Application-Integrated Data Collection for Security Monitoring - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Application-Integrated Data Collection for Security Monitoring - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Application-Integrated Data Collection for Security Monitoring Magnus Almgren and Ulf Lindqvist System Design Lab, SRI International The work described here was funded by DARPA under contract number F30602-99-C-0149 and F30602-98-C-0059. The


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Application-Integrated Data Collection for Security Monitoring

Magnus Almgren and Ulf Lindqvist System Design Lab, SRI International

The work described here was funded by DARPA under contract number F30602-99-C-0149 and F30602-98-C-0059. The views herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the supporting agency.

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Introduction

How many network IDSs can detect this? How many network IDSs can detect this?

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Outline Part One

Traditional NIDS and HIDS Host-located data collection Application-integrated module Proof-of-concept implementation Implementation architecture and data flow Part Two

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Traditional Network IDS

Problem areas:

Encrypted traffic Evasion tricks Network speed Session/transaction reconstruction and statefulness Timely preemption difficult

Advantages:

Passive, non-invasive Hidden Can monitor multiple hosts from one location

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Traditional Host IDS

Data sources

Audit data – useful, but limited insight into application data Application/system log files – limited content, disk space management

Usually, data produced after the fact Blind to most network-level attacks

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Host-located Real-time Event Data Collection on Multiple Levels

Application-integrated IDS Application OS IDS analyzing audit trail (system calls) Network Network IDS (located on network or host) Security violations manifest themselves differently

  • n different levels

The data sources are complementary

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Application-integrated Module

Advantages

Unencrypted information Independent of network speed Detailed information available True session and transaction decoding and reconstruction Opportunity for preemptive capability

Disadvantages

Tailored for a specific application Invasive: Could impact application performance and stability

Complements data

collection on other levels

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Proof-of-concept: One type of application

Web server

Web is a popular, ubiquitous service Allowed through most firewalls Existing EMERALD analysis engine for HTTP Many Web servers allow custom extensions

Apache Web server

Apache ~60% of market according to Netcraft Open-source, well-documented module interface

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Host Web server

Implementation Architecture and Data Flow

  • 1. The Web server

receives a request

  • 2. Module produces

transaction data

  • 3. Message is sent to

eXpert-HTTP

  • 4. eXpert-HTTP

performs analysis

eXpert-HTTP Data collection module EMERALD libraries Transaction records as EMERALD messages Alerts

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Outline Part Two

Inside the Apache Server Performance evaluation Evasion techniques Problems with this approach Future work Related approaches Conclusions

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Inside the Apache Server

Apache uses a request loop Hooks are available in all phases of the loop Our module is hooked to the logging phase

Currently no feedback from analysis unit

Passive data collection

[Stein 1999]

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Performance Experiment Setup

Goal: Measure impact on user experience Used WebLoad from RadView Software

Set up to request a single URL repeatedly Measured transaction round-trip time Each run was 60 minutes with 10 virtual clients on a single physical host

Static page: text and one image Dynamic page: CGI program

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Performance Results: Static Page

50 KB text + 12 KB JPEG

0.059 0.057 std dev 1.5% 1.521 1.499 average 2.1% 1.517 1.486 median Impact W/ IDS No IDS

Round-trip (s)

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Performance Results: Dynamic Page

Execution of a CGI program

0.048 0.034 std dev 3.6% 1.238 1.195 average 3.1% 1.229 1.192 median Impact W/ IDS No IDS

Round-trip (s)

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Evasion Techniques

Using lower protocol levels [Ptacek and Newsham] Crafting ambiguous HTTP request

1.

GET /cgi-bin/phf

2.

GET /%00cgi-bin/phf

3.

GET / HTTP 1.1 Host: victim Content-Length: 3 123GET /cgi-bin/phf

The evasion techniques work because Web servers and NIDS decode them differently

Tab

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Problems

1) Invasive Because the module must run within the server application, it could impact stability Testing is difficult

Server applications typically do not run from batch input Forced to use scripts rather than data files

2) Application-specific A module must be written specifically for every application you want to monitor Every application has its

  • wn interface (or none)

for customized module But: For many services,

  • nly a few major brands
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Future Work

Other Web server brands

iPlanet – prototype ready

Other services

FTP SMTP (sendmail) Remote access (telnet, rlogin) Databases

Great potential for improved analysis

In many cases, knows how the request was serviced (e g document or CGI program) Could detect evasion attempts Knows the exact local filename request refers to Check expected control flow of program

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Preemption: Two-tiered approach

Problem:

Complete analysis in module ⇒ performance hit Analysis on separate host ⇒ excludes preemption

Solution: Two-tier analysis

Module contains simple (fast) analysis engine: hash of suspicious source/CGI program eXpert-HTTP performs complete (slower) analysis and keeps a global state eXpert updates the module’s (simple) knowledge Three options for server module: serve request, deny request, or wait for further analysis

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Per-request Granularity

Single requests can be stopped or delayed (awaiting analysis) Select requests for analysis depending

  • n the type (static, dynamic, directory)

Compare with a packet-filtering firewall

IP address/port granularity Can only block, not delay

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Related Approaches

mod_id by Burak Dayioglu (www.dayioglu.net)

Performs simple CGI name matching inside module (development discontinued)

TripWire for Web pages

Limited to stopping altered content from being served (MD5 checksums)

Interfacing Trusted Applications with Intrusion Detection Systems Marc Welz and Andrew Hutchison, RAID 2001

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Conclusions

Application-integrated data collection for IDS complements data from other levels and locations Addresses the three most severe problems NIDS are currently facing:

Encryption Evasion Network speed

Prototype integrated with Apache and with EMERALD infrastructure and analysis engine