect observation (possible = observed) 0 . 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 • Goal: summarization Limit on length of description (k) 19

  20. Evaluation (effect of hierarchical values) • Multiple groups of servers • Synthetic access control policies • “group/server A can communicate 1 . 0 with group/server B” • 100 nodes, 5 groups of size bw 5- 0 . 8 30, 10 intents, 435 paths Precision 0 . 6 Anime w/o hierarchy, Recall: 1 • Perfect observation (possible = observed) Anime with hierarchy, Recall: 1 0 . 4 • Goal: summarization 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 100 200 300 400 Limit on length of description (k) 20

  21. Evaluation (partial observation) “train” on observed (60% of possible), evaluate on possible Near perfect F-score (1 FN, 0 FP) 9/10 actual intents correctly inferred 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 <\`abac8d(×fabghh \`abac8d(]fabghh 0 . 8 0 . 8 0 . 8 Recall 0 . 6 F-score 0 . 6 Recall 0 . 6 0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 F-score = 0 . 2 Compass 0 . 2 Net2Text Anime w/o hierarchy 0 . 2 Anime Anime Anime with hierarchy 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 0 100 200 300 400 Precision Precision Limit on length of description (k) Net2Text dataset Access control dataset 21

  22. Concluding remarks • A new approach towards bridging the semantic gap • Anime, a framework to express network behavior and infer intents • Fits the hierarchical nature of networks • Enables application of ML-toolbox to network intent inference • Prototype produces (objectively) high-quality results • Acceptable performance • Future • Incorporating user feedback • Automatic anomaly detection • User study with real-world network operators • Interested? • Let’s get in touch kheradm2@illinois.edu 22

  23. Backup slides 23

  24. Related work • Network behavior summarization Anime: • Net2Text [Birkner et al, NSDI18] snapshot: 1, path: X.A.Y • Network invariant inference snapshot: Any, path: X.{A,B}.Y snapshot: 2, path: X.B.Y • Network analysis [US patent 15/860,558] • Config2Spec [Birkner et al, NSDI20] A A A X Y X Y X Y ∩ = B B B 24

  25. Example 2 AS 1 AS 2 time: morning, failed links: 0, dstIP: 128.174.0.0/16, path: AS1.R1.R2.R5.AS2 time: evening, failed links 1, dstIP: 128.174.0.0/16, path: AS1.R1.R3.R4.R5.AS2 R 2 R 1 R 5 time: Any , failed links: [0-1] , dstIP: 128.174.0.0/16, path: AS1.R1. Internal+ .R5.AS2 R 3 R 4 25

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