Attack Trees, Security modelling for Agile Teams Michael - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Attack Trees, Security modelling for Agile Teams Michael - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Attack Trees, Security modelling for Agile Teams Michael Brunton-Spall @bruntonspall Michael Brunton-Spall He/His/Him Independent Cybersecurity Consultant Michael Brunton-Spall @bruntonspall Why Security Matters Michael Brunton-Spall


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Michael Brunton-Spall @bruntonspall

Attack Trees, Security modelling for Agile Teams

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Michael Brunton-Spall @bruntonspall

Michael Brunton-Spall He/His/Him Independent Cybersecurity Consultant

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Why Security Matters

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Criminal users on the internet

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Advanced Persistent Threats

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Security is not compliance

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Certification Accreditation PCI ISO27001

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Agile principles

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In Individuals and in interactions over processes and tools Work rking soft ftware over comprehensive documentation Customers collaboration over contract negotiation Responding to change over following a plan

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Risk methodologies

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Component based

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IS1, ISO27005, NIST SP-800-30

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System based

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TOGAF, SABSA, Attack Trees

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Component Pro’s Thorough, Exhaustive, Objective

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Systemic – Pro’s Subjective, Holistic, Interaction focused

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Simple Systems – A bike

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Complicated systems – A car

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Complex Systems - Traffic

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We don’t solve motorway congestion by assuring tires

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Attack trees

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Attack Tree Workshop System Scope Business needs Threats

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Understand the business

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Work out what’s in scope

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Understand the threats

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The Workshop

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Who are the attackers?

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What do they want?

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How will they get it?

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Workshop the attacks

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Build trees

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Breadth first

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Understand impact of attacks

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Ranking 1-6, often order of magnitude increase

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Cost to the attacker

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Complexity of the attack

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Consequences on the attacker

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Reward to the attacker

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Damage to the organisation

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How often can it be repeated

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Post workshop

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Determine countermeasures

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In place and planned

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Planned countermeasures go

  • n the backlog
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Repeat as needed

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Fitting into the agile cycle

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Workshop with whole team*

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Visible outputs for walls

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Threat Actor Personas

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Misuse cases

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Record decisions against stories

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Record deferred security debt

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Product Owner is in control

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Attack Trees: System based risk methodology, for the whole team, iteratively updated

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Any questions? @bruntonspall michael@brunton-spall.co.uk